




SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY



BY
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QUEENS COLLEGE



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PREFACE

THE FIELD OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY has expanded considerably in the fifteen years since the first edition of this book was completed. Among the many advances there are four which seem to me most important. First, motivation is far better understood today than it was in the 1920's. After a period of overstressing environment and learning in the determination of human motives—itself a counteraction against the stress placed on original instincts by MacDougall and Freud—we now realize that, though social-cultural training greatly modifies original nature and gives it a certain pitch and direction, we cannot escape the fact that there are universal and basic drives which provide the foundation for our adult motives, be they security, mastery, power, love, sociability, or others. Second, it has become increasingly clear that social interaction is absolutely essential to the development of personality. We are not at the outset isolated individuals with drives, habits, attitudes, and ideas, who are later socialized. Rather, from birth on, the individual operates within a social matrix. With regard to this fact, the work of George Herbert Mead has at last become fully recognized. Third, the measurement of traits, opinions, and attitudes has been tremendously extended and improved in objectivity. Personality testing and polling of individuals for opinions have become widely accepted and the results of many investigations are being used for purposes of prediction and control. In this respect, social psychology is gradually taking on the stature of a science. Finally, the linkage of social psychology and the other social sciences, especially cultural anthropology, has become more certain and fruitful. Under the broad rubric of culture and personality, a number of important contributions have been made. The attempt to trace in detail the emergence of personality with reference to constitutional make-up operating in a social and cultural milieu is being rapidly extended to the profit of social psychology and the social sciences. Especially important are the writings of Edward Sapir, Ralph Linton, Ruth Benedict, Margaret Mead, A. I. Hallowell, Gregory Bateson, H. D. Lasswell, John Dollard, Abram Kardiner, Harry Stack Sullivan, Franz Alexander, Karen Horney, A. H. Maslow, E. H. Erikson, and Eric Fromm. In the present book, which is a complete revision of the 1930 edition, an attempt is made to take into account these recent developments. Those phases of social psychology which deal more strictly with the genesis and growth of personality I have described and interpreted in my *Personality and*

Problems of Adjustment, (1940). After the chapters needed for a discussion of the roots of interaction and the growth of personality, the present volume deals more especially with the role and status of the individual in relation to his group-oriented life.

For those familiar with the first edition, note should be made of the following topics now either presented for the first time or offered in much expanded and more complete form: (1) In order to show the prehuman sources of social interaction there is a full chapter on the social life of lower animals, especially of monkeys and apes. As indicated in the text, interaction is phylogenetically and individually antecedent to culture and this fact needs to be stressed. (2) Two chapters are devoted to describing the elements and mechanisms which enter into the rise of the social self. (3) The treatment of the nature and function of what I call social-cultural reality has been extended and, I trust, improved. The close connection between the form and content of thought, emotion, and action and the social-cultural environment of the individual is rather fully explored. (4) With regard to the omnipresent fact of human conflict, there are added a chapter on the psychology of revolution and two chapters on the psychology of war and wartime morale. (5) The rapid extension and growing importance of such new forms of mass communication as the motion picture and the radio have made it necessary to give added attention to these new media in the formation of public opinion. (6) So, too, the topic of propaganda has become increasingly central to social control, and two chapters are now devoted to this subject, one of them with particular reference to World Wars I and II. Finally, the revolutionary threat to democratic culture and the appearance of total war in our time raise pertinent questions regarding the nature and use of power. If our liberal, industrialized world is not to disappear, serious consideration must be given to the problems of power: its function in mass society; its various forms; the matter of who shall exercise it; and the central problem of all—the moral responsibility for its use. I have attempted a sketch of this topic in the closing chapter, and particular features of the use of power are discussed at many points throughout. In addition to the many sources properly referred to in the text, I wish to thank Mrs. Elaine Zipes Rothenberg for helping to collect materials for certain chapters, and I am especially indebted to Mrs. Ruth Hill Useem for undertaking to see the book through the press.

KIMBALL YOUNG

New York

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
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SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY



Chapter I

PERSONALITY, SOCIETY, AND CULTURE

SOCIAL psychology is the study of persons in their interactions with one another and with reference to the effects of this interplay upon the individual's thoughts, feelings, emotions, and habits. As a field of investigation social psychology has its roots in sociology and psychology, but history, political science, economics, and philosophy have contributed much to the study of man in interaction.

Social psychology is a newcomer in the field of science. It has grown up in various academic and nonacademic sectors, and it is not yet mature enough for a well-rounded theory or method. There is missing a substantial body of carefully tested data on which to construct basic principles and laws of social psychology. Yet this is no reason for dismissing it as an infertile area of study. We do have a vast accumulation of observations of social conduct, and by drawing on a variety of sources we are able to expose a great many important facts and to offer interpretations which aid us in understanding and predicting human thought and action. For the present, however, we shall take an eclectic approach and shall draw upon history, political science, economics, philosophy, and sociology, as well as upon experimental and statistical studies from psychology, for data and concepts with which to comprehend the thinking, feeling, and acting of the individual in society.

In order to orient ourselves in the field before us, let us note some of the important features which will require our attention. One of these has to do with the structure and function of the individual as a reacting organism in a given social-cultural environment. Here the student of social conduct must draw upon the findings of physiology, neurology, and psychology as these concern the mechanics of stimulus and response. This material is important in indicating how man learns or becomes socialized. Secondly, there is the larger and for us more important problem of the "content," or nature, of thought, emotion, and action. That is to say, what are the "pictures" which a given individual has in his head regarding his role as a member of society? More specifically, what images has he of his mother, of his father, or of members of another and competing racial group? How does he conceive of his place as a citizen, workingman, or businessman? What are his concepts of right, justice, liberty, and other values which he

has acquired from his particular class or country? In dealing with such matters we must examine the nature of the person's social and cultural training so as to find out how he derived his particular prejudices, stereotypes, convictions, values, and frames of reference as they affect his conduct.

In terms of data and method, we want to know how to go about examining the mechanisms and content of thought and action. One of the commonest approaches is to study the personality as it develops in society and culture. We draw heavily upon the work of the child psychologists, or genetic psychologists, and upon certain work of the anthropologists. The emergence of the social self can be understood only against the background of the child's contact with parents, siblings, neighbors, schoolmates, teachers, and others. The growth of his language, of his basic attitudes, traits, and habits, has reference to his role and status as a growing member of a wide variety of human associations. This might be called the longitudinal, or genetic, approach.

Or we might undertake to study the traits, attitudes, opinions, and habits of an individual at any given time or place with a view to discovering how these function as phases of his role and status in the group. This approach would neglect the genesis of his roles and status and stress his present activities against the background of his contacts with his fellows. A statistical analysis of a number of students' opinions on certain public questions illustrates this approach. A case study of the occupational behavior of a workman in a given plant, or of a parent-child conflict situation, would be another.

To summarize, we might say that the primary interest of social psychology brings together the particular contribution of psychology as a study of mental and behavior mechanisms and that of sociology or cultural anthropology as a study of the content of thought and action. As we shall see, social psychology has to do not only with the mechanics of individual motivation, learning, and adjustment, nor alone with the mechanics of social interaction, but also with the manner in which the ideas, attitudes, and values of a given group operate within the individual.

Our second large concern really has to do with the manner in which the subject matter of social psychology may be divided for treatment. One fundamental aspect has to do with the emergence of the self or personality out of basic constitutional potentials operating within the social-cultural environment. Then, too, another important body of material relates to prejudice and various forms of conflict in society. Still another has to do with collective or mass behavior. In regard to this last, social psychology is concerned chiefly with the thought and action of individuals in their larger, usually public, relations. Most of the investigations of this area take the functional and cross-sectional approach and are concerned with such mat-

ters as fads and fashions, mob behavior (as in a lynching), speculative booms on the stock market, the formation and function of public opinion, and propaganda. Since the author has dealt rather extensively elsewhere with the development of the personality,¹ the present volume will give major attention to the wider public and mass aspects of behavior.

It is evident from this introductory statement that our discussion must deal with three broad and basic variables: personality, society, and culture. The rest of this chapter will sketch the chief features of each of these. The detailed treatment of them will appear in the appropriate places in subsequent chapters.

THE NATURE OF PERSONALITY

The organic foundations of the personality obviously rest upon the structure and function of the individual as a member of the species *Homo sapiens*. The human being is the product of a long evolutionary history, and that history has produced certain basic and more or less fixed biological characteristics, upon which adaptation to the environment, and hence survival, depend. These characteristics include the fundamental physiological processes: the assimilation of food, the elimination of bodily waste, the respiratory and circulatory functions, the control of temperature and of the internal liquid environment of the body cells, and the neuromuscular functions which co-ordinate these operations into a more or less organic unity.

Related to these physiological processes are certain fundamental drives or impulses which must be satisfied if the individual is to live. Such are hunger, the sexual demand, and the need for bodily protection. These basic wants are related to the rudimentary survival of the individual and the race, and in the course of growing up the individual not only acquires various means of satisfying them but extends tremendously the range and nature of his motives and satisfactions. In view of this fact we are obliged to reckon with another important aspect of the individual, namely, his flexibility—his capacity to modify his actions and to extend the manner in which he secures satisfaction. In other words, we must take into account the individual's learning capacity, his adaptability to new situations and new demands.

On the one hand, then, certain constants in the human organism must operate with a certain effectiveness if the individual is to live at all. On the other hand, a certain flexibility makes possible changes in the adaptive systems. Just as the physiological constants come down to an individual from his family ancestry, so, too, the degree of adaptability or learning ability is, by and large, determined by organic hereditary forces. When the psychologist talks about the inheritance of intelligence or of mental capacities, he is

¹ In his *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940.

thinking largely of the fact that nature has set the upper limit to one's ability to learn—that is, to acquire new motives, new satisfactions, and new adaptive devices.

This fact, in turn, is bound up with another. Some people learn quickly and with ease, some slowly and with difficulty. We say that these variations reflect individual differences. Moreover, variability is to be found not only in learning capacity but in strength of drives and in the nature of satisfactions as well.

Equipped with his organic constitution, the newborn baby comes into the world of his fellows, and from relations with them and with their more or less fixed patterns or culture his personality emerges. As we shall see, the newborn child is completely dependent for his existence upon his contact with his fellows. His survival rests upon the care his mother gives him. From this intimate situation habits of social adaptation begin to be formed. By the second year he begins to acquire language, and he becomes increasingly bound up with his fellows at every point. In time he learns a set of roles or functions in the family, he is accorded a certain position on a prestige scale (status), and around these two—role and status—he develops specific habits, traits of character, attitudes, and values. It is from this configuration of family members and others closely associated with them that the social self emerges. The child is not born human or social. He is at the outset an organism belonging to an animal species. It is only through his interplay with his fellows that he gets his “human nature” and that combination of acts and thoughts which we label the personality. ✓

Though we begin with acts, not thoughts, it is obvious that in the rise of the personality we witness a gradual internalization of our overt actions so that in time we may speak of the subjective or inner life of the individual. This is the realm of thinking, or mental activity. This internal life profoundly influences external activity and is, in fact, an important feature of personality and social interaction. Apparently this internalization accompanies the development of language habits, and, however we may phrase the relation of thought and language, everyone agrees that the two are intimately bound up together. In view of this development of language and thought on the foundations of overt or externalized adjustments, for purposes of description and study we may distinguish three levels of adaptive activity: (1) the overt, which involves the gross bodily muscles and which we speak of usually in terms of habits; (2) the verbal and other communicative activities; and (3) the thought and internal subjective processes—the private world—of the individual which we can only infer or know about from his responses at one of the two other levels. The relations of these three levels to one another and to social adaptation are among the most important problems in social psychology.

SOCIETY

We have just indicated that the individual cannot become a personality without contact with his fellows, and the very concept of society implies interaction of individuals. Society depends essentially upon what George H. Mead called the "social act."² That is, a social configuration is present whenever any given action tendency is modified by, or is not completed without, the intercession of another human being. The mother-child relationship in nursing is the basic social act, and from this develop in time a host of patterns of interaction. We shall review some of these in due course. But for our present purposes we must note certain of the structural features of society.

There are three general types of social interaction: (1) the person-to-person, (2) the person-to-group, and (3) the group-to-group, considering the group either as a collectivity of individuals or as some symbolic representation of such an aggregation.

The sociologist has conveniently classified group life—with respect to its structure and organization—into two large types: primary and secondary. We are familiar with the former in the family, in the play group, in the rural or village neighborhood, and in those small communities which characterize most primitive and rural people everywhere. The primary group is marked by intimate face-to-face contact and by a certain all-or-none inclusion of functions and statuses. Moreover, it is primary in time, for such groups are the matrix from which grows the personality. The effects on the child of the family and other intimate associations are well-known. The secondary group is much more consciously formed; it represents more or less specialized and segmental interests of its members; and it tends to become institutionalized—that is, to take on codes, rituals, and a fixed hierarchy of authority. The trade union, the corporation, the fraternal order, the extended church organization, the political party, and the state itself are examples of secondary associations.

One of the most significant features of the modern world is the domination of secondary groups over the primary. This condition is largely a product of the Industrial Revolution and its ramifications into urbanism, mobility of peoples, and high division of labor. In our complex, industrialized societies this domination has gone so far as to lead some writers to posit a special concept, mass society, to characterize the phenomenon.³ Mass society is characterized by rationality, impersonal relations, extreme specialization of roles, loneliness for the individual in spite of concentration of sheer numbers, and loss of sense of intimacy and security. In such societies

² See G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934.

³ See K. Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, 1940.

suggestion, persuasion, propaganda, demagoguery, and other aspects of crowd behavior are common. The irrational thus comes to stand in sharp contrast to the rationality implied in science, high skill, and deliberative choice. The impress of mass society upon men and their culture constitutes one of our most crucial problems of personality balance, sense of emotional security, and moral use of power. The implications of this new form of social organization will become apparent at many points in our later discussions.

In addition to the classification just noted, there is the familiar dichotomy of the in-group and the out-group. Any primary or secondary group toward which we feel intense loyalty, sense of oneness, and mutual identification of purposes may be designated as an in-group. But these attitudes are significant only when persons forming some other group are considered inimical to the welfare of our own. That is, the out-group is some competing or conflicting body of persons toward whom we feel fear, anger, or dislike, whom we avoid, or whom we oppose with reference to some goal or aim. Not all primary or secondary groups involve out-group relationships, but, once any group comes into opposition with some other group in terms of interests or ends, such patterns of thought and action tend to arise. Obviously, many of these antagonistic reactions are highly culturized and are transmitted from one generation to another. At the primary level we find it in the opposition to, or avoidance of, the "people who live on the wrong side of the tracks." At the secondary and mass-society level we find it exemplified in the struggle between two church bodies or two political parties, between employer organizations and labor unions, and we find it most evident in international conflicts.

As a matter of fact, two basic social and individual interactional processes are revealed in the relations between in-groups and out-groups: opposition and co-operation. Opposition may take the form of either competition or conflict. Competition may be defined as a struggle of persons or groups for some goal or end which is not shared with the opponent person or group. It does not necessarily involve any direct contact with the opponent. The aim is to secure the good or goal, and the particular person or group competing is of secondary importance. In contrast, conflict takes on a much more personal character. In order to obtain the goal, one must damage the opponent directly. Two adolescents fighting over a girl would be a case of conflict, but two students struggling for an academic prize would be an instance of competition. Of course, the line between these two forms of opposition is often not so easy to draw, but the distinction has merit in describing and interpreting certain forms of interaction. Co-operation, in contrast, may be defined as a striving for a goal with the help of another person or group, which goal, if obtained, will be shared by all concerned. Two boys constructing a toy boat, and two religious organiza-

tions combining to effect a moral reform in a community, illustrate co-operation.

There is, however, still another process involved in basic interactions: differentiation. This has to do with the development of the specific functions or roles of an individual as a participant in a group. In the field of economics we use the concept of division of labor, but differentiation of function is evident in all sorts of situations—for example, in the respective roles of the husband and the wife, in the role of the teacher and that of the pupil in the classroom, in the place of the leader as contrasted with that of the follower in a revolutionary movement, and so on. Differentiation of function may be found in connection with either opposition or co-operation. It is of fundamental importance, for it is one of the bases on which occupational, sexual, racial, class, and national lines are drawn.

From these three elemental processes, moreover, many others arise. Stratification, as illustrated in class structure, is a case in point. Accommodative patterns built up out of compromise between conflicting nations would be another. The acculturation or assimilation process studied by sociologists and anthropologists often represents certain combinations of co-operation, competition, and differentiation.⁴ We shall be concerned with these general processes only as they are related to particular analyses of our data.

We cannot introduce the basic aspects of society without pointing out that the roots of interaction lie in our history as a species. Society precedes culture by many millennia. Long before there was any culture, animals lived in close social relations and revealed the processes of conflict and co-operation and even a certain differentiation of function, chiefly in terms of age and sex. This matter is so vital to any understanding of man's social behavior that we shall devote the next chapter to showing in some detail the prehuman foundations of society.

The important matter at this point is a clear understanding that the individual lives within the framework of associations with his fellows and that his personality has no meaning outside this framework. From birth to death his overt acts, his communication, and his inner life will be profoundly affected by the groups in which he operates or toward which he has co-operative or aggressive responses.

CULTURE

The third basic element with which we must deal is culture as this is conceived by the anthropologist. The term refers to the more or less organized and persistent patterns of habits, ideas, attitudes, and values which are passed on to the newborn child from his elders or by others as he grows

⁴ For a discussion of these processes at the sociological level, see R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Society*, 1924; E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 3rd ed., 1938; and K. Young, *Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture*, 1942.

up. It provides a large part of the content of our beliefs and convictions, of our prejudices, of our affections, and of our antagonisms. At a descriptive level culture is sometimes divided into material and nonmaterial features. The former are physical objects, such as houses, vehicles, tools, implements, and machines, and all the material paraphernalia associated with living in society. The latter are thought patterns, attitudes and beliefs, bodies of knowledge, and skills. But this division is not entirely satisfactory, for it implies that physical objects may have meaning and usefulness apart from the thought and action patterns. The essence of culture is, of course, psychological: its persistence and functioning depend on human thought and action and not on the mere existence of a tool, machine, or material gadget.⁵

Culture sets the chief framework within which the individual learns to function with his fellows. In terms of what others demand or accept of us, we may say that some aspects of culture represent complete expectancies, such as are found in the law, the mores, and the necessitous compliance with the operations of physical nature as they become integrated into culture. Other elements fall into a category of permissibilities, in which individuals have considerable freedom of choice as to what and how they perform. Linton's distinction between the universals, the alternatives, and the specialities is helpful here.⁶ By *universals* he means those core features of culture which are generally and widely accepted and even required in a society, such as the codes and practices of the state and of the economic and marital systems. *Alternatives* are activities in which individuals have certain choices or certain permissive rights. For instance, while the universals in our country demand a legalized marriage under stipulations of the law, whether a couple are married by a priest or by a justice of the peace is for their own decision or that of their class or group. The *specialities* are the particular features of some role or occupation. They represent in part the culturization of the very process of differentiation noted above. The physician not only has special knowledge and skills, but has a professional vocabulary and value system that set him apart from the minister, lawyer, and engineer.

But there are other aspects of culture which we must note. Some of our cultural elements are definitely bound up with the fundamental wants of humankind, such as those for food, sexual satisfaction, and protection from disasters physical or human. Bronislaw Malinowski⁷ has termed these the "cultural imperatives." They represent the social-cultural adaptation to what we referred to above as the biological constants, the drives related to survival itself, such as those for food, mates, and protection. In addition to

⁵ The term *civilization* is sometimes used as synonymous with *culture*, but more often *civilization* refers to complex cultures of rather large populations with an extensive economic and industrial system, an organized state, and relatively elaborate institutions of art, religion, and intellectual life.

⁶ In his *The Study of Man*, 1936, chap. 16. ✓

⁷ See B. Malinowski, "Culture," *The Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 4: 621-645, 1933.

these basic cultural elements, which are found in all societies, there are, following Malinowski, secondary or derived patterns which are illustrated by play, artistic interests, and religious experiences. These, too, are found everywhere, but they are relatively supplementary to those which represent the irreducible minima of existence.

From birth on, the individual is under the impress of culture at the hands of his fellows. Just as we may say that the group is antecedent to any given individual, so, too, we may state that there is always a body of culture which gives content and direction to the manner in which an individual will develop as a person. However, though we may describe the general and more or less accepted and expected patterns of culture of any society, an examination of the thoughts and actions of the individuals who make up the society reveals that they seldom conform precisely to this ideal statement of the culture as a whole. The individuals in any society may conform pretty generally to the universals and constants and yet depart rather sharply from many other details of the generalized picture. The individual, as we shall indicate in more detail later, is a unique product of his organic constitution, his learning ability, his variability as to emotions, reactivity, and intelligence, and his own particular organization of socially and culturally determined experience. We must bear this in mind, for it is very easy to overstress the common and general features of social conduct and neglect the unique and autonomous aspects of the individual as an interacting member of a group.

The basis of uniqueness and individual difference rests not only on differences in biological inheritance, in nature and rate of bodily maturation, but on divergences stemming from the impact of society and culture on the individual. As just noted, cultural training itself varies from individual to individual. In addition, the infant, child, and older person are also exposed to training which is not completely predetermined by culture. To take this fact into account the present writer uses the term *personal-social conditioning*. It refers to the fact that a person is influenced by social contacts which are not necessarily defined by culture. The roots lie in the very essential interaction of mother and child in the first months of life and of later primary-group contacts that have not been established in the culture. There are hundreds of contacts of mother and child which emerge from differences in drive and differences in the immediate situation, involving restraint or affection and other basic social-emotional relations. These in time may grow into habits and attitudes, but, unless they become verbalized and transmitted from generation to generation as accepted forms, they can scarcely be called cultural. Some anthropologists and social psychologists, however, consider all social learning to be cultural learning. If this is accepted, we must grant culture to apes, monkeys, birds, and many lower forms. If the *sine qua non* of culture is language and its related higher

thought processes, coupled with certain accepted and expected forms of behavior, then these lower forms do not possess culture. (See Chapter II for further discussion of this.)

To return to personal-social conditioning, it occurs not only in mother-child relations, but in early play contacts among children, in many father-child interactions, and elsewhere. Obviously, such conditioning becomes increasingly overlaid by cultural definition, but the effects of such unstandardized and unexpected training is never lost. Note of these influences on thought and behavior will be made at pertinent points in our discussion.

In conclusion we must repeat that to understand social-psychological analysis we must take into account the interplay of these three variables. Though each may be described from the standpoint of a particular intellectual discipline, for a rounded view of social behavior we must reckon with all three. But our particular purpose is less ambitious than a full picture of social conduct. Rather it is our aim to consider the place of the personality in relation to the social interactions and with respect to its influence on other persons and on the cultural patterning itself. The central figure, then, is the person in interaction, and the social act becomes one of the chief themes of our discussion. We shall draw upon physiology and biopsychology for a brief summary of the organic elements in human behavior, and upon the sociology of process for a background to an understanding of some features of the personality in action. From cultural anthropology we shall select materials which will indicate the framework of thought and action which tends to limit, direct, and stimulate the individual in his contact with his fellows. Our hope is to contribute to the integration of the varied data at hand with a view in the end to stating a tentative theory of social psychology. Such organized knowledge may prove useful for purposes of prediction and control of social, cultural, and individual ongoing.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On the relations of personality and culture, see F. C. Bartlett, *Psychology and Primitive Culture*, 1924; Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 1935; and Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, 1936, chaps. 8, 16, 26, and *The Cultural Background of Personality*, 1945.

On the foundations of social psychology, see C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902; John Dewey, *Human Nature and Conduct*, 1922; George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934; Ellsworth Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature*, 1937; and Fay B. Karpf, *American Social Psychology*, 1928.

Part One

SOME BASIC RELATIONS OF PERSONALITY
TO SOCIETY AND CULTURE

SOCIAL life is by no means a human invention. The foundations of society lie in the prehuman animal species. Especially important for the social psychologist are the findings of research on the social relations among monkeys and apes, since these present a picture of many fundamental forms of social relation: sexual, familial, conflictive, and co-operative. Important phases of prehuman social life are treated in Chapter II. Yet interaction among human beings is far more complex than among the lower animals. Culture, or group-sanctioned habits, attitudes, and ideas, influences our relations with our fellows. A broad over-all description of the effects of variation in culture upon personality is given in Chapter III.

Despite the importance of social and cultural influences on the individual, the human organism is a dynamic, not a passive, element in adaptation. Original drives and emotions provide the basic inception of adjustment to the physical and social-cultural environment. These impulses, however, soon begin to be modified and elaborated by learning. Not only are the initial drives and emotions elaborated, but the adaptive reflexes are overlaid with conditioned responses. Drives and some features of social learning are discussed in Chapters IV and V.

Upon the basis of facts about society, culture, motivations, and learning, two chapters, VI and VII, are given over to tracing the interactional processes involved in the rise of the personality, or social self. But, since what a person thinks, feels, and does is conditioned by culturized ideas, attitudes, and values derived from his particular society, two additional chapters, VIII and IX, show how the content of thought and action—our stereotypes, myths, opinions, and judgments—are largely the product of our culture. Finally, every student of social behavior recognizes the special place which personal dominance has in all societies. The concluding chapter in Part One analyzes in some detail the role of leadership in directing and controlling human adaptation.

Chapter II

ANIMAL PROTOTYPES OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR

THE often quoted dictum of the English historian William Stubbs that "the roots of the present lie deep in the past" is, of course, as true, with reference to biological and social-psychological matters as it is in the field of human institutions. Certainly social life did not begin with man; it was only expanded and greatly enriched by him. In fact, the study of social life among various animal species has importance beyond that of merely furnishing interesting analogies with our own society. If we are to accept the general principle of continuity in species and in behavior, some attention must be given to the inception of those features of adaptation which characterize mankind everywhere.

From an examination of the vast literature of what is sometimes called "animal sociology" a number of basic questions arise: (1) What is the nature of social relations? (2) At what point in the evolutionary history of animal forms did social reactions arise? (3) What relation have these initial forms to the subsequent ones seen in man and his near relatives, the other primate species?

• We have already indicated that society implies interaction, that is, the interplay of two or more members of a species in which the action of one influences or qualifies the action of the other. Yet to uncover the point of origin of social relationships is not so easy as to define the essentials of such contacts once they are observed. But a number of important facts from biological history may be set down to aid us in getting at reasonably adequate answers to the second and third questions noted above, which are our concern at this point.

(1) The biological principle of gradual increase in complexity of structure and function may be accepted, and in this development the effects of many of the prior structures and functions are found to be the bases upon which later elaborations of adaptive capacity are founded. Moreover, changes in the relations between organism and environment are evidently due to a combination of external and internal (intraindividual) forces. The problem of the relative place of mutations and of possible hereditary accumulations arising from gradual adaptive modifications in the individual has not been settled. But no one would gainsay that great changes

in the environment have had a part in giving new pitch and direction to the evolutionary processes. Thus no one doubts that, after the basic vertebrate structure evolved in an aquatic environment, climatic and other external changes—for example, those which altered the ratio of land and water surfaces and perhaps produced certain seasonal variations—had a place in inducing modifications resulting in the appearance of the amphibian forms, which were capable of living either in the water or on the land. The paired fins of the fishes became altered to appendages suitable for land locomotion. In this same period also, and in association with this adaptation to a dual environment, the egg sac of the fishes and the amphibians emerged gradually into the internally contained uterine sac, which gave rise to the true placental-uterine method of reproduction. So, too, at about this same time—estimated to be 150,000,000 years ago—there occurred the differentiation into reptilian and warm-blooded mammalian forms. Other changes, of course, took place, such as the shift in food from insects to vegetation, and later, in some forms, to flesh diets, and finally in the higher forms to omnivorous sources of sustenance. Still later the arboreal life of the early anthropoids, for instance, gave way—for some species—to living on the ground again, and this shift in basic habitat, in turn, induced other important changes, as we shall note.

The point of this brief excursus into evolutionary history is that biologic continuity is a fundamental matter. And it is just as basic when we come to examine some of the factors of reaction that are associated with the organism-environment adjustment. In the efforts to obtain food, mates, and protection the opposition or struggle of individuals and of species is well-known. But so, too, are forms of co-operation to be found in nature. Perhaps Charles Darwin overstressed open conflict for survival; but the work of Peter Kropotkin and a host of students of animal behavior since has shown us that mutual aid also plays a part in the development of both species and individuals.

As to the beginning of social interaction, conceived in the broad sense of oppositional or co-operative interplay, if we take into account what might be termed mass physiology, some forms of interaction are evident in the simplest types of life.¹ There is apparently a fundamental tendency for organisms to respond to one another in some form of co-operation or antagonism, either of which reactions modifies the adaptive picture as a whole. There seems to be a basic organic or protoplasmic foundation for these more or less automatic sociotaxic relationships.

There are, moreover, not only co-operative and oppositional reactions among individuals of the same species, but interdependencies among plants,

¹ See R. E. Buchanan, "Population Behavior of Bacteria," chap. 1 in C. Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935.

among animals, and between plant and animal forms. The whole science of plant and animal ecology gives ample evidence of this.²

Illustrations without end could be provided to show that in nature there are interspecies communal relations without which there would be no survival. It is sufficient for us to repeat that such interdependencies are not just the product of late evolution, but appear to be basic in plant and animal life, and that we may consider such phenomena as much a fundamental phase of nature as interindividual struggle, or as the relation of an individual to an inorganic environment toward which he must adjust himself if he is to survive.

If we may assume, then, that some form of interaction is found at all levels of evolution, we must ask another question: Are we to take it for granted that the rudimentary and early phases of such contact are largely physicochemical and "instinctive" in the sense that the reactions are not learned? And is there a point at which tuition or learning enters into the situation?

With reference to the more rudimentary instances of interaction, it is usually assumed that most of the adjustments are the resultant of more or less automatic physicochemical forces which may broadly be denoted by one of the terms *tropism*, *reflex*, and *instinct*—depending on the relative complexity of the organic structures and functions involved in the adjustment. That is to say, there are certain more or less fixed patterns of adaptation—inflexible both as to situation and as to necessitous organic modifications—implicit in the adaptive process. But, as we examine the whole adaptive patterning along the evolutionary scale, we find more and more evidence both of individual variability in the adaptations and of the effects of learning.³

Viewing the entire range of animal species, we usually assume that the invertebrates represent a line of development in which the relation between organism and environment is rather inflexible, and that, on the other hand, the vertebrates reveal an ever-increasing degree of flexibility, individual variability, and capacity to profit by experience—that is, to learn. There is a large literature on the adaptive processes of the invertebrates, and a good deal of attention has been given to the social forms, especially among the bees, the ants, and the termites. Much more important to us are the data on the evolution of the social patterns in the higher vertebrates, particularly in the primate and other mammalian species. Let us examine some features of this development.

² See among others: F. E. Clements and V. E. Shelford, *Bio-ecology*, 1936; and W. C. Allee, *Animal Aggregations: A Study in General Sociology*, 1931.

³ See J. H. Woodger, *Biological Principles: A Critical Study*, 1929.

SOCIAL LIFE AMONG THE LOWER VERTEBRATES

When we examine the development of the vertebrate species, the place of social stimulation is evident all along the line. Of course, this is more apparent in some species than in others and particularly in the higher forms. There are some species in which the solitary "lone wolf" pattern is more clear than the communal. Broadly considered, one of the most important divisions of structure and function that make for interaction is sexual differentiation itself. And, when sex difference gets linked to intra-uterine growth, it becomes even more significant. As we come to the warm-blooded forms, especially the birds and the mammals, we find increasing care of the offspring by the parents. In fact, the rudiments of more permanent association arise from (1) sexual reproduction, (2) dependency of the young on the mother for survival, involving feeding and protection, and (3) aggregative or communal living with a view to feeding, protection, and play. The social group itself becomes a factor in the evolution of the species, and there arises a new threshold for social stimulation and response. This development, moreover, is marked by a gradual decrease in the importance of instinct—that is, of more or less fixed or predetermined patterns of stimulus and response—and by an increase in the importance of maturation and of learning—especially learning from other members of one's species. These modifications, of course, are linked to the growing domination of the higher brain centers, which provide a means of altering the adaptive processes.⁴ In other words, flexibility and learning come gradually to replace the fixity of reflexive behavior.

Social Factors in Lower Vertebrate Species. The extent of social stimulation and response among the lower vertebrates is not well known. There seems to be a seasonal or periodic aggregating of certain fishes, related no doubt to feeding and reproduction. The phrase "schools of fish" no doubt reflects the fact that certain species move in groups, and no doubt such massing influences the adaptive reactions. Whether there is any domination or subordination among these species is not fully known. Among the amphibians also there may be some interplay due to contact, including some ascendancy, and doubtless there is some vocal interstimulation in such species as the frogs, witnessed in the well-known comments about their so-called choral enterprises. But co-operation in feeding and maternal care are not apparent in either the fishes or the amphibians.

Among the reptilian species, however, we find nesting, some care and defense of the young, and attempts to control certain areas of movement.

⁴ The problem to what degree practice or individual adaptation modified brain structure and function in such a way as to influence the hereditary foundations for future generations, and to what degree the whole adaptive expansion came as a result of "successful" mutations, is still unknown.

L. T. Evans' study of what he terms the "social hierarchy" in certain lizards, *Anolis carolinensis*, shows that patterns of domination and subordination appear at this point in the animal scale. He writes:

"The urge to acquire and to hold a certain restricted territory is very marked. The resident male (that has been in a particular cage for 24 hours or more) wins in 91 per cent of the combats not only because he is heavier than the non-resident (42 per cent of such combats being won by the lighter males) but also because he fights harder to defend territory than the non-resident does to acquire it."⁵

On the whole, the dominance is highly correlated with weight: the heaviest males are to be found at the top of the hierarchy of power, the lightest at the bottom.

These lower vertebrate species reveal some of the rudimentary forms of social relationship; more important and extensive evidence of such contacts is found among the birds and the mammals.

The Social Life of Birds. Though avian development from the reptilelike ancestry represents a distinct branching off from the evolutionary line which led to the mammals, the birds show some interesting social features. Even with sharp differences among the species, we do find evidence for some of the following generalizations. (1) There is flocking or aggregating for purposes of feeding, seasonal migration, and nesting and rearing of young. (2) Much of the mating is monogamous, though temporary, and in some species pairing may persist through the period of nest-building, hatching, and caring for the young. (3) In many species, also, some form of dominance and subordination develops. At times this becomes an elaborate social pattern.

Thorlief Schjelderup-Ebbe has described the various orders of preference and domination among the birds.⁶ He relates many instances of what he terms "despotism" of one bird over another. A bird will show his ascendancy by pecking another, by changes in feathers, in emotional reaction, in "facial" appearance, and otherwise. The subordinate bird, in turn, demonstrates fear, submissiveness, avoidance, flight, and a variety of "expressive" reactions of the feathers, "face," and posture. In some cases we find a gradation of control in which bird A dominates bird B, and the latter dominates bird C, which may in its turn actually dominate bird A. Schjelderup-Ebbe's explanation of this triangular pattern is rather involved, but it is clear that a group of birds frequently reveals interactional patterns affecting feeding, mating, and other activities. In these relations, moreover, age, strength, and sex differences may play a part. In one species of sparrow the females take the dominant part. In some species there are even seasonal variations; among the Swedish mallards the male maintains ascendancy during the mating period and the female after the pairing season is over and the molting begins.

⁵ L. T. Evans, "A Study of Social Hierarchy in the Lizard *Anolis carolinensis*," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1936, 48: 88-111; quotation from p. 108. By permission of The Journal Press.

⁶ See T. Schjelderup-Ebbe, "Social Behavior of Birds," chap. 20 in C. Murchison, editor, *op. cit.*

This hierarchy of power has also been investigated by Carl Murchison, who experimented on the domestic fowl.⁷ He found a definite hierarchy of dominance related to feeding, mating, and size.

One of the most suggestive features of social interaction among the birds is their development of vocal communication. Though they have no true language, birds reveal a wide gamut of vocal signs which serve to express to their fellows varied emotional states. Wallace Craig's study of pigeons is illustrative. He classifies the vocal calls of the pigeons as follows:

"The uses of the song in social control are so numerous and so complexly interrelated that a complete list of them could not be made. I have drawn up the following partial list simply to give some notion of the diversity of the uses of the song.

"1. Personal control, as that of the male over his mate.

"2. Suggestion; as, the nest-call coo quickly brings the mate, the challenge coo causes the enemy to flee.

"3. Stimulation; as, working up both male and female to the point of pairing, inducing oviposition in the female.

"4. Inhibition; as, inhibiting adultery, inhibiting the use of nestingsites other than the one chosen; inhibiting copulation out of the normal time.

"5. Co-ordination in space; as, leading male and female to use the same nest.

"6. Co-ordination in time; as, leading male and female to go through the brooding activities synchronously.

"7. To proclaim: (a) the bird's species; (b) the bird's sex; (c) the bird's individual identity; (d) the bird's rights.

"8. Tradition; as, when an experienced bird is mated with an inexperienced one, the former takes the lead."⁸

These are not true speech reactions, but have taken on the character of gestures—that is, indicators of changes in emotional states and phases of oncoming acts. As an illustration of this latter the "threat sound" mentioned by Schjelderup-Ebbe in describing the dominance-submission patterns among birds is a good illustration of the rise of the gesture. Originating as an emotional response associated with opening an attack on another bird, this sound quickly becomes a warning or indicator to the latter, who may on hearing it take flight or otherwise escape.

Social Life among the Lower Mammals. As we have already noted, the survival of the mammalian species is bound up with their group life. This interindividual contact covers a wide area of activity: it is found in the mating relation, in the care of the young, in dominance-submission patterns, in gregarious activities for feeding and protection, in vocal communi-

⁷ See C Murchison, "The Experimental Measurement of a Social Hierarchy in *Gallus domesticus*," *J. General Psychology*, 1935, 12: 3-39; also *J. Social Psychology*, 1935, 6: 3-30; *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1935, 46: 76-102.

⁸ W. Craig, "The Voices of Pigeons Regarded as a Means of Social Control," *American J. Sociology*, 1908, 14: 88. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

cation, and in a whole gamut of learning situations. Respecting the patterning as it relates to mating, Friedrich Alverdes⁹ states that almost all mammals exhibit either temporary or lasting relationships of one male with one or several females. He contends that, although there is some occasional promiscuous mating in some species, this is not to be considered the normal form of sexual relation. The monogamous or polygynous mating is sometimes seasonal, ending after a given mating period, or it may persist for many years. In some instances the male forms a separate group with his one or more females; in other instances the group may be part of a larger association of animals forming a herd or pack. In these varied configurations we may find fighting for mates, feeding together, mutual protection, and other manifestations of interaction. Of particular importance is the rearing of offspring. The dependence of the newborn upon the mother for survival provides the biosocial setting in which important training takes place. Not only does the mother provide food and shelter in the earliest period of growth; but, as we go up the mammalian scale, this period of dependency is prolonged. The higher the species the more time and opportunity there are for tuition of the younger by the older members. Then, too, we find among these forms the rise of play, which provides a period for acquiring all sorts of basic reactions, which may be important later in stalking and catching game, in fighting, and in seeking shelter. No doubt a great deal of this activity is reflexive or instinctive, but it would be a mistake to deny that a vast amount of social learning takes place among these forms.

The dominance-subordination pattern is a widespread phenomenon. It is illustrated in the control which a powerful stallion exerts over his mate or mates and in his aggression toward other males who threaten his ascendancy. So, too, we find a variety of vocal signs in use among many mammalian species: cries in the presence of strange or threatening stimuli serve to warn others in the herd or pack of impending danger, and varied emotional vocalisms related to mating or fighting or greeting have been observed. Though the use of the voice among the lower mammals does not reveal the rich differences that we find among the birds, nevertheless vocal communication of a rudimentary sort is common among many of those species. But further up the evolutionary scale, among the primates, the use of the voice assumes great importance. There it becomes a gesture revealing an oncoming act and may serve as a sign-stimulus to another member of the same species.

SOCIAL LIFE AMONG THE PRIMATES

As suggestive as the data on the lower forms are in showing the place of associative life in the development of animal forms, for us the most

⁹ See F. Alverdes, *Social Life in the Animal World*, 1927; and his "The Behavior of Mam-

important data come from man's near relatives, the monkeys and apes. The primates constitute the highest order of mammals and are usually classified into three main suborders: the *Lemuroidea*, the *Tarsiodea*, and the *Anthropoidea*. The last are further divided into the platyrrhine (the New World monkey) and the catarrhine primates (of the Old World). The latter are further subdivided into families, with three of which we are mainly concerned: the *Bercopithicidae*, including the baboons, langurs, mangabeys, and black apes; the *Simiidae*, including the four manlike apes: gibbon, orangutan, gorilla, and chimpanzee; and the *Hominidae*, represented by true man, *Homo sapiens*.

Geologic History of the Primates. It was during the Eocene period—about twenty million years ago—that the first primate forms appeared. These early primates possessed the basic generalized structures of the higher mammals which made possible later adaptive specialization. Among the more distinctive features are the following: the digits of the feet have nails in place of claws, and the first digit is set off at an open angle from the other digits—a matter of importance in the later evolution of the big toe or thumb; the mammary glands have usually been reduced to two, located in the thoracic region; the snout has been reduced, and a true face begins to appear; the eyes have moved round toward a frontal position, thus making possible binocular vision; and, most important of all, the cerebral cortex has become further enlarged, especially in the visual, manual, and associative areas.

As the Eocene advances, we come upon the true monkeys, who have taken definitely to arboreal life. They are characterized by larger bodily size, further evolution of the hands and feet for grasping and manipulating food and other objects, further development of the face, an increasing tendency to assume an upright posture for at least a part of the time, and, again of great importance, further elaboration of the cerebrum. In fact, the long-continued brachiation (living in trees) brought about many other important changes in the body structures, such as alteration of the chest and modification of the visceral musculature, making possible better support for the abdominal organs in erect posture. Likewise the tail became less and less important as a prehensile or as a balancing organ, the spinal column became straightened, and the skull gradually moved into what is essentially the human position.

In the course of these changes the proanthropoids began to shift the major habitat from the trees to the ground again. This was an important phase in their evolution. We have no way of knowing just why or how some of these forms took again to the ground while their relatives remained attached to arboreal life. But it might well be not so much accident as evidence of superior intelligence,¹⁰ the result of a further mutation in the size

malian Herds and Packs," chap. 6 in C. Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935.

¹⁰ E. A. Hooton, *Up from the Apes*, 1931.

and complexity of the cerebral cortex. In any case, the return to earth meant further important modifications in structure and function. The hands were now freed from locomotion and might be used for more detailed manipulation of food and other objects. The posture took on more erect form, and the foot became everted to a supporting organ. There were changes in facial form and in the teeth, and again, especially important, a further development of the cerebrum and an extension of the vocal range.

It was apparently in the Miocene or possibly in the Pliocene period, about seven million years ago, that the separation of the ape and human stems took place. And, while there was some further development of the simians after that time, the manlike form showed the most striking further alterations, until, during the Pleistocene, the basic present-day human stocks emerged.

In summary we may note four basic factors in this evolutionary process: (1) the emergence of erect posture, (2) the development of the hand and manual skills, (3) the elaboration of vocalisms, and (4) the further advancement of the cerebral cortex. We have already noted the development of the feet for locomotion and erect posture with the descent from the trees. The hand-eye co-ordinations became increasingly accurate, and there was a great extension of preliminary manual activity with respect to feeding, seeking mates, care of the young, and other manipulatory situations. The lingual development was of great importance. With the shift in seizing food or other objects from the mouth to the hands and with the recession of the snout, the mouth and the vocal organs became available for new functions. This all meant the rise of new functions for the facial and vocal apparatus. They could now assume the increasingly important part of vocalization, thus laying the foundation for two of the most human of all traits, speech and associative thinking. Finally, the further growth of the cerebral cortex was marked especially by the expansion of the associative and speech areas. Not only did the brain become a more subtle organ for the reception of incoming sensory impulses and the direction of outgoing motor responses, but its service in retaining the effects of prior stimulus-response relations, and especially its function in shuffling and reorganizing the reactions in terms both of any present stimuli and of the residual effects of previous experience, became characteristic of the highest apes and especially of man.¹¹

No one knows in just what order these four major developments appeared. Certain writers are convinced that the first three noted above were completely dependent upon the previous development of the brain centers. Probably all four emerged together in some form of intricate interplay of modifications in structure and function, the product of both mutation

¹¹ See H. H. Bawden, "The Evolution of Behavior," *Psychological Review*, 1919, 26: 247-276.

and gradual long-time adaptive effects working themselves out into more permanent hereditary structures. Certainly, so far as linguistic development goes, we cannot agree with C. J. Warden when he says that language emerged from the "pressure of an imperative need for social intercourse."¹² All the evidence points to the fact that the matter was probably just the reverse: interaction of both overt and gestural form was already in operation, and language is but an extension of this into truly symbolic form. We shall return to discuss this point later. For the present we must bear in mind that the apes in particular possess all the essential anatomical and physiological characteristics of man, and that, though they lack the fuller development of the cerebrum, their life reveals some important prototypes of societal living.

Characteristics of Primate Association. Although the apes present a more advanced picture of social life than the monkeys, they have so much in common with the latter that for our purposes we shall draw upon data from both. The principal sources among the monkeys have been *Cebus*, *Macacus rhesus*, the howlers, and the baboons. Most of our data from the apes come from the gibbons and the chimpanzees. We know very little about the gorilla and the orangutan, either in their native habitat or in captivity. An important question is the validity of observations made in natural conditions and in captivity. In the literature on the monkeys and apes there is a good deal of wishful thinking, and it is only within the last few decades that strictly reliable researches have been made, either in nature or in zoological gardens or experimental stations.

The societies of monkeys and apes in their native habitat are more or less loose associations of adults and young. Sometimes these groups include several subgroups—each with a male, his females, and their children (primate families)—which are combined to form a band, or what C. R. Carpenter terms for the howler monkeys a "clan." The most important "ends" served by such group life are those connected with reproduction and the care of the young, the securing of food, protection (including both defense and offense), and a more generalized satisfaction apparently emerging out of interaction as such. This last is witnessed in grooming and in the obvious pleasures of gregarious life, of avoidance of individual isolation, and of the benefits derived from social facilitation and imitation.

The size of the groups varies. Among the lemurs, though they are sometimes found in pairs, groups ranging from six to twenty members have been reported. The howler monkeys studied by C. R. Carpenter¹³ ran in bands ranging from four to thirty-five, with a median size of eighteen members. He reports that in the average band (on the

¹² See C. J. Warden, *The Evolution of Human Behavior*, 1932, p. 93.

¹³ C. R. Carpenter, "A Field Study of the Behavior and Social Relations of Howling Monkeys," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1934, 10, Serial No. 48.

island of Barro Colorado) there were 2.48 adult males, 7.10 females, 3.34 infants, and 4.90 juveniles, supplemented usually by one or two "bachelor" males who existed on the fringe of the society by sufferance. H. W. Nissen,¹⁴ on the basis of his study of the chimpanzees in their natural state, reports that they ran mostly in what might be considered extended kinship or "family" groups ranging from four to fourteen members, with the average number 8.5. In fact, among the apes proper the groups seem to be as a rule somewhat smaller than among their monkey relatives. Among the chimpanzees there are usually one overlord, several adult females attached to him, the offspring, and perhaps one or more bachelors, whose relations with the group are often tenuous.

This generalized account will do for the moment, but it is well to bear in mind that the differences in size of groups, both among different species and within a particular species, are as striking as the variety in the details of primate life, some of which will be considered now.

The Reproductive Patterns. Without doubt the sexual functions of the monkeys and apes must be considered a basic factor in bringing about not only their more intimate but also their broader associations. Robert M. Yerkes and Ada W. Yerkes¹⁵ classify sexual relations in three groups: (1) those that take place within the breeding or rutting season—perhaps not so evident among the apes as among the lower primates; (2) those that take place without reference to a special breeding season but during periods of female receptivity, which are related to the oestrous cycle and ovulation—evident among the chimpanzees, the baboons, the howlers, and perhaps most, if not all, forms in their native state; and (3) those that take place without regard to any "natural" breeding season or to female periodicity—a situation, of course, most obvious in human beings, but found among various monkeys and apes as well.

During the condition of female receptivity—which is doubtless the time of most active overt sexuality—the male becomes highly active, and, even where there is a polygynous system of one male and several females, the unattached males also are frequently given sexual favors by the females in heat. Among the howlers either sex may initiate the sexual advances preparatory to copulation.¹⁶ Whether there are any so-called courtship preliminaries to mating is uncertain. It is said that the male chimpanzee sometimes performs a crude dance of rhythmic pounding of the ground

¹⁴ H. W. Nissen, "A Field Study of the Chimpanzee: Observations of Chimpanzee Behavior and Environment in Western French Guinea," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1931, 8, Serial No. 36.

¹⁵ R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes, "Social Behavior in Infrahuman Primates," chap. 21 in C. Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935.

¹⁶ This appears to be true of other species. So, too, the howler female—like other female primates—may refuse sexual contact to one male out of preference for another. This whole interactional relationship, in fact, is qualified by sexual periodicity and the configurations of domination existing in the group at the time. (See below on domination.)

with feet or hands, or indulges in handclapping, or strikes sharp blows on nearby objects. This report is for apes in captivity. Nothing reliable is known about such actions among wild chimpanzees.

There has been considerable discussion as to whether the primates are essentially monogamous, polygynous, or promiscuous. Though there is some evidence that sexual relations—at least in captivity—are somewhat free and easy, on the whole the pattern seems to be that of polygyny. In this connection it is worth noting that, so far as the howling monkeys and the chimpanzees are concerned, there is evidence of inequality in the adult sex ratio. It is generally assumed that the numbers of males and females at birth are about equal; but Carpenter states that he found the ratio of adult females to adult males among the howlers to be 2.5 to 1; and Nissen reports the ratio among the chimpanzees he observed as 1.9 to 1. These disproportions may be due to the more hazardous life of the males, particularly their struggles for supremacy and their food-seeking activities. But at best this is a surmise.

There is also evidence of certain homosexual relations, at least in captivity. As we shall see, this appears to be related to certain phases of the dominance-subordination reactions. Masturbation among monkeys and apes in confinement has also been noted, but practically nothing reliable is known about such autoerotic practices in the free state.

The relations of the mother and infant constitute another important element making for more or less extended social interactions among the primates. The newborn of both monkeys and apes is quite helpless at birth. The young monkey learns to move about freely within four weeks, but among the apes it is usually three to four months before free locomotion is possible. The young cling to the mother, first in the ventroventral position, and later on the back. The nursing habit is apparently acquired more or less by trial and error; but, once established, it becomes not only a source of food for the infant, but for long periods a "symbol" of refuge. It has been observed that a frightened young ape may race to the mother and grasp anxiously at her breast. During the early weeks and months the mother not only feeds the infant but cares for it in numerous ways: grooms it, directs its interests, and "instructs" it in numerous responses. This close mother-offspring relationship is of great importance, and among the chimpanzees the young remain dependent for three or more years.

This dependency relation of the young ape to its older and more powerful protector carries over later to other and stronger members. Its deep-seated character is also aptly indicated by the many illustrations of the affection of apes, young and old, for their human caretakers. The chimpanzee reared for nearly two years by the Kelloggs, who observed its behavior along with that of their own child, was almost pitiable in its dependence on Dr.

Kellogg.¹⁷ This identification with others seems to be the root of the whole patterning of gregariousness or belongingness which characterizes the primates. Certainly the basic conditioning from the mother-infant contacts is fundamental to many of the later interactions, and is a clear prototype of human experience.

Dominance-Subordination Relations. Everywhere among the primates we find some forms of domination and subordination. There are, however, considerable variations in the different species. For example, the howlers seem to have no such drive for persistent ascendancy as we find in the gibbons. Nevertheless, in all species there is some hierarchy of power, which is most obvious in relation to sexuality and feeding, and we have already commented on the general associative form of one dominant male controlling several females with respect to mating. S. Zuckerman's observations of the gibbon in the London zoo show that for this species—at least in captivity—there is a continual round of fighting for control of the available females.¹⁸ On some occasions these struggles are so fierce that they end in the killing not only of the weaker male but of one or more females who become embroiled in the struggle.

Yet domination does not concern merely the sexual or feeding activity. It is found in the rudimentary leadership among a pack of monkeys making their way to feeding grounds, or when there is some form of defense or offense against enemies. Moreover, there is here, as in birds and in some other lower forms, some evidence of a graded series of dominance and submission in which one member may control another, who in turn takes aggressive attitudes toward still other members of the band. A. H. Maslow has made extensive observations of forms of dominance among monkeys in captivity and under more or less controlled laboratory conditions.¹⁹

On the basis of his studies in the Vilas Park Zoo, Maslow posits a "syndrome of dominance" in which the stronger, more ascendant monkeys pre-empt most or all of the available food, show aggression toward all other members of the group, and are dominant in sexual matters "regardless of *gender* (a dominant animal whether male or female will mount the subordinate animal); he himself is rarely or never mounted."²⁰ The subordinate monkey, on the contrary, gets little or no food in competition with the dominant one, responds to aggression by passivity, by flight, and "less often by fighting back," and in some instances—without respect to sex—offers to play the female role in coupling. The aim in this last situation is evidently to avoid attack. Maslow thus confirmed the presence of what has been termed "prostitution behavior," the use of sexual appeals in order to avoid attack and to secure a variety of

¹⁷ See W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child*, 1933, pp. 159-162.

¹⁸ S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, 1932.

¹⁹ See A. H. Maslow, "The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual Behavior of Infra-human Primates: I. Observations at Vilas Park Zoo," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1936, 48: 261-277.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 275-276.

favors from a more aggressive animal. It was found that some females were dominant not only over other females, but over males as well. Moreover, females in heat may take the dominant role for a time and thus reduce the male control. In periods of intense play among a group of monkeys the dominance may also disappear for a time. On the whole, the larger and stronger animals control the others. If all members of a group are of about the same size, a smaller monkey may become dominant.

In a laboratory situation, A. H. Maslow and Sidney Flanzbaum²¹ observed twelve pairs of monkeys with regard to their dominance and subordination in the presence of food. Among a wide variety of reactions they noted the following: the dominant animal pre-empts the limited food supply 99 per cent of the time; frequently mounts the subordinate monkey regardless of sex (in about 98 per cent of the situations), and is rarely if ever mounted; frequently indulges in bullying the other (99 per cent), and is almost never bullied in turn; initiates most of the fighting (85 per cent); never cringes in the presence of the other, and is almost never passive under aggression from another (1 per cent); is likely to be more generally active than subordinate (65 per cent); is likely to initiate more play (by about the same percentage); and is likely to indulge in more grooming.

They also found evidence for a social hierarchy of power; one monkey who was subordinate to another, might, in turn, be dominant over still another. Such a hierarchy is rather common among the higher animals.

There have been many other studies of domination and submission among the apes. For example, Robert M. Yerkes²² observed twenty-one pairs of mature chimpanzees with particular reference to their reactions in food-getting and sexuality. Yerkes assumes a "natural dominance" among the apes, which he defines as "ability to command priority of response." This finds expression in a wide variety of circumstances. In addition Yerkes posits two other forms of social control designated as "right" and "privilege." He differentiates between these forms of control thus: "Action by right (according to custom) is definite, assured, unquestioned; that by privilege is tentative, uncertain, inquiring. Irrespective of natural dominance status either mate may grant right or privilege to the other. In so doing it does not necessarily alter its dominance. Privilege-granting between mates is proportional to congeniality or friendliness."²³

On the whole the males tended to dominate the females except when the latter were in heat. In these matters age and previous learning play an important part. For instance, the more experienced male is quick to detect the decline of the female's sexual aggressiveness and soon resumes his dominance. As a rule, the male behavior is marked by impulsiveness, directness, immediacy, and insistency, all expressed by forcible means if necessary. The female, on the other hand, uses cajolery, begging, indirection, and sexual allure, especially during periods of heightened sexual activity. She tends to

²¹ A. H. Maslow and S. Flanzbaum, "The Role of Dominance in the Social and Sexual Behavior of Infrahuman Primates: II, An Experimental Determination of the Behavior Syndrome of Dominance," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1936, 48: 278-309.

²² R. M. Yerkes, "Social Behavior of Chimpanzees: Dominance between Mates in Relation to Sexual Status," *J. Comparative Psychology*, 1940, 30: 147-186.

²³ *Ibid.*, p. 185. By permission of the American Psychological Association.

prolong the whole sexual interplay, the male to reduce it to its biological minima.

In discussing the wider gamut of interactions between mates, Yerkes points out the importance of individual differences. Among a variety of factors making for "change and diversity" in their social responses, he cites the following: (1) strong physique; (2) maturity and experience with regard to sexuality; (3) temperamental traits, such as courage, confidence, and assertiveness; (4) natural dominance and readiness to use it; (5) resourcefulness and skill in influencing the mate, especially evident in the cleverness of the female in securing co-operation from the male; (6) sexual selectiveness and individual preferences.

Likewise, Wolfgang Köhler has shown by his study of apes in captivity that certain orders of control become accepted in a group. Sultan, a powerful and highly intelligent male in Köhler's ape colony, had more or less the run of the entire compound. Yet a large female, Tschégo, gathered round her a number of less aggressive members, both male and female. She might on occasion undertake to protect them from attempts at control by others. In other situations she showed considerable solicitude for the welfare of some of those who attached themselves to her.²⁴

Forms of Communication, Vocal and Nonvocal. Since verbal and other forms of communication play such a significant part in human relations, we must examine the rudiments of vocal interaction in our primate relatives. It is generally agreed that the monkeys and apes do not possess true speech in the sense of conveyance of ideas. Rather their vocalisms, like their other gestures, are concerned chiefly with the expression of emotion or desire. In short, they are related to such interactions as sex activities, food-getting, flight, play, and dominance. While, for the animal which vocalizes, or otherwise gestures, his act may be largely "expressive" of inner changes, it may take on the aspect of communication by sign-stimulus. That is to say, although an ape is not capable of designating objects by voice, his vocal reaction may easily become a conditioned or substitute stimulus to another.

The roots of such learning lie far down in the animal series. Certainly we find ample evidence of it among the mammals. For example, suppose a herd of wild horses becomes frightened by some loud sound or other "natural" stimulus. All of them may take to running from the source of danger. Thereafter any individual of the group who begins to run—whether from a like danger or some other kind—will serve as a conditioned stimulus to set up the running of the other horses who perceive his flight. In like manner, among birds, vocal signals of danger, aggression, or affection certainly serve as conditioned stimuli. This type of response is even more evident among the monkeys and apes, where we find a wide gamut of vocal expressions. Let us note a few illustrations.

²⁴ See W. Köhler, *Mentality of Apes*, 2nd ed., 1927.

C. R. Carpenter has listed nine distinctive vocalisms used by howling monkeys, with notations as to their probable interactional functions, as follows: (1) certain defensive barks at the sign of danger; (2) a leader's deep-voiced, metallic clucking, which serves to initiate the movement of a band and to control its rate and direction; (3) a series of gurgling grunts on the part of an adult male upon mild apprehension, which serves to set up like responses in the other monkeys and put them on the alert for defense; (4) a mother's wail, followed by a grunt or a groan, when one of her offspring falls from the trees to the ground or gets beyond reach; (5) an infant's cries when he finds himself in such a situation as that just noted; (6) an infant's or juvenile's purring sound, which serves to attract the mother's attention with a view to help or comfort; (7) chirping squeals by the young during their play, which seem to facilitate group play; (8) grunting sounds made by an adult male when he witnesses a group of youngsters playfully fighting, which vocalism acts to modify the latter's activities or cause them to cease such play; (9) grunts by males of the "Who! Who! Who!" sort in the presence of some strange situation, which serve to direct the attention of others to the same stimulus. •

S. Zuckerman has noted a number of variations in the vocalisms of baboons, including grunts apparently expressing a sense of well-being; the high-pitched screech of a female or young animal in the presence of danger, which may serve to attract the attention of the adult males; screeches of a somewhat different pitch, connected with rage and fighting; and the far-carrying, deep-toned barks that serve to call a scattered band together in the face of danger.

The vocalizations of the chimpanzee are varied and complex, expressing a wide gamut of emotions, desires, and expectations. W. Kohler has said that chimpanzees express "rage, terror, despair, grief, pleading desire, and also playfulness and pleasure." And H. W. Nissen has given us a rough classification of his data on this topic from chimpanzees in their native state: (1) the vocalized-panting cry, of noticeable variation in pitch and strength, which is associated with general excitement or with some such specific state as fear, anger, or anxiety; (2) the high-pitched scream expressive of fear or pain or perhaps, in some instances, of great rage; (3) the loud barking cry, either low or high in pitch, expressing anger, defiance, or exasperation; (4) the whimpering or whining cry, usually not very loud, but high-pitched, denoting disappointment or frustration; (5) a muttering sound usually heard just before eating, similar to a low or soft and short bark, and evidently signifying satisfaction. There are, in addition, the drumming noises made by pounding on objects, although they show no special rhythm or tempo. Apparently the drumming and these vocalisms are chiefly a manner of expressing emotional states, but they easily become social by their association with certain behavior toward which others may or must adapt themselves. Nissen believes that, in turn, the animal producing the sounds may be influenced by the response of the others to his noise-making and may modify the sounds. He cites the "bluffing behavior" so often seen among captive apes as a case of habituation to this sort of interactional situation.²⁵

There are, among the primates, other means of communication than vocalisms. Robert M. Yerkes and Ada W. Yerkes are convinced of the

²⁵ For an interesting sidelight on "ape language," see W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *op. cit.*

importance of a wide gamut of facial grimaces and of general bodily postures, not only as expressing emotions or desires, but as serving to communicate, in a rudimentary way, these states to others. In any case, the communicative capacities of the primates, especially of the higher orders, are remarkable. In fact, many naïve observers have been led to believe that the apes possess true language (we shall return to this question later in the chapter). Certainly signaling reflexes may be used long before true speech arises, and the social life of the monkeys and apes is enriched and made more complex by their ability to develop such gestures, vocal and other.

General Interactional Patterns. In addition to those forms of social contact which are linked to the reproductive life, to food-getting, to struggling for power, to the dominance-submission relations, and to the whole range of communication, the monkey and the ape show a number of other interactions which we must note, including play, "ownership," defense, grooming, and a number of gregarious and co-operative activities.

Some form of play is found among all the primates, but it is most evident among the young, less common between mother or other adults and the young, and still less common among adults themselves. The most frequent manifestations are running, chasing one another, catching and mauling one another, playful fighting, "mouthing" one another, and at appropriate times considerable sexual play. As we go up the primate scale, we find increasing inventiveness and resourcefulness. Wolfgang Köhler has pointed out the variety of play observed among the apes he studied at Teneriffe, and all observers have pointed out how a group of apes in captivity will amuse themselves for hours on end with a piece of rope, a pointed stick, a nail, a mirror, or some other object. Just what forms of play are found in the native habitat is less well known. Nissen mentions "tag," "wrestling," and "play-fighting" among the wild chimpanzees which he studied.

What Yerkes and Yerkes term "ownership behavior" has been observed among howlers, baboons, and chimpanzees. The acquisition of food, or of a terrain for camping or nesting, and defense of food and locale are found. Moreover, the captive chimpanzee, at least, often collects all sorts of objects, such as tin cans, bits of glass, and sticks, which he carries about with him, often tucked between thigh and groin.

Both defense and offense are found among primates threatened by disaster. But adequate data respecting any organized group aggression in the wild state are not at hand. We have already referred to the extensive fighting among baboons for food and mates, but we really know little about overt struggles among the higher apes in their native habitat. It seems clear that, when a camp site, a nest, or a food object is threatened, not only will individuals fight but there arises some co-operative effort of the group against the intruders.

One of the most interesting of the more intimate interactions is that

called "grooming." Monkeys and apes spend long periods cleansing and picking at each other. The mother begins this process with the infant; but as a form of adult "social service"—as Yerkes and Yerkes term it—such contact takes up much time and affords the primates considerable pleasure. Writing of the chimpanzee, Robert M. Yerkes describes the matter thus:

"In so far as it occurs between individuals, this sort of activity involves visual manipulation, searching, and manipulation of the hair, skin, or flesh of a companion with fingers, lips, teeth, or all of them, removal of bits of dirt, dandruff, scabs, parasites, pus, and other extraneous materials which may endanger the comfort and welfare of the individual, and their conveyance to the mouth of the groomer, whose lips, tongue, and jaws the while may have been set in motion, with sound production, as if in anticipation of something to be swallowed."²⁶

Somewhat similar contact relations are reported for all the primates, although with considerable species variation. For instance, it is rare among the howlers and very frequent among the baboons and chimpanzees. Yerkes is convinced that this form of mutuality is one of the most important prehuman developments and that it is phylogenetically of significance as an elementary form of intimate tactile, gustatory, visual, and other sensory interaction. Certainly, as close physical contact, it ranks next in frequency and intimacy to mother-and-child relations during feeding and bodily care. It is apparently associated with friendliness, co-operation, and rudimentary sympathetic responsiveness.

Though dominance-subordination relations are everywhere present in primate society, co-operation is also general. Mention has already been made of mutual aid in defense and offense, and it appears in food-seeking, nest-building, and other activities.

In more general terms we may say that we have throughout these activities evidences of social facilitation, imitation (which is a phase of facilitation), and the deep-seated drive for belongingness or gregariousness. In a broad sense social facilitation is the enhancement induced in any activity by the presence of another member of the same species. In the human field there are numerous studies on this, and we shall take them up in due course. (See Chapter V.) Of course, there is also evidence that the presence of another member may serve to diminish or inhibit the action, and we have already noted cases of this in reference to rivalry and struggles for mates or food.

Certain forms of co-operation are found among the monkeys and apes. Köhler reports conjoint efforts of his apes to put boxes together so as to reach food suspended at the top of the wire-covered compound. Such collective construction was largely haphazard and none too intelligent. For instance, the apes have no sense of the effects of gravity, and frequently the

²⁶ R. M. Yerkes, "Genetic Aspects of Grooming, a Socially Important Primate Behavior Pattern," *J. Social Psychology*, 1933, 4: 3-25. By permission of The Journal Press.

whole mass of boxes would come tumbling down. Köhler and others have reported common play activities involving rhythmic co-operative movements. But one of the most enlightening reports is that by M. P. Crawford on the co-operation of young chimpanzees in the solving of certain problems.²⁷ Five apes were used, in certain pairings, in three types of learning situation. The first of these problems—and the one with which this summary is concerned—had to do with pulling a box of food toward the cage by means of ropes so that food might be obtained.

At the outset each ape was trained to pull on a rope in order to get the food box. During this initial period the experimenter gave vocal commands to "pull" and also guided the learning. Then the box was loaded so heavily that no single ape could drag it toward the cage, but two animals pulling together could do so. The first efforts to work together were awkward and unco-ordinated. Gradually, however, certain more definite reactions arose. These Crawford divided into three stages: (1) both partners responded simultaneously to the command "pull"; (2) one ape watched the other and "timed" his own pulling to that of his partner; (3) not only did the partners co-ordinate their efforts, but one solicited help from the other when the latter was not pulling. All five chimpanzees reached stage 1; in certain pairings four reached stage 2; and two reached stage 3. In the last stage the solicitation consisted in such reactions as turning the partner toward the bars, beckoning, changes in facial expression, and vocalization.

On the whole, co-operation was influenced by responsiveness of the partner, degree of friendly relations, strength of individual hunger, dominance relationships, and intelligence. The vocalisms were chiefly of the excited emotional type and seemed to have no special signaling importance as such. Usually these sounds were made at the same time that manual gestures were used. There were evident individual differences in the amount of effort put forth in the pulling itself.

Monkeys and apes show many evidences of what we popularly call imitation. In fact, our verb "to ape" shows how common-sense observation of primate behavior has carried over into our interpretation of human behavior. For our purposes at present we may broadly consider imitation to involve interactional situations where one or more of the following effects may be observed: (1) general facilitation of action; (2) direction of the attention of one animal toward an object by the attention given to the object by another; (3) direction of activity by another to the means to be used in reaching a goal or object; (4) direction of the attention of another animal to both goal and the methods of reaching it. However, we must not consider imitation as necessarily a complete and perfect copying of the act of one animal by another. This is, strictly speaking, impossible. Rather there is a considerable gradation from almost complete repetition in detail to a

²⁷ M. P. Crawford, "The Co-operative Solving of Problems by Young Chimpanzees," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1937, 14, Serial No. 68.

very generalized following of somewhat the same steps to a goal. (On human imitation, see Chapter V.)

There are all sorts of instances of like reactions: vocalisms, handclapping, spitting through the teeth, kissing, dancing and other rhythmic motions, various grimaces, and many forms of play. There are also instances of like manipulation of mechanisms in the solving of some motor task or some puzzle-box problem. The copying is not necessarily the result of a special structure-function trait, capacity, or instinct which operates more or less automatically in these situations; the imitating animal may react in any of a number of ways in reaching his end.

Finally, there are many data to show that the apes develop a strong and abiding concern for one another, somewhat independently of any particular or specific activity. It is not necessary to posit a gregarious or affectional instinct any more than it is essential to assume an instinct of imitation. Rather, out of earliest mother-child dependencies, out of co-operative effort in accomplishing tasks, and out of the wide gamut of vocal intercourse, there emerges a strong demand or drive for remaining with one's own associates. At the human level we may call this the desire for belongingness. (See Chapter IV.)

The data to support this are ample. On the negative side it is shown by Kohler's reports on the vigorous wailing of an ape that is segregated from his fellows in the compound and the noisy wailing and crying of those who remain behind in the group. Isolation sets up a nostalgia that is often associated with fear, timidity, and extreme distress. Nearly every serious student of primate behavior has testified to this fact. We certainly find this sort of thing in dogs and other mammalian pets, and there seems to be no reason for denying it among these higher forms. On the positive side, primates show strong attachment to their fellows, sometimes even in the face of certain brutalities from others. Thus, the return of a segregated member to the group is marked by emotional satisfactions. It may be that this is but an extension and elaboration of deep-seated dependency habits, but its manifestations across the whole horizon of ape and monkey life is so great that we are justified in giving it special mention.

On the other hand, we must not permit our interpretation to go beyond the facts. Clearly the apes have no specific memory images of their absent companions. Köhler points out that, once the ape which has been removed from his fellows is out of sight and beyond earshot, his "friends" seem quickly to forget him. Again the prototype is there, but sympathy in the human sense, so dependent on the higher mental powers, is beyond the ape.

Learning and Intelligence. Though our major concern is with the social aspects of primate life, we cannot neglect a brief review of some of the important facts regarding primate intelligence. For our purposes we may accept the general concept of Köhler that intelligence is the capacity to develop a means of taking a "roundabout" or substitute path in order to meet a situation or solve a problem. There is some evidence that social

tuition plays a part among the primates. Certainly, the facts regarding the adaptive capacities of monkeys and apes throw into focus some important features of human learning which we shall have to note later. (See Chapter V.) We need not review the various forms of learning, but rather note a few crucial instances that indicate primate intelligence.

The use of a stick to pull an object toward the chimpanzee was soon learned, sometimes in a surprising manner. One subject apparently gave up trying and went about some other activity, ignoring the fruit. But, as soon as the fruit was threatened by another animal, the subject very quickly took the stick and procured the fruit in a thoroughly efficient manner. One of Kohler's apes was observed during a very hot day trying to bring a pail of water within reach by means of the stick. The use of a single box to stand on in order to reach food suspended from the top of the cage presented little difficulty, and learning to open a door, swing it back, and climb upon it for the same purpose was comparatively easy.

The use of sticks was shortly adapted to the play of the apes. They learned to use a stick as a lever to pry up the iron manhole cover of a cistern and to make holes in the wire netting of their cage. The habit of scraping and digging up roots for food with the bare hand was also subsequently modified by the use of a stick, in digging, in a manner closely analogous to the employment of sticks for the same purpose by primitive human beings.

The making of implements introduces an entirely new problem to an ape, for it requires effort directed temporarily *away* from the immediate objective. Experiments directed toward the making of implements were successful and showed definitely intelligent solutions. The subjects broke branches off trees in order to obtain sticks with which to reach food, and, when an implement was not in sight, a purposive search for one was generally instituted.

Unless under emotional tension or else from carelessness, the ape will not attempt to use implements which are too small or too short. There is often a surprising effort to lengthen a short stick by holding another against it—an action which is obviously futile yet obviously an attempt to improve a tool. The opportunity to effect this improvement was given when two sticks were supplied, one of which was designed to fit into the end of the other. In one case, the effort to do anything with the sticks failed completely, and the ape gave up in disgust and began aimlessly to play with the sticks. The animal accidentally put them together in the proper manner and immediately rushed for the reward. Once the pattern was set up, the ape had no difficulty in fitting the sticks. The subject of this experiment often began pulling the food with the joined sticks, and separated them when the action became awkward. If, for example, the stick assumed with respect to the bars of the cage such an angle that the bars interfered with it, he took the joined stick apart. The short sections were then used to complete the task. The use of sticks in three sections was also successful. The experienced ape never attempted to join sections which obviously would not fit.

One of Köhler's particularly bright subjects developed a technique of biting the end of a hard board into shape to fit into a large tube. He also bit splinters from one end

of a tube to fit into the other end, and used this technique to obtain splinters with which to jab unsuspecting people and to poke about in locks in the absence of a key.²⁸

Some of the most important experiments in ape learning are those made by John B. Wolfe and John T. Cowles in their efforts to discover if chimpanzees might learn to use secondary rewards in the form of objects which could be traded or exchanged for primary rewards, such as food and water. Wolfe's work was the first of this kind, and Cowles elaborated and extended it later.

Wolfe²⁹ trained six apes, three males and three females ranging in age from two to six years, to secure water and food by operating vending machines with tokens or poker chips. This type of learning depends on a familiar mechanism of conditioned reaction, in which a substitute response takes the place of an original one. The next step was to discover whether other and novel learning could take place when the reward was not water, food, or some other primary object of desire, but rather the chips or tokens themselves.

The results were as follows: (1) When food and the tokens were used together as rewards, the particular learning was most adequate. (2) In delayed-reaction situations the tokens could be used if the time elapsing between giving the tokens and permitting their insertion in the vending machines to get the primary rewards was not too long. (3) The number of tokens already accumulated helped to determine how many additional tokens would be worked for "during a fixed period of time when none of the tokens could be exchanged for food until the end of the period." (There was evidently a factor of diminishing returns here.) (4) The apes learned to discriminate between two tokens when one kind had double the reward-value of the other; and, if hunger or thirst were intense, they learned to choose the tokens that would give the greater reward. They even learned to associate these tokens with certain "activity-privileges." (5) Competitive behavior not unlike that set up by food might be induced by the use of the tokens themselves.

Cowles carried this type of experiment somewhat further.³⁰ His conclusions are based on observation of five chimpanzees and showed that: (1) the apes would work for a considerable number of tokens, up to ten or even thirty, which tokens were exchangeable for food only when a certain number had been attained; (2) tokens could be used for standard learning experiments involving from ten to thirty-six trials, when the rewards were to be found in a room adjacent to that where the experiment was carried on; (3) the apes learned to differentiate between chips which yielded food and others, of varied colors, which did not; (4) the food tokens were only slightly less efficacious in stimulating learning than the direct primary reward of food itself, but much more effective than the nonfood tokens; (5) in fact, the food token was an adequate incentive to learning and retention only because in the end it was exchangeable for food, and the nonfood token was definitely at the bottom of a preferential scale of substitute incentives; (6) food tokens immediately exchangeable for food were

²⁸ The examples here are from Köhler, *op. cit.*

²⁹ J. B. Wolfe, "Effectiveness of Token-rewards for Chimpanzees," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1936, 12, Serial No. 60.

³⁰ J. T. Cowles, "Food-tokens as Incentives for Learning by Chimpanzees," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1937, 14, Serial No. 71.

more effective incentives to learning than food tokens which had to be accumulated in certain numbers before the food reward would be provided.

It is clear from these two studies that apes are capable of learning to employ secondary rewards, and that such rewards tend to take on something of a rudimentary symbolic character if they are linked fairly closely with the primary rewards themselves.

There are many evidences of social tuition among the primates. We have already noted the general fact that mothers instruct their young. But tuition is not confined to the parent-offspring situation. We have also noted the wide range of imitative and facilitative contacts. But there are instances of an even more "advanced" sort. Köhler observed that a skillful ape watching a less skillful one attempt to join sticks in order to get a food object will sometimes join the sticks himself and hand them to the other, and yet not appropriate the food himself as he might be expected to do. Just how far we may go in attributing this to the fact that one ape "really sees the task to be carried out from the standpoint of the other animal," as Köhler puts it, is a very important question. If this be really so, then we do find something approaching the ability of one human adult to identify himself with another. This is obviously related to what the older psychologists called "free imagery," and this capacity has usually been denied the apes. A simpler explanation might be that the situation set up the manipulatory reactions in the second ape, and that then, if he was satiated with food at the moment, he gave the prepared stick back to the first ape. Yet this is all pure supposition and must remain in the realm of theory until further evidence is adduced.

In comparison with man the ape is certainly limited in his learning. Though he acquires amazing motor skills, and though he may, as the Kelloggs and others have shown, come to perform a large number of specific acts when directed to do so vocally, there is still no reason to assume that he has developed anything approximating true language or those higher forms of thought in which the vocal symbol stands for a particular object and especially for a class of objects or the relations of objects. In other words, all investigators agree that the ape, though capable of great learning, still lacks the cortical structures making possible associations at a symbolic and conceptual level. Evidently the pain-pleasure economy dominates the monkey and the ape pretty much in terms of the immediate situation. He has retention in the sense of learning many skillful acts, but the ability to remake and reorder his prior experiences into novel forms for meeting present or future or anticipated situations is highly unlikely. Though his learning is first of all visually and then vocally conditioned, it is doubtful if he possesses true visual or auditory imagery in the sense of that found among human beings. In other words, he not only lives in the present and is influenced chiefly by the pain-pleasure controls, but is also dominated by his

senses rather than by his inner associative processes. G. Elliot Smith puts it thus:

"The ape is tied down absolutely to his experience, and has only a very limited ability to anticipate the results even of relatively simple actions, because so large a proportion (in comparison with that of man) of his neopallium [cerebral cortex] is under the dominating influence of the senses."⁸¹

These negative and limiting considerations lead us at once to a more general question: Do animals, at least the primates and especially the apes, possess what we may properly call culture? We shall close the present chapter with a consideration of this problem.

Is There an Ape Culture? We shall confine ourselves chiefly to a discussion of the possibility of culture among the apes. If we find that these close relatives of mankind do not possess culture, in terms of any adequate definition, then, obviously, culture cannot be attributed to the less advanced animals.

The basic elements of culture, as it is usually defined by historians, anthropologists, and sociologists, are, first, the possession of language, and, second, the possession of some body of recording—be it by verbal tradition or in written and more permanent symbolic form. Moreover, both of these are related to the existence of some more or less persistent thought patterns, which embrace symbolically the particular items, material tools and instruments and machines, skills, institutions, codes, and sets of values, that are made overt in action. Certainly by these criteria we must emphatically deny that the apes possess culture. There is no evidence that the apes have made use of words and vocal statements in the human sense. There is no proof that they keep any exterior records or pass on their learning by symbolic means.

It is an interesting fact, however, that the apes possess adequate vocal structures to utter the sounds essential to true language. The handicap to linguistic development is not in the vocal-motor field. Rather it is the lack of sufficient associative capacity in the ape's higher brain centers to enable it to learn and use true speech. Signal cries it has and employs; it is able to make many skilled responses to the vocal commands of human beings. But there is not one shred of proof that it has any capacity to link a vocal sound to an object, to a class of objects, to the qualities or relations of objects or to other symbols. Unless it can do these things, it does not possess true language.

On the other hand, that the monkey and the ape—and, for that matter, many lower forms—develop all sorts of social-contact patterns and come to depend upon them cannot be gainsaid. Certainly, the older members teach the younger, and adults may facilitate joint actions by imitation and co-

⁸¹ G. Elliot Smith, *The Evolution of Man*, 1927, p. 58.

operative reactions. How, then, are we to conceptualize these facts and bring them into line with what we have just written? The present author believes that here is further proof and illustration of his longstanding contentions, to wit: (1) that society or social interaction should not be equated with culture, as it so frequently is in the writings of some contemporary anthropologists and sociologists; (2) that social learning—that is, learning by interaction—exists far down the animal scale and is not confined to human beings; and (3) that, phylogenetically, social forms precede culture. That is to say, so far as species evolution goes, there is ample evidence of social contacts and of social learning which may influence not only the young, but adult members of the species; and furthermore, biologically considered, it is culture but not society which is the distinctive human characteristic.

Since, however, animals do transmit their learned reactions to others, or at least modify and qualify those of their fellows, it remains to argue that the mere transmission of acquired responses is not the *sine qua non* of culture, but rather symbolic accumulation of patterns and their transfer. In other words, the fact that animals learn together and imitate and otherwise facilitate one another's activities by no means indicates the existence of culture if this concept is considered in terms of its essential psychological features: true language, verbal transmission, and a symbolic content. Of course, one may define culture so broadly as to encompass all such learning, transmission, and interactional influence, but this would be to rob it of any distinctive and useful meaning in reference to mankind. We shall use it in its more narrow, accepted, and usual sense.

In conclusion let us mention again the major prototypes of human behavior to be found in the primates, especially among the apes. The limitations also, in comparison with man, will be indicated. (1) The mother-offspring association is clear during a prolonged period of dependency and protection. Here we find one of the roots of the human family. This is obviously a biologically determined interaction absolutely essential to survival of the young. This social setting permits tuition by the mother of the young, but, since culture in the human sense is lacking, such teaching is limited. (2) There is everywhere a struggle for power or domination. This rests upon conflict and competition for food, mates, and control of territory and activity. There is a social hierarchy, most obvious where one male is surrounded by a harem of females, the offspring, and at times certain marginal males, the "bachelors." The forms of aggression are both direct, as in overt punishment, and indirect, as in vocal and other gestures. (3) The sexual periodicity of the female may, on occasion, modify and qualify the operation of the male-dominated association just referred to. In getting this temporary control, the female uses cajolery, "teasing," and other actions suggestive of feminine human conduct. But the male, as a rule, tends

to re-establish his controls as soon as the sexual period is over. (4) Associative play is evident, though it seems to be more common among the younger than among the older members of the group. (5) Co-operation in action is rather widespread—chiefly in food-getting and in protection from danger. (6) Group solidarity is witnessed in the co-operative activity just noted, in protection of the young and helpless, and in avoidant and aggressive treatment of strangers introduced into the group. There is clearly a prototype of the human in-group. (7) Vocal and other gestural interaction is very common and, though vocalisms, in particular, are doubtless originally emotional expressions, they quickly take on the function of signaling or indicating phases of member-to-member contacts or of relations of members to the material environment. But there is no true speech among the apes, although the foundations are perhaps present. (8) The intellectual process of the ape is striking; he is capable of learning to use counters or tokens to represent food objects or other primary rewards; to fashion crude instruments to aid in securing food or making shelters; and to indulge in certain co-operative activities. But the ape lacks free imagery, true language, and the ability to form concepts either of objects, relations, and qualities, or of himself as a social object. (9) Though he is sympathetic to fellows in distress when they are immediately in his perceptual field, apparently he has no memory of such once the immediate situation has changed. In short, his identification capacity—if we may call it such—is decidedly limited in contrast to that of man. (10) On the whole, the monkey and the ape operate on the basis of what we should call in human terms an immediate "pain-pleasure economy." That is to say, there are not, as there are among men, any persistent and transmissible value systems of affection, sympathy, mutual aid, competition, or conflict that can become objectified into institutions, for the apes lack the capacity to make or to adopt a culture.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On the general biology of human evolution, see E. A. Hooton, *Up from the Ape*, 1931; and C. J. Warden, *The Evolution of Human Behavior*, 1932, chaps. 1, 2, 3.

On the social behavior in lower forms, see C. R. Carpenter, "Societies of Monkeys and Apes," *Biological Symposia*, 1942, 8: 177-204; Carpenter, "A Field Study of the Behavior and Social Relations of Howling Monkeys," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1934, 11, Serial No. 48; Carpenter, "A Field Study in Siam of the Behavior and Social Relations of the Gibbon (*Hylobates Lar*)," *ibid.*, 1940, 16, Serial No. 84; M. P. Crawford, "The Co-operative Solving of Problems by Young Chimpanzees," *ibid.*, 1937, 14, Serial No. 68; W. N. Kellogg and L. A. Kellogg, *The Ape and the Child*, 1933; Wolfgang Kohler, *The Mentality of Apes*, 2nd ed., 1927; Carl Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935, chaps. by O. E. Plath, H. Friedmann, F. Alverdes, W. C. Allee, T. Schjelderup-Ebbe, and R. M. Yerkes and Ada W. Yerkes; H. W. Nissen, "A Field Study of the Chimpanzee: Observations of Chimpanzee Be-

havior and Environment in Western French Guinea," *Comparative Psychology Monographs*, 1931, 8, Serial No. 36; R. M. Yerkes and A. W. Yerkes, *The Great Apes*, 1929; R. M. Yerkes, *Chimpanzees: A Laboratory Colony*, 1943; and S. Zuckerman, *The Social Life of Monkeys and Apes*, 1932.

Chapter III

CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

IT REQUIRES only a slight knowledge of anthropology to realize that there are striking contrasts among the many cultures of tribes and nations. Even neighboring tribes often reveal sharp differences not only in language but in basic customs, manners, ideas, values, and habits. Despite many popular misconceptions, it has been amply shown that such cultural variations are not due to biological or geographical differences. A familiar instance is found in our own Southwest, where the pacific and agricultural Zuñis and Hopis live near the pastoral and formerly warlike Navahos and Apaches. Another is found in the contrasts between the South African tribes, both cattle-raisers, the Zulus and the Swazis. The former are aggressive and violent, the latter peaceful and quietistic. Equally impressive examples may be found in our own time and among more complex societies. Perhaps one of the greatest shocks to the American people during World War II was their discovery of the differences between the Western democracies and Japan. Although Japan became highly industrialized in the seventy-five years after Commodore Perry opened up trade and other relations with it, the nation has remained largely medieval in social organization, with strong militaristic traditions and emperor-worship of a very primitive sort, and in certain other ways is quite unaffected by contact with Occidental culture. We also learned, though the divergences were not so great, that under a ruthless political party many less evident features of a complex culture such as Germany's could become the center of a revolutionary movement and that other aspects, of a democratic sort, could be suppressed.

In the present chapter the aim is to examine some revealing cases of sharp contrast in culture and then to indicate descriptively how the personality or life organization of individuals varies with such cultural divergences. Variations in individual life organization are due to the three basic factors: (1) biopsychological make-up, in which heredity and maturation play a part; (2) personal-social, or noncultural, conditioning; (3) cultural conditioning. It would be well if we knew just how much weight to give to each of these fundamental variables. But at this stage in the development of psychology and the social sciences we do not. Realizing, however, that in biological make-up and psychological potentials men are

everywhere basically alike, and that the underlying personal-social contacts everywhere revolve chiefly round co-operation or opposition (conflict and competition)—into which biopsychological differences due to age, sex, and maturity enter—we may hold with the anthropologists that the major variations in personality derive from differences in culture.

It is from this standpoint that the present chapter is developed. We shall first describe some of the basic factors in the relations of personality to culture. Then we shall review some of the findings in regard to the interplay of culture and personality among selected primitive peoples. The chapter will close with a brief analysis of selected examples of culture and personality from advanced societies.

SOME BASIC CONSIDERATIONS

Studies in social psychology, anthropology, and sociology have made clear a number of pertinent facts which bear upon any discussion of the interplay of culture and personality. It is now well established that human beings everywhere possess similar biological and psychological characteristics, and that, moreover, the primary forms of social contact or interaction are alike in all societies. Furthermore, though the content or nature of culture may vary greatly, the manner in which culture is acquired is dependent on universal laws of learning.

The Biopsychic Unity of Mankind. By definition a species has certain determinable common characteristics. So it is with *Homo sapiens*, or man, as a member of the animal kingdom. Some of the important universal features of mankind are the following:

(1) Men everywhere have the same basic wants or needs. These we call the original, or organic, drives. These include requirements for oxygen, liquids, food, rest and sleep, bodily elimination, sexual satisfactions, and protection against bodily harm, be it from pain, cold, heat, or other noxious stimuli. Although culture may profoundly alter men's wants and the manner of satisfying them, it must never be forgotten that all men continue to be impelled to action by these persistent and recurrent demands, or physiological imperatives. As we noted in the previous chapter, the "cultural imperatives" themselves are predicated upon such fundamental drives

(2) The neural-muscular-glandular systems of individuals are pretty much the same at birth. Though no one dares ignore the facts of individual differences in neural organization, muscular capacity, and glandular functions, the basic processes are alike in all of us. The sensory or receptor organs of seeing, hearing, taste, smell, touch, equilibrium, pain, visceral stimulation, and muscular movement are in structure and function the same everywhere. Likewise men have the same kind of response or effector organs, as evident in the muscular movements of various parts of the body: hands, arms, head, tongue, skin, legs, feet, and torso. These overt adjustive mechanisms are linked to the sensorium through the central and autonomic nervous systems, which, though varying in potentiality, are fundamentally the same in all mankind. So, too, we all possess the same internal glands, both with ducts and without, and these play an

important part in man's adaptation to his material and his social-cultural environment.

(3) Men, regardless of locality, race, or sex, have similar means of learning. These means are in fact determined by the structural organization of the neuromuscular system itself, but of particular importance are the central, or associative, areas of the human brain. There are individual differences in learning capacity, some of which certainly must derive from hereditary factors. The congenital idiot, imbecile, or moron is biologically incapable of acquiring the ideas, attitudes, and habits which we expect those born with normal learning abilities to acquire. But, assuming that most human beings possess what we call normal intelligence, the manner in which a child or adult learns to adapt himself to a given society and its culture is basically the same, be he born a Hottentot or a Navaho, a Japanese or a Hindu, a German or a Russian, an American or a Britisher, a Democrat or a Republican, a Catholic or a Baptist, a Jew or a Gentile, a Negro or a White. As we shall note in Chapter V, such learning may be qualified by the nature of the task, the state of the human organism, the immediate situation, and the kind of previous conditioning. Yet in all times and places the elements of the learning process remain essentially the same.

The case for the universality of man's characteristics rests on three sets of facts: common drives, common neural-muscular-glandular organization, and common mechanisms of learning. There is one additional factor, the *universality of social interaction*, which must be considered. Although, strictly speaking, this is an external or environmental rather than a biopsychological (internal) feature, the fact remains that, in the mammalian and other higher species, existence itself is dependent upon social contact. This was pointed out in Chapter II. The data presented in that chapter indicate that social interaction has its roots in the subhuman species, and that, in terms of species history or phylogeny, society is much older than culture. Since previous students of social psychology and the social sciences have tended, for the most part, to ignore or neglect this fact, it needs special emphasis.

To summarize, everywhere the human being begins his basic adaptation in a state of dependency on other members of his species, specifically on his kinship group, especially on his mother or, in relatively few instances, a mother substitute. While the satisfaction of his needs for oxygen, sleep, and elimination are at the outset biologically individual, his need for food is satisfied only by *social* means—that is, through the interposition of another member of his species, the mother or other adult. So, too, his general bodily requirements for protection against pain, cold, heat, and other noxious stimuli are, in the earliest period at least, satisfied only by the assistance or co-operation of others. Also much of the basic learning involves early socialization of responses to the need for elimination, rest and sleep, and other basic needs or wants. Later, the matured sexual drives can be satisfied only by interaction. In short, though we need not posit a social or gregarious instinct or drive, the universal setting of survival is a *social act*; the fundamental requirement is that another or others aid or make possible the satisfaction of at least three basic demands—those for food, bodily protection, and sexual satisfaction.

Therefore, it seems logically and empirically justifiable to include this

social factor among the universals in man's life. It is only in theory and in literary fantasy that a human being can begin and continue life completely alone and on his own. In actuality, there is always some social situation. Even the adult hermit, by prior training, both in survival habits and in ideas, is provided with a modicum of social participation.

Support for this contention is found not only in the type of material presented in Chapter II but in studies of feral man and of individuals raised under conditions approximating, though never completely duplicating, complete isolation. While we must remain skeptical of the many tales of children reared by wolves or bears, there is some support for certain of them, such as the case of the "wolf-children" of India, described by T. A. L. Singh and R. M. Zingg. So, too, children reared in almost complete isolation have been reported with varying validity and detail. Such were Kaspar Hauser, the Wild Boy of Aveyron, and some recent instances in our own country, such as Anna, described by Kingsley Davis.¹ The mammals are absolutely dependent for survival on social interaction. Human beings could not survive without the intercession and aid of older and more experienced members of their own species who instruct them in the adjustive processes which constitute society. In the development of the individual the initial phases of such interaction are not always culturized. It is for this reason, among others, that we posit the existence of personal-social learning.

As we noted in Chapter I, interaction is absolutely essential in linking the individual's basic drives and learning capacities to his cultural world. Let us now examine some aspects of this more closely.

Social-Cultural Factors in Personality Development. Given the basic biopsychic elements in the human organism, and given the universal fact of social interaction, we must next inquire how this human organism becomes a personality. One fundamental fact may be called genetic causality. That is to say, there is a developmental history from birth on through infancy, childhood, and adolescence to varying degrees of maturity. What the infant and child is the man becomes, and what the man is the child once was. This does not imply any magical maturation or unfolding of traits, ideas, attitudes, and habits. Rather, in terms of the organic foundations noted above, involving heredity and maturation, and in terms of basic interactions, the infant and child sets out on a course of personal development for which the culture provides the direction and content. As we shall have occasion to note, this does not mean that the adult person is merely a reflection of his culture. We cannot hold with Ellsworth Faris that the

¹ On the wolf-children of India, see T. A. L. Singh and R. M. Zingg, *Wolf Children and Feral Man*, 1943; regarding Anna, see K. Davis, "Extreme Isolation of a Child," *Amer. J. Sociology*, 1940, 45: 554-565. There is a review of the data on the wolf-children and on Anna in K. Young, *Sociology: A Study of Society and Culture*, 1942, pp. 4-8, 11-14.

personality is but "the subjective aspect of culture."² To do so is to ignore the individual differences, first as to variations in drives and learning ability, and second as to variations in personal-social conditioning, and especially to neglect the highly important differences in cultural conditioning itself. It must not be forgotten that culture is a broad concept for more or less standard patterns of behavior and thought, and that the personality always represents a particular configuration of such patterns plus its own unique—what G. W. Allport calls its autonomous—characteristics.³ Despite cultural uniformities there remains some degree of individuality among the members of every society.

Yet every society has certain institutions which Bronislaw Malinowski calls the "cultural imperatives." These grow out of the needs built around the family, around food-getting and other material needs, and around the basic group protections, including the whole area of social control. From these, other institutions emerge having to do with religion, magic, art, recreation, and the development and transmission of knowledge and skill. It is the complex of these institutions, meanings, and values which makes up culture. Moreover, the basic interactional processes—such as those of conflict and competition, co-operation, and differentiation—become more or less institutionalized. These may take on different forms and meanings in various societies and in the various groups within a society. As we shall see, some primitive societies stress opposition and others co-operation, and all reveal some forms of division of labor or specialization of role and status. Advanced societies are equally divergent, though they are all more complex.

In order to understand how the individual born into the group and society comes to take on the ideas, attitudes, and habits that are necessary if he is to become a participating member, let us outline the chief categories into which the basic training of infants and children by their elders and their own age groups may be divided. These will give us a basis for making tentative comparisons both of culture and of the persons who develop under its impact. The following factors are not arranged in any particular order of priority, nor does our discussion necessarily cover all the important elements. In fact, some of the more detailed aspects will be presented in Chapters V and VI, which deal more particularly with personal development in our own American society.

(1) One of the most important items of the earliest, the basic, training is the degree to which parents and others insist on regularity of habit in such matters as feeding, sleeping, bodily elimination, sexuality, and related drives. There is a wide variation in these matters, among both primitive and civilized peoples. Yet it is in these that the

² See E. Faris, *The Nature of Human Nature*, 1937, chap. 3.

³ G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, 1937.

first and fundamental forms of discipline and authority are imposed on the growing child. Correlated with the positive conditioning in these matters are the form and kind of punishment which the mother, father, or other older person metes out to the younger members of the family or other group. In some societies such control consists of mild reprimands or withholding of affection. In others it is more severe and takes the form of physical deprivation and use of force. At first sight these differences in treatment may not seem important for future development, but all the significant research and therapy in the field of child training bear witness to the high importance both of the degree of rigidity of basic habits and of the kind and intensity of punishment which is used to enforce these culturally accepted and expected habits and attitudes.

(2) The imposition of culturally determined forms of reaction, such as regularity in basic habits of feeding, sleeping, elimination, talking, and walking, induces varied degrees of frustration in the growing child. The response to such thwarting differs greatly, depending on which drive is blocked and what substitute reactions are possible. Later a variety of outlets (direct or indirect aggression, fantasy—a choice of compensating responses) may be acquired, but there is little doubt that in the young child the most natural and fundamental reaction to frustration is outright aggression. If it be the mother who imposes the denial, she will be the most obvious object on which to vent one's hostility. If it be a sibling, the antagonism takes some form of rivalry, overt or imaginary. If it be the father who imposes his will, he may become the person toward whom the accumulated aggression may be directed. Sometimes a child not only is the object of rigid control, in the name of the cultural demands, but may also be more or less rejected by his parents or other guardians.

However, it is well to note that the young child soon learns to transfer or redirect his aggression toward other individuals or material objects than those that initially block his drive or will. One of the commonest substitute outlets is daydreaming. But more overt is the redirection of aggression upon individuals who are considered inferior by the parents, siblings, and neighbors. In this way the child's aggression is displaced upon members of an out-group: those of foreign background, those who "live on the other side of the tracks," those of an enemy nation who threaten our very existence. It is on the basis of such early and culturally approved transference of aggression that hostility to those of other classes, political faiths, religions, and nations is developed. Such antagonisms flower in our adult world in various forms of competition and conflict. But it must not be forgotten that the roots of such aggression lie in the earliest frustrations of the child in the home or some other primary group. Yet the form and nature of such hostilities vary greatly in human societies. In some it takes the form of warfare, in others it is confined to intrasocietal oppositions, in still others it is pretty well sublimated into competition with others of one's society for wealth or status, and in some few instances it does not seem to play a very distinctive part at all. Quietistic and pacific tribes, such as the Zuñis and Hopis among the primitives, and societies such as the Mennonites, Amish, Hutterites, and Quakers in our Christian history, illustrate the fact that culture plays a large part in stimulating or reducing aggression. As we shall see, it is not that these latter groups show no aggression, but rather that it takes a milder and less violent form. In behavioristic terms, aggression toward the out-group is not highly rewarded. (See Chapter V.)

(3) In contrast to the aggressive patterns are those developed around love and sympathy. The basic interactions of mother and infant, those of father and child, and even those of siblings are not necessarily reactions of deprivation, discipline, and denial. There is no doubt that the mother may quickly acquire (if she does not innately possess) affection for the helpless being who is dependent upon her. Though in some instances, as among Marquesan women, cultural values tend to offset natural love and care for the offspring, for the most part mothers or mother substitutes do show love, sacrifice, and indulgence toward the infants under their care. It is pretty generally believed that the nursing act itself provides pleasure for both infant and mother. Certainly most societies, primitive or civilized, put a high value on the newborn, and out of the interdependence of parent and child grow human kindness, sympathy, dependence, and co-operation. In analyzing the socialization of the individual we must take into account love and sympathy as well as aggression in the form of conflict and competition.

(4) Bound up with regulation, aggression, and love are the various sanctions or moral controls which are imposed on the growing child. At the outset these are entirely external to him, taking the form of corporal or verbal punishment—that is, the use of physical force or the denial of his wishes. As he develops, however, the most significant sanctions are those which become built into his own ideas and attitudes, become moral values within him, and operate to inhibit actions disapproved by his fellows and to facilitate those which are expected of him. This internalization of sanctions is one of the most important steps in socialization and, as we shall see in Chapter VI, is the *sine qua non* of the moral self. It is highly important to take account of the manner in which a society indoctrinates the rising generation with its moral values and habits. In some persons they tend to remain external; in others they become deeply embedded in the individual's life organization. These moral habits and values form what we call the conscience, and the sense of guilt and shame which a person experiences when he deviates from his moral duties serves both to punish him and to direct him back upon the path of rectitude.

(5) In addition to the initial training which the child gets in feeding, sleeping, elimination, protection, and the satisfaction of other basic needs, as he grows older he is instructed, both in the family and outside, in knowledge and skills of various sorts. Some of these have to do with his relations with his kinfolk. Others have to do with his contacts with those not related by blood but contiguous to him in the neighborhood or community. Still others have to do with the class status of his family. Of great importance in all societies are the knowledge and the skill which he must have in order to get a living, and to establish himself as parent and household member. There are also demands of community participation and control which he must meet if he is to remain a member of the society. So, too, he acquires the accepted practices and beliefs of religion and magic. Finally, the forms of recreation and the aesthetic skills and standards of his group must be learned if he is to be a full participant in his community.

(6) Out of this wide and diverse instruction will emerge in time the ego or self of the individual—his sense of self-importance or pride, his aspirations for personal achievement, and his fundamental sense of emotional security as a member of his society. He will also develop a sense of rights and privileges and in relation thereto a

sense of personal responsibility and duty to his fellows. This combination of right and duty is obviously but another form of the group sanctions noted heretofore.

We shall note variations in the pressure which parents and others put upon the growing child and adolescent to advance toward maturity. In some societies the child is prodded to accept the role and status of an adult; in others there may be either indifference or an actual retardation. For example, among the Zúñis, the Dakotas, and the Kwakiutl—the first two marked by co-operation, the latter by intense competition—the child is urged on toward adulthood. Among the Bachigas, an African tribe, there is relative indifference to the rate at which one attains adulthood, and among the ancient Incas there was a graded and fixed system of stages by which one advanced to maturity in terms of age.

(7) Finally, note must be taken of the maladjustments that may be common in a society. What is normal and what is not is determined by the cultural acceptances and expectancies rather than by any biological or psychological criteria as such. One important area of observation is in what we term the behavior problems of children and adolescents. Another is the nature and incidence of moral, mental, and other breakdowns among adults. Although the data on this topic with respect to primitives are rather meager, we shall make an effort to note them when they are at hand. With respect to civilized societies, we have ample, though not always reliable, information on the nature and extent of personal disorganization or maladjustment. Variations in the kind and extent of such disorganization afford not only a picture of the moral values themselves but a rough measure of the adaptability of individuals to the demands of their culture.

With these seven classes of information at hand, we shall be able to present some interesting examples of the contrasting ways in which various societies impose their culture upon the growing members. Though the precise steps in the process of socialization are not known, especially with respect to the primitives whom we shall use as examples, nevertheless we shall indicate the broad differences and draw the most probable inferences we can from the data at hand. Yet we must repeat the caution implied above. Although we shall be concerned with concrete examples from primitive and civilized peoples, we must realize that we are summarizing extensive source data, and that, moreover, in dealing in generalities we must neglect many of the unique and individualistic features of persons living in these societies. Our main aim is to show the major cultural forces which impinge upon the growing individual and direct him into the life organization which his culture sets before him. Were we to examine specific persons in any one of these groups, we should find many individual variations within the larger general frame.

In the rest of the chapter we shall take up first some comparisons of culture and personality structure in selected primitive peoples. The chapter will close with some tentative comparisons among certain contemporary societies.

INTERPLAY OF CULTURE AND PERSONALITY AMONG SELECTED TRIBES

In undertaking to review some of the correlations between culture and personal growth among primitives we must bear in mind that detailed descriptions and analyses are not at hand. The sources vary in validity and reliability. In a few instances the facts are fairly complete and reasonably accurate; in others we must depend on observations and interpretations by relatively untrained persons. Furthermore, any attempt to present thumbnail sketches of aspects of a culture or of personality structure is open to criticism, especially from those who insist that such brevity thoroughly distorts the details, which can only be put forward by extended statement with many qualifications. Frankly, both the sources and the summary treatment are open to some doubt, and at best our presentation and interpretations are to be considered tentative. Yet, despite these limitations, we are justified in presenting these materials and inferences. To refrain from beginning in a tentative way to deal with these topics is to neglect a challenging opportunity. We need to know more about just how the individual, society, and culture interact. It may be that the interpretative theories are far from scientific. But this new departure into cultural anthropology and social psychology should in time yield invaluable data and lay the basis for more adequate generalizations on the correlation of personal growth and culture, and in this way, in time, provide a foundation for prediction and control.

Unfortunately it is not possible to select very satisfactory samples, either on the basis of geographic distribution of tribes or on the basis of major divergences in major culture forms. We take the material chiefly from certain secondary sources which attempt to relate culture to personal development. It is well to note also that some of the accounts provide more facts about the periods of training in infancy, childhood, and adolescence than do others. But, since we are primarily concerned with genetic development, we must sacrifice some range of cultural type in the interests of more satisfactory detail on the growth of the personality.

Using the seven categories of basic training, supplemented with a brief comment on the major cultural forms and values, we summarize the pertinent data dealing with personal development in eight selected primitive peoples in Table 1 (pp. 50-55).

The thumbnail data presented in this table serve merely to provide the student with information about (1) the variations in basic culture, especially in such items as social organization and fundamental processes, and (2) the deviations in training in what are considered the basic habits and attitudes, such as feeding, bodily elimination, personal care, aggressions, love and sympathy, and sanctions, as these, in turn, are related to self-

development and to participation of individuals in group life. Finally, attention is given to forms of maladjustment and to the role of the social-cultural deviants in these primitive societies.

It must be noted that the comments on these tribes stem from standards and norms common to our own society and culture. This can hardly be avoided because we have not yet developed any strictly objective criteria of norms of behavior which could be applied to all societies and all cultures regardless of time and place. Thus, when we use such concepts as "indulgence," "rejection," "discipline," and "regularity," we are really defining the practices of these primitives from our own standpoint. So, too, when we make informal statistical comparisons in terms of "more or less," we do so from our own cultural frame of reference. Despite these difficulties, we can at least indicate in broad outlines the manner in which the life organizations of individuals differ within varying social-cultural contexts.

It is not possible to give extended interpretations of the data summarized in Table 1. One or two comments may be offered, especially where the data are fairly ample. We shall use the Balinese as an interesting contrast to other primitive peoples and to ourselves.⁴

The most striking features of Balinese character are its stylized form, in which role, status, and obligations are highly fixed, and the curious split between the everyday life and that of the elaborate group rituals.

This division in life organization begins in the first months. At the outset the baby is greatly indulged by its mother, father, sisters, brothers, and other kinfolk. The basic training is easy, and punishments are mild. The infant is treated as a toy, but, withal, as one of great importance, for he represents a direct connection with the departed but still potent ancestors. He is mildly teased but also richly rewarded by affection. Later, at the "knee baby" stage, the teasing is followed not by love and cuddling but by avoidance and downright rejection. The child's reactions to such frustrations at first take the form of crying and temper tantrums, which may lead to some solace from some other adult than the one who teased him. But in time the child learns, by imitation, to assume attitudes of placid indifference to teasing or ordinary bodily care by another. Some affectional interest is transferred to playmates, or to toys, beetles, or younger siblings (as in the case, especially, of young girls), but avoidance and placidity become the norm in the usual day-by-day relations.

As the individual matures, his ordinary life takes the form of a dreamy, dissociated existence. Anger, for example, is expressed, not openly, as with us, but by "greater smoothness of speech." "People on the scene of an accident sit in a paralyzed semistupor, not talking, not looking, but nodding; the thief whose case is being tried slowly falls asleep." ⁵ However, affection, fear, and aggressiveness are not lost. They are dis-

⁴ Drawn from Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead, *The Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis*, 1942. Special Publication of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 2. By permission of the authors.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 39. By permission of the authors.

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION,
AMONG SELECTED

	MOUNTAIN ARAPESH	BALI	HOPI	KWOMA
A. Nature of social organization	Not organized as tribe, small and loose kinship and vicinal units. No status system. Mildly co-operative. No stress on leadership.	Well-organized society; rigid status system by castes. High division of labor; work done in groups. Cycle of life varies between sacred and profane activities. Elaborate ceremonialism.	Well-organized tribe, matrilineal, matrilocal. Co-operative economic system. High development of religious-magical ritualism.	Not organized as tribe, patrilineal descent, loose in-group for protection, fighting, head-hunting. Distinctive age status. Gardening and barter, chief economic activities.
B. Basic habits				
1. Regulation and degree of rigidity in training	Little or no rigid training; rather indulgent toward child.	Initially indulgent treatment of infants, followed by severe teasing and rejection. Babies looked upon as a mixture of toy and puppet.	Few routines in early training. Mother and maternal uncle control.	Little or no rigid training. Later trained in self-reliance.
a. Nursing	Irregular, breast to pacify, any nursing mother may indulge child.	Suckled but infant is forcibly given pre-masticated solids at same time.	Irregular; breast to pacify.	Irregular; breast to pacify.
b. Weaning	Late, in third or fourth year.	Gradual.	End of first year or in second year.	Gradual, in second or third year.
c. Habits of elimination	Slight training; mild punishment for soiling; use of example and imitation.	Defecation in privacy stressed; urination not. Child not punished for wetting, mother's sarong.	No formal training; later mild punishment for soiling.	Very mild punishment for soiling; some fear of evil spirits as threat.
d. Walking	Gradual training.	Gradual training.	12 to 14 months; some handicap from cradle board, which is used for 6 months.	
2. Aggression—frustration; anger; fear responses	Docility not aggression stressed; slight allowance of anger in boys. Adults avoid leadership-dominance positions.	Severe teasing and denial of love, directed to infants after period of great indulgence, leads to frustration, withdrawal,	Little aggression; discouraged by parents; little frustration. Adult aggression: vicious gossip, striving for ritual status.	Little aggression at first; later much teasing and ridicule; sibling conflict; also adult later severe with children, who

* Among others the following sources were used in the preparation of this summary table: G. Bateson and M. Mead, *The Balinese Character*, 1942; W. Dennis, *The Hopi Child*, 1940; M. Mead, ed., *Competition and Cooperation Among Primitive Peoples*, 1937; M. Mead, *Growing Up in New Guinea*, 1930; M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935; J. W. M. Whiting, *Becoming a Kwoma*, 1941.

AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT
NATIVE PEOPLES *

MANUS	MARQUESANS	MUNDUGUMOR	TCHAMBULI
Tribal organization; patrilineal descent; clans strong. Leadership stressed. Status from exchange activities. Reciprocal services of groups stressed.	Tribal organization; bilateral descent; no classes; social rank determined by primogeniture, regardless of sex. Property both personal and communal; both individual and co-operative economics. Fishing, agriculture, trading. Polyandry: 2½ males to 1 female. Female stress on physical beauty.	Tribal organization; no clans. Severe sex segregation. Head-hunting and cannibalism. Fishing, agriculture, trading. No co-operation; much conflict. Polygyny.	Tribal organization; patrilineal descent; sex segregation as to residence; also some sex differentiation in occupations. High stress on ceremonials, handled by men; women more important in economics.
Little or no rigid training of young; father may use fear or physical punishment.	Little rigid discipline, especially of eldest child. Fear of female spirits strong, child not left alone. Little or no attention from mother.	Rather severe though not rigid training; indifference to child, rejection of child common.	No rigid discipline; casual treatment of child by mother, except to protect from physical danger and feeding.
Irregular; breast to pacify.	Irregular; soft food almost from beginning, no breast feeding.	Irregular, little breast feeding; breast used to pacify.	Slight regularity; generous with breast feeding.
In second or third year.	In first period; mother dislikes nursing as it spoils her beauty.	Early.	
Strict taboo; use of shame to punish; sex segregation in excretory acts.	No rigid training, at least not till after first year.	Some training and punishment for soiling.	No rigid training.
Gradual (swimming at same time).		At about two years.	
Aggression encouraged, rage at frustration; child may strike parent or other child. Later aggression transferred to intense personal competition	Infant frustration at mother's rejection in nursing. Adults little aggression, except when intoxicated. Some sexual jealousy, occasional homicide;	Strong sibling rivalry, older children aggressive to younger. Intense father-son hostility, children often hate father for taking a new wife. Conflict	Some aggression of older on younger children. Adults: women much more aggressive than men. Men's aggression chiefly disguised in suspicion

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION,
AMONG SELECTED

	MOUNTAIN ARAPESH	BALI	HOPI	KWOMA
(Continued) 2. Aggression— frustration; anger; fear responses	Fear of sorcery; of strangers; of any conflict.	and negativism. Aggression reappears in ceremonial form. Fears of evil spirits, witches, also ceremonialized.		obey, lie, or escape punishment by flight for time. Indirect aggression to parents by grumbling and insults behind backs. Much adult aggression. Fear of spirits as controls in some situations.
3. Love, sympathy, indulgence, co-operation	Much indulgence of children, who learn to love and trust everyone. Father-son affection strong. Co-operation with relatives and friends taught early. Sense of private-personal property very slight.	Much indulgence at first, followed by rejection. Co-operation reappears in communal dances, etc., also in work and in mutual obligations of giving and sharing.	Much indulgence in early years. Stronger love for father than mother or maternal uncles, who discipline children. Early trained in co-operation.	Much indulgence in early months and later less, as teasing and ridicule appear.
4. Sanctions and moral controls; growth of moral self	Few threats of punishment; high respect for others and their property. Sorcery applied to outsiders. Sense of guilt; anxiety over loss of affection, over loss of health, lack of co-operation from others. These considered penalties for aggression toward others.	Begins with mother rejection of child; partially offset by father's friendliness. Child observes, then imitates the elaborate social rules. Child introduced early into ceremonials.	Punishment chiefly by maternal uncle. Stealing and fighting condemned, also talking back to elders. Vicious public gossip as control. Strong shame, external control; witchcraft.	Boys tabooed from looking at naked girls. Strong punishment for infractions. Shame stressed, but deception considered all right if not discovered.
5. Basic education, knowledge, skills	Little or no formal education; by informal imitation, chiefly in family. Child not hurried to adulthood, kept from knowing about adult problems. Warning of sorcery stressed. Girls betrothed at about 10 years; go to live with future husband's family. Faith in an ordered, safe uni-	Training begins early; taught postures, dances, manipulation of fingers, arms, etc; later visual observation, then participation in adult economic life, and especially in group ceremonials. Trained in dissociations: speech, action, sleeplike responses to world around them.	Gradual instruction in skills and knowledge, chiefly by maternal uncle. Avoidance of danger taught very early, especially of fire and of falling off cliffs. Religious-magical training given high place.	Mother and co-wives help train children. Adolescent girls trained especially for women's role; boys initiated into men's group and then assume economic responsibilities and work habits. Child prodded to grow up. Rather elaborate system of training the young.

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AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT
NATIVE PEOPLES *

MANUS	MARQUESANS	MUNDUGUMOR	TCHAMBULI
and war. Much quarreling in group struggles for property. Fear of demons; but training in self-reliance.	also killing for sorcery. War a cultural outlet. Fear of spirits and sorcery.	and competition encouraged; much jealousy and envy; intense husband-wife conflict. Head-hunting and cannibalism. Fear of water and drowning.	and injured feelings. Sex rivalry between older and younger men. Some head-hunting, not particularly warlike however.
Sibling affection fostered. Father gets more love than mother from children. Child made to feel important; object of extreme solicitude by older persons.	Little or no affection from mother, considerable from father and secondary husbands. Strong sense of interdependence among males. Little deep or abiding love between sexes, no romantic love. No tenderness in love life, but sensuality. Unsatisfied in affections.	Little or no parent-child, or intersibling love. Sometimes affection from unmarried aunt or uncle. No romantic love.	Mother affectionate, especially to sons. Women of tribe show care and affection for any child.
External controls: through mediums and diviners and compact with supernatural guardian. Chief controls through internal sanctions of shame, guilt, prudery. Anxiety fostered by failure to achieve goal or by loss of supernatural support.	Strong fear of spirits, especially of female ogre; hypochondria; fear of loss of social support. Ridicule and laughter at others; sense of shame, guilt. Some male suicide over failure to secure a given female.	Severe punishment of children: slapping, harsh words. Many taboos. Shame and sense of "doing wrong." Virginity a high value, though taboo broken at times.	Severer controls begin in later childhood. Boys rejected by women's groups, but not accepted by men till older. Adult controls chiefly ceremonies. Shame in timid men.
Small children taught skills in handling canoes and in swimming; later in economics. Stress on competing with one's own record. High respect for property from earliest years; also basic moral-religious training given early. Sons of leading men take on their fathers' aggressiveness.	Training of males in manual skills of high order. Girls instructed in erotic practices from early age. Almost complete promiscuity and women sexually aggressive.	No orderly training of children, highly individualistic and varied. No work demands on child. Later, boy helps mother or older male relative. Girls help father and both learn from these experiences.	Same training for sexes till 6 or 7 years; gradual distinction in roles afterward. Much ceremonialism for boys and men, boys gradually shifting to men's group. Girls from 7 or 8 years on under tutelage of mothers; trained to be self-reliant as workers and future mothers. Girls taught to be sexually aggressive.

TABLE 1

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION,
AMONG SELECTED

	MOUNTAIN ARAPESH	BALI	HOPI	KWOMA
	verse; death not readily accepted.			
6. Growth of self or ego; self-assertion, pride. Personal goals, achievements. Emotional security. Rights and duties. Rate of development to maturity	Little or no stress on self-assertion; depress self in interest of others. No emphasis on ego-drive or individual goal, mastery, or achievement. Security depends on sense of being loved, and aid from others; insecurity from isolation from family and community. Child not hurried toward adulthood, but as adult takes much responsibility for parents.	Teasing sets up resistant patterns ambivalent to those of love. Schizoid or split personality begins to appear fairly early. Tends to dreamy, dissociated reaction in face of personal crisis. Fear or anger shown by indifference, except as sublimated ceremonials. Emotional security and integration through participation in ceremonials; but no sense of self-assertion as an individual. Stylized form of life. Indoctrination of adult status begins rather early, especially through ceremonials.	Trained in sense of dependency on group, on co-operation. Pride not permitted; success in terms of absence of self-assertion and aggression. Personal goals and achievements taboo, but group goals stressed. Aggression sublimated into gossip and certain mild rivalries. Individualism not stressed; insecurity from loss of group support and of participation. Child hurried toward adulthood.	Age grades. suckling infant, child, adolescent, adult, old age, each with more or less special role. Early indulgence and love later give way to aggressiveness, especially toward younger siblings; but some indirect aggression toward parents. Success measured in part by aggressiveness. Later strong ego-drive is directed toward nonrelatives, through sublimated aggressions or through head-hunting and war. These latter two give prestige. Insecurity comes from aggressions of people who may punish, sorcerize, or otherwise threaten him.
7. Maladjustments, nature and extent of. Behavior problems in children. Adult deviance from norms	Few children show temper tantrums; more in boys than in girls. Outlets not on persons but physical world. Little stealing or lying.	Negativism from rejection and frustration, but becomes "integrated" into the schizoid or split personality structure. Adults show forms of dissociation similar to our severe hysteria—this aside from the ceremonial dissociation; but these states are accepted. Not considered pathological.	Little misbehavior in children. Thumb-sucking not considered serious, mildly punished. Enuresis expected till second year, maternal uncle trains boys. Some temper tantrums, from second to sixth year, more common in boys. Some sadism toward animals. Stealing and lying rare. Masturbation ignored, not punished. Over-aggressiveness in children or adults considered "bad."	Some excessive fears.

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AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT
NATIVE PEOPLES *

MANUS	MARQUESANS	MUNDUGUMOR	TCHAMBULI
Strong ego-drive, stress on self-assertiveness. Personal goals and attainment aim at meeting pace set by group, but more important is to beat one's own record. Great pressure to gain and hold status. Emotional security depends on status, by success in exchange, and by kinship, including dead ancestors.	Early frustration and rejection by mother induces sense of insecurity. Males also made to feel inferior to women; fear of exploitation by women. Compensated security of males by men's groups, and lack of real and deep affection for women. Rank, however, disturbs male solidarity. Women build ego around sex drive and beauty; some insecurity with respect to other women. Both sexes have considerable food anxiety, perhaps rooted in early rejection abetted by later periods of economic shortage of food for all. Considerable homosexuality among men as compensation for distrust, fear, and inferiority with regard to women.	Strong self-assertion, especially females. For man, world divided between those whom he avoids and fears, and those who are friendly: a split or schizoid pattern. Pride strongly rewarded. Intense sense of possessiveness: wealth, prestige, leadership. Emotional security through success in head-hunting and war. Women severe to children, aggressive toward men. Child prodded toward maturity.	Male self identified with ceremonial life and art. Otherwise shy, timid, embarrassed in relation to women. Women self-reliant, aggressive, efficient, mildly tolerant of males. Men get security from what women give them. Women bound in solid in-group, men not. In theory men rule, actually women do. A kind of split culture. Girls urged on to maturity; boys are not.
Certain nonconformists do not strive for high status, considered deviant. Some temper tantrums in children, and some extreme lack of discipline.	Sometimes extreme rivalry among women; feigned pregnancy in women at times to gain attention. Lack of tenderness and deep affection makes for certain dissatisfactions and unhappiness. Homosexuality in men as compensatory outlet for affection.	Certain nonviolent, nonaggressive men, who are thought divergent. A few extremely aggressive men even exceed tribal ideal. No homosexuality.	Men who are aggressive and virile are deviant; a mild woman would not be labeled deviant. Some cases of hysterical deafness, some neurotic illness, some extreme violence.

placed into group ceremonials constructed around the theme of a struggle of good and evil forces. The child is soon inducted into these activities, first as spectator, and later as actor. On these occasions there is a great outburst of emotion, often ending in a frenzy which leads to true trance. This state is considered to bring the individual into close contact with supernatural forces.

The Balinese character, like all others, has its roots in the early training, and, as the child grows up, his life organization takes on what we should call a schizoid or dissociated form. But we must not assume this to be abnormal. Among the Balinese this is the *norm*, and, though we may find certain parallels among our own dementia praecox patients, we must not forget that the common acceptances and expectancies—which in Bali are put chiefly into group ceremonials—provide a standard of conformity and interaction that is, for the self and others, thoroughly normal and proper. Among the Balinese the deviant would be the person who did not develop such a splitting of thought and action. (See below on deviants.)

Another good illustration of cultural variability and its effects upon personality is brought out in Margaret Mead's analysis of three cultures—Arapesh, Mundugumor, and Tchambuli—which show remarkable contrasts in masculine and feminine roles and statuses as well as in related features of their cultures.⁶

An examination of the summary facts in Table 1 will show at once that in these three societies, living fairly close to one another, the major values differ considerably. Among the Arapesh there are strong affectional and dependency bonds in the family, and in the relations of the sexes there is no sharp conflict. Among the Mundugumor, on the other hand, who have strong individualistic values, there is continual strife between men and women for power and status. There is little overt affection or interdependency, but much intersexual struggle for dominance. In the third instance, the Tchambuli, we find a remarkable reversal of sexual role and status. The ideal calls for masculine dominance, but in actuality the women are the aggressive ruling members, while the men give their time and attention to the rich artistic and ceremonial interests of the society. Obviously, the biological functions of child-bearing cannot be avoided by the women; but the care of the offspring, especially beyond the first years, is neglected or left to the men. With reference to women, a man grows up to be timid, shy, and inferior. The women form a rather tightly knit group upon which the man depends for economic support and affection. This has its effects on his sexuality itself. With few exceptions there is none of the type of masculine dominance, accompanied by jealousy and even violence, that our laymen and experts alike have long taken to be a biologically determined trait of men.

There is some rivalry among men over women, but it tends to be furtive and to take the form of suspicion, petty gossip, spying, and backbiting among the men in their clubhouses. There is none of the open and fierce competition that is often ideal.

⁶ See M. Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935. Though this work has been subjected to severe criticism both for its factual presentations and for its interpretations, it is a genuine contribution to the task of correlating culture and personal life organization.

ized in other societies. Although the husband is theoretically head and master of his household and may on occasion even resort to violence to control a wife, for the most part the Tchambuli husband is subservient to his wives, who form a solid group, "confused by no rivalries, brisk, patronizing, and jovial."⁷

It should be noted that what is more or less normal or accepted in each of these societies is found in other societies along the fringe of normality. For example, there are many female-dominated households in our society. There are households in which the spouses continue together although there is sharp and continuing struggle for top status and control. And there are also some families in which the milder conjoint controls of both parents are found. With us the ideal or norm may traditionally be the masculine patriarchal control, but in fact the spousal relations vary considerably from male-controlled households to those in which the maternal role is heavily stressed. In our complex and heterogeneous culture there is no insistence on—that is, cultural expectancy of—either patriarchal or matriarchal controls. With us variability itself is within the norm.

Before making further comments on this whole topic, let us examine some instances of cultural variability and its impact on personalities in contemporary industrialized societies.

CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY AND CULTURE

If it is difficult to characterize the culture and the personality structure of primitive peoples, it is even more difficult to attempt this for contemporary industrialized societies. The culture of the latter is much more complex and heterogeneous, involving an enormous number of different culture patterns. Generalizations are open to question. Nevertheless, the study of national characteristics has produced some data on the basis of which tentative comparisons may be made. By common-sense observation and conventional stereotypes most people recognize differences in individuals which reflect differences in their cultural training. And more adequate studies have tended to support these everyday observations. Speaking statistically, the modal Englishman is not like the modal Frenchman. Certainly, American values and habits of thought are highly dissimilar to those of the military élite of Japan, as events in World War II have demonstrated.

For purposes of contrast and comparison we shall summarize certain basic features of the cultures of Nazi Germany, modern Japan, and the United States, as these are related to the development of personality in those three countries. But all three societies show also a vast range of individual differences, which for the present must be overlooked. For purposes of easy comparison our data are summarized in Table 2.

It is not possible here to offer extensive comment on this summary. The three industrialized societies may be compared, however, with regard to

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 264.

TABLE 2

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION,
AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT
AMONG JAPANESE, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS *

	JAPANESE	GERMANS	AMERICANS
A. Nature of social organization	Modern culture a mixture of medieval and industrialized features. Rigid class system, with many features of mass society. Myth of emperor's divinity strong; parliamentary forms, little liberalism; strong centralized state, under militaristic domination. Economic system mixture of industrial production, capitalism, and landlordism, with considerable state control. Religion a mixture of native Shintoism, emperor worship, and Buddhism. Patriarchal family system strong, and linked to emperor worship.	Modern culture highly industrialized but one in which democratic parliamentary government never deeply integrated into older medievally founded culture. State (government) and society closely identified. Economic system never as free of state controls, as was case in England; much carry-over of mercantilist practice. Although considerable variability and social mobility, in general the class system is made up of aristocracy (Junker and military contingents), upper bourgeois, petty bourgeois—seriously disintegrated by effects of World War I—and the working class. Religion, largely Catholic or Lutheran. Authoritarian and patriarchal family pattern strong, and deference for authority easily transferred to centralized state, symbolized by Emperor or Fuhrer. Much stress on masculine, aggressive trends, partially counterbalanced by some feminine, masochistic, romantic trends.	Strong individualism belief in God-given rights of person, often with little deep sense of moral duty or responsibility to community or state. Economic system traditionally laissez-faire capitalism, but with some modification in certain state protections and controls. Industrialization spreading rapidly, but not fully accomplished in agriculture. Open-class system with much stress on personal competition to get ahead, often resulting in intense disappointment and cynicism if goals are not attained. High moral and legal code, frequently flouted in practice. There is a split between democratic Christian idealism and overt economic and political activities to secure personal success. Religion: Catholic and wide variety Protestant churches, many Jews.

* From among numerous sources the following were particularly helpful: W. J. Clear, "The Jap as a Fighting Man," pamphlet published by Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1942; E. H. Erikson, "Hitler's Imagery and German Youth," *Psychiatry*, 1942, 5: 475-493; Eric Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, 1941; Geoffrey Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," *Transactions of the New York Academy of Sciences*, Series II, vol. 5, no. 5; pp. 106-124; A. H. Maslow, "The Authoritarian Character Structure," *J. Social Psychology*, 1943, 18: 401-411; G. B. Sansom, *Japan: A Short Cultural History*. Rev. ed., 1943; Otto Tolischus, *Toyko Record*, 1943, also L. Farago, an unpublished manuscript on Japanese psychology.

TABLE 2—*Continued*

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION, AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT AMONG JAPANESE, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS

	JAPANESE	GERMANS	AMERICANS
B. Basic habits	Rigid training; stress on regularity but some maternal indulgence in early period; later severe controls.	Rather rigid and regularized training, backed by punishment which in turn is somewhat softened by maternal indulgence and sentiment. School, clubs, and various adult institutions, especially the military and bureaucracy, carry forward patterns of severe discipline.	Variable and not too rigid controls in which maternal authority and influence are strong; paternal authority not greatly emphasized in practice. Discipline mixed with considerable emotional indulgence.
1. Regulation and degree of rigidity in training			
a. Nursing	Indulgent; child overfed, often forced to take food.	In general on regular schedule, but some variability.	Regularity tends to be stressed, but considerable variability.
b. Weaning	Gradual between second and third year.	Usually gradual but mildly severe; some variability.	Usually in first year but gradual and with considerable variability.
c. Habits of elimination	Cleanliness training and sphincter controls begun very early; great stress on defecatory habits.	Usually gradual but mild punishment for infractions; general stress on regularity and cleanliness; some variability.	Considerable variability as to severity, but cleanliness tends to be stressed.
d. Walking	Gradual, but with care; trained against danger of injury in locomotion about house. (Also special training in sitting.)	Usually in second year; gradual.	Usually in second year; gradual.
2. Aggression-frustration; anger, fear responses	Some emotional outbursts against training; but, from third or fourth year on, the boy is encouraged in overt aggression, toward mother and sisters especially. Girls are trained in docility and passivity. Early fears concerning falling down and bodily injury.	Some emotional outbursts against rigid training which are met by punishment and suppression; aggression toward discipline, especially paternal, tends to be suppressed and later transferred to outgroups, e. g. other classes, or enemies of state. Sibling rivalry	Aggression and competition encouraged; sibling rivalry strong, later carried over to other group and interpersonal relations. Conflictive and competitive aggression later deflected into vocational, business, and various forms of group struggle.

TABLE 2—Continued

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION, AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT AMONG JAPANESE, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS

	JAPANESE	GERMANS	AMERICANS
		strong. Boys encouraged in aggressiveness; girls in more docile and domestic roles.	
3. Love, sympathy, indulgence, co-operation	Considerable indulgence toward young baby; new baby in family gets much attention, both from parents and older children. Girls trained to show care and affection; boys soon get ambivalent patterns of showing some affection which is quickly overshadowed by aggression. Strong family fidelity.	Love and indulgence of mother and other feminine influences tend to counteract more severe aspects of masculine discipline. Ambivalence toward paternal authority since there is considerable affection for father; some ambivalence toward maternal affection in form of loss of earlier deference and resistance to feminine love. Boys encouraged to follow paternal authoritarianism, girls to follow maternal docility and affection. Later there is often a curious mixture of romanticism, love of nature, and other gentler qualities and aggression, cruelty, and violence. Often there is a conscious resistance to sympathy and love as weak counterbalanced by unconscious craving for affection and willingness to suffer (masochism).	Considerable love and indulgence, in early years especially; but interpersonal affection counterbalanced by early appearance of rivalries. Overt expression of sexuality strongly tabooed. Some co-operation with close in-group emphasized but not highly rewarded as are gains from successful interpersonal competition.
4. Sanctions and moral controls; growth of moral self	Mockery one of earliest punishments, supported by some physical punishment. Ridicule from members of another group lead to rejection by one's own. Later shame and guilt attitudes built up as defense of status or "face." Strong awareness of danger of losing respect of others.	Father domination and control transferred to top-sergeant attitude of severity. Strong sense of hierarchy of authority: deference to those above, discipline directed toward those below. External punishment gradually internalized into sense of guilt and shame associated both	Father domination in theory, but considerably modified by role of mother who combines discipline and indulgence. External punishments by mores and law; but soon internalized into strong sense of guilt and shame. Failures tend to be attributed to personal incompe-

TABLE 2—*Continued*

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION,
AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT
AMONG JAPANESE, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS

	JAPANESE	GERMANS	AMERICANS
	No sense of guilt regarding sex.	with personal status and success and that of particular groups: family, school, class, trade union, officer corps, professions, etc. Identification with power in others counterbalanced by drive for power over others.	tence, reflecting emphasis on personal competition and personal status.
5. Basic education: skills and knowledge	Complete obedience to patriarchal authority. Status training severe; also with regard to politeness, deference, and reverence for sacred symbols, authority, and power. Boys early indoctrinated into aggressive roles; girls, into passivity. Manual skills and aesthetic appreciation provided. Much stress on the need to know everything, related to insecurity feelings.	Early training severe and authoritarian. High specialization in skills rewarded. Considerable stress on book learning and on mystic identification with group, especially race, community, and state. Moral codes definitely linked to in-group rewards. Nationality solidarity deeply ingrained.	Early training rather mild; not prodded toward adulthood. Much protective coloration by moral verbalisms. Importance of specialized skills and knowledge related to competitiveness. Money-making and other external marks of success highly rewarded. At same time much emphasis on Christian love, sympathy, and good will.
6. Growth of self or ego; self-assertion, pride. Personal goals, achievements. Emotional security. Rights and duties. Rate of development toward maturity.	Great stress on conformity, on having a stable fixed universe. Chief concern is to have status; also great fear of mockery, ridicule, and loss of prestige. Boys and men are encouraged to show self-assertion, pride, and aggression; girls and women to show passivity and docility. Goals identified with those of family, class, and state. Little identification with groups outside own nation. Insecurities arise from loss of face or status. Ambivalence shown in politeness, social rituals, aesthetic interests, and extreme sadism in war. Great stress on strength; dis-	Identification with somewhat indulgent, soft, and masochistic mother quickly offset by identification, especially of boys, with tyrannical and somewhat sadistic father. This duality later directed to own group as object of intimate identification and aggression toward out-group. Kindness to others, especially outside the group, viewed as weakness, thus indicating limited socialization. Hence great stress on communal, national, and racial solidarity which bespeaks an intense inner sense of loneliness, isolation, and anxiety in the individual. Considerable	Many and diffuse identifications with groups, leading to varied and often inconsistent roles. Strong status drive; but authority, status, and pride counterbalanced by roles of kindness, generosity, and expansiveness. Overt aggression somewhat encouraged in early years, especially among boys, but later sublimated into competition: economic, political, and recreational. Sentimentality, love, and romanticism mixed with strong personal drives for power. But greatest emphasis is on personal struggle. Sense of guilt and shame for failure—or

TABLE 2—*Continued*

SUMMARY OF PRINCIPAL FEATURES OF TRAINING, DISCIPLINE, AGGRESSION, AFFECTIONATE RESPONSES, SANCTIONS, EDUCATION, AND SELF-DEVELOPMENT AMONG JAPANESE, GERMANS, AND AMERICANS

	JAPANESE	GERMANS	AMERICANS
	<p>dain for weakness or sympathy. Rights and duties center around family, class, and especially around state; identification with aims of nation and emperor. Social ritualism and perfectionism—according to their rules—emphasized.</p>	<p>fear of democratic individualism, since it would leave person isolated and exposed through loss of group-centered support of others. Intense drive for power, found by identification with race, class, and national units. Yet no growth of democratic political man and role as individual making own choices and bearing own responsibility therefor. Certain sentimentality and romanticism as offset for compensated strength and cruelty, but insight or identification with those outside the group not well developed. That is a mixture of sadism and aggression with masochism and dependence.</p>	<p>threat of same—act as goad to striving.</p>
7. Maladjustments, nature and extent of. Behavior problems in children. Adult deviance from norms.	<p>Ceremonial suicide accepted as normal. Excessive fear of loss of face, of showing or admitting any weakness, and of meeting a world which is not fully fixed and understood. Children show some temper tantrums, some anxieties under the severe regimen of cleanliness and adaptation to authority. Adult deviance found in anxiety over loss of status, face, and in those who have taken on some of the morality of the Christian Occident.</p>	<p>Considerable splitting of personality structure, partly from lack of understanding of others and of the world outside. Tendency to breakdown when the fixed world outside does not operate according to plan. Guilt and shame are often counterbalanced by intense self-pity and paranoid projection on others. Suicide common. Basic inner weakness and anxiety bolstered by continual demonstrations of power by overt means, including violence.</p>	<p>Tendency to develop split personality due to sharp divergence between Christian and democratic moral principles, faith in law, and belief in fairmindedness and the overt practices of intense economic competition, of class conflict, lawbreaking, and of struggle for power. This condition is evident in high degree of personal anxiety and lack of inner integration. Excessive individualism often leaves no central focus for individual with respect to group, be it family, class, political party, or nation.</p>

certain basic matters: sources of security and of insecurity, and sources of ego-satisfaction and of ego-depreciation. Let us begin with Japan.

First of all, Japanese society is rigidly organized and stable. This is evident in the family, in class organization, in the community, and in the nation as a whole. The family is built essentially around parent-son relations, and from the father the son picks up the basic codes of authority which later carry over to others. In the family complete obedience, loyalty, and submergence of the personal will are quickly conditioned. The whole ideal of the individual's relation to the nation and especially to the emperor is founded on the family pattern. From infancy on the individual is trained to complete submergence of self to the will of the larger collectivity, the Japanese race and nation, which has, under the emperor, a divine mission to rule the world. The matter is neatly illustrated in "The Way of Subjects," an important statement prepared some years ago to rationalize the Japanese imperialist policy. At one point it states: "The respect of gods by the Emperor is reflected in the love of His subjects. The fundamental character of Japan is based on this 'theocracy'... The Emperor loves his subjects with a paternal heart, and the subjects serve the Emperor with a spirit as of bowing to their great father... The Imperial Family is the fountain source of the Japanese nation, and national and private lives issue from this... The way of the subjects is to be loyal to the Emperor in disregard of self."⁸

Thus the patriarchal family form is transferred to the imperial family and especially to the emperor, who is still considered to be divine. Such a source of complete identification is bolstered on every hand by a wide variety of ceremonials. These include the Great Shinto Purification Ritual and the codes of the warrior, justification for which is provided in the Bushido—the ancient code of the Samurai. Then, too, almost every aspect of daily life is routinized. The result of all this is to provide a stable, secure, and safe world for the individual. The idealized mission of the folk, moreover, gives an outlet for personal ego-expansion which under modern means of indoctrination can amount to fanaticism.

Closely related to this intense in-group feeling, in which individualistic impulses are submerged and then reshaped in complete adherence to the collective aim, is the intense hostility toward the threatening out-groups or other elements in the external world. The most violent aggression is permitted toward the enemy, and any sign of kindness, fair dealing, or compromise on his part is viewed with disdain and as an indication of weakness. The aggressive spirit is expressed in familial concepts. Strength, force, and authority are considered as "male" principles in the universe, and compassion, compromise, and democratic forms are thought of as "female" weaknesses.

Yet such rigidity and solidarity are purchased at the cost of situations which set up insecurities and may, on occasion, tend to depress the strong ego-manifestations. A number of features become apparent on closer acquaintance. One is the "face-saving" that is essential to individuals in this society. Curiously enough, from our standpoint, the young person is conditioned to this with regard to reactions from persons outside the family or other in-group. Geoffrey Gorer puts it thus: "Criticism or mockery by strangers... [brings] punishment from the parents... The fear of

⁸ From "The Way of Subjects," quoted in O. D. Tolischus, *Tokyo Record*, 1943, pp. 423, 424. By permission of Reynal & Hitchcock, Inc.

criticism from strangers is one of the chief motivating forces for young Japanese during the whole of their childhood and adolescence; it is the most potent threat for enforcing conformity."⁹ A group turns against one of its own members who is ridiculed or defeated or otherwise outdone by outsiders. This need for approval from the outside world takes on, from our standpoint, the nature of an obsession. The Japanese have no sense of sin in our terms, but sense of shame is a potent element in their lives.¹⁰ It is a factor, along with emperor-worship, in the unwillingness of Japanese fighting men to surrender. It is one cultural cause of the institution of hara-kiri, or ceremonial suicide.

Closely related to this anxiety about losing status is the insatiable demand to know and control the outside world. This is one way to defend oneself against the threat of ego-degradation. In one sense the very rigid organization of life in Japan rests on this need to avoid anxiety and uncertainty by fixity and finality. The formality of social intercourse; the minute control of the details of a household or a garden; the need to know, as soon as possible, a stranger's age, business, social status, and the like—these symbolize the Japanese desire for a controlled universe. When it is not forthcoming, a person may easily become insecure and wary of his adjustment.

The double-dealing, deceit, amazing espionage, and other elements of Japanese character revealed in diplomacy and war also reflect much this same demand. It is evident in the attempt by legislation to prevent all change. Even thoughts which have to do with a new world are forbidden. From a cultural standpoint, of course, one may well ask in view of all this how to account for the amazing adaptation of modern industrial techniques in Japan. More or less forced to accept it at the outset—after hundreds of years of almost complete isolation—the Japanese have learned to know and control modern technology. But the ideas and implications of democratic thinking, of individualism, of flexibility and inventiveness, which are, in the Occident, associated with the beginning and continuation of modern industrial life, representative government, and personal freedom, have not penetrated deeply into Japanese thought or action. Here we see a specific example of the generalization that mechanical and other scientific techniques may be diffused to a new region without carrying with them the ideational and other nonmaterial aspects of the culture from which they sprang. Modern Japanese culture represents a grafting of modern technology onto a feudal social order and primitive thought ways which are highly different from our own. To ignore this is to fly in the face of facts. Certainly Japanese personality structure is in many features quite alien to our own. The fact that the Japanese has adopted our machines does not mean that he thinks, feels, or acts as we do.

Whereas the Japanese represents a high degree of personal identification with a social or collective ideal, and submerges his life in that of his group, the American tends to symbolize an extreme of almost anarchic individualism. Japanese commentators have not been slow to realize this fact and to take advantage of it in dealing with us. Our strengths and securities and opportunities for ego-expansion lie along lines that diverge from theirs.

⁹ From G. Gorer, "Themes in Japanese Culture," *loc. cit.*, 122.

¹⁰ This attitude is described in Warren J. Clear, "Close-up of the Jap Fighting-Man"

Our society lacks any high degree of rigid organization. Though there is some shift toward more fixed classes, for the most part the flexible, open-class system noted by Charles H. Cooley still obtains.¹¹ The stress with us is on individual merit and attainment. The assumption is that on the basis of one's own efforts one can rise in the social-economic scale. The successful person is accorded status and approval and secures a high sense of security and prestige therefrom. On the other hand, anxieties constantly threaten one, for aspirations are likely to outrun accomplishment. This feature of American personality has become increasingly apparent as the frontier has disappeared and as war and economic depressions have interfered with what was once believed to be an inevitable social and personal progress. Furthermore, the anonymous nature of mass society has added other anxiety-stimulating situations. The widespread disintegration of primary-group organization and controls, coupled with this intense drive for individual attainment, exposes a person to additional threats from his environment. It is pretty apparent that the recent tendency to throw responsibility for economic security and health upon the government is the result of efforts of individuals to find some source of comfort and stability in an otherwise uncertain and hostile world.

Another feature of our culture which makes for personality disturbance is the conflict among the ideals laid before the child and adolescent. On the one hand we stress Christian morality, the Golden Rule, sympathy, love of our fellow men, and humanitarian sentiments. On this basis we develop a conscience and a sense of guilt and sin. In contrast, we emphasize individual ambition, the need to get ahead economically, and other aspects of *laissez-faire* philosophy. This dichotomy often makes for mental conflict and a sense of confusion and guilt. However, through sentimental charity and other institutionalized devices we ease our conscience and provide rationalizations for our somewhat divided lives.

One important source of security, but often a partial one, is found in the varied group attachments open to the individual in our society. Americans are notorious "joiners," and part of the motivation is doubtless the inner demand to belong, to be "one of the gang." But loyalties and activities in these groups, at the secondary level especially, are likely to be segmental and to conflict with other loyalties. What we lack, perhaps, especially in times of peace and prosperity, is a central theme in life, a focus for irrational and emotionally controlled allegiance and faith. Americans have had this in the past and, like other peoples, tend to develop it in times of national danger. But there is no doubt that some of the problems of national morale, some of the group splits in our own time, reflect this lack at the level of social organization. For the individual it is made evident in his competing loyalties or in his indifference to national survival. It is seen in his escape, on the one hand, into the rationalistic selfishness of getting what he can "while the getting is good," and, on the other, into emotional political and economic cults, mob actions, new mystic religions, or other fantasies which become widely approved.

(pamphlet published by the Command and General Staff School, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1942).

¹¹ See C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909. It is well to point out that in one area we have a rather fixed class structure. Negro-white relations, especially in our Southern states, take on a caste form. This raises some interesting problems about American personality structure, but for our purposes at this point we must neglect them. Some aspects of this will be discussed in Chapter XI.

In contrast to these elements which make for and reflect insecurities stands the high importance in American society of flexibility, growth, and individual creativeness. Both on our economic and on our political fronts we offer great opportunities for accomplishment. Moreover, our basic faith in political democracy offers the individual a constant challenge to participate with his fellows in determining the kind of world he is to live in. This kind of system, of course, is easily threatened, and it remains to be seen if democracy, as we know it, can survive in industrialized mass society. What is needed, as we shall see later, is a balance between the flexibility or individualism and the fixity of group order. Such a co-ordination demands a recognition of, and a place for, both rational and irrational elements in the human personality. Since much of our discussion revolves around situations and persons in American society, we shall have ample opportunity to note the difficulties involved in trying to obtain such a balance.

The typical German personality stands between the Japanese and the American, as we have described them. Under the impact of National Socialism, however, German culture has moved definitely in the direction of the rigidity of the Japanese. It remains to be seen how thoroughly the Nazi program of *Gleichschaltung* ("co-ordination") and "absorption" of all cultural elements has gone. In the midst of a mighty conflict it is difficult to discover just how far the Hitler regime was able to move the entire German nation toward a world of fixed structure and absolute ideals. Yet there is no doubt that the German cultural framework contains many features unlike those of the British or American.

Germany is much more highly organized than the United States. This is a hang-over from the feudal order. The class system is more rigid than ours, and, though Germany accepted both Christianity and later industrial capitalism, she never developed the individualistic tradition of Britain and America. Therefore, though the split between striving for economic power and the maintenance of the Christian idealism of goodwill and love is evident in her culture, it is not so powerful a factor as in our own or the British culture.¹²

In German thought and practice the state has a different place than with us. It is a larger, over-all power, which in the minds of Hegel and others becomes a mystic entity above the national society. It long served as a unifying symbol for politically separate German states. Under Prussian leadership it became the basis for political unification. Hitler's view of the totalitarian state is only an extension of cultural trends that were already present in modern Germany. To the state, moreover, he added the concepts of folk and race, dressing them up in romantic mystic form.¹³

For the individual the basic training in security and ego-expansion comes in the family, under a stern, patriarchal system. The child under the mother is indulged,

¹² The Lutheran emphasis on "Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are God's" is, for Protestant Germans, a convenient rationalization of a split set of values. Catholic Germans find similar justification in the distinction between temporal and spiritual interests.

¹³ By "added" I do not mean that these concepts were original with Hitler and his colleagues. These are also old in German culture, but they were stressed and linked to the ideal of a powerful state.

but at the same time insistent demands are made for obedience, orderliness, and authority. The severity of this training increases as the child grows older and passes into the hands of the father and other masculine influences.¹⁴ Rebellion against this discipline and control is suppressed at first but is soon given an outlet in culturally conditioned conceptions of Germany's sacred mission as a world power and of the enemies who would encircle and crush her. This culturally approved transfer of aggression to an external object gives the individual a means by which he can integrate his world and himself. Security and ego-expansion derive from identification with the larger "collective will" of the race, folk, and state.

On the other hand, insecurity appears as fear of retaliation and of revolt against the institutionalized cruelties. As with the Japanese, the organized cruelty which heaps one violence on another bespeaks an inner sense of uncertainty. These people must constantly convince themselves and others by hostilities toward the environment that they are all-powerful. The counterpart of their egocentricity is the submission demanded by the hierarchy of strict authority and obedience. This master-slave pattern is an outcome of what they call the *Fuhrerprinzip*, the "Leader Principle." And, as the old maxim has it, "the most abject slave makes the most terrible master."

The German conscience is compounded of Christian influences and the demands of complete allegiance to the nation-folk-race ideal. Divergence from the expected conduct induces a mixture of sense of guilt and sense of shame. There is, however, no such strong sense of face-saving as is apparent in the Japanese. In military matters the Germans operate more within the orbit of Western culture. Despite propaganda and the atrocities born of desperation, it is still true that for the most part they fight according to rules more or less common to all the military traditions of the Occident. This is not true of the Japanese. Moreover, some deviation from the code and cult of hardness, obedience, and cruelty is found in the softer, romantic elements that are still evident in their thought and conduct. Some habits of *Gemullichkeit* emerge from their past, despite the orders and indoctrination coming from the Nazi leaders.

Neither have the Nazis succeeded in completely destroying certain democratic and individualistic elements in the older German character. This is evident in the fact that, despite the *Gestapo* and omnipresent propaganda, resistance to the Hitler regime continued. The courage of the church groups, both Protestant and Catholic, is a specific illustration of this. It is in these areas of their life that the Germans maintain some psychological contact with democratic and individualistic societies. Comparable divergencies in culture are not apparent in Japanese tradition. There the few liberals represent no deep and abiding features of the people's history.

For the individual German, however, the *Vaterland* still constitutes a powerful ideal for which continuing sacrifices may be expected. One of the problems of culturally reconditioning the German will be to reorganize this ideal in some functional relation with other nations along political, economic, and other interests. Perhaps the *Bruderschaft* (brotherhood) now associated with obedience to the *Fuhrer* can be shifted to other national groups, and the leader symbol become linked to some ideal

¹⁴ Elementary education in Germany is male-controlled. Though there are some women teachers in the primary schools, a maternal educational pattern such as ours has little place in German education.

of international comity. What applies to Germany in this regard applies with much the same force to Britain, America, and other nations. Using our concepts of maturity, individuals must learn to move from infantile and adolescent identifications sufficiently to permit a co-ordination of local and national loyalty with global and international co-operation.

SOME INTERPRETATIONS OF CULTURE AND PERSONALITY

We sum up our review of the main factors in the interplay of the individual, society, and culture.

First, the individual has certain drives and mechanisms of learning. The larger the population, the more probable is a wide range of individual variability in strength of drives and in potential learning capacity. The homogeneity of tribesmen, numbering often but a few hundred, is not entirely a result of cultural forces. Small numbers and generations of inbreeding have produced a homogeneity of organic structure and function which is not found in the large and mobile populations of our industrialized mass society.

Second, the individual's drives are satisfied chiefly within the frame of social interaction. This is especially true of feeding, sex, and protection, and those which fall outside the social act at first, such as sleep and elimination, are quickly brought within its scope. As a result, practically *all* of man's basic and acquired drives operate within a social framework. Moreover, despite the tremendous impact of culture upon human learning, such basic personality features as aggression, love, and dominance or submission emerge as a result of personal-social, or subcultural, conditioning. The degree of cultural rigidity or flexibility may have much to do with the extent to which this early but important learning takes place. In any case, individual variation depends not only on biologically inherited differences in drive and capacity to learn, but also on personal-social and cultural effects.

Third, the culture gives content and direction to the individual's learning. Attitudes, values, and habits, the patterns of co-operation or conflict, and other interactional processes are largely determined by culture. Yet culture never has been and probably never will be able completely to determine the life organization of individuals. There will remain differences in strength of desires and in learning potentialities, and various personal or private interpretations of experience, which, though socially and culturally qualified, still remain unique and highly individualized. In fact, it is a combination of inherited differences, of the effects of personal-social conditioning, and of differential participation in culture that makes for human individuality and for inventiveness, creativeness, revolt, and

divergences of other kinds, some of which become beneficial to other members of the society and some of which do not.

However, the particular content of culture varies greatly. The economic systems range from those managed and controlled in a co-operative or collective manner to those in which individual ownership and operations are general. So, too, political organizations vary from high concentrations of power in a special personage, such as a divine king, or in a small élite, to a widely diffused and democratic control by the mass of adult citizens. Familial organization varies chiefly in being monogamous, polygynous, or polyandrous. And differences in religion, art, and recreation are well-known.

The processes by which the major social institutions function also vary from those that are highly individualistic, competitive, or conflictive to those in which co-operation has a high place. Yet nowhere is opposition in some form completely absent, nor is co-operation lacking even in the most individualistic society. Another universal process, of course, is differentiation, or specialization, of social roles. Even in the most rudimentary societies there is some kind of division of labor, based on age and sex if not on skill. Cultural advancement in any form requires some kind of specialization in the major cultural imperatives: family survival, food-getting, communal control, and religion and magic. From these bases the specialization spreads to all other areas of group action.

Turning now to personality organization itself, let us present some tentative generalizations. We may open this discussion by quoting some general inferences from Margaret Mead's analysis of the culture and personal development of thirteen tribes, some characterized by a high degree of co-operation, some by competition, and some which she designated as highly individualistic. She writes:

"Strong ego development can occur in individualistic, competitive, or cooperative societies.

"Whether a group has a minimum or a plentiful subsistence level is not directly relevant to the question of how cooperative or competitive in emphasis a culture will be.

"The social conception of success and the structural framework into which individual success is fitted are more determinative than the state of technology or the plentifulness of food.

"There is a correspondence between: a major emphasis upon competition, a social structure which depends upon the initiative of the individual, a valuation of property for individual ends, a single scale of success, and a strong development of the ego.

"There is a correspondence between: a major emphasis upon cooperation, a social structure which does not depend upon individual initiative or the exercise of power

over persons, a faith in an ordered universe, weak emphasis upon rising in status, and a high degree of security for the individual.”¹⁵

Though there are variations in the norms of cultural maturation and in the rate at which an individual attains maturity, every society has some concept of what constitutes adult membership. In comparison with our own practices, the adolescent is prodded toward adulthood in some societies and held back in others. These differences are not necessarily linked with particular social processes. For example, among the Hopis, a society in which co-operation has a high place, the youth is hurried into adult status so that he may take on important ritualistic functions. Among the Arapesh, who stress mild individualism and informal co-operation, the young are kept back from assuming mature roles.

The rate of maturation may change in a society as economic or other institutions change. For instance, in pre-industrial colonial and pioneer America, the adolescent was expected to move rather rapidly toward adult responsibilities. Young men and women took over many adult duties in their late teens and often married and set up their own households before they were twenty. Even as late as the Civil War a considerable proportion of Union soldiers were under eighteen years of age at the time of their enlistment. In recent decades, in our industrialized mass society, there has been a definite extension of the dependency of young people on their parents. We tend to retard the development toward maturity. The laws regulating child labor have been revised to raise the age below which persons may not be hired to labor, and we have kept an ever larger part of our older teen-age youth in school. The force of this custom was amply demonstrated during the early part of World War II, when many parents, abetted by various sentimental organizations, opposed the drafting of eighteen-year-olds for military duty on the ground that young men of such “tender age” were too immature to face responsibilities as soldiers. However, modern armies everywhere draw heavily on the young manpower of their countries.

Another matter of importance in an interpretation of the relations of culture and individual life organization is the disparity between cultural norms or ideals and the actualities of everyday life. In most societies there are not only norms expressed in the mores and law, but also certain ideals held up before the growing child and adolescent. These involve not only the goals but the manner of achieving them. They may set up personal aspirations for making money, attaining leadership in the community ceremonials, becoming a first-class warrior, or getting higher status in some other kind of action highly valued in the community. In actuality,

¹⁵ M. Mead, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, 1937, p. 511. By permission of McGraw-Hill Book Co., Inc.

most individuals fall considerably below these ideals, both in attainment and in the manner by which they get what they go after.

We note a few examples. In many societies, despite severe taboos on premarital relations of the sexes, there is considerable promiscuity, often without much punishment. In our Christian world the Golden Rule is often more honored in the breach than otherwise. In politics party leaders sound high ideals and make many promises while using all the tricks of machine politics and the spoils system to get into office and to stay in once they have been elected. The Spartan or Puritan idealism of revolutionary parties is well known. So, too, is the fact that revolutionists often rationalize conduct such as terrorism or personal graft on the dubious ethical principle that the end justifies the means. In the name of mass democracy the Communist Party of the Soviet Union has built up a new élite controlling every aspect of community and national life—through the bureaucracy, the military, the educational program, and every other agency of control. The Nazi Party likewise boasts of its idealism but actually operates pretty much at the level of mediæval robber barons or of their modern counterparts, the criminal gangsters. The Japanese ideology is expressed in fancy terms of universal justice and good will, which stand in sharp contrast to the conduct of Japanese military and civil officials toward their own and especially toward non-Japanese populations.

This divergence between cultural ideals and actions is reflected in the personalities of those concerned. Even though the sense of guilt or shame may prevent too great a departure from the cultural ideals, justifications of various sorts are quickly built up. Ruthless moneymakers pay off their consciences by contributing later—when their wealth is accumulated—to education, charity, and religion. Violent revolutionists defend their terrorism and cruelties in the name of absolutes of varying hue. Though the rank and file in a population do not impress us so much in these matters as do those in positions of dominance, there is evidence that they excuse their own divergence from the cultural norms and ideals in much the same way. The general tolerance in this country for the quick and easy moneymaking of the politically and economically powerful reflects the same kind of conduct, on a smaller scale, among run-of-the-mill people. The petty graft, the "chiseling," the psychological, if not monetary, rewards which come from "putting something over" on another, are all of a piece with the similar practices on a grand scale among the leaders and the élite. With us the more or less open approval of financial success, be it among businessmen, bankers, speculators, gamblers, or gangsters, indicates that we tacitly accept a system of rewards which do not coincide with the Christian and humanitarian idealism to which we give lip service.

Of great contemporary interest is the varied manner in which aggression is handled in different societies, primitive and civilized. Granted that

some form of aggression arises everywhere in the personal-social and early culturized interactions of parents and children and of siblings or childhood playmates, we may well ask how the outlets for aggression vary, and how we may account for the differing intensity or amounts of antagonism which are revealed by individuals and groups. In some societies aggression seems to be encouraged and increased; in others it seems to be reduced and highly sublimated. It is doubtful if it is ever entirely suppressed or wiped out, though cultural conditioning seems amazingly successful in reducing its vigor. Yet the quantity theory of aggression is open to considerable qualifications. According to some, especially those who have been much influenced by Freudian psychology, the individual possesses a given amount or quantum of energy which must, and will be expressed in some form or other. The first outflow of this energy may be stopped by frustrations, but the energy is not lost. It remains to be re-directed in one way or another. It may take the form of neurotic or psychotic breakdowns, it may be deflected into criminal acts or into intensive competition with one's fellows for money and power, or it may be directed against the out-group in the form of overt conflict, say in mob violence, revolution, or war.

This view does not seem to be firmly supported by the evidence from cultural or personal history. Though later cultural training cannot completely offset the earlier personal-social and cultural conditioning which forms the basis of aggression, it seems to the present writer that culture can and does enhance or reduce the amount, as well as change the direction, of aggression. In other words, aggression as a drive is not purely instinctive and is not incapable of modification by learning. Rather it is a by-product developed at first in attempts to satisfy hunger, sexual desire, and other needs. Later it is modified by direct encouragement or by the substitution of other forms of interaction. It does not appear that all aggression ever completely disappears. But that it is, in part, the product of learning or habit-formation as well as of basic frustrations seems established in fact.

The development of aggression in the personality and its subsequent displacement on public and out-group objects or situations is neatly illustrated in both Germany and Japan. The foundations of antagonism are found, there as elsewhere, in the family and other primary-group conditioning, both personal-social and cultural. On the one hand we find the dominance of a strong, patriarchal father or of an older brother, or of both, which provides a framework for building intense deference, humility, and fear on the part of the young child, especially the son. Opposite the stern and overbearing father is the mother, who is given a lowly position in the social scale, but who none the less affords both discipline and some indulgence and comfort to the child growing up in a harsh and rigid world. As the child grows up, however, the aggression which has been practiced on him by the father or older

brother may in turn be put upon a still younger brother or some person outside the family. But the transfer does not stop at this point; in both Japan and Germany the state affords a focus for loyalty, deference, obedience, and fidelity. The emperor or the *Führer*—both psychologically partaking of the mystic and the divine—replaces the natural father. Individual wishes are submerged in the complete acceptance of the leader as a symbol and of the state as the basic object of worship and sacrifice. The counterpart of this reverence and obedience is the aggression practiced upon enemies inside or outside the state.

Moreover, the individual is trained from childhood on in just this form of aggression. Instead of being diffused and sublimated into a variety of channels, such as sports, business, politics, and other competitive undertakings, the aggressive spirit finds its greatest rewards—of status and power—in the military career. All else tends to be secondary to this. Both the deference and loyalty and the aggression and violence are now expressed in abstract principles: a divinely given mission to rule the world, or some other impersonal aim.

There is little doubt that the direct aggression fostered by early training is increasingly rewarded as it develops into the fanatic zeal of the Nazi or Japanese warrior, and that sympathy, kindness, and affection for those outside the closely knit in-group are reduced by lack of practice or by punishment. The latter takes the form of ridicule of one who is soft, sentimental, and lacking in masculine and warriorlike attributes.

Yet love and sympathy do not entirely disappear in these societies. Comment has often been made on the sharp contrast between the politeness and gentleness of life among the Japanese at home and the extreme brutality and sadism of the Japanese at war; and, despite the Nietzschean doctrine of hardness, so touted by the Nazis, the age-long sentimentality and romanticism of the German appear again and again. They are found in his songs, in his interest in pets and small children, and in his lovmaking, which is romantic despite the dogmas of racial purity and of procreation as a mechanical device for producing future citizens of the Reich.

In both Germany and Japan there is a split between the extreme of sadism and cruelty and the affectional patterns derived from maternal indulgence. The implication of such a sharp division—for healthy personality as judged by democratic and humane standards—is evident, not only in the larger problem of power—its distribution, use, and morality—but in the forms which aggression takes in various societies, in prejudice, in warfare, in competition, in sports, and in a variety of other circumstances and institutions. We shall have many occasions to return to this matter in later chapters.

The variations of life organization around cultural ideals or norms reveal the degree of flexibility permitted. In some societies there is far greater rigidity than in others, and one of the striking features of democratic capitalistic countries, in contrast to totalitarian, is the high degree of individual variation permitted. On the other hand, this value is not without its price to the individual. It has been pointed out many times that in our society extreme individualism, personal competition, and the approval of conflict lead to considerable personal anxiety. As we have noted, this

derives, in part, from the opposition between the ideals of Christianity and those approving vigorous struggle for economic and political power.

Considerations of this kind bring us to the question of how societies define the normal. And this implies, of course, some deviation from the standard. It is now pretty well accepted that every society has some conception of expected and accepted conduct which serves as a norm or frame of judgment of the individual. This is set by the culture rather than by biological or psychological standards as such. Most societies also tolerate certain persons who diverge from these norms. Some of the norms fall definitely into the moral and legalistic field. Everywhere we find some standards defining the protection of life and property, the rights and duties of individuals and groups, and the community, tribal, or national welfare. Without these there could be no order, stability, or solidarity. And most societies have some kind of criterion as to what is normal in personality make-up, including ideas, attitudes, and overt habits.

Many illustrations could be given in support of this statement. For example, among the Hopis and Zuñis the individual who is highly aggressive and individualistic is looked upon with disapproval and even with fear. Such a person may disturb the co-operative patterns and disorganize the group. Among the taboo- and magic-ridden Dobus, where every man is suspicious of his neighbor lest he harm him by sorcery, friendliness and willingness to aid in gardening or cooking are looked upon askance; such conduct is interpreted as a device to secure the means of invoking black and dangerous magic. Among the Tchambuli a man who failed to conform to the female domination of household, economic life, and lovemaking would be considered a deviant. So, too, a Marquesan woman who did not follow the expected sexual role but took to giving great care and attention to her babies and to playing a sexually less aggressive part with regard to the men in her household and community would be labeled "queer."

As for the mental and behavior characteristics which we in our society call abnormal, in many societies individuals with those very characteristics often have a high role and status. For example, in Christian communities suicide is still considered both a sin and a crime; to the Japanese soldier it is a highly approved act under certain circumstances. Among us the homosexual is under rather severe taboos of the mores and the law, and is, at best, in our urban communities, tolerated unless his conduct becomes too open; in classical Greece such a person had high status, and among many primitive peoples the transvestite has special functions, sometimes in religion and magic, sometimes in war. In many societies the hysteric may be considered a source of divine messages and take on leadership functions. And ideas, attitudes, and conduct which resemble paranoia may become culturized, as during the witchcraft mania in the seventeenth century in Europe and the American colonies. Some believe that the modern culture of Germany is essentially paranoid.

However, attempts to describe whole cultures in terms which we have developed to describe individual mental abnormalities are open to con-

siderable question. As has been pointed out elsewhere,¹⁶ the behavior of the Kwakiutl chieftain who is suspicious and megalomaniacal by our standards is thoroughly integrated into the tribal norms. The anxious, suspicious, and magic-ridden Dobus of New Guinea and the Ekoi of West Africa follow the expected and accepted behavior of their respective tribes. To characterize them as paranoid—by our standards—is misleading. First of all, we know practically nothing about their mental and behavioral processes as individuals. Hence we have no adequate basis for inferring that their inner life is similar to that of paranoiacs in our society. The very fact that they live within the norm of their people may itself alter the meaning which their conduct has for them and for their fellows. What we should term neurotic anxiety, for example, may not be found among them. At least, their aspirations and drives have the support of their fellows, and from their standpoint their attitudes, ideas, and conduct would appear perfectly sane. So, too, since the self or ego with its roles and statuses is largely the product of an individual's acceptance of the expectancies of others, if these are believed normal, then what we label schizoid or paranoid may actually have quite different components in such societies. If we are to accept, as it seems we must, the evidence that cultural conditioning influences the very processes of perception, memory, and internal or mental organization, then we must be extremely cautious not to project onto individuals of dissimilar societies the interpretations which we place upon those of our own society whom we label by law and psychiatry as abnormal.

This is not to say, of course, that societies with varying cultures may not be characterized by different features of mental life and conduct. They may. But, from an objective, scientific standpoint, it may be unwise for us to attempt to label such societies and cultures with terms derived from our own clinical psychiatry. Rather we need careful case and statistical studies of individuals from varying cultures, and we need some more general concepts with which to designate type differences in norms and conduct. To use terms from a psychiatry which has grown up in our own individualistic culture may mislead us when we interpret the culture and the individuals of other societies.

Nevertheless, we cannot ignore the basic fact that culture provides content and direction for the life organization of individuals in a society. This is not to say that every item in the personality is determined by culture; to take that position would be to neglect the importance both of individual differences in the biological foundations of thought and behavior and of personal-social conditioning, especially that which takes place in the earliest years of life. We must never forget that the concepts of culture and society

¹⁶ See K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chaps. 27 and 28, for an extended discussion of this entire topic.

are generalizations that cover certain manifestations of behavior, and that the person or individual—also, of course, a concept—reveals items in his thought and conduct which are not to be completely subsumed under either of the other terms. In dealing with the individual, then, we must provide terms which designate his uniqueness and creativeness—in short, his variability from his fellows. He is both the carrier and the creator of culture. Above the impress of culture and society there is the person, who is never simply a reflection of the influences of these conditioning factors. To deny this is to deny the dynamic nature of *Homo sapiens*, who stands above all his animal ancestors and relatives, not only by adjusting himself to his environment, but by adapting the environment to himself and thus by modifying, extending, and creating his environment.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On the general topic of this chapter, see Ralph Linton, *The Study of Man*, 1936, especially chaps. 16, 26, and *The Cultural Background of Personality*, 1945; Ruth Benedict, *Patterns of Culture*, 1934; Abram Kardiner and Ralph Linton, *The Individual and His Society*, 1939, chaps. 2, 9, 10; Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, 1940, chap. 18; and, though they are in psychological rather than cultural terms, the discussions of Gardner Murphy, Lois B. Murphy, and Theodore M. Newcomb in *Experimental Social Psychology*, 2nd ed.; 1937, chaps. 7, 8, 11.

On the interplay of culture and personality among primitive peoples, see Kardiner and Linton, *op. cit.*; Margaret Mead, editor, *Cooperation and Competition among Primitive Peoples*, 1937; Margaret Mead, *Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies*, 1935; John W. M. Whiting, *Becoming a Kwoma*, 1941; Leo W. Simmons, editor, *Sun Chief: The Autobiography of a Hopi Indian*, 1942; Clellan J. Ford, *Smoke from Their Fires*, 1942; Ruth Benedict, *op. cit.*; Paul Radin, *Crashing Thunder*, 1926; Cora DuBois, *The People of Alor*, 1944.

For attempts to analyze contemporary Germany in terms of culture and personality, see Erich Fromm, *Escape from Freedom*, 1941; Richard M. Brickner, *Is Germany Incurable?*, 1943.

With regard to normality and abnormality as related to culture and personality, see K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chaps. 27, 28, and the extensive bibliography cited there.

Chapter IV

DRIVES AND EMOTIONS

As a background to the development of the personality this chapter will present some facts regarding the constitutional foundations of the individual. These include, first of all, the basic and acquired motives and the feelings and emotions. Another constitutional factor, learning capacity and its place in adjustment, will be taken up in Chapter V.

HEREDITY AND MATURATION AS THE BASES OF ORGANIC DEVELOPMENT

From a biological point of view the individual is a highly complex and ordered physicochemical machine, constantly fluctuating, in its adjustments to the environment, between equilibrium and disequilibrium. In order to understand human adaptation, we must take into account the organism, the environment, and the dynamic relations of one to the other. Before taking up the basic motivations of behavior, let us note briefly certain facts regarding the foundations upon which all action or behavior rests.¹

The major factors determining human behavior may be classified into three categories: those structures and functions which have their bases in the species (that is, those which come to the individual through what we term heredity); those that emerge or come into operation through growth or maturation; and those which we acquire through learning. The concept *heredity* covers the fact that parents pass on to their offspring certain organic structures which set the direction of certain functions. *Maturation* refers to alterations in bodily structure that are not direct effects of influences from outside. *Learning* means modifications due chiefly to the impact of the external environment upon the individual, inducing or obliging him to alter, extend, and acquire ways of adapting himself to that environment.

As a result of a long evolutionary history, the various species have developed persistent structures and functions which are transmitted by the genes and chromosomes from one generation to another. These include

¹ For a more nearly complete review of the constitutional foundation of human behavior, as it relates especially to personality development, see K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, and the extensive literature on the subject there referred to.

all the fundamental organs of the body: the bony framework, the muscles, the viscera, the glands, and the nervous tissue. Of particular importance are the so-called sustaining systems of digestion, respiration, circulation, and elimination, and the neural and endocrine systems, which co-ordinate the others and make possible an orderly and more effective adaptation to the external world. Despite the constancy or fixity of these structures, they show some variability, determined in part by internal and in part by external changes. Although the body needs relatively constant amounts of oxygen, food, liquids, and mineral salts, certain deviations occur. On a hot day we need more water than on a cool one. One engaged in hard labor needs, ordinarily, more food than a clerk sitting in an office. So, too, the elimination of wastes varies with work, temperature, and other conditions.

But along with the rigidity of structure and function of the sustaining systems, which is essential to the preservation of life, we find evidence of the increasing importance, as we go up the animal scale, of flexibility. This is absolutely fundamental to man's social life, to his building and continuing of his culture. And it is (in the neurological system that this flexibility is most significant) The simple reflexes—in which specific response follows specific stimulus rather directly, as in activities such as breathing, digestion, excretion, and the avoidance of noxious stimuli—do not furnish the basis for any very complex form of adjustment. We need a neural mechanism that permits an ever-wider range of shuntings or modifications between stimulus and response. Moreover, we require a wide repertory of response outlets. It is this which the higher centers of the nervous system provide. In other words, this is the foundation of the plasticity or modifiability of the neural protoplasm, which in turn influences the functions of both stimulus and response. In short, the higher animals, and especially man, are a somewhat curious mixture of permanence and change, fixity and flux, stability and instability.

Both the constant and the flexible features of the organism are affected by mutations arising in the course of hereditary transmission. Mutations are rather sudden alterations of organic structure which appear during the earliest phases of gestation. They may have little permanent influence upon subsequent generations. On the other hand, some mutations persist, and their effects are passed down the hereditary line. There is little evidence that *Homo sapiens* has been greatly changed by inheritable mutations in many millennia, but we should not deny, without adequate proof, that minor and perhaps cumulative mutations have taken place since the dawn of culture.

Individual variability is first of all the result of biological inheritance. The combination and recombination of male and female reproductive cells, each line representing somewhat distinct elements, make for deviations

within any generation, such as differences in physical size, in intensity of physiological wants or drives, in learning potential, and in reactive capacity.

Other factors also play a part in inducing individual deviations from the species norm. From studies made of germinal, embryonic, and fetal stages of growth—considering only the higher animals—it is clear that differences may result from internal factors such as variations in the chemical effects of the endocrines. To cite only one illustration: a deficiency in thyroid secretion may so slow up neural development in the fetal stage that the individual will thereafter remain defective in learning ability. So, too, external causes may alter growth. Lead poisoning or venereal infection of the mother may influence the fetus in such a way as permanently to handicap the child's later development. Or severe physical pressures during pregnancy may derange the growth of the child.

Then, too, maturation has its place in influencing both general and constant features and individual differences. Maturation is not a mystic force, but is simply the changes resulting from internal functions rather than from direct external impressions on the system. Obviously, maturation is influenced by elements taken into the organism.

Surely the impact of light, and the intake of air, food, and liquid, have a part in growth. The point is that heredity and tuition are not the only factors determining structure and function. Maturational factors are in operation from the inception of embryonic life and continue even beyond the fetal period. Though the human organism is practically complete at birth in its basic physiological processes, (the neuromuscular development is not complete till some time later) The precise nature of maturation, and its relation to hereditary factors on the one hand, and to external pressure or tuition, on the other, are not fully understood. Yet we may say that maturation stands between heredity and learning as an important factor in determining the organic foundations of adjustment.

There is much evidence that learning itself is dependent upon (the maturational level of the neuromuscular system.) Until there is an organic readiness, children cannot be taught to walk, or to manipulate certain objects, or to perform certain mental functions. However, we must not imagine that growth represents some sort of miraculous unfolding. Maturation is but a convenient term to cover the biochemical and physical modifications that are not directly the result of what we ordinarily call learning. Finally, there are the further variations arising from learning—that is, from the impact of the external environment, leading to new stimulus-response linkages. We shall discuss some of the effects of learning in the next chapter. For our purposes at this point it is important to note that the organism at birth already has two aspects, the more or less constant conditions of structure and function which rest upon heredity, and the influences of prenatal and early postnatal maturation. It is well to bear in

mind that the prenatal environment, on the whole, is constant. Hence the persistence of forms—the constancy factor—may result, in part, from this fact as well as from the forces making for persistency and constancy in the organic hereditary factors themselves. Many investigators, including C. M. Child, have shown the importance of the standard and constant environment on the growth of plants and animals.² When these standard environmental forces are sharply changed, many striking changes in the individual may arise.³

DRIVES AND GOALS

As a result of the interplay of factors derived from heredity and prenatal growth, the normal infant comes into the world equipped with certain basic needs or physiological imperatives which must be met if he is to survive. As an aid in meeting them he is also provided with a remarkably flexible neural-muscular-glandular system which will assist him in making elaborate and more satisfying adaptations to his environment. The basic needs derive from the sustaining systems. In the process of getting from need to satisfaction, the organism undergoes a variety of internal and external activities. It is our purpose to examine the impulsions or motivations of such activities.

The Biopsychological Imperatives. The basic requirements for survival have long been described by such terms as *needs*, *wants*, *instincts*, *impulses*, and *drives*. For two decades after the publication of William MacDougall's *Social Psychology* in 1908 there was a great deal of discussion about the place of the instincts in the determination of individual behavior. This verbal controversy got entangled in the long-standing debate about the relative influences of heredity and environment, and a vast amount of ink was spilled over this entire problem. Theorists produced conceptual schemes in defense of one view or the other; and the empirical research worker and the clinician dealing with human frailties produced a wide variety of contradictory reports—not always as free from hidden biases as one might wish. Without reviewing this whole discussion, we may say that today most students of psychology have come round to two views. First, heredity and environment interplay on each other in producing the individual; second, though maturation and learning profoundly influence the course of individual development, there are certain basic constitutional constants, or "physiological imperatives." In getting at the motivations or intentions of human conduct we must take these latter factors into account. Largely because the term *instinct* fell into bad repute as popular writers used the term in a loose sense to mean fixed habits, the recent tendency has been to employ the concept of organic drive to denote the fundamental demands

² See C. M. Child, *Physiological Foundations of Behavior*, 1924.

³ See K. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 39-43, for a convenient review of some of these data.

or requirements which underlie all adaptive reactions. The organic drives of men are detectable by at least two criteria. They represent a species or phylogenetic continuity with the prehuman animal forms; and they are universal in mankind.⁴ Essentially physiological in character, they soon get a psychological significance because they play such a large part in man's behavior and thought.

When asked to list these basic drives, one is confronted with a problem of classification and terminology, and an examination of the discussions of this matter reveals a good deal of variation in detail. Although there are differences as to terms and categories, there is, on the whole, pretty general agreement. All assume the basic requirements for oxygen, temperature regulation, and the essential minerals and plant and animal foods that are necessary for survival. All assume the requirement for the elimination of organic waste matter, and also for a rhythm of sleep and rest to offset fatigue. All assume the existence of the reproductive functions. In addition we have a general concept of an organic provision for protection, involving avoidance of pain and noxious stimuli and defense or offense against threatening situations.

Besides those already mentioned, which man has in common with a vast range of species, the higher species also show many associated reactions, (such as vocalizations) so-called (random muscular movements) (perhaps induced by internal tensions related to posture and fatigue), and feelings and emotions. It may well be that phylogenetically these reactions are supplementary to the more imperative ones. In any case we must reckon with them both because they are found in our animal progenitors and because they are universal in mankind. True, their original physiological foundations are not always self-evident, at least after social-cultural influences have played upon them.

For purposes of summary we may list these fundamental organic drives in the tentative order shown on page 82. It is but one of a number of possible classifications.

Underlying these larger groups of drives are many internal and overt reactions. The newborn human infant demonstrates a wide variety of adaptive reflexes. Moreover, maturation and learning both operate to organize and elaborate these tendencies to action. On the response side man differs from his animal relatives in possessing a much wider gamut of reflexes. Since these are not fixed by heredity, they permit a much more extended development than is found among the lower species. In a way, man's lack of stable patterns, his flexibility, though it makes him more

⁴ Otto Klineberg, in his *Social Psychology*, 1940, p. 61, lists three criteria: continuity in the species, biochemical basis for the specific activity, and universality. It seems to me that his second is implicit in the first. Continuity implies a biochemical foundation which is relatively constant.

TABLE 3
CLASSIFICATION OF ORGANIC DRIVES

A		B		C	
PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS SET UP BY INTERNAL CHANGES	REQUIRE- MENTS SET UP BY INTERNAL CHANGES	PHYSIOLOGICAL REQUIREMENTS SET UP BY EXTERNAL CHANGES	REQUIRE- MENTS SET UP BY EXTERNAL CHANGES	EXPRESSIVE REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO A AND B	REQUIREMENTS RELATED TO A AND B
1. Respiration, circulation, and temperature stability		6. Avoidance of, and with- drawal from, painful and noxious stimuli		10. Random vocalization	
2. Sustenance, hunger and thirst		7. Warmth, comfort, shel- ter, and pleasant stim- ulation		11. Random muscular ac- tivities	
3. Elimination of waste through respiration, defecation, urination, perspiration		8. Specific satisfactions from sustenance satis- factions		12. Overt reactions arising from feelings and emo- tions	
4. Sleep and rest to offset effects of fatigue or of use of organs		9. Sexual pleasures in- duced by stimulation of external genitalia and related erogenous zones			
5. Reproduction, the need rising to full maturation at puberty					

dependent on others for survival at the outset of life, enables him to control himself and his environment to an extent seen nowhere else in nature.

The Cycles of Activity. The drives, of course, do not exist for themselves; they represent but an initial stage in the effort of the organism to satisfy its needs or wants. We may state the principal features of the course from drive to satisfaction as a cycle of activity, and for purposes of descriptive analysis this series of reactions may fall into these phases or stages: (1) There is the need, demand, or basic impulse arising from physiological and psychological tensions or strain. (2) There is the seeking of the stimuli or situation which will release the tension or satisfy the drive; or, on the contrary, there is avoidance of the stimulus which blocks the course to satisfaction. (3) There is the final finding of the reward or satisfying stimulus, or the avoidance of the unpleasant stimulus. This is sometimes referred to as the consummatory activity. (4) There is a sense or feeling of satisfaction marked by release of tension, or relaxation. This final stage is a pleasant feeling, or relief from strain—a state of complacency which may last till another cycle of activity is set up. The maladjustments in the adaptation of the individual to his fellows, either in close intimate associations or in his wider public life, are linked up to the frustrations or blockings which prolong the struggle for, or prevent the smooth attain-

ment of, the goal or satisfaction. We shall return¹ to examine this matter when we take up the nature of learning.

An important feature of the cycle of activity is the time involved. With the simplest types of drives—those of almost reflex physiological sort, such as bodily elimination—the time from demand or need to consummation may be very short. In feeding and sexual satisfaction a longer period is usually involved. But among socialized human beings—that is, those who have been tutored by their fellows—there may be considerable extension of the time between demand and consummation, even for the rather rudimentary drives. With the acquired motives, to which we shall refer shortly, this temporal extension is even more obvious. In fact, one of the striking features of the learning processes is that it permits inhibition or blocking of the rapid, but natural, biological reactions from demand to reward. Man learns to wait for his meals and to plan a time and place for his amorous pleasures.

There is a great variety of cycles. In fact, our habits might be classified as falling roughly into various cycles: diurnal, seasonal, and so on. For instance, the physiological demands of hunger make for a frequent recurrence of feeding periods. On the other hand, in sexual activity there may be considerable extension of time or elaborate sublimation. And in the development of a life career years may be passed before the final goal is reached; but in the meantime hundreds of shorter cycles may arise.

The Emergence of New Drives. Man does not long continue to live at a strictly physiological and mammalian level. The influences of those around him induce in him, through learning, changes in his drives. The basic biological impulses get overlaid with social and cultural effects. That is, the original imperatives become changed into insistent social-psychological and cultural requirements.

The initial step in this shift from purely physiological to acquired drives takes place in feeding. The physiological demands of the infant for food and drink cannot be satisfied without the intercession of the mother or some mother-surrogate—wet nurse, or food in the hands of an older person. That is, the child's drive for sustenance can only proceed through stages 2, 3, and 4 by interaction with another person. In like manner—though less directly, perhaps—the need for bodily protection from cold, danger, and the like becomes associated with the mother or some other adult. From these earliest social contacts the needs for sustenance and protection become organized into recurrent needs for *dependency* and *security*. (See Chapter VI.)

Although maturing much later, the sexual demands can be normally fulfilled only by contact with another person. That is, the sexual drive also is biosocial in mammals. Obviously, sexual relations occur without

reproductive results, especially in the primates, and under certain circumstances such drives may be satisfied in other ways than those normal to reproduction. But, no matter how greatly social-cultural training may affect the form of this satisfaction in the higher species, this powerful drive, second only to sustenance in its insistence, can normally be completed only by interaction.

On the foundation of demands for food and drink, for bodily protection, and, later, for sexual satisfaction, there are built up various reactions, both oppositional and co-operative, which relate to dependency, love, protection, and security. *These are the underpinning on which all the later motives and the cultural imperatives are constructed.*

Yet the striving to satisfy these fundamental wants, and the later process of fulfilling secondary wants, are not always easy or uninterrupted. The progress from demand or drive to consummation may be blocked by various factors—for example, by a scarcity of the rewards. The most obvious instance would be that resulting from a lack of natural resources, such as food. Another might be due to the monopoly of food, mates, or protective means by another member of the species. Or there may be still other forms of stoppage. Confronted with such inhibiting forces, the individual may react in various ways. He may make a frontal attack upon the situation, he may try to get at the goal by indirection and substitution, or he may withdraw from the effort. The more or less direct attempts to secure his reward by increased effort we call opposition, including in this concept both conflict and competition. Substitute reactions often have a place in this. Substitution may also replace one drive by another which can be fulfilled. Withdrawal may take the form of daydreaming.

In any case, aggression itself becomes such a powerful means of fulfilling various fundamental drives that it gets organized into a motive which we call the *(desire for mastery)*. In subsequent discussions the function of this incentive will become evident. In turn, the desire for dependency, security, and protection, beginning usually with the mother, spreads out to other persons. In time it becomes generalized into a need for membership or feeling of belongingness with others. Such gregariousness, or *wish for relatedness*, becomes an important motive in innumerable human situations.

Qualifying or elaborating the necessary means of moving from need to goal or reward, learning and habit-formation come into play. Moreover, learning gradually moves from external habit-formation to internal controls, including ideas or concepts, emotions, attitudes, and traits. Both habits and these internal factors, in turn, become motives in their own right. For example, the desire for knowledge—or, more simply, *curiosity*—emerges as a motive. This may take the form of desire for new experience or for aesthetic and other satisfactions in form, color, and the like,

as well as for facts as such, and it has a conspicuous place in intellectual attainment, in invention, in artistic creation and appreciation, and in concern with philosophic and religious matters.

We have, then, a series of emerging motives. Their compelling character differs, as they are linked to the fundamental physiological needs or to those which are obviously the result of man's living in a society possessed of a culture. The first-level imperatives are related to *sustenance*, *sexual demands*, and *protection* from physical dangers. The second-level motives are those of *mastery*, or *power*, and *belongingness*. And at a third level are those which grow out of intellectual processes, and flower not only in technical skills and common sense and scientific knowledge, but also in concern with aesthetic, religious, and philosophic matters.

The Freudian psychologists, who have done much to point out and interpret the dynamic nature of men's motives, both original and acquired, often classify the major drives under two headings, *sex* and *ego*. Were we to accept these two broad categories, sexual and love demands, sympathy, co-operativeness, and need for sociability or belongingness would fall into the first. Demands for self-assertion, personal aggression, security, and mastery would come under the second. But, like other simple classifications, this one leaves out of account a number of important motives. For example, aggression is not entirely bound up with the ego manifestations; and others, including those we have labeled curiosity, aesthetic interests, recreation, and religion, do not fall neatly into one Freudian pigeonhole or the other.

The Importance of the Goal in Learning. The goal sought in any adaptive cycle is closely related to the motive or impulse which sets up the course of activity in the first instance. The consummation of a physiological imperative is as predetermined, within limits, as the drive itself. For example, hunger pangs are satisfied by the introduction of food into the stomach, a full bladder by elimination, fatigue by sleep, and so on. But learning introduces controls into the process of consummation. Thus, the time and place of eating, sleeping, eliminating, and the like are settled largely by cultural definitions. Obviously, the kind of food and drink taken into the system is culturally settled for us. As to sexual drives, certainly social-cultural influences on the goal or reward are highly varied. Not only do we find substitutes for normal heterosexuality, as in masturbation and homosexuality, but through fantasy, anxiety, and a wide range of overt manifestations some, if not all, of the sexual drive may be deflected from the reproductive goal.

When we consider the derived and acquired aims, such as are connected with security, mastery, dependency, belongingness, and curiosity, we realize at once what amazingly varied outlets culture provides for the individual. Take mastery for example. Domination and control may be exercised by overt force, by persuasion and suggestion, or by flattery, to

mention only a few outlets. Or the desire for mastery may be so turned back into the individual that he satisfies himself with daydreams of immense power over others. For curiosity and its components, such as desire for new experience and concern with the unknown, the range of outlets may be extensive, ranging all the way from travel and big-game hunting to invention or even to the vicarious satisfaction of reading adventure stories at home.

The point is that here, as in so many other aspects of social adaptation, we find different degrees of choice and flexibility. The physiological imperatives clearly set definite limits to the modification of goals. That is, culture itself cannot extensively alter or suppress these. On the other hand, in the derived motives—resting in part, of course, on the basic original ones, and in part on acquirement—culture may or may not permit a wide range of selection to the individual. It is well to bear this in mind, and we shall have occasion to indicate in some detail how this operates in certain areas of interaction. For example, mastery and security both have important roots in the constitutional foundations of man and therefore are not entirely subject to unlimited control or redirection. On the other hand, curiosity, being much more the result of early training and much less an “original impulse,” is capable of elaborate choice or little, as the cultural framework permits. In short, the degree of constancy or of flexibility depends upon biological as well as upon social-cultural factors, and the place of each will have to be determined by an examination of the particular motivation.

FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS

In discussing the basic physiological cycles of activity, we made use of such terms as *pleasant* and *unpleasant*, *satisfaction* and *dissatisfaction*. These words of common speech refer to certain general mental and bodily states of well-being or its opposite. We are all familiar, too, with those “stirred up” states which we call variously by the names *anger*, *fear*, *love*, *grief*, and the like. In traditional psychology such generalized reactions are called the *affective*, or feeling-emotional, processes. As responses these have a “warm” quality in contrast to the “cold” nature of the more strictly intellectual processes, such as reasoning. The affective states or reactions may be linked to the drives, to the efforts to consummate them, and to the goals themselves. They are as much a part of the total activity as any other phase of our adaptive effort.

The Nature of Feelings and Emotions. We may summarize as follows the common features of the feelings and emotions: (1) There is a perception of the situation, involving seeing, hearing, tasting, or some other sensory reception. Affective states are not the product of internal changes by themselves. (2) There is a stirring up of the internal activities, how-

ever, involving the sympathetic nervous system and the endocrine glands—both related to the basic adjustive patterns of securing sustenance, sexuality, avoiding danger, and securing safety and comfort. And (3) there is a sharp increase in the trend toward overt activity, especially toward sexual approach, flight, fighting, and the like. In general, such reactions take the general form of approach or withdrawal. All three features, then, are bound up with the affective processes: perception, bodily change, and overt action.

Using both experimental work and observations in nature, Walter B. Cannon has interpreted the emotions in terms of what he calls an "emergency theory."⁵ According to Cannon, the emotions represent increased and repeated efforts of the organism to make more effective adjustments to its environment, especially in crises. At the level of animal existence this seems self-evident. However, in modern man the brute struggle for survival is so overlaid with social-cultural influences that not only are the rudimentary affective states profoundly altered, but there is some doubt as to the adaptive usefulness of certain emotions, especially fear and rage. Nevertheless, the emotions and feelings continue to play an important place in our lives and represent a physiological fixity or constancy with which man in his adjustive attempts must reckon. The feelings and emotions, whose roots lie in heredity, still have an important function in society, as we shall demonstrate time and again in subsequent chapters.

Observations and experiments on the development of the affective processes in the individual show that, in common with much of the infant's rudimentary adjustment, the feelings and emotions, at the outset, take the form of a general, excited, mass activity, not yet specifically organized. Certainly the basic physiological phases of such reactivity are general and undifferentiated. John B. Watson's earlier thesis that the three fundamental emotions were anger, fear, and love has given way to the theory that underneath these broad classes of emotions lies the more undifferentiated response which may be called "excitement" or "startle." Such mass activity is witnessed in a child's crying from pain or in other bodily demonstrations of distress. Gradually, however, such mass reactions become separated into two large divisions; one may be called pleasant, the other unpleasant. That is, some of these excited or upset states are associated with the sense of well-being, relaxation, and what we call pleasure. Others are linked to the opposite, or "unpleasure"—to use a term sometimes used by psychologists to classify these states of unpleasantness and sense of distress. For example, the hunger pangs may be accompanied by unpleasant affective reactions, such as crying and wriggling, and the filling of the stomach by gurgling, smiling, and other evidences of relaxation and

⁵ W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*, 2nd ed., 1929, and his *The Wisdom of the Body*, 2nd ed., 1939.

satisfaction. Obviously, in this example, the initial phase of the cycle—the drive—is characterized by an unpleasant, the reward by a pleasant, state.

The next stage in the development of the emotions and feelings comes about when more and more situations or objects give rise to specific affective states or reactions. On the foundation of pleasant or unpleasant excitement are built anger, fear, and love, which seem to be the basic emotions. Loud sounds, dropping a child through space, and shaking him vigorously when he is asleep incite fear. Anger arises from restraint or frustration of free movement. Love is definitely related to the internal and external stimulation of sexual organs or to responses associated with care of the young infant.

From this point on differentiation and elaboration of the emotions proceed throughout the early years of training. The perception of situations or objects becomes conditioned or linked to certain bodily or systematic reactions, on the one hand, and to certain verbal terms or names, on the other. Although originally the feeling-emotional state was one of undifferentiated mass excitement, only vaguely to be distinguished into pleasant and unpleasant phases, in the growing child and in the adult perception, memory associations, and particular bodily expressions become linked together into a total reaction which we label from our cultural heritage. At this level appear designations such as *grief*, *pity*, *maternal affection*, *anxiety*, and *indignation*.

Social-Cultural Conditioning of Specific Affective States. Any acquaintance with the feeling-emotional expressions found among primitive tribes or higher societies will show at once the importance of social-cultural definitions in the affective processes. Interactional effects are everywhere evident in the development of man's feelings and emotions, since nearly all of the fundamental training takes place within the framework of the social act. To prove this requires only some comparison between the emotions revealed among ourselves and those found in other societies.⁶

First, let us note some striking divergences in the overt expression of the feelings and emotions. Many observers have commented on the stolidity and passivity of the American Plains Indians in situations which with us would induce obvious changes in voice, face, and manual gestures. Among some of these Indian tribes a youth who would join a band of adult warriors had to undergo certain ordeals. One of these consisted of inserting hooks in the flesh under his shoulder blades, attaching to these hooks a heavy mass of buffalo bones, and dragging this weight back and forth for long periods of time. If he emitted any cry of pain or showed fatigue at any point in this procedure, he was counted as unworthy of the adult-warrior status and was remanded to the inferior status of women, children, and old men. So, too, the passivity of the Chinese face in the presence of danger

⁶ For a rather extensive discussion of these differences, see Otto Klineberg, *op. cit.*, chap. 7.

or unusual situations has led to our Occidental stereotype of the "inscrutable Oriental." Such people stand in sharp contrast to the volatile South European, who is full of gestures and bodily movements not only in habitual social contacts, but in unfamiliar or strange situations.

There is no reason to assume any hereditary foundation for these differences. They are largely the result of cultural conditioning, although we must reckon with certain individual variations in any one society. There are Chinese who are more expressive than others, and doubtless some Italians are less volatile than their neighbors. But on the whole there is a remarkable degree of conformity to the group-accepted norms.

In some societies persons under the emotional excitement of magical and religious festivals are known to walk barefooted on burning coals, or to thrust heated skewers into their flesh, without any evidence of pain. The Christian martyrs, without flinching, endured horrible tortures for their soul's sake. And the induced hysterical anesthetics which prevent the normal sense of pain are no doubt the result of culturalized habits and attitudes. Well-trained soldiers under great stress endure intense pain without signs of distress. In many of these situations cultural norms call for the suppression of outward manifestations. For example, soldiers often report that they face gunfire and other hazards in great fear yet, because of their combat training and their ideals, are able to carry on.

Anger, which obviously becomes associated with many aggressive reactions, is demonstrated in various ways. Otto Klineberg has examined certain classical Chinese novels in order to secure an idea of how emotions were expressed in ancient China.⁷ Anger was expressed when an individual opened his eyes very wide, changing them from the almond shape to one more like the European. Staring also was an acceptable manner of expressing anger at another person. Or one might smile "a chill smile" to show one's irritation. So, too, a Chinese might on occasion faint from anger, like the heroines of eighteenth- and nineteenth-century English novels who collapsed from shame or fear.

The fundamental expression of grief seems to us to be tears; yet, when we examine behavior in grief-provoking situations in different societies, we find a variety of responses. In some societies, on the death of a relative, professional mourners are employed to wail at the funeral, while the family members remain quiet. In describing grief among the ancient Chinese, Marcel Granet, the great French scholar, remarks on what was essentially an elaborate vocal ritual of grief.⁸ Grief was required to be expressed only in certain prescribed ways and amounts, in which the intensity of expressed grief was positively correlated with the status of the

⁷ O. Klineberg, "Emotional Expression in Chinese Literature," *J. of Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1938, 33: 517-20.

⁸ M. Granet, "Le langage de la douleur d'après le rituel funéraire de la Chine classique," *J. de Psychologie*, 1922, 19: 97-118.

deceased. A young matron should mourn more for the death of her mother-in-law than for her own mother. Tears were expected at certain times only and under specified conditions.

Yet tears may mark joy as well as sorrow. In our own society people, on occasion, are said to cry for joy at the reunion with long-lost loved ones. In some societies such conduct seems thoroughly culturized. Observers of the Andaman Islanders report that relatives indulge in weeping and wailing on their reunion after an absence of a few weeks or months, and this ritualistic weeping seems to have some habituated emotional significance, apparently related to the sense of in-group solidarity.⁹ The New Zealand Maori also had a form of ritualized weeping, but Peter Buck reports that under English influences in the schools and elsewhere it is disappearing.¹⁰

Just as crying is a basic and early expression of unpleasant and painful experience, so pleasant and euphoric states are evident in smiling. Though the newborn baby does not smile, it very soon expresses a pleasant or satisfying condition by gurgling, grunting, and the like. And in a few weeks a baby shows a definite smiling response to other persons. The initial failure to smile is perhaps due to incomplete neuromuscular maturation rather than to lack of adequate social stimulation. In other words, the biological fact of satisfaction underlies any overt expression. The early assumption that smiling was the result of a social instinct must be revised to take into account both maturation, and social interaction, which begins at birth. Smiling appears to be a basic response, but it is early conditioned to specific objects by the social-cultural stimulation of the infant.

The expression of pleasure is relative to the cultural norms. Lafcadio Hearn noted that in Japan the smile was a conventional expression of submission to a superior. An inferior who was rebuked must smile, not sulk, before his master.¹¹ When we talk of unrestrained joy, we are simply saying that we are habituated to a particular form of emotional-feeling expression. To individuals who grow up under the impress of such a cultural expectancy, it seems perfectly natural to act in an "unrestrained" manner, and to act otherwise would seem strange, bizarre, and improper.

Laughter, Wit, and the Emotions. Laughter is clearly related to smiling and pleasant affective states. The species origin of laughter is unknown, and it is said that man is the only animal which laughs. Though it first shows itself in young children as a response to mild and not too prolonged tickling, laughter is primarily induced by social-cultural stimuli, either physical or symbolic. Furthermore, it is closely related to play and make-believe rather than to serious actions involving survival.

⁹ See E. H. Man, "On the Aboriginal Inhabitants of the Andaman Islands," *J. Royal Anthropol. Institute*, 1882, 12: 69-116, 327-434; and A. R. Brown, *The Andaman Islanders*, 1922.

¹⁰ See Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, 1940, pp. 185-186.

¹¹ L. Hearn, "The Japanese Smile," in *Glimpses of Unfamiliar Japan*, 2 vols., 1894; and his *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation*, 1904, p. 192.

There have been various theories about the phylogeny of laughter, including the "excess energy" thesis of Herbert Spencer and the view of George W. Crile that laughter is an organic reaction permitting release of energy which had been mobilized for a serious purpose—that is, that it is a diversion of energy that is not needed as the person anticipated.

As a social-cultured process, laughter concerns at least three types of situations, all of them related to be the self-assertive aspects of personality. In the first type laughter may be called a release of taboo, such as we experience in the joke of *double entente* or in the tolerated but ribald jokes of vaudeville or musical comedy. The second type is related to the sense of security and superiority. Thomas Hobbes, the British philosopher, put it thus: "Laughter is caused either by some sudden act of their own that pleaseth them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves."¹² We laugh to see a dignified preacher or banker slip on an icy pavement. It is likely that the sight enhances momentarily our sense of personal dominance. A release of tensions probably also occurs. On the principle of ideomotor learning, witnessing someone else fall may set up in us bodily tensions such as we would experience if we were ourselves to start to fall; but, not falling, we find a release from these incipient tensions through laughter. The third stimulus to laughter involves witnessing or hearing the incongruous, in posture, speech, or gesture. But perhaps here also unconscious attitudes of superiority are aroused. Obviously, much, if not all, of our laughter is linked to our conscious and unconscious desires for power and self-expression. In wit, in particular, we are able to express hidden hostilities to others, or to show sexual or other interests not otherwise permitted by the cultural norms.

Laughter is definitely conditioned not only to other persons, but to particular situations. We anticipate laughter in the theater but not in the church, at a sporting event but not in a courtroom or at a directors' meeting. It is distinctly related to anticipatory reactions as these are controlled by permissive cultural patterns. Laughter *at* others is aggressive in meaning; laughter *with* others tends to be more sympathetic in tone. J. C. Gregory remarks, "The triumphant laugh of aggressive or satirical wit has an echo of war, and scorn or contempt or superiority may tinge laughter according to the relief precipitated."¹³ On the other hand, conjoint laughter may not only release tension but enhance the well-being of an entire group and facilitate co-operation and consensus. A successful public speaker knows how to get audiences to laugh at some situation or person that is disliked and to laugh with him when he wants to secure approval of a point.

¹² T. Hobbes, *Leviathan*, Everyman's Library edition, 1914, p. 27.

¹³ J. C. Gregory, *The Nature of Laughter*, 1924, p. 221.

Many forms of wit and humor have an obvious social-control function. Ridicule of a person may not only induce a sense of inferiority but deter him from some morally disapproved action. Likewise, irony and sarcasm may have restraining effects upon others. Ridicule or laughter is a rather common way of inducing shame and guilt both among primitives and among civilized peoples. Hence, though laughter in various forms is an expression of individual superiority and aggression, it also provides, in some of its forms, an important means of communal control.

Since the development of the personality does not depend entirely on the drives and the affective processes, but on learning as well, we must now turn to examine briefly some of the important processes involved in the modification of the human stimulus-response system as the individual moves on from infancy to maturity.

• SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On the constitutional foundations of human behavior, see W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body*, 2nd ed., 1929; J. M. Dorsey, *The Foundations of Human Nature*, 1935, chaps. 4, 5, 6; R. G. Hoskins, *Endocrinology*, 1941; H. S. Jennings, *The Biological Basis of Human Nature*, 1930; A. Scheinfeld, *You and Heredity*, 1939; and J. H. Woodger, *Biological Principles: A Critical Study*, 1929.

On motivation, see O. Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, 1940, chaps. 4, 5, 6; G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, rev. ed., 1937, chaps. 2, 3; H. A. Murray and others, *Explorations in Personality*, 1938, chap. 2; and P. T. Young, *Motivation of Behavior*, 1936.

On feelings and emotions, see P. Bard, "Emotion: I, The Neuro-humoral Basis of Emotional Reactions," in C. Murchison, editor, *Handbook of General Experimental Psychology*, 1934; W. B. Cannon, *Bodily Changes in Pain, Hunger, Fear, and Rage*, 2nd ed., 1929; and W. B. Cannon, *The Wisdom of the Body*, 2nd ed., 1939.

Chapter V

SOME FACTORS IN HUMAN LEARNING

MODIFICATIONS of response begin almost in the first days after birth. Those derived from the impact of the external environment on the individual we call learning. Learning has three principal effects on the adaptive process: first, on the drives; second, on the goals; and, third, on the means of getting from drive to goal. It is beyond the scope of this book to make any extensive survey of theory or experiment in the field of learning. But we must discuss certain factors in learning as it bears on social psychology.

THE NATURE AND TYPES OF LEARNING

In learning, popularly called experience, external impressions and the responses thereto produce changes in the neuromuscular system. This is an adaptive capacity of great importance to man. It makes possible the flexibility of stimulation and response that is essential to effective adjustment. It makes for less waste of energy, for accuracy, speed, and decrease in the sense of effort. As we move up the animal line to the higher species, we move away from the organic rigidity of the lower forms and through ever-increasing degrees of flexibility.

The organic foundations of learning are more or less determined by heredity and by prenatal and early postnatal maturation. The seat of learning lies in the central nervous system, especially in the cerebral cortex. Although the capability of learning is fixed in the species, there are sharper individual differences in this potentiality than there are in the more fixed sustaining systems. Moreover, this variability is profoundly affected by the impact of the material and social-cultural environment. C. J. Herrick puts the matter in these words:

"In addition to his heredity organization the newborn child possesses the large association centers of the brain with their vast and undetermined potencies, the exact form of whose internal organization is not wholly laid down at birth, but is in part shaped by each individual separately during the course of the growth period by the processes of education to which he is subjected, that is, by his experience. This capacity for individuality in development, this ability to profit by experience, this docility, is man's most distinctive and valuable characteristic."¹

¹ C. J. Herrick, *Introduction to Neurology*, 3rd ed., 1922, p. 350. By permission of W. B. Saunders Co.

Yet, as Herrick goes on to state, these higher functions depend on the "immense capital of pre-formed and innate ability which takes the form of physiological vigor . . . and impulsive actions." And, moreover, "no higher association center of the human brain can function except upon materials of experience furnished to it through the despised lower centers of the reflex type."²

The mechanics of learning are universal in man. What is learned, however, is definitely set by society and culture. The processes of learning, however, are not entirely independent of the content or meaning induced by the culture. This is ably demonstrated by Gregory Bateson and Margaret Mead from their materials on motor training in Bali. Unlike us, the Balinese make little use of verbal instruction, but depend to a large extent on tactile manipulation of the learner by an older person. These authors say:

"Learning to walk, learning the first appropriate gestures of playing musical instruments, learning to eat, and to dance are all accomplished with the teacher behind the pupil, conveying directly by pressure, and almost always with a minimum of words, the gesture to be performed. Under such a system of learning, one can only learn if one is completely relaxed and if will and consciousness as we understand those terms are almost in abeyance."³

Individual differences in learning ability have long been recognized. Individuals in Western society have been classified in terms of learning capacity, or what we call intelligence, as feeble-minded (idiots, imbeciles, morons), normals, and supernormals. In cultural terms the normals—the majority—manage their own affairs with ordinary prudence, participate in a variety of group activities, and are the chief carriers of our values. From the supernormals we recruit our inventors, scientists, artists, and many of our leaders. They constitute only a small fraction of the population, as do the feeble-minded. The latter may perform some useful functions but on the whole constitute a social decrement. Since these individual differences in intelligence are basically fixed by heredity and early maturation, there are biological limits to social-cultural training. This fact is often ignored by those who daydream and plan to make man and society perfect.

Passive and Active Learning. It is easy to assume that all learning is active and dynamic, like that reported by psychologists who experiment with rats, monkeys, or men. However, much adaptation is passive. That is, as an individual moves through the necessary daily routines, he is influenced by sights, smells, sounds, and the like in an only partially conscious manner. What is called sensory accommodation illustrates the matter. When first residing or working near stockyards or a tannery, a person

² *Ibid.*, p. 351.

³ G. Bateson and M. Mead, *Balinese Character: A Photographic Analysis*, 1942, p. 15. Special Publication of the New York Academy of Sciences, vol. 2. By permission of the authors.

may be aware of the unpleasant odors, but in time, he becomes unconscious of them. A gradual and nondeliberate adjustment to these stimuli takes place. In the same fashion we doubtless acquire a large number of postural and motor reactions to varied situations without much of the stress we usually attribute to more formal learning. So, too, at the symbolic communication level, we learn from others jokes, tunes, and facts of all sorts without making any active effort to do so. All these acquirements, however, sensory-perceptual, motor, and verbal, affect subsequent learning, either passive or active.

There is much common-sense as well as clinical evidence that we receive without being aware of them—stimuli which later affect conduct. Morton Prince cites the case of a girl who under hypnosis reported specifically on the color and texture of a man's suit although consciously she was completely unaware of them. Posthypnotic suggestion reveals confirmatory data. In the literature on hypnosis we have hundreds of cases in which the subject is instructed to do something after he is awakened. He is brought out of the hypnotic state and at the time and place suggested performs the act he was told to perform. Curiously enough, such individuals produce rationalizations of their conduct not unlike those of all of us when we are pressed for the reason for conduct the real motives of which are not clear to us.

In our social experience with others, and in the course of their laying down the social-cultural framework of our behavior, there are doubtless thousands of situations of which we are not fully aware, but which nevertheless influence our future conduct. Shrugs of shoulders, tones of voice, facial movements—all influence us in ways which we little comprehend. In impressing the young with the proper conduct laid down by the standards of our society, these marginal stimuli of gesture, tone of voice, and facial expression are perhaps almost as important as the purely verbal stimuli in which most culture norms are carried, and which, of course, we are ordinarily conscious of receiving. Children unconsciously take up the gestures and tones of voice of their parents. (See Chapter VI.)

Unconscious stimulation and the loss to consciousness of earlier stimulations must be reckoned with when we describe and interpret the social behavior of individuals. Especially are the emotional feeling-tones and attitudes carried through life in this unconscious stream of activity.

In contrast to this type of adjustment, much of our learning is more obviously active and is motivated by certain insistent demands of the organism or of other persons. Active learning usually takes place in the course from the drive to its consummation—that is, in cycles of activity. The matter is illustrated in the seeking of food or mates, in avoidance of severe injury or pain, and in many acquired cycles. Most of the studies of learning made by psychologists concern active rather than passive learn-

ing, although active learning itself is often influenced by previous or accompanying passive adaptation. Animals used in conditional-reflex experiments become passively adapted to the harness, the apparatus, the experimenter, and other features of the laboratory situation. A number of experiments on rats have shown that these animals may become acquainted with the paths in a maze even though they are not rewarded by food, and, moreover, that later, when maze learning is attempted in which a definite reward such as food is used, this prior acquaintance with the maze greatly increases the speed of learning. Certainly a great deal of human teaching is based on the theory that previous knowledge—acquired passively or actively—serves as a background for more active learning.

Drives, Cycles of Activity, and Learning. In the course of development from infancy through childhood and adolescence to maturity, learning profoundly affects the drives, the rewards, and the manner of moving in a cycle from impulsion to consummation. Experience may affect the individual's adaptation with respect to any phase of a cycle. We have already noted some of the new drives which we get in the process of socialization. So, too, substitute goals or rewards appear as products of our efforts to overcome frustrations. But it is in the second phase of the cycle of activity that learning is most obvious. One basic element is the organization and canalization of random trial-and-error movements into a facile and smooth habit which aids in getting from the drive to the reward. Learning which begins with modification of overt muscular action leaves effects within the central nervous system. In time, especially with the aid of speech and the higher thought processes, the internal factors may determine the rate, accuracy, and end of learning. Some aspects of this phase of learning will be reviewed below, but at this point we must emphasize that learning is set up in the first place by drives moving on to reward. Hence the strength of the drive will play a part in the learning process.

It is clear from Chapter IV that some drives are prepotent, or more powerful than others. So, too, acquired drives differ among themselves in priority and insistence. Certainly, if drive A is prepotent over drive B, then, other things being equal, the former, rather than the latter, will give impetus to learning. Among men the predominance of some drives over others is not always easy to demonstrate, but the physiological imperatives appear to take precedence over drives which have been learned. The operation of a hierarchy of impulses among lower animals is well shown in C. J. Warden's study of the primary drives of rats.

He induced various drives by depriving the animals of food, water, mates, litters of young, etc., and then measured the number of times a rat would cross an electrically charged grill during twenty minutes in order to reach a satisfying object or goal. For the male rats he reported a rank-order of priorities as follows: (1) thirst (an average of 21 crossings of the grill to get the water); (2) hunger (an average of 19 crossings

to get food); (3) sex (an average of 13.5 crossings to get the reward); and (4) "exploratory" (6 crossings). For the female the order was maternal feeling, thirst, hunger, and sex.⁴

Such prepotencies might be affected by endocrine changes. Had the female rats not had litters, their hierarchy might have been different. In this connection we should recall the study of Yerkes cited on page 23, which showed that among the apes the oestrous cycle influences the aggressiveness of the female toward the male.

We cannot reason directly from rats or apes to mankind, for human beings are greatly influenced by social-cultural training. Nevertheless, certain motives persist everywhere and generally predominate in the determination of the incitement to action and hence to whatever learning may be necessary to attain the goal. The imperative character of the needs for food, sexual activity, and bodily protection, and their effects on basic institutions, have already been discussed.

Some Other Conditions Influencing Learning. While the drives and the effects of prior conditioning are probably the most important determinants of the learning at any time and place, certain specific factors may modify the learning process. We note only a few.

There is a vast literature showing the effects of certain endocrines, or hormones, on learning capacity and on the direction and intensity of drives. Children lacking adequate thyroid substances—chemicals absolutely essential to sound bodily and mental health—are listless, dull, and inattentive. Under proper feeding of thyroxine they improve not only in weight and muscular tone but in schoolwork. In connection with emotional changes, the introduction of adrenaline, a hormone from the adrenal, greatly enhances the expenditure of available energy and thus heightens the reactivity of the individual.

Fatigue, a condition of depleted bodily energy, has its effects upon learning. Fine discriminations, persistence of effort, and other important factors are qualified by fatigue. So, too, certain emotionalized sentiments or stereotypes may be induced in individuals more easily when they are worn out by previous hard work, loss of sleep, or some other fatiguing experience. It is said that Adolf Hitler defended the holding of political rallies late at night on the ground that the audience would then be more susceptible to persuasion.

Emotional states affect learning. Conditioning by fear, anger, or some other strong emotion not only is rapid but may persist for long periods, even without further practice or reinforcement by repetition. For example, knowledge acquired in grave danger or in the emotional excitement of a crowd, or the association of a word or a slogan with strong feelings of dis-

⁴ C. J. Warden, "The Relative Strength of the Primary Drives in the White Rat," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1932, 41: 16-35.

pleasure or pleasure or with the emotion of fear or anger is an example of learning in which affective states play a large part. Such learning is particularly evident in the acquisition of basic group values, prejudices, anxieties, and hopes.

Strong emotional-feeling states may also act to inhibit certain forms of learning, especially those involving niceties of logical reasoning. For example, the student learns difficult lessons in mathematics, science, or literature less effectively if he is burdened with worry, anxiety, or irritations—attitudes surcharged with fear and anger.

Bodily states, which influence learning, are changed by various drugs or narcotics. Some drugs act as stimulants, others as depressants. Caffeine stimulates at first but later depresses the circulatory, respiratory, and neural systems. Alcohol, by dulling the higher mental centers, makes for ineffective associations and also releases certain inhibitions which serve ordinarily to block untutored impulses. Bromides tend to cause loss of acquired skills, either motor or symbolic.

In short, we must always bear in mind that the acquisition of new stimulus-response patterns is qualified and controlled not only by the neurological system, but by the endocrines and by the general conditions of bodily health.

Types of Learning. Although all learning rests upon the association of old and new, there are various kinds of active learning. Perhaps the commonest is *trial-and-error* learning, in which the individual acquires some new skill or knowledge by means of repeated trials in which fumbings, false reactions, and effort finally disappear into a smooth and effective habit. The successful acts are rewarded by attainment of the goal, and the inaccurate, unsuccessful ones are inhibited and drop out because of failure to be rewarded or because of punishment of some sort. A child learns to manipulate toys and clothes, and acquires a large number of motor skills, in this way. Adolescents and adults, in much the same fashion, acquire complicated skills in handling the tools, instruments, and machines which characterize our industrial civilization.

Another type of learning is known as the *conditioned response*. The classic case of conditioning is Ivan Pavlov's training a dog to salivate at the ringing of a bell through a series of trials in which the animal is shown at the same time a pellet of meat, which will naturally set up salivation. As Neal E. Miller puts it, the conditioned-response technique consists in collapsing the trial-and-error process into its simplest form, wherein "all errors have been eliminated by the use of a stimulus which is certain directly to produce the response to be reinforced."⁵ In other words, the experimenter or the situation sets the stage in such a way as to avoid or

⁵ From Neal E. Miller, mimeographed notes, "Survey of Psychological Principles Relevant to Social Behavior," 1940. Courtesy of author.

eliminate a host of false starts and confines the action to the acquisition of the correct response only. Simple conditioning is rather temporary unless it is reinforced by repetition of the association of the two stimuli. But, if acquired under emotional conditions, a single conditioning may persist for a long time. All sorts of apparently irrational fears, sentiments, and attitudes may be so induced. Often the particular situation in which the linkage occurred is completely forgotten, but the conditioned response remains.

Yet conditioning may be complicated by a number of other acquisitions. It is possible to blot out, or inhibit, a conditioned pattern by introducing a second conditioning. Many sorts of learning illustrate this. For example, suppose a child has been frightened by a loud sound, such as thunder. A parent may then, by fondling, giving candy, or appealing to the prestige-rivalry that is common among older children, remove, or inhibit, the learned fear response. This "inhibition conditioning," as it is technically known, is the replacing of one habit pattern by another. Yet this is not the end of the possibilities of relating one habit to another. If a third conditioning is introduced, the inhibition may be broken down and the initial acquisition re-established. Thus, the child who had overcome fear of loud thunder by being fondled or given sweetmeats might, if the parent punished him, again acquire fear of thunder. At a more complex level, involving a wide range of other factors, chiefly symbolic, a man under the stimulus of a religious revival, a lynching mob, or a strong nationalistic ideology may find that he unconsciously (unwittingly) releases aggressive or fear reactions which have long been out of his routine conscious experience.

Yet, not all learning involves trial and error or conditioned-reflex mechanisms. The *Gestalt* school has emphasized the importance of *configurational* learning. The essence of this process is that in perception, memory, association—in short, in relation to the important factors of learning—we must deal with total configurations or patterned wholes, not with highly specific and discrete elements. This grouping of elements is most obvious in learning involving social situations. We know that the schoolchild, in learning to read, reacts not alone to the printed book before him, but to the other pupils, to the teacher, and to the physical aspects of the room—seats, lighting, sounds, and all.

In addition to stressing the total pattern, the *Gestalt* school have also introduced an element which they call *insight*. By this they mean that a person may acquire a new skill or power without deliberately connecting all the necessary elements together, either by trial manipulations or by conscious associations. Rather the solution appears suddenly and in more or less complete form. The case, cited by Wolfgang Köhler, of the chimpanzee Sultan, who quickly learned to put two sticks together to fashion one long enough to reach the food, is said to be an instance of learning by insight.⁶

⁶ W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, 1927, pp. 125-133.

Certainly, with human beings, there is ample evidence of the sudden appearance of the more or less complete solution of a problem, and whether we should call this insight is a matter of no great concern. In human beings the so-called unconscious or nondeliberative processes appear to operate in just this way, and the history of invention and discovery—to note the most striking examples—is replete with instances where some mechanical device, some mathematical or literary composition, came in just this sudden, unexpected manner. As to the occurrence of this process in the usual learning of skills or of verbal acquirements, we know practically nothing systematic. Novel associations of motor reactions or of ideas do take place outside the range of deliberate and conscious awareness, but this is no more a cause of learning than is trial-and-error manipulation. At best it is a descriptive category to denote some particular form of organized linkage.

The most complex, or “highest,” form of learning is the *symbolic*, which involves the manipulation of symbols in a reasoned or logical fashion. This process marks man’s greatest superiority over his animal precursors. It depends, first, upon the cerebral processes which make possible intelligent judgment, choice, formation of ideas or concepts, and reasoning, and, second, upon the level of culture to which the individual is exposed. Symbols, chiefly linguistic, play the major part in its operation.

The development of this higher thought is not a matter of magic or chance. It rests upon rudimentary motor learning; but it depends essentially upon a shift of control from the external stimulus to the internal controls, which are dependent on previous associations. This internalization, in turn, is related to the development of language, itself a social or interactional product. By talking subvocally to himself, by using symbols for objects, and partial reactions for whole responses, the individual is able to manipulate his world in imagination and thus prepare for a more effective external adaptation. So far as we know, no animal can do this, first because animals lack the cerebral capacity, and, secondly, because they do not develop true language. Reasoning—the highest phase of this internal activity—is a process of mental exploration that goes on by means of memories, judgments, and concepts or ideas derived from previous experience.

The concept is the key. It is a symbol or representative for objects, relationships, and qualities. Its growth and use depend on one’s noting both similarities and differences in objects, relations, and qualities, part-features which have other part-features of similar character. For example, according to the Stanford-Binet test of intelligence, a normal seven-year-old child should know the difference between such objects as a fly and a butterfly, a stone and an egg, and wood and glass. A year later he is supposed to

know the likenesses of such objects as wood and coal, an apple and a peach, and iron and silver. At twelve years of age he should be able to define accurately a considerable number of abstract words, such as *pity*, *revenge*, *envy*, and *charity*. A year or more later he will be dealing in more advanced problems in logical reasoning, in which algebraic symbols may replace arithmetic ones.

The importance of such capacities is obvious. They permit the individual to arrive at judgments and to make choices *in advance* of the particular situation where they are needed. It permits man—unlike his animal forebears—to go out and meet the environment rather than to wait till the environment forces him to adjust himself. More important than that, such foresight, planning, or anticipation makes it possible for man actually to create his environment—thus providing him a means of controlling it. The entire cultural heritage is witness to this fact. In short, man may develop purposes, ideals, and aims which take the place of more rudimentary drives. He is able to move from trial and error or external forms of learning to those types which take place in symbolic form, and his goals or accomplishments may likewise be altered from mere biological adaptation to satisfactions in which science, art, religion, and philosophy themselves have a large share.

In terms of psychology these higher processes depend essentially upon (1) externally determined associative mechanisms in learning—that is, the new linkages between perception and reaction; (2) memory mechanisms (retention, recall, and recognition)—that is, persistence of the prior associations, which help to direct and control later adaptations; (3) mental associations which replace, in a sense, the initial, externally-determined acquisitions—that is, conceptualization; and (4) reasoning, in which symbols rather than motor acts become the important elements. But, as noted above, these internal processes are not a magic or mystic capacity but are an elaboration of psychological principles which we find exemplified in the higher animals and in primitive man.

Perception, memory, and other higher thought processes are essential in establishing the content and meaning of culture for the individual, and we shall return to examine some particular features of these processes in Chapter VIII, where we take up the nature of social-cultural reality.

At this point we may summarize certain basic facts about learning as follows: (1) It modifies, elaborates, and adds to the cycles of activity making for adaptation. (2) It is both passive and active, but it is particularly significant in crises—that is, when the course from drive to goal is blocked. (3) The time sequence is important—that is, the earlier learning is prepotent and basic, and what happens to the individual in the first years of life sets the foundation for most of his later adjustments. (4) There

are various types or forms of learning, but the central feature is some kind of new association of stimulus and response. (5) The effects of learning not only are cumulative but become organized into certain patterns.

THE ORGANIZATION OF LEARNING

Not only is the new learning built upon the old, but the whole process operates under certain general principles, or "laws." Some aspects of social-cultural learning will be clearer if we review selected facts about the organization of learning.

The Basic Principles of Learning. Three of the important "laws" of learning are those of *effect*, *substitution*, and *reward*. The first, long associated with the name of Edward L. Thorndike, states that, "when a modifiable connection between a situation and a response is made and is accompanied or followed by a satisfying state of affairs, that connection's strength is increased; when made and accompanied or followed by an annoying state of affairs, its strength is decreased."⁷ This law of learning is as old as the pleasure-pain theory itself and has much to support it. It rests on the fact that feelings and emotions strengthen the associative connections, especially those in which basic needs or desires are involved. Closely related to the law of effect are those of *exercise* and *use*, in stating which Thorndike made clear that frequency or repetition of connections and recency play important parts in establishing a habit. In short, the greater the degree of satisfaction, the oftener a response is repeated; and, the more recently a reaction has been rewarded and exercised, the stronger will be the linkage of the old and the new.

The principle of substitution has also long been recognized, but it took the work of Ivan Pavlov on the conditioned reflex to indicate its wide applicability. Not only may overt responses be linked together, but substitute stimuli and substitute reactions may also be associated. A word, a picture, or any other symbol may become as powerful a motive as the original demands of the organism. So, too, symbols of status and power and ideals may under cultural situations become more desirable rewards than a full stomach or a new lover. We all realize the power of words in the manipulation and social control of our fellows. The law of substitution is of particular importance in social psychology because much of the interaction with which that subject deals is carried on in the currency of symbols, talk, gestures, and other forms of communication outweighing the more motor forms of interaction.

Clark L. Hull has made explicit a third important factor in learning. Accepting Pavlov's principle of the conditioned reflex and Thorndike's

⁷ E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology*: vol. II, *The Psychology of Learning*, 1913, p. 4 By permission.

law of effect, he laid great stress on the importance of drive and reward or punishment. Reward and punishment reinforce any conditioning. Most earlier students of learning recognized the place of interest in facilitating associative thinking and doing, but Hull restated the matter in behavioristic terms, made clear the place of basic and acquired drives as setting learning in motion, and especially underscored the importance of reward as providing a closure, or completion, for the cycle set up by a drive. According to Hull, there are four fundamentals in learning: drive, cue, response, and reward. The *drive* is any native or acquired strong stimulus which impels to action. The *cue* is a learned indicator which determines when, where, and what the *response*, or final action, will be. Cues emerge as conditioned stimuli chiefly in the second phase of the cycle of activity. The noon whistle is a signal for workmen to throw down their tools and get out their lunch boxes. The American flag or the national anthem arouses patriotic responses. Finally, the *reward* marks the culmination or satisfaction of the drive.⁸

Not only positive reward but negative punishment plays an important part in fixing a habit, attitude, or idea. Rewards and punishments, like motives, may be overt and physical or acquired and symbolic. That is, by means of substitution they may take highly social-cultural forms, quite remote from the original forms, which operate in the earliest stage of motor learning.

Although the laws of effect, substitution, and reward are not the only principles of learning, they are broad generalizations that cover much of the detail found in the various forms of learning.

Additional Factors in the Organization of Learning. In the organization of what is learned a number of subsidiary processes are highly important. Let us look at these.

When one reaction enhances or improves another reaction, we speak of *facilitation*. Learning under shock leaves a very strong impression; a vigorous emotional reaction, for example, may implant a conditioned response so firmly that no further practice is necessary to ensure its persistence. Moreover, linkage having been set up between a certain skill and a certain reward, the reward may be used to reinforce any other response which may be associated with it.

In contrast to facilitation we find that inhibition is also important in the organization of learning. *Inhibition* is the blocking of one activity by another. A strong emotional state, such as fear, may inhibit overt activity, or great anger may lead to the loss of all discrimination or judgment. But the principle operates at other levels. As we noted above, one conditioned

⁸ For a convenient review of Hull's theory, see N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, 1941, chaps. 1-5.

pattern may block another, and, in turn, a third learned pattern may inhibit the inhibitory one and thus set free the original learned activity. In a broad sense, what is called "extinction" or, in the older psychology, "forgetting" is a special case of inhibition. Failure to reward a particular action may, in time, lead to neglect of effort to pursue that action. Parents often find this an effective device in correcting minor habits of children.

In the competition for dominance among the drives—say between desire for food and that for sexual outlet—the success of one depends on the restriction or stoppage of the others. Moreover, the culturally acquired moral codes operate largely through inhibitions. Through fear, punishment, and rewards the individual is trained to hold in check his more rudimentary drives for food, dominance, sexual expression, and the like. At intellectual levels the same principle is seen, operating through symbols. A train of fantasy may make impossible the clear and logical thinking required by a mathematics assignment. Successful adjustment—either symbolic or overt—depends on our capacity to hold one trend in check while operating another. In fact, a great deal of learning is marked by recurrent competition between facilitation or reinforcement and inhibition or extinction. One of our cultural aims is to reinforce certain patterns and to block others which are believed detrimental. In many social situations the interplay of facilitation and inhibition is apparent. This is especially clear in situations involving prejudice and crowd behavior.

Differentiation is a process involving certain discriminations among stimulus-response patterns. Stimuli that vary in intensity or some other characteristic may induce choices, or discriminations in response. Whereas, as we shall see, generalization depends upon the capacity of the organism to react to similar or identical elements in two otherwise somewhat different situations, differentiation represents a capacity to make rather sharp choices between sets of stimuli. An animal may be conditioned to give one response to one rate of metronome beats and a different response to another rate. This seems to represent the basic pattern of judgment.

The best-known illustration of this important function in man is exemplified in Weber's law. This law states that the discrimination which one makes is not absolute but rather proportional to the range of possible stimuli. For example, we know that it is easy to discriminate between two light weights, such as 31 and 32 ounces, but not easy to detect a small difference between two heavier weights, such as 100 and 101 pounds. In the same manner one could tell rather easily the difference in illumination between a small room lighted by one candle and the same room lighted by two. But, if there were eight candles, we would not notice the effect of adding one more. In general, this law states that, as the responses increase arithmetically, the stimulus must increase geometrically. But this effect is most evident in the middle range of sensory-perceptual judgments. The law does not seem to hold for the extremes, such as low and high intensities.

The individual learns not only to discriminate between important stimuli, but also to react to identical or similar stimuli in more or less the same fashion. This process we call *generalization*.

Certain relations of part to whole are the basic factor in generalization. The animal or human being comes to respond to a phase or section rather than to the total configuration, and this particular aspect calls out the entire reaction that was first associated with the stimulus. Much the same principle lies behind the development of cues, or indicators of larger situations. In time any acquired element may set up any reaction with which it has been previously associated. Trial-and-error learning brings about a simplification and organization of the movements between drive and goal; there is also a reduction, to a smaller and more partial character, of the cue or initial stimulus that starts the activity. In verbal learning a word may come to stand for what was originally the large physical configuration which instigated a movement. In fact, the function of the symbol in thought and speech is derived, in part, from this process.

In a sense, generalization is only an extension of the cue-reduction process, but the reduced stimulus may represent a variety of otherwise somewhat divergent stimulating situations or objects. For example we have J. B. Watson's classic experiment with Albert. Having been conditioned to a fear reaction to a furry animal, Albert, without further special conditioning, showed fear of such furry objects as a fur muff and cotton-wool, objects otherwise quite distinct from the original stimulus. In adult terms we might say that Albert was reacting to furriness as a quality, not to a diffused, undifferentiated situation.⁹

At the level of attitudes and symbols, generalization is highly important. For example, not only may we induce specific attitudes of like or dislike for a person or group of persons, but we know from everyday observation and from experiment that individuals tend to generalize many of their attitudes into larger, over-all reaction-tendencies. At the symbolic level the growth and use of concepts, of course, depend upon the generalizing process, aided, as it must be, by differentiation. The use of words to classify specific objects into groups, of words to characterize these classes, of words to name qualities or quantities or relationships beyond the immediate physical objects—this is the flowering of tendencies to react to parts as well as to wholes, of the capacity to reduce the original stimulating situation to a symbol or representative of its initial totality.

In social behavior there is no better illustration of generalization than the stereotype, which is but a faulty concept. By verbal labeling of races, classes, denominations, nations, and the like we qualify them, define our attitudes toward them and our ideas about them, and predetermine, in large measure, how we will react overtly to them in the future. So, too, purposes, goals, and ideals—stated in verbal terms and representing internal pictures of the future for us—are themselves further elaborations

⁹ J. B. Watson and R. R. Watson, "Studies in Infant Psychology," *Scientific Monthly*, 1921, 13: 493-515.

of this generalizing process, especially as it is coupled to anticipation and integration. (See Chapter IX.)

Another important aspect of the organization of learning is found in *anticipatory* or *expectancy* responses. In the behavioristic terms of Neal E. Miller, the phrase *anticipatory response* refers to the fact "that acts near the point of reinforcement (such as food or sexual reward) tend to move forward in the response series."¹⁰ That is, the individual not only acquires ability to react quickly and effectively, or with little lost motion, to a given situation, but through learning goes out to meet the oncoming stimulus. In the temporal sequence an act is moved forward, and this act we call anticipatory.

The development of expectancy seems to go somewhat like this: some act associated with the consummation becomes sufficiently reinforced and generalized to appear much earlier in the cycle than it did originally. For example, in a food-getting experiment a rat had to depress a certain bar—in a series of possible choices—to secure the food. In time sniffing, which had at first appeared only *after* the food was available, began to appear as soon as the rat was placed in the maze. That is, it began sniffing *before* other reactions, essential to the choice of the correct bar, had been made. Sniffing at this early phase we call anticipatory response. In behavioristic terms, it becomes the meaning for the animal of the entire series of acts from goal-stimulus to goal-response.

In man the whole process, though more complex, doubtless rests on the same general mechanism. A person seeing savory food in a shop window, or even an advertisement of food, may begin salivating. Symbols become highly important in setting up anticipatory reactions. The individual gets "set" to perform consummatory or goal-reaching acts before the stimulating object itself is even at hand. Moreover, this prior response gives further reinforcement and direction to the adjustive acts involved.

Anticipatory responses take on the character of part-to-whole reactions, and therefore have a place in the development of both differentiation and generalization. So, too, anticipatory patterns—chiefly internalized as mental images and concepts—are especially significant as phases of foresight and conscious planning. In fact, there are actually two aspects of anticipation: the reduction of the overt act to an attitude or a tendency to react, and the development of the image or concept, in which verbal and intellectual elements enter. Both are phases of the internalization of which we have already spoken.

This principle of anticipatory response is the foundation upon which we build up the principle of social expectancy or anticipation. As we shall see, expectancy is essential to the development of the social self and its functions, and it provides a clue to the symbolic reactions to future events. In

¹⁰ N. E. Miller, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

moral control the codes of conduct laid before the individual by parents and others take the form of anticipatory reactions which fortify him against temptation. In many instances of crowd behavior and in the leader-follower situation, expectancy is of fundamental importance.

By *integration*, which is related to generalization and differentiation, adaptive processes become co-ordinated into larger and more effective patterns, and different whole or partial stimuli set off identical or at least highly similar responses. Integration is evident in all sorts of motor learning. In tennis, golf, handball, and other games of this sort, the awkward, wasted, and unco-ordinated movements give way in time to integrated actions involving larger and smaller muscle groups in what is at its best a highly efficient total act.

We have in these instances not only co-ordination of separate units of the reaction system, but a certain channeling of these into a hierarchy, or order, so that one flows smoothly from another and all make for effective adaptation. In this whole process, of course, previous learning has its place. This increase in co-ordination and unified response is made possible by the integrative function of the cerebral cortex. This principle is amply illustrated in social interaction. The commands of the officer are stimuli to the integrated movements of the military squad. As one builds up one's reactions to parents, brothers and sisters, friends and enemies, the single items in the process become linked together into unified wholes. The gestures, physical appearance, habits, ideas, and attitudes of others constitute a configuration of stimuli. The individual's responses to these stimuli are woven together into organized habits and attitudes. For example, the reaction of the speaker to his audience is conditioned by the form of the audience—the number present, the seating, and so on—and the response of his listeners is determined by the integration of his voice, facial and manual gestures, posture, and expressed thoughts. Any person gradually builds up a general attitude toward, and a general idea about, his family, class, religion, and country. We shall refer to this in Chapter VII as the *general role*. Such integrative patterns telescope our responses into brief compass and thus make for more effective adaptation.

Yet integration must be understood in its relation to dissociation and differentiation. We may have a highly co-ordinated system of response to some value or object, such as our family name, our religion, or our country; and at the same time we may have an equally strong negatively integrated pattern of reaction to some family in an out-group, to some other religious body or its members, or to some enemy country. In fact, this balance of divergent patterns is highly important in our behavior, and it is well to note that integration is always related to particular skills, objects, or situations, and may be found alongside equally strong but opposite patterns of different character.

SOME SPECIAL FACTORS IN SOCIAL LEARNING

Before concluding this chapter, we must review certain features of learning which have special bearing on social psychology. These are imitation, suggestion, praise or blame, competition or co-operation, and related factors which serve to facilitate or inhibit particular kinds of social adaptation.

Imitation. Aside from *instinct*, no term has been more loosely used in social psychology than *imitation*. It is employed to cover such actions as yawning when others yawn and running when others run, to account for the acquisition of one's native tongue or one's specific or general role in a group, to describe both the deliberate and the unconscious following of fashion, to explain the spread of a revolutionary social movement, and even—in the sense of Walter Bagehot¹¹ and Gabriel Tarde¹²—to explain what is known in cultural anthropology as diffusion. An early American writer on social psychology, James Mark Baldwin, went so far as to make imitation practically identical with all learning, simple or complex.¹³

Obviously, imitation shortens the learning process, for the perception of another individual's action may lead at once to the performance of a similar action. That is, the imitator acts without any trial and error or other form of prolonged learning. Whatever imitation may be, it is closely related to social facilitation, the favorable influence of one individual's action on the actions of another.

A good deal of research has been done on imitation among the lower animals, especially among the monkeys and apes, but unfortunately there has been little agreement on the means of recording or measuring imitation or even on the definition of the term. As pointed out in Chapter II, there is no evidence of a special instinct of imitation among the lower animals. What is called imitative instinct is largely a matter of conditioning.

Although the term has been loosely used, there is little doubt that certain behavior may be descriptively classified as imitation, if we mean by this certain uniformities or similarities of behavior. In any consideration of imitation among human beings, four points must be taken into account:

(1) There is the common constitutional foundation of all perception and reaction, which gives a basis for like or similar behavior.

(2) There is the similar or even identical conditioning into which both personal-social and cultural factors enter. Such simple reactions as running when others run, peering at an object when others do so, and laughing when others laugh are obviously acquired. Some of the more obviously complicated forms are: (a) the ac-

¹¹ See W. Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, 1873.

¹² See G. Tarde, *The Laws of Imitation*, transl. by E. C. Parsons, 1903.

¹³ See J. M. Baldwin, *Mental Development in the Child and the Race*, 1895

quirement of one's native language, in which self-imitation may play a part, as when a child babbles because he babbles, or repeats over and over again certain words or phrases; (b) the learning of the expected moral habits of one's group or society; (c) the social approval (positive reward) or punishment (negative reward) for conformity of actions, both moral and conventional. In their extensive treatment of imitation, Neal E. Miller and John Dollard define certain instances under points 1 and 2 as "same behavior."¹⁴ Individuals who go to work at the same time as others, or who, in a crowd, respond as the crowd does, may do so, not because they were taught together in an interpersonal situation, but because they have been exposed to similar social-cultural patterns. Strictly speaking, "same behavior," as Miller and Dollard define it, is not imitation if we mean by that the direct modeling of one's behavior on that of another person.

(3) There is also social facilitation, which plays a part in so-called imitation. This is particularly evident in leader-follower relations. A pace-setter with prestige may set the direction of action for others. Miller and Dollard call this type "prestige," or "matched-dependent," imitation. So, too, enthusiastic persuasion by an agitator or an advertiser may secure followers for a social movement or a dress fad. In such situations the action of one person may direct attention to specific aspects of the stimulus or response, thus enhancing the speed of learning of the others.

(4) There is, finally, that similar behavior which is sometimes called "conscious imitation." This seems definitely to depend (a) upon the development of the internal process which we call imagination, and especially (b) upon the rise of the self. The sense of self, or of personal ego, develops, as we shall see in the next chapter, as the individual takes on the role of another person. This process itself may be loosely described as imitation. Certainly, once the capacity to imagine another's role and status has been developed, one can deliberately copy another's gestures, speech, and other habits. In this sense, imitation depends upon imagery, memory, and other processes of higher mentality, of which only human beings are capable; thus only man is capable of imitation. The existence of this form of anticipatory reaction simply means that the secondary stimulus, derived from previous experience with other persons, is now within the individual himself. Hence, one may "imitate" an ideal figure or some character in past history as readily as one does a living person. Such imitation is simply a phase of the whole conditioning and integrating function of learning, in which the secondary stimulus and the reaction are similar if not identical. George Humphrey remarks: "This secondary stimulus may originate either in the same or in another organism, so that imitation may technically be either of self or others."¹⁵

Imitation, therefore, whether it be a simple conditioning or an acquisition of culture patterns, may be explained as a special phase of the integration of conditioned responses into habits and attitudes. It is not some special instinct. When one recalls the identical mechanisms of learning in all human beings and the common patterns of personal-social and cultural environment to which individuals are exposed, it is not difficult to

¹⁴ Miller and Dollard, *op. cit.* This is an important contribution to the subject of imitation from a behavioristic point of view.

¹⁵ G. Humphrey, "Imitation and the Conditioned Reflex," *Pedagogical Seminary*, 1921, 38. 20.

understand why human behavior, in many dimensions of life, is similar in form and content.

The whole point of the matter is well stated by Charles Bird when he says that we "learn to imitate" rather than "learn by imitation."¹⁶ When we consider also George H. Mead's interpretation of imitation as self-conscious assumption of another's acts or roles, we may describe imitation as a phase of higher learning in which imaginative processes have the major part.

Suggestion. Most writers distinguish between suggestion and suggestibility, as these play a part in learning or adjustment. Suggestion may be considered the stimulus, and suggestibility the internal phase related thereto.¹⁷ In any case the broad process of suggestion involves interaction at the communication level in which both external and internal factors play a part. Surely, external stimulation alone will not evoke a response unless the internal state—ideas, images, attitudes, and sentiments—is of such and such a character. We may define suggestion as a form of symbol-communication by words, pictures, or some similar medium inducing acceptance of the symbol without any self-evident or logical ground for its acceptance. However, suggestion is not a special mechanism, any more than is imitation. The acceptance (or rejection) of the proposition or symbol is determined by the stimulus and the internal conditions operating together. In this sense suggestibility is a phase of anticipatory activity which may either directly or indirectly affect conduct. The process of suggestion short-circuits logical analysis, inhibits critical restraint, and leads at once to the desired conclusion.

The type of incipient or overt response that a stimulus will arouse depends upon social-cultural training. Once the image or idea and the accompanying attitude are set up, action tends to flow in the direction which they give. That is to say, anticipatory reactions tend to become overt unless other anticipatory or overt responses inhibit them. We have but a special case of facilitation and inhibition working together. And, since we are moved far more effectively by emotions and feelings than by rational ideas, the most far-reaching effects of suggestion are produced by appeals to those emotionalized images, sentiments, and attitudes which rest upon previous conditioning.

Suggestibility is often discussed as a trait of personality. When we speak of a person as highly suggestible or as more suggestible than others, we refer to some specific, or perhaps generalized, trait. Actually a large number of factors enter into the communicative process of suggestion. From experimental work in this field we know that the instructions of the ex-

¹⁶ C. Bird, *Social Psychology*, 1940, p. 250. See chap. 7, for a review of some of the pertinent literature on imitation.

¹⁷ See *ibid.*, chap. 8.

perimeter, the nature of the task, the apparatus, and the readiness of the individual to respond, all have their place.

Certain *external* conditions make for suggestibility: bright colors, pleasant tones, rhythmic and monotonous stimuli, and certain qualities of the instructions or statement. So, too, prestige-bearing individuals, in person or through their statements, add weight to suggestions.

Internal conditions favoring suggestibility include both the physiological, such as fatigue and the effects of narcotics or intoxicants or prolonged fasting, and the psychological, which arise from prior training in submission to authority, in principles of moral conduct, or in prejudices about class differences and the superiority of one's group or society. Especially pertinent are emotional disturbances as they develop dissociation, giving rise to free fantasies and uncontrolled associations, or as they release more elemental impulses of aggression, fear, and sexuality. Later we shall note in detail how important such early conditioning is in providing a background for effective suggestions with reference to prejudices, leader-follower relations, crowd and mob action, fashion change, propaganda, and the like. Since the emotions arise most easily in severe crises, any dislocation in class or economic structure or in everyday living, as through flood, famine, financial panic, religious revival, crime wave, or war, produces an excellent setting for the operation of suggestion.

Some suggestions are direct, others indirect. Some are positive, some negative. Direct suggestions are often found in advertising, where the appeal to thrift, high social status, or what not is obvious. Indirect suggestion is found in veiled propaganda, where the aim is to undermine a value or slowly to build up another value. Positive suggestions are, of course, those which induce one to act at once, such as the advertising slogan "Eventually, why not now?" Negative suggestions stimulate one to avoid an act or a thought. Campaigns for public safety are of this sort. Many commercial advertisements use both a negative and a positive approach. Those dealing with body odor or bad teeth or life insurance often combine stimulation of fear and avoidance with some positive proposal as to how to overcome or offset the situation.

Suggestion has often been classified under three types: *ideomotor suggestion*, *prestige suggestion*, and *autosuggestion*. The first is found at the sensory-perceptual level and was the subject of many early researches in this field. The classic work was that of Alfred Binet, who presented a number of children with a series of pairs of lines progressively nearer and nearer the same length. It was found, as might be expected, that far more often than chance would allow a child judged the lines which were of the same length to be different or lines of slightly different length to be the same, depending on where these were introduced into the test series. Ideomotor suggestion merges easily into empathy, which is illustrated when spectators at a high jump lift one leg at the time the jumper goes over the bar. Much of this suggestion takes place below the level of conscious-

ness. In these instances suggestion and imitation, as descriptive categories, merge into one another.

Prestige suggestion is everywhere evident. A speaker may sway his audience because he has a great name. People flock to a motion picture in which a prominent actor or actress appears, often without inquiring into the merit of the play itself. A famous mining engineer who has traveled in a foreign country may be considered an expert on international politics affecting his own and that particular country. A world-famous physicist may issue pronouncements on the subversion of education by certain types of classical literature. Yet responses to prestige may be positive or negative. In reacting to such suggestions, one tends to be either all for a given suggestion or all against it. G. H. Estabrooks has shrewdly observed that all responses involving strong emotions tend to be of this "all-or-nothing" type, and prestige suggestion is always heavily laden with emotional freight.¹⁸

Akin to suggestions reinforced by personal prestige are those which come from experts or majorities. A number of striking studies have been made on this topic, and they have a bearing on the problems of leadership and public opinion.

P. A. Sorokin and J. W. Boldyreff asked their subjects to state preferences for one of two identical renditions on a phonograph of a part of Brahms' first symphony. At one playing the subjects, 1,484 high-school and college students, were told that this was a superior, musically finer, and more beautiful piece than the other. At the other playing the same selection was referred to as "an exaggerated imitation of a well-known masterpiece, totally deficient in self-subsistence and beauty." As to the first suggestion that the identical records were different, 96 per cent accepted this as true. Regarding the effect of prestige or expert opinion as to these alleged two different pieces, 59 per cent followed the suggestion, 21 per cent "suspended their judgments," and 16 per cent disagreed. Finally, 4 per cent only recognized the second playing of the piece to be the same.¹⁹

In another important investigation Henry T. Moore compared the influence of majority opinion with that of expert opinion. His study showed that, for college students in our society at that time (1920), the opinion of a majority was more effective than that of experts.²⁰

More than a decade later C. H. Marple confirmed Moore's general finding with an investigation of the opinions of a large number of individuals on seventy-five controversial problems in economics, education, politics, and related fields. The subjects were to express their views as "yes" or "no" or "uncertain" on these topics. Marple's

¹⁸ G. H. Estabrooks, "Experimental Studies in Suggestions," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1929, 36: 120-139.

¹⁹ P. A. Sorokin and J. W. Boldyreff, "An Experimental Study of the Influence of Suggestion on the Discrimination and the Valuation of People," *Amer. J. Sociology*, 1932, 37: 720-737.

²⁰ H. T. Moore, "The Comparative Influence of Majority and Expert Opinion," *Amer. J. Psychology*, 1921, 32: 16-20.

sample was made up of three groups of 300 each, equally distributed among high-school seniors, college seniors, and adults out of school. From each of these he selected a control group of 100 who would be retested on the initial questions without having had any suggestions. A second group of 100 from each was exposed later to the opinions of the experts, and a third group of like number was exposed later to the opinions of the majority. The second test was given in such a way that Marple could measure the extent to which the subject altered his original opinion to agree with the opinion of the expert or of the majority, as the case might be. Due allowance was made for changes due to chance.

The number of high-school seniors who changed their opinions to agree with the majority was about four times as great as that likely by chance; the number of those who changed to agree with the experts was about three times as great as that likely by chance. The college seniors moved in about the same proportions toward majority rather than toward expert opinion. For the adults, the changes were in the same direction but less striking. In short, though expert opinions influenced judgment, group opinion had a greater effect.²¹

It is apparent from these and many other studies—as it is from common-sense observation—that cultural conditioning largely determines whether the suggestion process will operate in a particular situation. Though we have no experimental proof, we may infer that the importance of majority opinion as a determinant of thought or action is due chiefly to the fact that in our democratic society we believe in majorities rather than in experts, at least in economic and political fields. In a society in which majorities had little recognition but in which leaders, and especially experts, had the highest prestige, the results might be quite different.

Hypnotism, a form of dissociation resembling somnambulism, or sleepwalking, is induced by suggestion. The prestige factor is of great importance, involving as it does the use of rhythmic tone, repeated verbal or visual stimulation, and control of the thought and action of the person under hypnosis. The dominance-submission relation is strikingly apparent, and a person will perform unusual acts not only during the hypnotic state itself but afterwards, through what is termed posthypnotic suggestion. It is generally agreed that a hypnotized person cannot be “forced” or “made” to do things which run counter to his deepest moral conditioning, although the experiments of L. W. Rowland indicate that there are individual differences in this matter. He found that some persons under deep hypnosis would actually reach out to take hold of a rattlesnake when told that it was a coil of rope, or would throw sulphuric acid on the experimenter. (The snake was placed behind invisible glass, and the experimenter was protected from injury.) However, most of the subjects were afraid of the snake and also refused to follow the instructions to injure the experimenter.²²

Sigmund Freud contended that hypnotism is but an extreme instance of the complete identification of one person with another, in which the

²¹ C. H. Marple, “The Comparative Susceptibility of Three Age Levels to the Suggestion of Group versus Expert Opinion,” *J. Social Psychology*, 1933, 4: 176–186.

²² L. W. Rowland, “Will Hypnotized Persons Try to Harm Themselves or Others?” *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1939, 34: 114–117.

libidinous ties are very close. He held further that it is only through such a condition that leaders are able to control their followers completely, and that the general pattern is established in the early dominance-submission relationships of parents and children.²³

Whether we accept Freud's particular theory or not, there is no doubt that orators, executive leaders, and others in positions of prestige and authority exercise a powerful sway over their followers, in part because they arouse submissive attitudes. There is a widespread belief that such leaders possess a special power to hypnotize the masses. Certainly large audiences may be so stimulated as to believe, at least temporarily, in all sorts of ideas and attitudes or even to follow lines of action which in less emotional circumstances would be completely inhibited. Mental epidemics, mob lynchings, and incitements to revolutionary political movements are illustrations of such action patterns, in which dissociation seems to have a definite function. (See Chapters XIII, XIV, XV, and XVIII.)

It would be a mistake, however, to equate such forms of mass control with hypnotism in the usual experimental or clinical sense. Yet we know from the work by Clark L. Hull and others that amazing effects on action may be induced by direct and conscious suggestions to un hypnotized persons.²⁴ Direct suggestion, abetted by rhythm, monotony, stagesettings, and appeals to deep, though unconscious, attitudes and ideas, may well induce emotional states not unlike those found in hypnosis.

In *autosuggestion* the individual directs his own train of thought and action. This process is easy to understand in terms of role-taking. (See Chapter VII.) Just as we talk to ourselves, giving advice, scolding or blaming, rationalizing, or thinking aloud, so we may set up suggestions for ourselves to follow. This is simply an instance of talking to ourselves as others might talk to us. It is an introjection, or internalization, of a prior communicative process between the individual and someone else. Usually a prestige factor enters into this, as shown by the belief in Emile Coué, a French popular psychologist, who told people that they could cure themselves of worry, mild illnesses, and other disturbances of their daily lives by following certain simple verbal stimuli, such as his famous line, "Day by day, in every way, I am getting better and better."

Individuals differ in suggestibility. Studies have shown that the young are more liable to suggestion than their elders and that the feeble-minded are more suggestible than the normal. In the first instance the deference to age and power is clear; in the second the lack of critical ability has perhaps the major part. Also a number of investigations in our Occidental society have shown that girls, on the average, are slightly more suggestible than boys. When intellectual and age differences are held constant, this seems to result chiefly from the fact that girls, like adult women, are

²³ See S. Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1922.

²⁴ C. L. Hull, *Hypnosis and Suggestibility*, 1933.

still under the general cultural domination of a man-made world. Certainly there is no evidence of any biologically founded sex difference in these matters.

Some writers have asked whether differences in suggestibility might not grow out of differences in psychological types. The entire question of personality types is unsettled, but, assuming for the moment that there may be some basis in fact for the introvert-extrovert typology, it might be contended, in theory at least, that extroverts are more suggestible than introverts. The former are assumed to be more inclined to adapt themselves to their social surroundings than the latter. In like manner it might be assumed that hysterics are more suggestible than schizoids. But we have no adequate evidence on this question. If the theory of personality types becomes more firmly established by empirical proof, and if it is shown that suggestibility has some positive correlation with particular types, then the relations of suggestibility to general traits and attitudes will also have to be re-examined. But until we have sufficient research on this question, we had best refrain from giving much credence to such relations.

We may summarize as follows some of the important things we do know about the process of suggestion: (1) Suggestion is not a special mental or interactional mechanism, though it is clearly related to identification. (2) It is not a special or general trait of the total personality, though the evidence that people may differ in their readiness to accept suggestions does raise the possibility that it may be correlated with type differences. (3) It certainly is not a "dynamic" or "explanatory" concept, but a descriptive one involving a combination of stimulus patterns and internal anticipatory patterns. And (4) culture plays a large part in predetermining the readiness to accept and follow suggestion; that is, cultural expectancies, in the broad sense, set the framework in which suggestion in the social interactional world will operate.

For example, the Mohave Indian of our Southwest is conditioned to expect—as a phase of his growing up—a vision from the gods of his tribe, and this will influence not only his own subsequent conduct but that of his fellows. The Malay native, in like manner, may be trained to undergo severe ordeals, such as walking on hot coals or passing hot skewers through the flesh, as phases of religious-magical rituals.²⁵ In our own cultural history mental epidemics and highly emotional religious revivals illustrate the same process.²⁶

In short, while the mechanics of suggestion rest on physiological or constitutional foundations, its particular direction and meaning will be largely controlled by the social and cultural forces which impinge on the

²⁵ See H. A. Murray, "Visceral Manifestations of Personality," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1937, 32 161-184.

²⁶ A remarkable story of the manner in which a shrewd understanding of the function of suggestion and a belief in magic were employed by Europeans to escape from captivity during World War I is given in E. H. Jones, *Road to En-Dor*, 1920.

growing individual. It is only in recent years that the academic psychologist has come to realize how profoundly these unconscious but powerful elements affect his findings in his experimental, statistical, and observational studies of suggestion.

In addition to imitation and suggestion, some other social influences on learning must be noted, such as those of praise and blame, of spectators or auditors, of group discussion, and of competition or co-operation.²⁷

Praise and Blame. Learning is obviously affected by encouragement or discouragement. This is but a special instance of the symbolic reward or punishment, which has become accepted in our culture. Both praise and blame are in constant use in the home, on the playground, in the school, in the office or factory, and in other situations where training goes on. "Spare the rod and spoil the child" is an old aphorism in child-training. But, like much folk wisdom, it is countered by advice which stresses praise and positive rewards rather than punishment. "You can catch more flies with honey than with vinegar." In fact, it is difficult to tell which device is the more effective. Neither common-sense observation or statistical studies give unequivocal evidence. Clearly, much depends on the nature of the learning and the relation of the learners to those in control.

Elizabeth B. Hurlock found that praise of schoolwork had a beneficial effect on classroom output, especially on its accuracy. She also found that the effectiveness of discouragement decreased markedly if continuously applied. Also, the effect of praise or reproof is evidently greater with older and brighter pupils than with younger and duller ones.²⁸ However, some other studies do not entirely confirm Hurlock's findings. George Forlano and H. C. Axelrod, for example, found considerable increase in output when blame was applied. At least, it was not until after several trials at a task that praise brought out positive effects.²⁹ This study also brings out some differences in responsiveness to rewards and punishment in terms of the personality types introvert and extrovert.

Spectators, Auditors, and Co-workers. Doing an act in the *presence* of others or *with* others will alter the nature and efficiency of the performance. In certain paper-pencil tests the presence of spectators reduced the accuracy and increased the speed of the workers. Other tests, on manual skills, revealed an increase in accuracy. Still other investigations showed that speed is reduced in some activities when others are watching. In one free word-association test, the range and quality of the associations decreased when the test was taken before watchers. The effects of co-workers

²⁷ There is a good review of the literature on these topics in J. F. Dashiell, "Experimental Studies of the Influence of Social Situations on the Behavior of Human Adults," in C. Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935.

²⁸ E. B. Hurlock, "The Value of Praise and Reproof as Incentives for Children," *Archives of Psychology*, 1924, 11, No. 71.

²⁹ G. Forlano and H. C. Axelrod, "The Effect of Repeated Praise or Blame on the Performance of Introverts and Extroverts," *J. Educational Psychology*, 1937, 28: 92-100.

also vary. Floyd H. Allport reports that in free word-association, cancellation of letters, attention tests, multiplication, and other verbal tasks there was a distinct increase in speed of reaction when the tests were taken in a group instead of individually. However, in some instances there was a decrease in the quality of performance.³⁰

In a society where high value is placed on co-operative enterprises, the results might be different from those obtained in a society where great stress is put upon individualistic action. Moreover, if spectators use emotional devices to confuse or distract performers, the results will no doubt be different from what they would be if the watching or hearing were passive.³¹ Yet one may become negatively conditioned even to "razzing," as American baseball players demonstrate.

Competition and Co-operation. Competition has long been considered an important device for increasing learning and performance. This view, however, probably reflects our competitive culture. Parents, teachers, and industrialists set up competitive situations in order to increase the output of children or adults. In other societies the stress may be upon co-operation. Though the roots of competition lie in man's aggressions, and those of co-operation in his sympathetic, affectional responses, there is little doubt that, as adult responses, competition and co-operation are learned.

The experimental literature on the effectiveness of these two forms of interaction is none too satisfactory. Irving C. Whittemore's study of competition is one of the best. He set up the problem of printing with rubber stamps. His subjects increased their speed when instructed "to compete," but the quality of their performance fell off. However, when the competition was between two groups, there was an increase in speed but no decrease in average quality.³² Age, sex, the nature of the task, and the size of the group influence the effectiveness of both competition and co-operation, and all these variables are influenced by cultural acceptances and expectancies.

Eduard Lorenz, a German psychologist, has reported his study of factory workers making gymnasium shoes. An average woman worker could make forty-three pairs of shoes a day when she did all six steps herself. Working in an average group of six persons to a table, each doing one particular task, an average worker could raise her output to sixty pairs a day. Lorenz showed by a series of controlled experiments that the combination of division of labor and co-operation was the most efficient. He also reports some other interesting facts: In a group of workers at a table the fast worker "is slowed down, though not in the same degree" as the slower worker is speeded up. Also, a good table-group, when located between poor groups, tends to be slowed down, and a poor table-group placed between two faster ones tends to be stimulated to do faster work. This study, like several others, confirms the common observation that

³⁰ F. H. Allport, "The Influence of the Group upon Association and Thought," *J. Experimental Psychology*, 1920, 3: 159-182.

³¹ See Joseph Pessin and Richard W. Husband, "Effects of Social Stimulation on Human Maze Learning," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1933, 28: 148-154.

³² I. C. Whittemore, "The Influence of Competition on Performance: An Experimental Study," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1924, 19: 236-253.

people working in co-operative groups show less individual variability than those competing as individuals.³³

The work of Elton Mayo and associates for the Western Electric Company indicates that groups working together build up an *esprit de corps* which increases their efficiency. It is particularly striking that the social interactions, independent of the economic motive, seem to be highly important in inducing and keeping up efficiency.³⁴

Summarizing various studies of co-working groups, J. F. Dashiell points out that either facilitation or inhibition may be present. The former seems usually to be promoted by the stimulation of the working movements of those around one and by a group-induced emotional excitement. Inhibition seems to be promoted by a certain distraction of attention, which may well account for the decrease in individual variability and in accuracy shown in some studies of co-working groups.³⁵

Doubtless the sympathetic attitudes set up by co-operation tend to relieve interpersonal tensions, fears, and anxieties. On the other hand, the aggressiveness set up by competition may make for more output, especially if this is rewarded by money or by power-giving prestige of some kind.

We may conclude this chapter by remarking briefly that the development from infancy to maturity is marked by an extension of drives and goals and of the means of moving from the former to the latter. In this change, learning plays the basic part. First, there is a steady trend from overt, or external, handling of drives and the means of reaching goals to internal, or mental, management. This is made possible by such important factors in the higher mental processes as facilitation, inhibition, discrimination, generalization, anticipation, and integration. Second, this very internalization makes possible a growth in the ability to react to increasingly complex situations and to their specific and general features. Finally, the internal functions make possible an "increased" ability to respond to more and more distant goals, to develop values and ideals which reach far beyond the mere physiological imperatives with which we all begin life. In the following chapter we shall see how these changes form the background for the emergence and development of the personality.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On general learning theory, see any standard textbook in psychology; the following are suggested: E. R. Guthrie, *The Psychology of Learning*, 1935; E. R. Hilgard and D. G. Marquis, *Conditioning and Learning*, 1940; E. L. Thorndike, *The Fundamentals of Learning*, 1932; J. F. Dashiell, *Fundamentals of General Psychology*, 1937, chaps. 14, 15; R. W. Husband, *General Psychology*, 1940, chaps. 19, 20, 21; F. L. Ruch,

³³ See E. Lorenz, "Zur Psychologie der industriellen Gruppenarbeit," *Zeitschrift für angewandte Psychologie*, 1933, 45: 1-45. Summarized in Dashiell, *op. cit.*, pp. 1111-1113.

³⁴ See E. Mayo, *The Human Problems of an Industrial Civilization*, 1933.

³⁵ See Dashiell, *op. cit.*, p. 1115.

Psychology and Life, new ed., 1941, chaps. 9, 10; R. S. Woodworth, *Psychology*, 4th ed., 1940, chaps. 9, 10.

On *Gestalt* theory, see Wolfgang Kohler, *Gestalt Psychology*, 1929; and Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, 1929.

On imitation, see N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, 1941, and references noted therein.

Chapter VI

THE FOUNDATIONS AND MECHANISMS OF PERSONALITY

PERSONALITY is a concept of wide and varied meaning. To the man in the street it is a special, almost magical, quality which makes it possible for one to make a sale, win a sweetheart, or convince an audience. Such an idea might be stated more objectively in this way: that personality is the stimulus-value which one individual has for another. This rather behavioristic view hardly satisfies us, for even the common-sense belief is that personality includes inner qualities, motives, moral stability or instability, and self-assertive and self-respecting attitudes. Serious students of human behavior recognize that there are both external and internal aspects of personality, although they may differ as to the elements which go into it and as to its basic relations to the biological, psychological, and cultural forces which produce it.¹

For our purposes we define personality as the more or less integrated body of habits, attitudes, traits, and ideas of an individual as these are organized externally into specific and general roles and statuses and internally around self-consciousness and the concept of the self, and around the ideas, values, and purposes which are related to motives, roles, and status. In other words, personality has two aspects: role and status with respect to behavior affecting others, and selfhood, ego, or life organization with regard to internal motivation, goals, and ways of viewing one's own and others' behavior. More briefly, it concerns overt *action* and *meaning* as these are oriented about one's interactions with one's fellows.

The present chapter will deal, (1) with the nature of traits, attitudes, values, ideas, and other psychological elements that go into the personality, (2) with the general mechanisms of interaction, (3) with the specific aspects of such interaction which serve to induct the newborn individual—with his drives, emotions, and learning capacity—into society and its culture, (4) with the development of the sense of self through role-taking as this development is influenced by language and by overt activity, (5) with certain aspects of the moral self and the integration of personality, and (6) with the problem of personality types.

¹ See G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, 1937, chaps. 2, 3, for a review of the varied meanings given to the term *personality*.

ATTITUDES, TRAITS, AND RELATED ASPECTS OF INTERNAL ORGANIZATION

In the previous chapter we reviewed some of the important mechanisms which have a part in the organization of the individual's inner adaptive patterns. Here we are concerned with certain more structural features of one's life organization, especially attitudes, traits, sentiments, values, ideals, and over-all frames of reference.

The Nature and Function of Attitudes. Unfortunately the term *attitude* has both a broad and a narrow meaning. It was first used in a rather narrow sense to mean a motor-mental predisposition to action. Later it was used in a somewhat broader sense to mean specific or general reaction tendencies which qualify, temper, and control the interpretation of, and response to, new situations. Some, however, have used it to mean the whole baggage of inner life—the entire apperceptive mass of ideas, opinions, and mental sets—in distinction to overt action patterns or habit. It is on the basis of such broad and loose use of the term that both laymen and psychologists continue to consider the terms *opinion* and *attitude* as synonymous. We shall use the term in the narrower and stricter sense to mean a tendency to action. An attitude is essentially a form of anticipatory response, a beginning of action which is not necessarily completed. In this sense it is much more dynamic and predictive of behavior trends than is a mere opinion or idea.

Three important features of an attitude must be noted. First, although not to be confused with images and verbalized ideas (words), attitudes are usually associated with images, ideas, or external objects of attention. Second, attitudes express direction. That is, they not only mark the inception of overt response to situations, but give direction to this action. They are characterized by approach or withdrawal, likes or dislikes, favorable or unfavorable reactions, loves or hates, as these are directed to specific or generalized situations. Third, attitudes, at least the significant ones, are linked to feelings and emotions. Pleasant or unpleasant associations with an object or situation—fear, rage, love, and all the complicated and learned emotions—play a part in attitudes.

Attitudes are really forms of internal though largely unconscious habits, and they bespeak one's actual trends to overt conduct better than do the verbalized expressions which we call opinions. For the prediction of behavior, therefore, it is more important to know the attitude of a person than to know his mental images, ideas, or verbal opinions. Emerson's remark, "What you are sounds so loudly in my ears that I cannot hear what you say," expresses precisely the influence of attitudes rather than mere verbalisms in our judgment of those about us. Attitudes thus offer a clue to the unraveling of human motives. The building-up of attitudes, however,

is so largely unconscious that we are seldom aware of how they arise. Frequently the marginal impressions of an experience determine our response, because these tangential stimuli touch off the deep-lying attitudes.

In summary, then, an attitude may be defined as a learned and more or less generalized and affective tendency or predisposition to respond in a rather persistent and characteristic manner, usually positively or negatively (for or against) in reference to some situation, idea, value, material object or class of such objects, or person or group of persons.

The Nature of Traits. Psychologists have long used the term *trait* to classify and describe certain persistent and fundamental human characteristics, both learned and original. Some confuse it with *attitude*, but it is rather a term applying to a highly generalized aspect of personality organization which is relatively independent of any particular object. In this sense, however, a trait is akin to a general attitude. However, traits lack the directionality of attitudes. The latter are reaction tendencies for or against, favorable or unfavorable, of like or dislike. Traits have no such features. Our concepts of them are expressed largely in adjectival form. For instance, we speak of this woman as neat, of that man as persistent, and of another as domineering. Such units or elements may be considered as distinguishing structural features of an individual. Dynamically, however, we assume that on the basis of knowledge of traits we can predict an individual's behavior in situations which call for an overt expression of this or that characteristic.

People may have general traits of punctuality or of ascendancy, for example, but in actual situations they express themselves in reference to a particular stimulus and hence take on a certain direction. The point is that such reactions tend to be general, persistent, and consistent within the limits which the group expects or which the culture demands or permits. But, since these attitudes and traits are distinctly bound up with individuality and type reactions, which in turn are qualified by social and cultural training, we shall return to the discussion of them when we take up the problem of typology at the close of this chapter.

Sentiments. Closely related to both traits and attitudes is the emotionally toned idea or conviction which we call sentiment. The term is applied to such traitlike combinations of emotion and idea as love, hate, pity, remorse, joy, and grief. These all resemble somewhat the generalized features of the trait but are aroused by particular objects. On the other hand, sentiments are closely linked to predispositions or attitudes in certain areas of thought and action. With regard to morality, art, science, economics, politics, and other fields of human interest, certain ideas and beliefs have a strong and abiding feeling-emotional tone. For example, our moral sentiments are related to attitudes of approval or disapproval. Sentiments are products of cultural conditioning; they may be closely allied to our funda-

mental values, or they may be relatively fleeting in their strength and importance.

Values and Ideals. Another phase of internalization into which cultural conditioning enters is the development of values. The individual learns that some motives and goals are preferable to others. We say that he values this more than that object or situation. In terms of motivation such preferences have their initial roots in the hierarchy of drives. Do men prefer food to sexual satisfaction, or safety and food to prestige, or is there some other order of choice or merit? Judgment of this kind will depend in large part upon the situation and the state of the individual. Obviously the needs of hunger and bodily safety cannot be put off long, but the satisfaction of the desire for sexual expression or for human companionship or for mastery may be long delayed, or the desire may be considerably sublimated.

It is out of such a hierarchy of potency of desires that values arise. Values represent objects toward which we direct our desires and attitudes. Through socialization we invest them with moral or ethical rationalizations. Such moral justifications make possible actions which people with other cultural conditioning may not understand. Americans do not understand the values which the Japanese or the Nazis hold in high regard, and vice versa. Out of such divergences are born prejudice and conflict. Closely related to values are ideals, which represent long-range drives or ends toward which we may strive. Ideals, growing out of the cultural norms of a society, are anticipatory projections into the future conduct of the individual or the group. Purposes, aims, or ideals are not something mystic and unexperienced. They are born of imagination and are rooted in man's daily life and desires, but they represent an expectation of some goal that is not immediately bound to the rudimentary demands for food, shelter, and bodily protection.

Frames of Reference and Integrated Purposes. One measure of the maturity of the individual is the degree to which his traits, attitudes, sentiments, values, and ideals become integrated into a larger philosophy of life, a general frame of reference by which he judges his own acts, words, and thoughts and the acts and words of others. Such an individual style may come to characterize one's entire life. It is born of all the elements, inherited and learned, which have gone into one's personality. The two major forces in its development, aside from the constitutional foundation which comes from heredity and early maturation, are the cultural force which makes for qualities held in common with the members of one's society and the difference in personal-social and cultural conditioning which makes for uniqueness and an individualized style of life.

Not everyone, of course, has a highly integrated pattern of living. Some persons go through life with rather diffused and sometimes contradictory

values and philosophies. Others arrive at a fairly stable and persistent organization.

SOME MODES OF SOCIAL INTERACTION

Interaction, or what has been called the *social act*, is the essence of society. It is the interpersonal mechanism that makes personal life as well as group life possible. As we shall see, it is only out of the matrix of person-to-person interaction that the personality emerges and develops. Before examining this important process, let us define the social act more closely, see what kinds of interplay it provides, and show some of the important forms it takes.

Definition of the Social Act. We may define the social act in its simplest form as the act of an individual which qualifies, modifies, or otherwise alters the act of another individual. Sometimes the movement from drive to consummation is absolutely and directly dependent upon the intercession of another person, as when an infant feeds. Sometimes the qualifications and modifications are less direct, as in bodily care or basic habit-formation. Yet, the social act, operating within a drive-to-goal cycle, determines practically all adjustments, internal and external. Whether interaction takes the form of conflict, competition, co-operation, division of labor (differentiation), or some other social process, it remains the *sine qua non* of human nature and human adaptation. Aside from the most elemental physiological processes, there is scarcely any thought, emotion, or overt action which is not influenced by the fact that man, as the highest mammal and as the bearer and creator of culture, is a social being. He is not first a person and then a member of society, as so much of the earlier psychology contended. His very existence and personal qualities are the result of his living with his fellows and participating with them in culture: in its material and non-material objects, in its acceptances, expectancies, and obligations.

There are really two major kinds of personal interaction. The first of these we call *overt* behavior. It involves the use of the larger muscles, tendons, and bodily structures concerned with manipulating material objects or other persons in space. This is the field of direct physical contact. It is illustrated in two persons fighting, making love, or jointly undertaking an enterprise. It is seen in the mother-child contacts during nursing. The second kind of interaction is *symbolic* or *communicative*. It begins in gesture, which is an oncoming act broken off or modified by the corresponding act of another person. But it flowers in language, spoken or written, and language occupies a central place in both personality and culture. It is the source of thought and meaning, without which social life and culture at the human level would be impossible. The development of the internal processes depends on the nature of the overt and communicative

interactions, but especially of the linguistic function. In fact, much of the internal process of adjustment or thinking takes its form and significance from the social act.²

In the rise and activity of the personality both forms of interaction play a part as well as does the internalized reflection of this which we call thinking. But before we take up the development of the self, we must introduce the more important modes through which interactions operate, including identification, projection, compensation, sublimation, displacement, and rationalization.

Identification. The basic form of interaction is that which takes place between the child and the mother. Long before self-consciousness emerges, the child makes postural and other direct adjustments to the mother's voice, gestures, feeding activities, and handling. From this rudimentary beginning various forms of interaction arise: as the mother speaks in one tone, the child smiles; as she speaks in another tone, he may scowl or cry; and so on. As language emerges from these beginnings and as the child comes to take the role of the mother—that is, imitates her gestures, voice, and actions—true identification appears. Identification may be defined as the taking over of the acts, tones of voice, gestures, or other qualities of another person and making them, temporarily or permanently, one's own.

The whole process, obviously, moves from external imitation toward an internal acceptance. Through learning the child takes over from acceptance of conduct the internal attitudes, ideas, and emotional sets which accompany such conduct. The term *introjection* is often used for this process of internalization; among some writers the terms are used interchangeably. The important thing to note, however, is the shift, as in other learning, from external adaptation to that which involves a reorganization of the internal life—thought and emotion.

Moreover, the development of sympathy and of co-operation depends in large part upon the growth of identification. The little girl identifies herself with her mother when she dons her mother's clothes and struts before a mirror or before her friends. A boy identifies himself with his father or favorite uncle when he plays at driving an automobile or boasts of his imaginary exploits in business or golf. Children and adolescents take over the clothes, gestures, and manners of their favorite teachers or motion-picture stars. Adults ape the fashions of those whom they consider their social superiors. The follower of a revolutionary leader takes over the manner, speech, attire, and frame of thought of his leader.

Projection. The opposite of identification is projection, the thrusting on, or attributing to another of ideas, emotions, and actions in which we indulge or would like to indulge. As we grow up, we not only learn to take

² For an extended discussion of this whole process, see K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chap. 10.

over the behavior of those around us but also tend to attribute to them what we ourselves perceive, think, feel, or do. Projection is as fundamental a social act as identification, but it appears to arise after identification has begun. Not until a person has introjected another's ways of thought or action can he, in turn, thrust his own thoughts or acts outward upon the environment. In a sense sympathetic reaction has a component of projection as well as of identification.

Illustrations of projection are plentiful. We may believe that others are talking about us behind our backs, because we do the same to others, or at least wish to do so. The person tempted to indulge in infractions of moral rules often projects on quite innocent people thoughts and conduct which are not theirs. The revolutionary agitator may attribute to those in power the very tactics which he himself is using or would use, and he may get his followers to believe in his projection through their own identification with him and his theories—a neat instance of both mechanisms at work.

Compensation, Sublimation, and Displacement. It is well known that the substitute reaction is a common method of getting round or overcoming a frustration. One common form of this is compensation, the substitution of one goal for another or of one method of reaching a goal for another. An individual thwarted in love may develop a strong drive for power in money matters, and persons with physical deformities often succeed in occupations which provide a substitute form of satisfaction.

Sublimation is a special instance of compensation in which the substitute secures high moral approval. Familiar examples are righteous indignation at alleged social evils and the adoption of children by childless couples.

Alfred Adler, who developed the concept of compensation, pointed out that much of our striving is motivated by a sense of inferiority, and that, as we attempt to overcome our inadequacies, compensatory responses often became dominant in the total personality.³ Of course, a sense of inferiority does not necessarily lead to compensatory efforts in another direction; one may simply accept one's lowered status and adapt oneself to its social implications. Cultural expectancies may give direction to the use of such a device. In a society such as ours, which puts much stress on individual prowess, everyone—cripples and normals, old and young—is motivated by the strong urge to be recognized as important. Other cultures do not make such demands on persons who are constitutionally or otherwise incompetent.

Closely related to compensation and sublimation is displacement, or transference, which is the shifting to another object, social or material, of ideas, emotional attitudes, values, and reactions. Freudian psychology has tended to emphasize the shift of love and affection, but today the term

³ See A. Adler, *The Neurotic Constitution*, 1916; and *The Practice and Theory of Individual Psychology*, 1925.

displacement is used to refer to any shift of a drive, a reaction, or a goal from one situation to another. Some good illustrations of displacement will be given in Chapter X.

Rationalization. An important phase of interaction is the finding of justifications or excuses for one's conduct. This we call rationalization. At the conscious level there appear to be sound and "good" reasons for our behavior. In terms of unconscious and habitual determinants these may not be the genuine reasons at all. By "good" excuses we mean those that pass muster in our society or group. The members of every society produce some justification for their existence and for their conduct. In our particular cultural setting, however, the Christian mores and a certain intellectualism have tended to stress moralistic rationalizations. But it must not be thought that rationalization has to do only with the mores. It concerns culturally acceptable reasons for much of our conduct.

It has often been implied and even openly stated that rationalization is a pathological and somewhat evil type of behavior. Really, however, this device serves man admirably in soothing his conscience, or his socially conditioned sense of right or wrong. It provides a defense against the exposure of violent, anti-social, or unethical motives. The genuine motives can often be brought to light only by careful analysis of past behavior and usually only by persons who are sufficiently outside one's social picture to examine one's conduct objectively. Rationalizations, at least those acceptable to one's group, make for smooth and uninhibited behavior. It is hard to live in the world of our fellows, to participate in social life, if we are constantly aware of the true foundations of our conduct. In fact, the usual interpretation of one's own conduct or of one's own culture is likely to be an elaborate rationalization.

It is not always easy to tell where rationalization leaves off and genuine objective thinking begins. In the natural sciences rationalization has no place. In the social sciences it still continues to operate. In everyday life it is an important coin of social exchange. Some particular aspects of rationalization, related to social myths, stereotypes, and prejudices, will be discussed in Chapters IX, XI, and XII.

Repression and the Unconscious. Closely associated with the overt and communicative forms of interaction are those which develop in the covert field and appear in disguised or indirect fashion in speech or deed. One of these is repression, or inhibition. In psychoanalysis the term means the exclusion of painful or unpleasant ideas and impulses from consciousness or from overt action. Behavioristically understood, repression is a form of counter-conditioning. (See Chapter V.) It plays a large part in personal adjustment and is important in the development of the moral self, for it prevents many of our rawer impulses from coming to the surface of speech or action.

The concept of repression is closely associated with that of the unconscious. The latter has had a stormy career in psychology; at a descriptive

level of analysis, however, it is a valuable concept. It indicates that many stimuli reach us and affect us without our being fully aware of them, that much of what we have learned is inhibited, and that a dynamic organizing process operates outside the consciousness. We know it by inference from fantasies, wit and humor, slips of tongue and pen, dreams, and aggressions and other overt conduct, especially that of a dissociated character. The psychoanalytic interview, which uses prolonged and repeated free associations, has provided us with more nearly direct access to the workings of the unconscious. Brill tells of a woman who, inquiring about a mutual friend, called her by her maiden name. When her attention was called to this error, she admitted she disliked her friend's husband. The reader will recall the case cited by Prince (p. 95) of the girl who under hypnosis reported on the color of a man's suit, though consciously she was completely unaware of it.

The first drives of the newborn for food, rest, etc., and the early acquired wants and desires are doubtless not conscious in the adult sense of that term. Later they take on conscious significance, but, in the interim, personal-social and cultural conditioning inhibit many of the more elementary expressions of these wants. But, if the want or drive is strong, repressing it does not suffice to keep it in check. In later behavior such unfulfilled desires unconsciously affect the adjustments of individuals to parents, siblings, friends, and other persons.

There is ample observational as well as clinical evidence that, without being aware of them, we get impressions, hear sounds, see sights, taste flavors, smell odors, and have tactile experiences which later affect conduct. Both in close primary relations and in secondary and public groups, personal adaptations are closely influenced by motives and reactions whose sources lie outside the consciousness. When we find it hard to tell why we like or dislike this person or that, our attitude may depend on subliminal stimulations of which we are not at all aware. The following well-known rhyme illustrates this:

I do not like thee, Doctor Fell;
The reason why, I cannot tell;
But this I know, and know real well,
I do not like thee, Dr. Fell.

The dislike for Dr. Fell may lie either in some repressed association or in some original stimulation of which we were never aware. Moreover, this reveals the important fact that continuity of attitude is more often carried on an emotional than on an intellectual plane. As the German phrase has it, *Objekt vergeht, Affekt besteht*. That is to say, even if the objective cause of the attitude disappears, the feeling-emotional tone remains.

Reaction-Formation. Reaction-formation, or reversal-formation, is the development of ideas, interests, or sentiments which are the antithesis of others. Sometimes intense love acts as a screen for great hatred and fear. A wish hostile to a parent may set up undue anxiety about his welfare. In these operations the unconscious processes clearly play a large part. Moreover, some substitutions which look like sublimations are in actuality defensive reactions against hostile and aggressive impulses. In genuine sublimation there is a certain harmony or integration, whereas in reaction-formation the repressed pattern may reappear under a number of circumstances. Protective coloration of this sort is often pretty thin. No doubt this mechanism is at work in the somewhat superficial but important accommodations which occur between hostile classes, races, denominations, and nations.

Ambivalence. A discussion of the defensive nature of reaction-formation provides a good point at which to define the concept of ambivalence. This term denotes contradictory or opposing attitudes, ideas, and values with respect to some object. These may arise alternately or exist side by side by virtue of dissociation.

The basic constitutional foundation for ambivalence may be found in certain drives themselves. Sometimes drives engage in a struggle for prepotency. For example, hunger may compete with the sexual demands. Both drives cannot be satisfied simultaneously, and there may well be a certain struggle between them for dominance. Another factor in the development of ambivalence is the periodicity, or rhythm, of many fundamental organic processes. Then, too, the differentiation of behavior—that is, the building up of partial or segmental patterns—furnishes a further foundation for such opposition. The interplay of inhibition and facilitation in conditioning offers a simple instance. So, too, the contrary directions of rage and love, of like and dislike, provide other examples.

Ambivalence is not so much a mechanism as a significant characteristic of many functions of the individual in the course of adaptation, a highly important characteristic having wide ramifications in the personality. Although it has its rise in the constitution and in the earliest social contacts, its further development and meaning are profoundly influenced by cultural training. Ambivalence appears in a wide variety of social situations, especially in reactions of the in-group versus the out-group, and we shall see that it affords one of the most important means of integrating otherwise opposing trends in the individual.

Fixation and Regression. It has been a common practice to view the development of the personality as going through different stages. Without committing ourselves to any particular scheme, we can see that the child's life organization varies as he passes from the suckling infant to early childhood, from there to prepuberty, thence into puberty and adolescence, and finally into adulthood. The initial drives and their first modifications at

the hands of others produce patterns of conduct and attitude which we consider relatively elemental and crude compared with those of an adult. Under cultural conditioning the ego-centered impulses of the infant and the young child give way, in part at least, to co-operative and sympathetic motives and goals. The growth of the self certainly follows a line, as we shall see, from highly specific patterns to more generalized ones, and from amoral to moral roles.

Yet acquaintance with individuals in their various walks of life will convince the keen observer, as it does the clinician and trained research worker, that adults represent fixations at different points along an assumed normal line of development. Moreover, people may be mature in some components of the personality and immature in others. Cultural demands have a great deal to do with such differences. In our society, honesty has a high reward, as in our credit and contract systems, and most people conform to these standards. In many things there are no clear-cut cultural norms, and hence there may be wide variation. For example, though our culture demands a certain institutional conformity in mating, in wedlock itself the spouses may reveal amazingly childish reactions. Though we permit righteous indignation and provide for legal or other means of expressing our opposition to abuses, childish outbursts of aggressive temper are common among men and women otherwise considered mature. In moral matters we may thoroughly accept the codes and practices of primary-group controls but feel free to break these codes in dealing with competitors in business.

The opposite to fixation or maturation is regression. In a crisis, externally or internally stimulated, the individual may revert to some earlier stage of growth. A common illustration is found in the words and deeds of adult men and women under the influence of alcohol. When drunk, a person may regress to childish anger, fear, and sexuality. Out of continued mental conflict involving basic drives and goals, individuals often develop neurotic reactions closely akin to, or reflective of, infantile and childish phases of development. Crowds motivated by fear and rage at infractions of the sacred codes of their culture quickly revert to elemental aggressions. Under the hysteric propaganda of wartime, the masses often let go with sadistic expressions which in peacetime would arouse general disavowal. Under mob and wartime conditions the older conscience or moral self is submerged, and new rationalizations are provided to support thought and conduct otherwise considered primitive.

These very examples indicate, of course, the relativity of the criteria of normality, maturity, and regression. The acceptances and permissibilities of culture are themselves highly flexible in situations concerned with group and individual survival. Nevertheless, the concepts just noted give us a yardstick with which to measure conformity or deviation, as these are related to the correlation of flexibility with fixity.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

See the list at the end of Chapter VII.

Chapter VII

THE RISE OF THE SELF

It is within the family that the newborn infant experiences his first interactions, for the family is the basic primary group in all societies. Some of the interactions there are definitely set by culture; others are not, but fall into the personal-social form and hence influence the growth of the child. For the most part the initial training of the child takes place through the mother-child contacts, and we may ignore those few and extreme cultural deviations where the mother or mother-surrogate does not introduce the young child into society and culture. Even in these exceptional instances some older person must take over the care of the infant if he is to survive.

INITIAL INTERACTIONS: CHILD AND OTHERS

The biosocial root of interaction cannot be overemphasized. The child begins life with powerful drives, especially hunger and other bodily demands. Yet he could not long survive were it not for the interposition of another person to provide food and drink, shelter and bodily protection. This linkage of the basic drive-to-goal cycle to the social act is the most important feature of primary training. Out of this initial conditioning the social self emerges.

The Child and the Mother. The two fundamental features of the social act involving the mother and child are *dependency* and *discipline*. The social acts concerned with satisfying the needs for sustenance, bodily care, and protection are essentially those of dependence, and they provide the foundation on which are built love, sympathy, and co-operation. Out of such interactions grow the habits of feeding, elimination, sleep, and care which induce in the child the basic sense of emotional security and dependence. Around the principal habits develop supplementary or accessory habits, such as petting, kissing, cooing, singing, carrying, and rocking. These forms of indulgence and affection enhance dependency and security. They provide the experience out of which the child's own love and sympathy will later arise.

Yet almost from the outset the child is subjected to certain disciplines of his original drive-to-goal activities. That is to say, his mother may block his responses, by putting him on a feeding schedule that does not conform to the physiological rhythms of hunger pangs, or by training him to use

the toilet, or by laying down rules for sleep, play, and speech, or by teaching him to avoid danger. Such *other-determined patterns* may set up a sense of frustration in the child. Yet his conditioning by punishment, in the form of cross words, rejection, deprivation, or outright physical force, makes it evident to him that he cannot satisfy his needs unless he conforms to the standards of others. In other words, successful attainment of rewards and avoidance of punishment require his adaptation to the demands of others. In this way one interactional pattern is reinforced, and another is inhibited, or suffers "extinction" from lack of practice.

The Child and Other Members of the Family. While the mother or mother-surrogate introduces the child into a world that has discipline and regularity as well as personal dependence and affection, other persons, such as the father, adult relatives, siblings, and other children, soon come in contact with him. These persons also provide him with patterns of love or discipline and denial. It is from these initial forms of regularity and control that he is inducted in time into the operation of authority. The father may take over certain functions of instruction and reward or punishment for his conformity or lack of it. So, too, brothers or sisters, by interfering with the growing child's efforts to satisfy his desires, may set up other frustrations.

On the basis of the patterns imposed by others, the child acquires new goals and new drives. For example, he learns in time to take solid food instead of milk. Or, on the basis of accessory habits, he develops power devices such as crying, not because he is hungry or cold or wet, but because he wants the affectionate attention which for the moment is going to some other child.

The regularity and discipline, however, are not always easily purchased. Frustration of such powerful demands as those for food, elimination, and avoidance of painful stimuli may set up strong emotions of rage and aggressive response. If substitute drives and rewards are not provided, or if compensatory indulgence and affection do not soften the force of controls introduced by parents or others in power, the child may develop temper tantrums, negativism, or inner anxieties of a persistent kind. However, by social-cultural conditioning, antagonistic reactions to frustration are usually redirected into approved—that is, rewarded—channels of competition and conflict.

Hate as well as love must be given a place in conduct. One of the functions of the out-group, and of art, play, and other institutionalized forms of indulgence, is to give just such an outlet. The release of such strains in the individual, be he child or adult, is an essential feature of all societies and cultures. In other words, along with acceptance of controls and authority will be found various means of lessening the tensions which are a necessary price of such conformity.

Although, in the satisfaction of the child's physiological imperatives, there is always interaction between the mother and the child or between some other person and the child, comparative ethnology shows that the forms of child-training differ considerably. Even our summary in Chapter III of contrasts among a few tribes and among three industrialized societies shows striking variations in the details of such training. For example, among the Marquesans the mother's interest in sexuality and physical beauty is correlated with her outright rejection of the infant, shown by early weaning and her general indifference to his welfare. As a result of this and later experiences the man fears women and finds his deeper emotional dependencies in homosexual attachments. In contrast, among the Arapesh, both mother and father are indulgent toward the child, and his discipline and social maturation apparently take place without strain. Among the Germans, despite certain traditional indulgences shown by the mother, the tyrannical father, from the outset, exercises rigid control. Among the Balinese the affection and friendly teasing indulged in at first are followed by outright parental rejection. From this beginning and from other training a divided, or schizoid, social and personal life emerges.

Despite the contrasts in fundamental training, the learned drives and goals built up on the basic physiological demands are generally similar. Though the social-cultural impress is powerful, the fundamental impulses cannot be entirely repressed or eliminated. Hence, everywhere there are some forms of ego-expression which we may designate as desires for security and for mastery or power. Everywhere the sexual drives are worked out into desires for sexual love and for filial and intersibling affection. And from these bases are developed sympathy and love for friends or members of one's in-group. But, no matter how the modifications and elaborations of the physiological imperatives may vary in detail, such variations take place only within the frame of interaction. The social act is as important in the process of development as the basic drives and the learning capacity. We can never explain the emergence of the personality on the basis of any one of these three variables. All of them are involved, no matter how different one culture may be from another.

THE RISE OF THE SELF IN THE SOCIAL ACT

There has been some confusion in psychology about the origin and nature of the social self, but there is really nothing mystical or difficult about it. An individual's self is his consciousness of his acts and thoughts as they are related to others. It is really a phase of internalization, but it has its origin in overt interactions.

Identification and Expectancy. The first step in the rise of the self lies in the anticipatory reactions which the child builds up with respect to his mother or some other person. For example, in the course of learning to use the mother as the intermediary in the satisfaction of hunger, the child develops a host of anticipatory reactions to her. In satisfying this want, the mother performs a series of acts. Very shortly, therefore, in addition to the

systematic pains or tensions, shown by crying, which constitute hunger, the child, in expectation of having his demand fulfilled, acquires bodily postures and gestures of lips, tongue, and hands. Moreover, these movements become increasingly correlated with the corresponding actions of the mother: her presenting the breast, her tone of voice, her smile, the pressures of her hands and body on the child.

Out of this interactional matrix an external identification arises. Just as the mother interprets the infant's cries, manual gestures, and bodily tensions as evidence that he wishes to be fed, so his own gestures take on significance because they lead to his taking her breast and ingesting her milk. He cannot get his reward, in fact, unless he adjusts his own acts to hers. He learns to control or direct his acts in terms of what another expects of him. That is, the first meaning of hunger and its satisfaction comes from his mother's actions toward him as well as from his toward her.

This process of identification of the child with his mother—that is, the linkage of his drive and his response to her reaction toward him—is an example of the earliest phase of self-development. Similar relations of the actions of two or more persons are involved in all primary habit-training. The rewards, on the one hand, and the punishment, on the other, with respect to habits of elimination, of cleanliness, of avoidance of danger, illustrate a similar interplay. The child cannot fulfill his need or wish without learning to anticipate the actions of another and to modify his own actions.

The Place of Language. Such interactional processes are greatly facilitated by language. The roots of language lie in the crying and whining and later in babbling, all of which provide the child with vocal practice in necessary sounds. Babbling in particular is important because it affords the child the important experience of hearing his own voice and of responding to it by similar sounds. This circular stimulus-response-stimulus provides practice in repeating the same or similar sounds.

True language begins when, after the mother or some other person has presented an object and has at the same time uttered a certain sound combination, the latter is repeated by the child. This is a conditioning of the visual or tactile sense of an object with a vocalism. Through repetition of such a combination, the child associates the sound and the object without the mother's help. When he has made this connection, language has begun. The word now stands for—that is, is a symbol of—the object.¹

Gesture and true language belong to the field of anticipatory, or incipient, reactions. Words not only symbolize objects, qualities, quantities, relations, and classifications, but have a dual direction. They go back to the previous linkage of the symbol and the thing it stands for, and they point

¹ For an extended discussion of language development, see K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chap. 8.

forward to future actions. It is clear, moreover, that words in their anticipatory functions are related in origin to attitudes. The attitude remains the general bodily and mental set of approach or withdrawal, of like or dislike, of approval or disapproval.

Language becomes enormously elaborated and often departs rather strikingly from its origins in gesture and incipient action. But attitude and language are alike in having emotional-feeling tone. Since the powerful drives and frustrations which arise in the cycle from drive to goal produce affects, the gestures and words which define the interactions associated with the cycle also have feelings and emotions attached to them. Later the affective accompaniments are reduced, at least in our more logical use of language. Yet much of our speech and writing remains heavily laden with emotions. We shall discuss the relation of language to the forms of thinking in Chapter VIII. At this point we are concerned with the function of language in the rise of the self.

Words can now replace or supplement the voice, face, and hands in the interaction between the child and the mother. They define the mother's intentions and expectancies more definitely for the child and indicate his desires more specifically to her. For instance, whereas the infant's anticipatory movements of lips, tongue, and hands were adequate for a time, now by the use of words the child can not only express his wants but answer them to himself, in anticipation at least, by using the words which his mother has used. In this way the vague identification and first expectancies give way to more specific forms in which the verbal anticipations of the child may be followed by a repetition (a kind of imitation) of her words to him.

Role-taking. In such anticipatory activities and, especially, in imitation of the acts of others, the child begins to extend his identifications with the social world around him. This is clearly shown in the play life of the child. In our society he may follow the mother or cook about the kitchen, playing with pans and pots and spoons in rough mimicry of the serious work taking place about him. At the outset the child's play is largely of a motor-pleasure sort derived from movement of toys and movement of his own body. As he learns to walk, and especially as he learns to talk, his attention to the activities of others becomes a stimulus to him to do as they do. He is rewarded for some acts similar to those of his parents and punished for others. Such reward or punishment directs the course of his identifications. We say that he is taking the role of the mother.

The possibilities for role-taking are tremendously extended with the coming of true speech. Now the child has a tool which enables him to address objects and persons in the words of another. The matter is neatly illustrated in two social situations. (1) When a child is left, even for a few moments, with responsibilities ordinarily taken by an adult, such as watch-

ing over a baby or an automobile, or making some small purchase, he may take the role of a parent, including tone of voice, words, and overt acts. For instance, of two brothers who played together, the older, whenever he could not have his own way, altered his speech and acts to resemble those of his mother, with her commanding word, tone, and deed; and the younger often resorted to tears or rebellion, such as he had used before his mother, in order to escape punishment at the hands of his brother. (2) A child not only assumes the roles of others, in play or in serious activities, but comes to view himself as others view him, both in speech and in action. He speaks of himself as others speak of him. Just as earlier he learned to respond overtly to others as they reacted to him, so now he talks to himself as others have talked to him. It is through speech that the identification begins to be internalized into thought. For example, many children in the second and third years express their wants in such a sentence as "Johnny wants this" or "Mary doesn't like that." Not all children in our society go through such verbal identification, but many do. When a child arrives at this phase of his growth, the self is ready to be born.

The Emergence of the Social Self. Especially important in this "dialectic of personal growth,"² in which the child talks as does his mother, his father, or some other person, is the fact that he also replies to this assumed speech of another. The development of the self depends upon the acquired capacity of the individual to be an object to himself. And the origin of such capacity lies in communication and its introjection into one's inner life. Gesture and word are the media between overt act and the inner world of thinking. Hence thinking is by its origin essentially social.

A child perceives himself after the manner in which others have reacted to him. The matter is illustrated by the types of identification and role-taking just described. The acts, words, tones of voice, and other gestures of another—at first, chiefly the mother—are associated with the child's responses. He plays, we say, first one part and then another. He can do this because he has associated the activities of others with his own wishes and because his role-taking is an assumption of elements of the social act which are related to the fulfillment of his needs. His role-taking is an adaptation to the expectancies of others.

The child plays at being mother, nurse, fireman, airplane pilot, and soldier. But, even more important than this, he plays several roles in close succession. In imaginative play he talks first as one assumed character, then as another, and perhaps as himself. There is a rehearsal within his own control of the words of others to him and of his reply to them. He may one moment be a storekeeper and the next a shopper. He goes through the interactions of selling himself make-believe candy. As policeman

² This apt phrase is from James Mark Baldwin, one of the first American psychologists to recognize the interactional origin of the self. See his *Mental Development in the Child and in the Race*, 1895.

he may arrest himself; as traveler he delivers his make-believe ticket to himself as conductor. These various groups of stimuli and response, some actual, some imaginary, get organized into a wide range of separate roles. They are related to the situations at home, on the playground, in school, and wherever the child gets his fundamental social conditioning.

In this process, then, the child calls out in himself the attitudes which others call out in him when they react to him. Not only is the little girl the mother in role when she plays at being mother to her dolls, but she also responds, for the doll, as she has responded to her own mother. It is out of such learning to take the role of another and to respond to it that the self emerges. George H. Mead puts it thus: "The self arises in conduct, when the individual becomes a social object in experience to himself. This takes place when the individual assumes the attitude or uses the gesture which another individual would use and responds to it himself or tends to so respond. . . . The child gradually becomes a social being in his own experience, and he acts toward himself in a manner analogous to that in which he acts toward others."³

George H. Mead's Theory of the "I" and the "Me." That the core of the personality, the self, arises in the social act was recognized by a number of earlier psychologists, most notably by Josiah Royce, James Mark Baldwin, William James, and Charles H. Cooley. But it remained for George H. Mead to give us the most naturalistic and so far the most valid analysis of the processes involved in the rise of the self.⁴

Mead not only recognized communication, identification, and role-taking as basic factors in the emergence of the self, but presented a dynamic theory which links the response of the individual to the roles which he takes over from others. The self is born when we become an object of attention and reaction to ourselves; yet any adequate theory of the self must take into account the dynamic reactions of the individual to others. That is to say, if the self were defined merely as the learning of specific and general roles by the introjection of those of others and the reorganization of them into our own, we should still lack a view of the self in action. Such an interpretation would give us a rather static and certainly an incomplete picture of the personality. Borrowing certain concepts from James, Mead introduced the concept of the dynamic "I," or actor, which is set off against the "me," or "other," which is the specific or general role got by identification. These concepts are not entirely satisfactory, for they are sometimes confused with the terms as used in a strictly grammatical sense. Nevertheless, defined as they are by Mead, they represent two basic features of the self.

³ See G. H. Mead, "A Behavioristic Account of the Significant Symbol," *J. Philosophy*, 1922, 19: 157-163; quotation from p. 160. By permission.

⁴ For references to Mead's major contributions and those of earlier writers on the self, see the Suggestions for Further Reading at the close of this chapter.

Mead uses the term "me" or "other" to mean the roles and the accompanying attitudes, words, and gestures taken by the child from parents, siblings, playmates, teachers, and others, and from imaginary characters brought to him in stories or born out of his own fantasies. Yet, when the child acts in one of these roles, there is more than a mere duplication of the role he has picked up from another. This is the "I," the dynamic factor. At the outset this element is composed chiefly of the raw drive impelling one toward a goal. Later it includes the motives and habits which are acquired in the course of social-cultural adaptation. That is, the "I" of the growing child or of the adult is the product of the integration of the roles he gets and of the actions he takes in them.

According to G. H. Mead, the simplest way to describe the operation of the "I" is to recognize that we know it only in memory. It is always active in the present, but we are never quick enough to catch it except in retrospect. Yet, when we look back upon the "I" in memory, it has already taken on certain aspects of a "me" which has acted in relation to some social object. In other words, the "I" always appears as a historical item in behavior. It is the response of the individual to the attitudes of others, whereas the "me" is the more or less integrated set of attitudes and ideas of others which one has assumed as one basis for the overt action itself.

In gestural or linguistic (subovert) interaction there is no sharp distinction between the "I" and the "me," although logically the latter serves as a phase of the object toward which the "I" responds at the moment. That is, in responding to another, we react to him as an external object and also to an internal image of him, or to him as a "me." But, as Mead points out, one cannot entirely predict what this response of the "I" to the "me" will be. There is a degree of uncertainty in every overt act except purely reflex ones. So, too, in reflective thought, which usually takes the form of internal conversation, the same mechanism operates. In overt or covert activity the attitudes of other persons which one assumes as features of his own make-up will constitute the immediate "me." But exactly what an individual is going to do about the situation—defined in terms of this "me"—he does not know completely in advance. True, he can take this situation into his own experience because he can assume the ideas and attitudes of other persons involved in it. But the "I" comes into play in his response. As G. H. Mead puts it, the "I" is "the answer which the individual makes to the attitude which others take toward him when he assumes an attitude toward them."⁵ Yet, after he has reacted, the "I" appears in the field of experience, as we said above, chiefly as a memory image.

Although the attitude or incipient action which a person takes toward others may be partially known in terms of his previous responses, the actual overt response is not entirely predictable. It contains a novel feature. It is

⁵ G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934, p. 177. By permission of the University of Chicago Press

something which even the person himself cannot anticipate completely. He may be aware of himself and of the situation, but precisely how he will react he never knows, as Mead puts it, "until after the action takes place." Thus the "I" is the unpredictable, the unique, the novel element in our thought processes and in overt action, the unanticipated, unpredictable feature of all activity. This is a statement of the logic of the matter. Actually, of course, there exist in most individuals levels of predictability. In highly automatic reactions the "I" factor does take on stability; in those involving any degree of choice, however, there is always this uncertain element. And in any case the "I" is constantly related to the "me" or "other." G. H. Mead thus summarizes the matter:

"The 'me' does call for a certain sort of an 'I' in so far as we meet the obligations that are given in conduct itself, but the 'I' is always something different from what the situation itself calls for. So there is always that distinction, if you like, between the 'I' and the 'me.' The 'I' both calls out the 'me' and responds to it. Taken together they constitute a personality as it appears in social experience. The self is essentially a social process going on with these two distinguishable phases. If it did not have these two phases there could not be conscious responsibility, and there would be nothing novel in experience."⁶

Though Mead's concept of the "I" provides recognition of the dynamic nature of all behavior and thought, we must not imagine that the "I" is some unchangeable element in every act. It is certainly not an unqualified factor in that sense. It is capable of modification by the various "me's," which, in turn, depend upon the social-cultural training and the time and place. We should often act otherwise than we do were it not for the external restraints—the expectancies—which are laid upon us by others. We have only to observe ourselves or listen to confidential remarks of our friends to understand this. A person remarks, "I wanted to give him a piece of my mind, but I thought better of it and said something else." This merely means that one combination of "I" and "me" was inhibited in its overt expression by another combination more in line with social approval. A further illustration from the drama comes to mind. The traditional "asides" indicate the operation of dual patterns of verbal expression—one communicated, the other held to the level of subvocal yet audible thought. The "aside" became in Eugene O'Neill's *Strange Interlude* (1928) the vehicle for an entire dramatic episode. There the subvocal thinking is made audible, so that the audience is "let in on" the thoughts and attitudes which the characters in the play are normally suppressing in their accepted conversations.

Although they do not interpret the genesis of the self in the same way as does George H. Mead, J. J. Piaget and many other students of child behavior have amply

⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 178.

demonstrated the importance of this concept of the "I," of the self as actor. On the basis of his extended observations of young children at a nursery school in Geneva, Switzerland, Piaget makes clear that during the first seven or eight years of life a child's reactions are ego-centered. That is, he reacts to others chiefly from a relatively untutored demand to satisfy his own wants. Gradually, however, he shifts to a society- or others-oriented form of response. Piaget's technique of discovering this, moreover, fits well into Mead's insistence on the central place of language in the rise of the self. He recorded not only the children's overt actions but also their conversations and monologues.⁷

Piaget has pointed out that the child's capacity to view himself as an object, that is, as others view him, comes into full play at about the same time that he learns to consider the external world of material objects as outside himself. This also fits into Mead's significant thesis that the sense of material objects, including awareness of one's own body, is a phase of the introjection of an "other" into one's inner life. Through handling, seeing, hearing, tasting, smelling, and the kinesthetic sense, the material environment constitutes a kind of "me" or "other" to which we, in turn, respond.⁸

The importance of fantasy in the growth of the self and of attitudes—in short, in the meaning of experience—has been ably described by Piaget. Some aspects of this will be treated in Chapter VIII. As we shall see there, a child constantly confuses his thoughts with his perceptions of, and reactions to, material objects, animals, and other persons.

In Mead's terms, the shift from infantile egocentricity to socialized and other-oriented responses means that the earliest "I" impulses, often marked by outright aggression, gradually become altered by the "me's," or roles which the child has introjected into his own life organization through contact with others. It is by social-cultural conditioning that the accepted and expected actions of others become integrated into the personal organization and the more rudimentary impulses become inhibited or repressed.

Although the "I" and the "me" are logically segregated, they fuse together, in differing degrees, in responses to situations. In everyday life, of course, there is segmentalization or dissociation between what one wants to say or do and what one says or does. This is particularly evident in an atomized mass society, with its complex and often conflicting patterns of culture. In such a world men live by half-measures, compromises, and repression of many impulses, native or acquired. Yet there are some situations, some types of activity, in which the fusion of the "I" and the "me" may be complete—for example, in engrossing teamwork, in the intensity of sexual congress, in the ecstasy of religious experience, in the intensity of mob action, in the violence of person-to-person fighting, in feuds, in war, and in revolution. Remembering these very intense actions, we say that

⁷ For references on Piaget, see the Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of the chapter.

⁸ For a discussion of the social origin of our concepts of the physical world, see Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, pp. 178-186.

we "lost ourselves" in what we were doing; that, is, some part of the "me," or another "me," which often stands aside and judges or observes the "I" in action, was completely repressed or integrated with the total activity. Ordinarily there is no such complete harmonizing of the "I" and the "me." Even in cases of complete integration, whether in co-operative or in conflictive situations, we seldom "know" how we acted till afterwards. And, in order to explain "why" we acted thus and so, we usually introduce rationalizations.

That phase of the self which Mead calls the "I" is the unique, unpredictable, and creative aspect of the person. What Gordon W. Allport has stressed as the autonomous feature of the personality can be subsumed under this concept. What he would call the common and general attitudes, shared, through culture, with others, would derive chiefly from the "me's" or "roles." In contrast, the individuality, the divergent element, would be in large measure the product of the "I," for certainly, in the internal organization of attitudes, ideals, values, and sentiments, the "I" has a distinctive place. On the other hand, from the "me's" we get the moral self, the conscience, or what Freud called the "superego." Before we take this up, however, we must return to trace the development of the self from specific role-taking to its more general and integrated features.

The Rise of the General Role. On the basis of recurrent needs and of repetition of the social situations in which they operate, the specific roles begin to get organized into larger units. Although the mother may respond variously to the child, with respect to his differing wants, there usually is some consistency in her reactions to him. Hence, in linking his need-reward cycle to her response to him, the child himself develops a certain continuity and consistency. This ordering of specific roles into larger unity Mead described by the term "generalized other." For instance, the child comes, chiefly through his name, to consider himself as a *child* in a family group, not just as a disparate set of roles strung together in time and place.

The growth of the general role, or "generalized other," is further stimulated by the child's participation in co-operative activities with others, such as games and work. The teamwork demanded in organized games and later in serious tasks provides important social settings for the emergence of the general role. In the earliest individual and group play the child may take various roles, but the various identifications may be haphazard or merely seriatim. To be a member of a team, however, requires not only skill to perform one's own part, but also ability to imagine the roles of other members of the team. In baseball the pitcher must identify himself with catcher, batter, first baseman, and others. It is not that the player need keep all these other roles in mind at once, but rather that through habit and attitude he becomes trained to react quickly to what the others may do. In

other words, an organized pattern of expectancies with respect to teammates is built up, and these form the total configuration of the group's activity.

The same sort of operation is found in the drill team or the tactical fighting team of the army. There is much of it in the co-ordinated efforts of men in a work gang. Even in the assembly-line type of occupation, in which teamwork is reduced to a minimum, each man must have some idea of, and attitude toward, the others at the conveyor belt. So, too, the organized community or other group furnishes a basis for the generalized "me" or "other."

Group control over the participating individual is illustrated in the rules of the game, in the standard skills of the job, in the mores and other folkways of the community, and in the laws of the state. Rules, moral codes, and laws are statements of the reactions called for by a particular role or general attitude. In still broader terms we may say that an institution represents, psychologically for the individual, just such unification and patterning of reactions.

Finally, the nature of the "I" is altered by the generalizing process just described. True, the self as actor always remains partially unpredictable and unique; nevertheless, overt responses within the framework of rules and laws are for the most part stable and expected—that is, they are controlled or predictable. When we speak of a man's character, we mean his stability and predictability in the moral field. A person without a character is one without a generalized other or moral self in terms of certain expectancies of the community. Likewise, the fanatic or agitator in religion, politics, or economics is often considered a deviant because his ideas and conduct do not conform to the long-accepted standards of his community or nation. He may be a troublemaker, but he may also be a creator. He is one whose "I" has not been completely dominated by the moral "me's" laid down for him by tradition and custom.

In like manner the basis of security is this recurrent stability or predictability of interaction. It begins with the social act involving the child and the mother, and in time it includes relations with the father, the siblings, other relatives, playmates, neighbors, teachers, and other adults. The sense of security arises from the consistency of the reactions of others toward the child, which he, in turn, introjects and uses as a basis for defining his own role and hence for determining his actions and attitudes toward himself and others. Self-assurance, self-reliance, and self-esteem—three basic components of the self—depend for their origin and continuance upon the ability to meet demands defined at first by others and later by ourselves in advance.

THE RISE AND FUNCTION OF THE MORAL SELF

The basic training in moral codes and practices is an important aspect of the growth of the self. The rise of the moral "me's" within the frame of the self is not different in principle from that of other roles.

Like the other roles, those related to proper conduct begin in overt identification and gradually become introjected into the inner life organization as the conscience, or, as Sigmund Freud termed it, the "super-ego." The initial identification is derived from the child's assumption of the role of punisher of acts which others consider improper. He simply reacts to his own acts as others do. Children have been observed to slap themselves in punishment of the kind of act for which they had previously been slapped by another. Even more common than such completely overt identification is the common practice of talking to oneself as others do. Children scold themselves for their acts. They may use the third-person form, "Johnny mustn't do that," or address themselves in the direct second-person command, "You mustn't do that." But, the particular verbal form aside, the main point is that they check specific acts by taking the attitude of others. From these overt beginnings they introject the patterns of control, which is to say that they develop a self-punishing mechanism, or conscience.

This conscience operates by the introduction of one set of "me's," or roles, which counteracts or blocks another. The psychological mechanism for this is the familiar inhibition. One role, the approved one, is first rewarded by others and later by the sense of self-righteous approval. The tabooed one is met by pain, deprivation, or other punishment, and later by personal shame and sense of guilt. The pleasant feelings and emotions are tied to acts which are morally approved, and unpleasant ones to those which are not. Shame and sense of guilt are degradations of the self, a reduction of one's sense of approved participation with others. In one form or another, shame or guilt or both appear in all societies and are powerful devices of social control.

One of the main functions of the moral "me's" is the repression of the more primitive and less socialized impulses, the biological "I," as it were. Ordinarily, in the adult and the older adolescent, the more elemental selves are inhibited. But in severe crises, such as a race riot or a lynching, in revolutionary mobs, in wartime hysteria, in fad and craze, and in religious frenzy these repressions may be removed by more elemental drives and roles. One function of moral training—that is, of the moral aspect of socialization—is to fortify the individual against such outbreaks. Shame and the sense of guilt are the watchdogs of what we are taught to consider right and proper.

The moral controls of society are built up largely through institutions

which are external coercive and persuasive devices for regulating conduct. The institution is a kind of generalized other, and those which have to do with the mores, laws, and related controls fall within the larger framework of generalized patterns. One function of such institutions is moral instruction.

The social function of such instruction is, of course, to build up moral roles in advance of the situations which call for proper conduct. In doing this many societies have recourse to extensive verbal training in morality. Emotionalized words are frequently used to define situations for the child or the adolescent long before he comes in contact with them. Very often this verbal training is aimed at the generalization of moral roles in advance of any emergence of a general role from recurrent day-by-day experience. This anticipatory use of language is but a special instance of the defining function of words.

Acts and persons are defined as good or bad, proper or improper. The verbal aspects of the moral "me" are conveyed in such terms as "You're a bad boy" and "You're a good girl." At adult levels we get positive definitions of the "good citizen," the "loyal soldier," the "good provider," and the "true Christian." On the negative side we describe a member of an out-group by "nigger," "wop," "Bolshevik," "Nazi," or some other, from our point of view, derogatory term.

In building the moral self, as in building other features of the personality, we begin with acts, not with words or thoughts. The aim of moral instruction, as of much of education, is to reverse this process. That is, by use of words and other symbols we attempt to build up strong, emotionally toned ideas, sentiments, and values which will define and hence control overt action in advance. The moral man—that is, the man of character—knows what to do in most situations involving morality without giving thought to his acts. In other words, the impulsive, or rudimentary, "I" is repressed or controlled by the impact of a moral "me." Of course, as George H. Mead would have put it, it is not always possible to predict completely what the overt expression of even the most moral man will be. Yet, if the training has been sound, the man of character will probably abide by the moral codes.

What men say about their moral codes and beliefs often does not correspond with what they do. Verbal responses seldom correspond completely to overt actions, except in exact science and its applications. Using a statistical or probability concept, we may say that one of the aims of moral ideals and codes is to set a norm which individuals may approach as a limit. However, in many situations a verbal profession will satisfy the moral demands of the moment by setting up expectancies and acceptances in others.

On the other hand, too great a deviation of overt conduct from the norm

leads to a dissociation in life organization which may prove disastrous, even to the point of being labeled by others as criminal or psychopathic. In our society we have two moralities, one derived from Christianity and the Golden Rule, and the other from business enterprise, where sharp dealing and cutthroat competition are considered virtuous practices. Sometimes the strain induced in persons who are culturally indoctrinated in both codes results in schizoid, or split, personality. Some aspects of this will be discussed in the next section.

DISSOCIATION AND INTEGRATION OF PERSONALITY

Ideally, out of our basic drives and the recurrent means of satisfying them, and from the generalization of roles, we should develop a co-ordinated or integrated pattern of life which would tie together the many diffuse lines of day-by-day adjustment. Yet people vary in the degree to which they are able to co-ordinate their activities around a central theme. More often than not we find both dissociation and integration.

As we pointed out above, the young child is rewarded for some kinds of adaptation and punished for others not considered adequate or proper by his mother or other persons. Sometimes the child purchases approval at considerable cost in original impulse. This leaves him frustrated in certain reactions though satisfied in others. The discipline and authority of the parent may lead him to fear and rage. Such a condition may produce internal conflict, for the rewarded drives and outlets are reinforced by the rewards, and others, often very potent, are not. Such conflicting "me's," or "roles," or attitudes, tend to split the child's reaction system with respect to the introjected images of the mother and father. One set of roles is marked by pleasant toning and the fulfillment of certain wishes, the other by unpleasantness, aggression, and other negative attitudes. The first the parents label as "good," "proper," and "nice," the second as "bad," "improper," and "naughty," and each develops its own phase within the emerging set of selves. The first, linked to approval, pleasantness, love, sympathy, and other affectional reactions, conflicts with the opposite responses of the second. The former may grow into strong habits and tend to become generalized; the latter is permitted certain mild expression, is repressed, or is displaced upon other persons or situations.

Another source of dissociation in role-taking is the competition and conflict of siblings for parental affection, for toys, or for other objects for which all may strive. In fact, there is some evidence that a child's first strong reactions against his mother may arise when a newborn infant tends to replace him in her attention.

As a consequence of this division of reactions, one socially approved and rewarded, the other repressed or punished, there is a division in the child's environment, for the meaning of the social-cultural environment is de-

terminated in large part by just such actions and attitudes. Some roles of the developing self stand out as satisfactory to the self and to others, while other roles are hidden away along with their inciting motives. Yet the accumulated aggression is not entirely lost. Moreover, the very nature of our interactional patterns permits considerable culturally approved deflection of the accumulated aggressions. This is the function of fantasy, compensation, and sublimation; it is clear in our projective mechanism; and it is most apparent in conflict and competition with other members of one's in-group and especially with members of out-groups.

It might be imagined that such splitting of the patterns of life organization would altogether disorganize the personality. This is by no means so. The outlets just noted are of vast importance. Some, like fantasy, are internal; others, such as compensation and sublimation, are verbal or overt or both. Especially significant is one's positive identification with the aims, symbols, values, and activities of an in-group in opposition to those of members of an out-group.

Such ambivalence permits a balance or integration between inner organization and outer conduct which has vast implications for many phases of personality and for wider group relations. Such dual but co-ordinated responses, moreover, are found at every level of group organization, primary or secondary, and are reflected in culture because they exist in man in interaction with his fellows. Through such means we can at once love our fellows and hate our enemies. We can be kindly to our parents or other relatives and in fantasy harbor murderous thoughts about them, or, better still, displace those thoughts into our enjoyment of tragedy.

It does not follow that every group is opposed to a corresponding out-group. Nor are our aggressions all conscious or overt. Often they are greatly disguised and appear in the form of irony, wit, or unconscious slips of tongue or pen. Very often our violent attitudes are dressed up in moral terms of righteousness and struggle for great causes. Revolutionary agitators, and lynchers out "to protect white womanhood" are, from their standpoint, highly ethical persons. In conflicts of all kinds persons on both sides rationalize their verbal and overt aggressions in terms of divine or human principles. This saves their moral self or conscience and at the same time serves to motivate their aggression.

Figure 1 summarizes this whole discussion and shows how widespread these divergent yet balancing reactions are. It indicates that the social order, with its many institutions, has grown up in reference to, or out of, these deeper, socially rooted actions and reactions of men. Finally, it shows that, just as basic and acquired drives are fulfilled only in the social act, so the forms of interaction, oppositional or co-operative, set the stage, at the social as well as the cultural level, for integration of the personality. While generalization and integration are, for the individual as a biological




FIG. 1.—Diagram Showing Opposite Social-Cultural Outlets and Their Correlated Ambivalent Personal Attitudes and Roles

specimen, the results of certain neurological processes, at the social-psychological level they are products of mind and action, both of which are socially derived. In many chapters hereafter we shall have occasion to examine the operation of these interactional patterns with reference to particular aspects of man's adaptation to man.

PERSONALITY TYPES

Some writers have taken the position that any attempt to study individuals in terms of types is unscientific because it ignores the rich variety of persons known to us in everyday life. Others, while admitting variability, take the position that typology is perfectly feasible and scientifically sound. Since the author has dealt with this controversy rather exhaustively elsewhere,⁹ only the broad implications of the topic need be presented here.

The Concept of Type. Those who oppose the theory of types and eschew efforts to state questions concerning personality in typological terms stress the uniqueness of the person and the high specificity of his ideas, attitudes, traits, and habits. Many of this school of thought look upon the mental and motor organization of the individual as additive. For them specific mental elements or behavior units must at all times be related to particular situations. Any organization of these into larger totalities depends on the existence of what E. L. Thorndike calls "identical elements" in the situation and in the individual.¹⁰ Others, like Gordon W. Allport, emphasize the highly autonomous and unique nature of each individual, who is really an integration of many separate unit traits, attitudes, and habits.¹¹ Those who take this approach in theory and method find not types or modalities among individuals but a continuous gradation of specific variables, such as unit traits, attitudes, intellectual capacities, gestures, and habits, along some continuum or scale by which occurrence and frequency and intensity may be measured.

It is pretty clear that a certain standpoint and method of investigation will produce evidence for such an interpretation. Beginning with assumptions about the discrete nature of traits, attitudes, and habits, and using present-day tests and a statistics of probability, workers have collected proof for the thesis of specificity. This approach has been used chiefly by mental testers who used the school populations as subjects of research. However, as J. Zubin well puts it, "the continuity in distribution may have

⁹ See K. Young, *op. cit.*, chap. 13. For other references on this topic see the Suggestions for Further Reading at the close of this chapter.

¹⁰ This is essentially the view taken in H. Hartsborne and M. A. May's *Studies in Deceit*, 1928.

¹¹ See G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, 1937. This entire book is built around the thesis of autonomy of personality, but on types and traits see especially chaps. 3, 11, 12.

been a result of the logical consistency of the scoring key rather than of the behavior of human beings."¹²

Those who favor the theory of types do so on several grounds. By common-sense observation they find certain correlations between attitudes and behavior in one situation and those in another. On this basis they assume some continuity of a general feature or characteristic in the individual that determines, at least in part, his ideas, attitudes, and overt actions in varied situations. The very concept of general role, or of generalized and integrated life organization, suggests that it may be possible to classify individuals with respect to their dominant drives, or their temperaments (underlying feeling-emotional tones), or their social role.

Much of the work in typology has grown out of psychiatry and clinical psychology, in which the subjects were deviants. Few of those who have tried to develop typologies would deny a place to uniqueness of specific individuals. What they try to do is to arrive at some valid abstraction or generalization out of the welter of everyday experience with people which will enable them to differentiate, not between individuals or particular traits, attitudes, or actions, but between certain general and basic determinants of personality. They seek to discover whether behind the rich variation of attitudes, traits, and actions there are some central modes of motivation and activity which will enable them to predict, and hence control, behavior.

It is by this standard that the real test of this problem must be made. Any examination of the vast literature on types, pro and con, reveals merit on both sides. The basic consideration is whether one or the other or both approaches will in time yield the scientific data and generalizations which will permit prediction of specific behavior. In all honesty it must be said that so far neither approach has gone very far in developing predictive devices, though, in the prediction of success in school, vocations, and marriage, and of recovery from criminal conduct, some advances, chiefly in the use of the methods of specificity, have been made.¹³ At the present time it seems wise to keep an open mind and to examine the data and interpretations which come to us from all the varied sources. For our purposes we may note some systems of typological classification which have been proposed and used.

Some Psychological Types. Literary men and philosophers originated the concept and use of the type long before modern psychology developed. One recalls from Shakespeare's *Julius Caesar* a common correlation be-

¹² J. Zubin, "A Technique for Measuring Like-Mindedness," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1938, 33: 239.

¹³ This topic has been exhaustively analyzed by Paul Horst and others in *The Prediction of Personal Adjustment*, 1941, Bulletin No. 48 of the Social Science Research Council. Pertinent statistical and case-study methods are discussed there in detail.

tween mental characteristics and bodily build. Seeing Cassius approach, Caesar remarks:

Let me have men about me that are fat;
Sleek-headed men, and such as sleep o' nights:
Yon Cassius has a lean and hungry look;
He thinks too much: such men are dangerous.

Another popular Shakespearean character, Falstaff, is depicted as fat and jolly, and his antics symbolize a general idea that stout persons are good-natured and not given to anxiety. Similar linking of physical constitution and psychological traits will be found in proverbs, fables, novels, drama, and poetry.

It was Ernst Kretschmer, a German psychiatrist, however, who made one of the first serious attempts to correlate, in a causal theory, bodily build and temperamental characteristics. Using data on patients in mental hospitals, he divided his sample into three major morphological types: asthenic, athletic, and pyknic. The *asthenic* is the tall, thin, and hungry-looking man with angular face and narrow shoulders. The *athletic* is the person of thick chest, broad shoulders, and heavy muscles, a picture of physical strength in face as well as in torso. The *pyknic* has a fat, rounded figure, which, according to Kretschmer, does not become fully apparent till middle life. In addition to these types there are certain mixed forms. The major physical types are linked to certain psychological types, the asthenic and athletic to the schizoid, who resemble in personality make-up the victim of dementia praecox, and the pyknic to what Kretschmer called the circular type, those who show the manic-depressive pattern of behavior.¹⁴

At least two problems are involved in Kretschmer's and similar studies. Is there an inherited and causal linkage of morphology with a particular temperament or mental organization? Kretschmer seems to assume that there is. Even if we do not assume an inherited basis for this relationship, do other studies bear out his contention that on the whole the pyknic builds are correlated with outgoing, expansive, and extroversive traits, and the asthenic and athletic with ingrowing, introversive traits?

We have no adequate means of testing the first hypothesis. The whole problem of possible causal relations between physical constitution and mentality, be it with regard to intelligence, feelings and emotions, or other elements, is so far unsolved. On the second hypothesis there are various reports; some tend to support, in general, Kretschmer's findings, and others do not. Part of the difficulty has already been noted. Using statistical devices, themselves constructed around the concepts of highly specific traits, some workers have not found any support for his types. Other studies, though scouting Kretschmer's sharp dichotomies, lend some support to the idea that there are modes of behavior which could loosely be called typical.

✓ ¹⁴ See E. Kretschmer, *Physique and Character*, 1925.

Recently an elaborate study of physical types has been made by William H. Sheldon and collaborators. They attempted to correlate a variety of physical measurements into composites, or types, which might be classified in terms of certain modalities or frequencies. Their three types are the *viscerotonic*, marked by sociability, conviviality, relaxation, and affection for people; the *somatonic*, showing "a predominance of muscular activity" and "vigorous bodily assertiveness"; and the *cerebrotonic*, characterized by "attentional consciousness, inhibition, and desire for concealment."¹⁵

The best-known psychological theory of types is that of Carl G. Jung, a close associate of Freud who later departed from his master to set up his own theory of psychoanalysis. One phase of Jung's work involved typology, and his terms *introvert* and *extrovert* have become household words. The sources of Jung's classification of introversion and extroversion lie apparently in his clinical experience and in older dichotomies, such as William James' tough- and tender-minded persons. Broadly speaking, these types represent different organizations of drives, traits, attitudes, and habit patterns.

The fundamental orientation of the extrovert is toward the outside world of physical and social objects. He has, like others, an inner life, of course, but it is oriented toward the outside. Extroverts deal more in words and deeds and the manipulation of externals than with their own inner wishes and thoughts. In contrast, the introvert lives "on the inside of his head." He finds his chief values inside himself, in his fantasies. His organization of the world tends to be egocentric and idealistic. Unlike the extroverts, who run to activities like those of executives and salesmen, and who in philosophy tend to be empiricists, the introverts like jobs calling for thoughtful planning and the systematic organization of ideas. Often they want to arrange the world according to a fixed scheme so as to prevent chaos, disorder, and uncertainty. They make good idealists and agitators but poor diplomats, political bosses, and business leaders.

The introvert's adjustments to persons and objects outside himself are highly qualified by the fact that much of his attention is directed inward. From observations, both casual and clinical, it seems to the writer that persons falling into this general category lay down a screen between themselves and their fellows. To get on with such persons, one must try to penetrate this veil, or must bear in mind that it is there. Such barriers always qualify an interactional process involving introverts.

Jung, not satisfied with the dual classification, broke down each major category into four subcategories. Each major type was divided into "thinking," "feeling," "sensation," and "intuition" subtypes. But for our purposes we need not follow up the details.¹⁶ Few if any American psychologists have employed the eightfold classification as a basis for their testing of Jung's typology. Most of them have used only the broad general categories of introversion and extroversion.

Many studies have been made to determine whether Jung's types are valid, and the interpretations of this work vary with the investigators'

¹⁵ See W. H. Sheldon, S. S. Stevens, and W. B. Tucker, *The Varieties of Human Physique: An Introduction to Constitutional Psychology*, 1940; and Sheldon and Stevens, *The Varieties of Temperament*, 1942.

¹⁶ See C. G. Jung, *Psychological Types*, 1922. There is a convenient summary of these subtypes in K. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 306-308.

points of view and purposes. On the whole, despite extensive criticisms, the results tend to bear out Jung's characterizations. However, many accept his categories only as a device for indicating certain clusters of specific traits and refuse to assume outright and rigid types. Others have shown that there are general traits behind the classifications. One important contribution to the general theory is that of J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, who, using elaborate factorial analysis of scores on an introversion-extroversion scale, found the following four general factors to be indicative of introversion: (1) tendency to fear the environment, and to shrink from it; (2) emotional sensitivity to the environment; (3) impulsiveness; (4) interest in oneself.¹⁷

In terms of George H. Mead's theory, we may say that the introvert is a person whose roles, both specific and generalized, have a distinct inward reference. He is dominated by strong egocentric wishes and a strong "I," which resists modification by "me's" taken over from his contact with others. He identifies his wishes, thoughts, and actions with his own strong ego drives, and his adaptation to others is made largely through his inner reconstruction of any situation in which he must meet them. The extrovert, on the other hand, builds his roles—specific and general—more easily around the expected and accepted patterns of others. He assumes "me's," or drops them, as the situation demands. In fact, it might be said that the extreme extrovert lacks sufficient self-focus for stability and continuity. The extreme introvert finds it hard to change his "stripes"; the extreme extrovert is the social "chameleon." In extreme instances the extrovert escapes into outer reality while the introvert retires into the inner citadel of his fantasies.

As has happened with other dual classifications, investigators who worked with Jung's types soon developed a mixed type, the ambivert, as a reaction against the initial tendency to put everyone into one pigeonhole or the other.¹⁸ The ambivert is a combination of certain features of introversion and extroversion.

There are many other psychological typologies, some with two types, others with more. At best they are approximations to generalizations. Most users of typology consider types to be, not sharp and rigid categories, but clusters of traits, attitudes, and other elements which tend to give characteristic or typical direction and meaning to the total personality. This view is not far removed from that of many who oppose typology as theory or fact, but who use the probability theory applied to multiple variables

¹⁷ J. P. Guilford and R. B. Guilford, "An Analysis of the Factors in a Typical Test of Introversion-Extroversion," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1934, 28: 377-399.

¹⁸ This tendency to escape the rigid classification by adding mixed types or subdividing the original types into minute categories is sharply criticized by G. W. Allport, who writes, *op. cit.*, p. 93, "The temptation with every typology as soon as its inadequacies are apparent is to elaborate it through subdivision."

as a basis for indicating central tendencies as well as variabilities in personalities.

More important than the theoretical controversy is the applicability of the findings to prediction. Since personalities do not exist in a vacuum, but operate in social-cultural situations, the real test of typology is: Do such classifications help us to predict what people will do and think in everyday life? Before discussing this, however, we must note that sociologists and political scientists have also tried their hand at a typology of the major roles that individuals play in society.

Social Typologies. The use of the social type, as distinct from the psychological, also has its origins in ancient times. For example, Theophrastus, in the third century before the Christian era, classified people into what he called "characters," such as the "flatterer," the "boor," and the "coward," and he presented their personality features in terms of what we should call role. He has had many imitators, both in fiction and in social psychology. One of the serious attempts was made by W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki with a threefold classification of major social roles: (1) the *philistine*, or practical man, who overemphasizes security and safety; (2) the *bohemian*, who inclines toward new experience, is flighty and fickle, and lets his hedonistic impulses control him; (3) the *creative man*, who, though relatively stable, has capacity for change and invention by creative activity in science, art, philosophy, or education. Other sociologists have made some use of this classification or have modified it somewhat.¹⁹ In political science Harold D. Lasswell has used a social typology—as distinct from a psychological one—in his treatment of political leadership. We shall make some reference to this work in Chapter X.

Though many sociologists see some merit in attempting a typology of roles and statuses, they have not done anything approaching the elaborate research in the typology of personality.²⁰ Yet in studies of delinquency, crime, minority peoples, and marital adjustment various concepts of social types have been applied. One of the major problems is that simple two-, three-, or fourfold categories will hardly serve to classify adequately the wide range of general roles found in our complex society.

But, this difficulty aside, the distinctions to be drawn between the personality type and the social type are important. The former is the product of heredity and early conditioning, some of it outside the scope of culture. The chief features of the personality type are laid down in the first years of life and are not greatly modified later. Moreover, they represent mechanisms of reacting to the world, as we indicated above in commenting on

¹⁹ See W. I. Thomas and F. Znaniecki, *The Polish Peasant in Europe and America*, 2-volume ed., 1927. See also E. W. Burgess, "The Study of the Delinquent as a Person," *American J. Sociology*, 1923, 28. 657-680.

²⁰ See H. Becker, "Constructive Typology," *American Sociological Review*, 1940, 4: 40-55, for a pertinent statement of the whole matter of social types.

Jung's types. On the other hand, the social type is built around the content of attitude and action. It consists of the generalized role which the individual develops in interaction. As E. W. Burgess points out, a person may change his social role, say from criminal to salesman, without any basic alteration in his personality type. To use Jung's types for illustration, we may find introverts and extroverts among criminals just as we may find them in various respectable businesses and professions.

Yet a fundamental problem remains. Are persons of one type better suited for some general or major role than those of another?

How much is social-cultural adaptation itself facilitated or hindered by a failure on the part of the individual and of his fellows to recognize these differences? Such problems have obvious bearing on vocational adjustment, on the appeals of various religious or political faiths, and doubtless on the intimate relations of the family, to say nothing of the appeals of leisure-time activities and hobbies.

The problem is well illustrated in Kretschmer's discussion of various kinds of activities which fall within his major classification of cyclothymes and schizothymes, for he is really dealing with the relations of social to personality types when he puts realistic and humorous poets, empirical experimentalists, and "jolly" organizing leaders among the former, and the poets of pathos, romance, and formalism, logicians, and idealistic and fanatic leaders among the latter.

There has also been some effort to correlate introversion with certain occupations, and extroversion with others. Morris Freyd found that mechanically minded individuals tended to be introverts, and that "socially" inclined persons, such as executives, were more likely to be extroverts. Donald Laird states that inspectors, accountants, and research engineers tend toward introversion, in contrast to executives, foremen, and nurses, who are more often extroverted. In a sample of teachers studied by L. A. Pechstein there was a preponderance of introverts. And E. S. Conklin found business-school students, premedical students, and life-insurance salesmen decidedly more introverted than students of journalism or of English literature, or bank employees.

So, too, the report of G. W. T. H. Fleming, based on forty years' records at the Dorset County mental hospital in England, suggests the possibility of linking up personality types with certain occupational roles. Dividing the patients with functional disorders into introverts and extroverts, he found that, on the whole, the former tended to be students, engineers, bookkeepers, surgeons, dentists, chemists, soldiers, carpenters, stonemasons, bricklayers, and lawyers. Those diagnosed as extroverts tended, for the most part, to be farmers, blacksmiths, policemen, railwaymen, shepherds, merchants, managers, and business directors.²¹

The broader theoretical aspect of the relation of personality to social role involves the constitutional foundation of both personal differences and possible type classifications. It also emphasizes the importance of social interaction, especially in the early years, in fixing the basic mechanisms of

²¹ Modified slightly from K. Young, *op. cit.*, pp. 327-328.

interaction for the rest of life. Finally, the adaptation of individuals of different constitutional and psychological make-up to social expectancies throws into relief one of the profoundest problems of social psychology and social science, namely, the relation between the social order and culture, on the one hand, and the how and what of the individual's life organization, on the other.

In dealing with this last problem we must take into account both the universal and typical factors of personality and those which are unique and distinctive. It would be a mistake to assume that the personality is a complete reflection of the society and culture in which one participates. To do so is to ignore the dynamic nature of man's adjustment to his world. It is to neglect the flexibility or variability which is as much a constant in man's life as are rigidity and the inherent tendency to stability through generalization and integration. As students of personality and culture, we are deeply concerned to discover the interplay of these basic patterns, one toward individuality and flexibility, the other toward fixity and stability. In describing and analyzing these we must bear in mind organic and inherited forces and also those which come from personal-social and cultural conditioning. With regard to culture we are particularly concerned to discover, if we can, how far institutions may go in restricting and re-directing the trends toward variability and change. Is there a point at which cultural efforts to predetermine completely every aspect of personal life organization break down? This is a particularly important problem in a time when a vast struggle is going on between ideologies, one of which tends to stress fixity and stability and over-all control, while the other still places high values on individuality, free choice, inventiveness, and uniqueness of life organization. We shall return to this topic in Chapter XXII.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On traits and attitudes, see G. W. Allport, *Personality: A Psychological Interpretation*, 1937, chaps. 11, 12; Charles Bird, *Social Psychology*, 1940, chaps. 5, 6; G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, 1937, rev. ed., chaps. 6, 7, 8, 12, 13; J. S. Plant, *Personality and the Cultural Pattern*, 1937, chaps. 4, 5; L. F. Shaffer, *The Psychology of Adjustment*, 1936, chap. 13; Ross Stagner, *Psychology of Personality*, 1937, chaps. 8, 10; P. M. Symonds, *Diagnosing Personality and Conduct*, 1931, chaps. 5, 6.

On the important mechanisms of interaction, see W. Healy, A. F. Bronner, and A. M. Bowers, *The Structure and Meaning of Psychoanalysis*, 1930, Section V; K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chap. 6.

On the rise of the self, see C. H. Cooley, *Human Nature and the Social Order*, 1902, chaps. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8; G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934, Part III; L. B. Murphy, *Social Behavior and Child Personality*, 1937, chaps. 3, 4, 8, 9; H. A. Murray

and others, *Explorations in Personality*, 1938, chap. 2; K. Young, *op. cit.*, chaps. 9, 10.

On the problem of typology with reference to personality, see Gardner Murphy and Friedrich Jenson, *Approaches to Personality*, 1932, chap. 1; K. Young, *op. cit.*, chap. 13.

Chapter VIII

THE NATURE OF SOCIAL-CULTURAL REALITY

THE PURPOSE of the present chapter is to examine further into the factors which determine, in large part, the meanings or interpretations which we give to our thoughts, emotions, and actions. Also we shall discuss the forms of thinking and the manner in which they interplay with culture. There are various lines of evidence upon which we may draw. In particular we shall show from experimental work and from everyday and controlled observations how culture influences the content and form of thought processes. Supporting evidence will be drawn from studies of primitive peoples.

THE INFLUENCE OF CULTURE ON PERCEPTION, MEMORY, AND CONCEPTION

As we have pointed out, the basic sensory structures and functions of mankind are everywhere the same. How an individual uses these is determined in large measure not only by the nature of the physical world but by the interpretations and meanings provided by his social-cultural training. We shall discuss this fact with reference to perception and memory, and finally with regard to the higher thought processes involving the formation and use of concepts.

Perception. What we see, hear, taste, smell, and otherwise sense depends upon the meaning as well as upon the external causes of sensory impressions. Perceptions, of course, begin in reactions, unlearned and conditioned. What we call meaning is not some mystic element but a deposit of prior responses that give direction and significance to present sensory impressions. Perceptual functions arise slowly as learning proceeds and especially as internalization takes place. This last includes subvocal speech, incipient motor reactions (the basis of attitude), incipient changes in feeling and emotion, and the whole field of what the older psychology termed imagery and imagination.

The manner in which meaning or perceptual judgment is built up is admirably shown in the experiment of Muzafer Sherif on autokinetic movement.¹

Sherif set out to discover how a norm or standard of perception is built up when there is no reference point in prior experience or in the immediate external situation.

¹ M. Sherif, "A Study of Some Social Factors in Perception," *Archives of Psychology*, 1935, No. 187. A summary is in Sherif's *The Psychology of Social Norms*, 1936, chap. 6.

He thought by this means to test some of the factors which go into the establishment of a norm of judgment. He also wished to see what part social or group influences might play in this matter. What is called the "autokinetic effect" provides an excellent situation for such a test. If a single point of light at a fixed position is shown in a completely dark room, or in outdoor darkness (as in a complete blackout), it will appear to move. Moreover, the movement will seem to be erratic.²

The experiment began with the introduction of individuals one at a time into a dark room. The point of light was exposed, and the subject was asked to tell how far, in inches or fractions of inches, the light moved. Nineteen persons—completely unfamiliar with this phenomenon and untutored in psychology—took part in this phase of the experiment. Each made a hundred perceptual judgments of the movement. Each reported that at first the light moved irregularly but that, as the experiment was repeated, he found himself setting up a certain spatial norm or standard. As a result, by the hundredth trial each had established for himself a certain average range of variations. Moreover, on subsequent days, when the trials were repeated, the subjects made their judgments largely in terms of the first day's experience.

It is clear from this that, when first confronted with such a visual stimulus, one cannot make a sensible judgment, but that during repeated attempts one sets up an individual norm, or frame of reference, which qualifies all later perceptions.

A second part of this experiment consisted in exposing the point of light to two or three subjects at the same time. The results of this phase are particularly interesting for social psychology. Two situations were established. In one the individuals went through the experiment in the group without having had any prior experience with the experiment. In the other they came into the group experiment after they had established their own personal ranges and norms for the movement. In both situations the subjects were permitted to offer their judgments in more or less random order, but, of course, each heard what his fellows had to say. There were twenty subjects in each stage of the second part of the experiment.

We may state the major finds briefly: (1) When individuals who had already established their own personal norms were brought together, the first judgments varied tremendously, but, as judgments were continued, they invariably tended to converge, and at the end of the sessions they were practically identical or at least highly similar. (2) When the individuals making up the group had had no previous experience with this experiment, their judgments from the outset tended to coincide. In fact, the convergence to a common, group-accepted norm was greater than when the subjects had been allowed to fix norms for themselves in advance.

As Sherif notes, there may have been some polarization about the judgments of the more aggressive individuals, about those who spoke first, or about those who spoke most loudly. Yet, he reports, there was much shifting of judgment. In fact, once a norm was more or less accepted by all, a "leader" who then altered his judgment was not likely to be followed in subsequent sessions.

The point of this experiment is clear. Individuals, alone or in groups, when forced to react—in this case to make a perceptual judgment—sooner or later develop some norm or frame of reference from which later judg-

² There are probably physiological factors, such as fatigue and variation in focus, to account for this; but for purposes of the experiment these have no bearing

ments are made. What began as an erratic perception becomes consistent and stable through the emergence of a norm, which may, in a group, become a cultural standard controlling subsequent perceptions of like character. What is true of this visual experience is, in general, true elsewhere. Our diffuse and unorganized perceptions and reactions tend to become stabilized and orderly because our individual reaction and judgment are qualified and controlled by widely accepted, and hence expected, norms. It is not merely physiological maturation or organic learning but also social-cultural influences that put stability, predictability, and order into our world.

The development of perception in children amply illustrates the importance of cultural imposition on primary and elementary sensory contact with the world. The point has been illustrated with reference to space, time, number, color, and all other perceptual fields. Let us note a few examples.

The development of the spatial sense is linked to distinctions between the self and the not-self. At the outset, apparently, a child does not distinguish between the spatial separateness of his own body and the extension of the physical surroundings. The mouth and the hands are evidently the first means of learning about objects. Nursing at the mother's breast provides an initial contact with an external object, one which is socially significant as the source of satisfaction of the fundamental need for food. Reaching and touching the mother's body doubtless supplement this oral orientation. Gradually other objects come into the child's hands: bedclothes, clothes, and toys. In this way the arena of his physical contact expands. As the eyes come into play, especially as the child learns to focus on objects, this spatial world is further expanded, and objects not in direct contact now begin to make up his environment. As the child learns to walk, his spatial perceptions are expanded again by still other physical contacts.

In all these experiences space-perception is a result of overt action. Later language helps define spatial experience. The name of the object becomes associated with what the child does to it, or for it, and what the object does to, or for, him.

Along with language, the sense of self, and other perceptual experiences, the initial stages of learning about space are embedded in the whole context of what the child does. There are many illustrations of this. Two German observers, Ernst and Gertrud Scupin, report that, when they first took their three-year-old son into a certain building in the zoo, they went in by going up one flight of steps and came out by going down another. On a later visit to the same building they entered by the stairs by which they had formerly left. The child protested that this was a mistake, saying, "These are the going-down steps."³ What is called a "space of action" or a spatial quality of action in the child becomes in later training a more distinct concept of space as such.

³ E. Scupin and G. Scupin, *Bubi im 4.-6. Lebensjahr*, vol. 2, p. 77.

In our society it is not till the child is six or seven years old that he can distinguish between the right and the left of his own body. Even at that age he cannot tell the right and left of others' bodies; according to J. J. Piaget, the Swiss child psychologist, it is not until the child is about eight years old that he can do this, and not till he is eleven or more years old that he can distinguish the left and right of inanimate objects.⁴

George H. Mead contended that the spatial sense of objects and of one's own body as distinct from that of others arises *after*, not before, the child learns to view his attitudes, ideas, habits, and roles as others view them. That is, the sense of external objects emerges after the beginnings of the self are laid down.⁵ Certainly the spatial sense grows gradually and is related to the rise of the self in distinction to other selves.

The extent to which an abstract spatial sense is developed depends on cultural training. In our society people raised in the open flat country, originally plotted to the cardinal points of the compass, are likely to continue to orient themselves and others in terms of east, west, north, and south. Individuals who have grown up in such a locality may later have difficulty in accommodating themselves to the left-right orientation found in cities with irregular streets and crowded traffic. If such persons lose the orientation to the compass, they may become hopelessly confused in trying to follow directions stated as left and right turns.

Spatial orientation is largely a matter of habit. Recently the writer experienced a curious sense of vastness and a slight disorientation on Second Avenue in New York City on the first occasion of his coming into that part of the city after the elevated tracks had been removed. The whole spatial configuration was so altered that for a moment he was not sure he had arrived at his destination. The art of camouflage in wartime is designed, of course, to destroy the usual visual cues that are essential to the perception of certain objects or terrain.

The advancement of the spatial sense is also evident in one's introduction to geometry, which deals with abstractions of space. Some individuals never seem capable of making the shift from the concrete, space-in-situation adjustment to the higher levels of abstraction, which are useful chiefly to mathematicians and engineers. Most of us do not need to employ geometrical concepts in dealing with everyday spatial adjustments.

The cultural determination of spatial perceptions is amply illustrated in societies outside our cultural sphere. Our four-point orientation is a cultural product. Other people use different systems of noting spatial relations. The Japanese conceive of the universe as defined by eight points. Dante's conception of the cosmos in the *Divine Comedy* certainly was unlike ours. Among some Australian tribes space was systematized not according to geography or geometry but into separate regions of the number

⁴ J. J. Piaget, *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*, 1928, pp. 177 ff.

⁵ See G. H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934, pp. 178-186.

of totemic clans in the tribe. The Zuñis divided universal space into seven sections, following the partition of the tribe into seven clans; in fact, the villages were laid out in seven districts, and the whole political and religious life of the Zuñi community was minutely ordered in line with this sevenfold division of space and people.

The development of the sense of time follows somewhat the same general form. For the young child sequences of time are definitely tied to action and objects. Night and day do not stand alone, but are parts of the events of going to bed, of getting up, and of a series of activities through the waking period. Young children usually divide the day, not into minutes and hours, but, personally, into important events, such as breakfast, lunch, and supper, and perhaps bathing, washing, and training in bodily habits. So, too, months and seasons are associated with activities. Winter literally means to a child in our northern climate snow, ice, and activities which go with the season. Months are often associated with special holidays or with family events such as birthdays. Many children believe that the calendar makes time: Sunday is the day which is red on the calendar and week days those which are black. Embedded as it is in everyday events, time is regarded as a material object and as discontinuous. His birthday often means to a child that he is actually a year older and perhaps a different person. The personal role-taking in this connection is obvious, as with the boy who is given his first pair of long trousers on his fourteenth birthday. Such an event may mark a considerable change in his interests and in his self-regard.

Sometimes, under ambitious parental tutelage, young children get confused about these matters. When one child of six years and eight months heard that it was night in America when it was day in Germany, he asked his parents where the line was on the earth "where day begins and night ends."⁶

As adults we commonly follow similar patterns. Our dairy farmers, not unlike the cattle-raising Ugandas of Africa, divide the day into "milking time," "watering time," and other chore times. Many primitive peoples divide the year into cycles of blossoming of fruit, ripening of fruit, and the like. Others, who live by hunting and fishing, separate the seasons according to seasonal activities. The Trobriand Islanders have an elaborate system of "gardening time." For example, they will say: "this happened *o takaywa*, during the cutting of the scrub; . . . *wa supa*, in planting time; . . . *o tayo-yuwa*, during the harvest proper."⁷

Yet the Trobrianders, like many other primitive peoples, reckon time also by lunar months and by certain broad seasons of activity such as festivals and periods of trading with other tribes. These concrete, time-in-action periods, though somewhat inconsistent, worked well enough. In cultural

⁶ Scupin and Scupin, *op. cit.* vol. 2, p. 199.

⁷ B. Malinowski, *Coral Gardens and Their Magic*, vol. 1, p. 53. By permission of the American Book Co.

development a more careful counting of time by lunar changes came only with more advanced demands and the rise of early mathematics. So, too, it was only much later that civilized man learned to make use of solar functions as a measure of time. Our use of clocks and calendars to determine our daily routine is evidence of the dominance of the machine in our society.

In a similar way the perception of size, colors, and other qualities is more or less controlled by one's social-cultural milieu and not by any elemental direct biological contact with the world. Children are slow to distinguish and name colors. They do learn in time by discriminative action with respect to colors and by naming the differentiating experiences. As late as entrance into the first grade, pupils often confuse red and orange, blue and violet, violet and purple. In our culture most people learn, in school and outside, to name and distinguish the seven major colors, but it is well-known that many never go beyond these broad categories. Men in our society are notoriously less well trained than women to distinguish fine hues and nuances in the colors of clothes. For most people colors, like other sensory-perceptual qualities, are linked to day-by-day judgments of concrete objects. Only the expert tends to segregate these into fine discriminatory detail.

The perception of size is likewise a result of social-cultural training. The growing child gradually builds up standards of size, but he links this feature of the total perceptual *Gestalt* with others. As with space, so with size: highly specific and discrete perceptions are rarely needed in everyday life.

The habitual linkage of size and numbers, which is conceptual, is neatly illustrated in H. Ansbacher's study of judgment of the size of postage stamps. He had his subjects judge the size of ordinary postage stamps of varying denominations. He found that those with the higher values were perceived as larger than the others. In another part of the experiment he exhibited Canadian stamps of exactly the same size and denomination as those of the United States and found that the former were seen as smaller than those of the subject's own country.⁸

Imagery and Memory. Social and cultural influences also play a prominent part in determining what we remember. Not only what we see, hear, smell, or otherwise perceive is affected by time, space, and circumstances, but what we are able to recall—that is, the amount of recollection, and its form and meaning—is affected by prior learning. Moreover, the dynamic, changing nature of the internal processes is well brought out in the findings of various writers on retention and recall. Studies of recall show that our memory images are subject to falsification by erroneous matter, the substitution of one memory item for another, transpositions of time and place,

⁸ H. Ansbacher, "Perception of Number as Affected by the Monetary Value of the Objects: A Critical Study of the Method Used in Extended Constancy Phenomena," *Archives of Psychology*, 1937, No. 215.

condensation, dramatization, and other distortions, all resulting from the changes which internal processes bring about.

F. C. Bartlett's studies of the reproduction of stories are particularly informative on this subject. For example, in one series of experiments the subjects were given stories about mythological characters. Each subject repeated the story he had heard to another subject, and the latter, in his turn, to a third, and so on. The results showed among other things a definite tendency to remake the material in more concrete form, to condense much of the detail, to make the styles of the stories more nearly uniform, to rationalize or explain the account, and to elaborate by adding new matter.

Bartlett has also reported observations on the memory functions of different tribes. For instance, he compared the African Swazis and Zulus. The former are a pacific, cattle-raising tribe; the latter are warlike and given to organized banditry. In recounting military engagements between these two tribes, individuals of the former tended to report incidents in a quiet and stolid fashion. In contrast, the Zulus retold the same events with emotional excitement and gusto. It is obvious that there is no original organic difference in emotion or memory function between these two racially close tribes. The differences reflect the different meanings which their different attitudes and values have given to common experiences.⁹

Concept-Formation. From perceptions, associative images, and memory the individual in time acquires concepts or ideas as a further aid in his adaptation to his world. Concept-formation is closely linked to the growth of language and other symbols and is the highest level of intellectual development. Some of the learning processes concerned with conceptualization we reviewed in Chapter V. At this point we want to show how social-cultural factors play a part in this.

The psychological basis of concept-formation lies in conditioning with respect to qualities, part-processes, and relationships rather than to total actional or perceptual items. The development of concepts may be seen in studies from child psychology which show the emergence of true concepts from the larger perceptual reactions under the impress of cultural demands. We shall note these changes with reference to definitions, classification, number concepts, relationships, and causal relations.

At the outset a child defines objects very largely in terms of concrete actions and uses. For example, in our society, most children of five or six would define a chair as "something to sit on," a bottle as "something to put milk in" or "something to get milk out of," and an apple as "something to eat." Earl Barnes found in a large sample of six-year-old children that 82 per cent of the definitions of common terms were of this kind. For the fifteen-year-olds in this group, only a third of the definitions were of this concrete character.¹⁰

The emergence of classification systems follows a similar shift from

⁹ F. C. Bartlett, *Remembering*, 1932.

¹⁰ E. Barnes, *A Study on Children's Interests*, Stanford University, Studies in Education, vol. 1, no. 6, 203-212, 1897.

highly perceptual and immediate associations to those which indicate an awareness of difference and likeness in terms of qualities, forms, and relations of parts. A number of experiments have shown that in matching unrealistic, geometrical colored forms, as in the Lotto test, children in our society tend to classify by color rather than by geometric form. For realistic objects, however, the initial classification tends to follow form rather than color.¹¹

As William Stern points out, the rise of the concept of a quality common to a number of diverse objects is often preceded by an awareness of plurality of act or feature. For example, Stern's girl of three and a half years always asked, when she saw a different bird in her book of animals, "Does this bird lay eggs?" and "Does this bird lay eggs, too?"¹² Apparently at about the age of four or five most children in our culture begin to develop a rudimentary ability to classify common objects—horses, chairs, automobiles, and the like—in terms of their more general characteristics.

Number concepts arise in a somewhat similar way. At first, objects, either single or plural, stand within a total context. Gradually, in terms of generalization and differentiation—that is, likeness and unlikeness—the child learns to cut the number loose from the perceptual totality, and acquires some scheme for ordering numbers. For example, counting begins with specific things, such as fingers or persons or objects. So, too, simple addition is learned in the same way. One feeble-minded adult with a mental age of seven years could add two loads of coal to three loads of coal to get the correct answer. But he could not transfer this ability to get the sum of two loaves of bread and three loaves of bread. His experience in handling coal made a simple concrete addition possible for him, but beyond this his mental capacity did not reach.¹³

The self-reference with regard to numbers is neatly shown in Piaget's report on the difficulty which young children have telling just how many siblings each brother or sister in their own families have. In fact, up to the age of ten years, three quarters of all the children studied could not give the correct information. For instance, one child had correctly said that there were two brothers in his family. He was then asked, "And how many brothers have you got?" to which the lad replied correctly, "One, Paul." When asked further, "And has Paul got a brother?" the boy answered "No." A still further query was made: "But you are his brother, aren't you?" to which he said, "Yes." But when asked, "Then he has a brother?" the boy replied, "No."¹⁴

¹¹ See H. Werner, *Comparative Psychology of Mental Development*, transl. by E. B. Garside, 1940, pp. 235-237, for a review of experiments.

¹² See W. Stern and Clara Stern, *Psychology of Early Childhood*, 1930.

¹³ H. H. Goddard, *Psychology of the Normal and Subnormal*, 1919, p. 284.

¹⁴ Jean Piaget, *Judgment and Reasoning in the Child*, 1928, p. 217. By permission of Harcourt, Brace and Co.

Obviously, the culture to which the child is exposed provides him with the manner in which he will order his arithmetical concepts. It is easy for us to assume that all peoples, counting the ten fingers, "just naturally" develop a system based on ten. But anyone even slightly familiar with the number systems of primitives knows that this is not so. The Mayans counted by twenty digits, using toes and fingers.¹⁵ And we know from other peoples that the decimal and vigesimal systems are not the only possibilities. A. W. Howitt states that the native tribes of southeastern Australia used a system that could run up to thirty. It began with the five fingers of one hand, then went on with six for "the hollow formed by the end of the radius and the wrist," seven for "the swelling of the flexor muscle of the forearm," eight for "the inside of the elbow-joint," and so up the arm, through points on the shoulder, neck, and head, to fifteen at the crown of the skull, and thence down the other side.¹⁶

From a numerical system we go on, by a further abstraction, to algebraic concepts. Obviously, culture—in the form of courses in school—provides us with this step, and, as we know, many individuals never make much headway at this level of abstraction. For most of us the simpler forms of arithmetic serve our needs.

Further development of concepts is shown in tests of word associations. In the completion test pair, *wash - face: sweep -* —, younger children tend to fill in the blank with *broom*. Here the association is still rooted in the total context of everyday experience. Only gradually does the child learn to abstract out of this the conceptual relationship demanded in this instance.

In like manner the concept of causality is slow to develop. At the outset the emotionalized ego-centered world is such that causation is considered in terms of one's immediate and more obvious experiences. When asked why it always gets dark in the evening, a five-year-old boy said, "It's because the people get tired and want to sleep."¹⁷ Yet even at such an early age the social-cultural influences are felt. The same lad said that it rained because the angels wished to clean the heavens "with their brooms and lots of water." It should not be assumed that children get their anthropomorphism spontaneously. The roots of such associations lie within their concrete day-by-day perceptions, but the verbal elaborations are usually furnished them by older children or adults. Most of us got our first explanations of thunder, in just such a manner, from older persons.

Immediate associations, resembling fantasy, are apparent in many instances. One child, who had long been promised a trip to a museum, arrived there late on a Saturday afternoon and found that the guards had just locked the doors. At the instant the father rattled the door there was a sudden clap

¹⁵ A. L. Kroeber, *Anthropology*, 1923, p. 231.

¹⁶ A. W. Howitt, *The Native Tribes of South-East Australia*, 1904, pp. 697-698.

¹⁷ Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 320.

of loud thunder, accompanied by a sudden shower. The child asked, "Did the thunder and rain make the doors lock?"

Piaget states that this rudimentary stage is followed by what he terms a "naïve dynamism," a kind of animism which assumes that events happen because of forces that reside inherently in the objects or situations. Often words play a part in this. The word is considered to be the source of the power. Such a stage is followed, says Piaget, by a third, more realistic one, beginning at about the age of seven or eight.

The development is illustrated in I. Huang's experiment. Children from five to nine years old were shown a small open cardboard box to the four corners of which pieces of string were attached. Into this box a penny was put. When asked what would happen if the box were turned upside down, all answered correctly. Then the experimenter, holding the strings together, whirled the box about his head with sufficient velocity so that the penny did not fall out. When asked to explain why the coin did not fall out, the younger children made such replies as "Because it's in a corner" and "Because it gets in the corner like that and sticks there." The somewhat older youngsters remarked that the "box is going too fast." A few of the older ones got nearer the correct explanation in saying that "the box turns so fast that the penny doesn't have time to fall out."¹⁸

As a matter of fact, many adults would not get beyond this stage; or, even if they should use such an adult term as "centrifugal force," they would not really be able to explain it. The arrival at the highest stage of causal reasoning in terms of universal and necessary causes is difficult and slow. Such a combination of native mental ability and cultural training relatively few attain.

It would be easy to fall into the old error of drawing a parallel between the conceptualization of children in our culture and that of primitive adults. Such an association reflects a misunderstanding of the relation between mental development and culture. The conceptual systems of non-European peoples differ from ours, not because they lack the innate intellectual capabilities, but rather because their culture is less complex and hence the demand for what we call higher logic is not present. Within the framework of his institutions and culturized adjustments, primitive man possesses sufficient conceptual tools for his everyday needs. The native African cattleman may not be able to count abstractly beyond a few numbers, but he may own and manage large herds. By various devices of identification and classification in terms of age, sex, and color, he is able to keep track of his stock. Although the categories of plant and animal life of savage peoples do not resemble ours, for their purposes they suffice. From our standpoint primitive man is ignorant, but he is not stupid. For that matter, the mass of mankind in Occidental society, despite popular education,

¹⁸ I. Huang, "Children's Explanation of Strange Phenomena," *Psychologische Forschungen*, 1930, cited by Werner, *op. cit.*, p. 323.

operate intellectually pretty much at an elementary level of logic. Most of their so-called mental adjustments are handled in terms of verbal habits that they have previously learned in concrete situations or by sheer rote. Anyone who has had experience in interpreting intelligence tests given to adults knows how few of us are trained in objective, logical thinking. Most men, even in our sophisticated world, operate in intellectual matters on the basis of habit, emotionalized attitudes, and rote.

In fact, the place of wishful and emotionalized thought is so important that we must now turn to examine other aspects of thinking.

FANTASY AND LOGIC

The close linkage of language and thinking has long been a topic of discussion and study by philosophers and empirical scientists. We need not enter into the long controversy about whether language or thought came first, or whether thinking is possible without language. Certainly thought and language are closely correlated, and, whenever communication of thought is involved, a person is absolutely dependent on some form of gesture or language. Any social interaction that is not direct and overt depends upon such substitute responses. Nor do we need to enter the dark arena of the controversy over the relation between language and thought functions and the brain mechanisms. No scientist seriously doubts that the cerebral cortex is the anatomical and physiological seat of speech and thought, but the point-to-point causal relations of the neural structure to thought activities need not concern us, beyond the realization that the processes are correlated.

Language as Symbol. It is obvious that language is a substitute for certain bodily responses to objects in the environment. We have already noted how a child is conditioned to the use of vocal sounds for objects outside himself and for his own activities. (See Chapter VII.)

Overt and direct behavior is limited in time and space to the moment. Language permits us to manipulate the worlds of the past, present, and future. For example, when a child grasps an apple and puts it to his mouth, his entire organism is more or less integrated in the cycle moving from want to reward. Yet his control of apples is decidedly limited in the number he can reach and consume or otherwise dispose of at the moment. On the other hand, if the child does not have an apple but has learned to use the vocal substitute, or symbol, "apple," the mother or someone else may give him the desired object. Or, possessing an apple, he may ask the mother to put the fruit away for him against a time when he will want it. Saying the word "apple" not only stands for, or symbolizes, the apple, but gives the child power to control the apple in the present or future. When the word "apple" is used to get an apple, or later to classify apples into a general concept, it is an instrument of adaptation to both the physical and the

social world. The case of the apple presents the basic elements in the function of symbols.

As aids in adjustment, then, symbols stand for overt responses, for objects past, present, or future, for relations, qualities, and categories of objects and their relations. Sometimes the abstract symbols of mathematics seem completely remote from physical actions and events, but the final test of the most abstract language and logic of the mathematician, scientist, or inventor is its relation to physical, chemical, biological, and social-cultural events. For most of us, of course, language serves the more immediate purpose of day-by-day communication with our fellows. It also evokes emotions and feelings and incites us to action or inhibits our impulses or drives. The range of thought and language with respect to man's adaptation to his physical and social-cultural world extends from fantasy to logical and objective thinking. Let us look at some of the important aspects of these forms of thought.

Two Modes of Language and Thought. The function of fantasy and logical thinking will become clear if we briefly retrace the development of thought and language in the child. Fantasy is self-centered, wishful thinking into which a great deal of emotion and personal drive may enter. Logical thinking is objective, verifiable, scientific thought.

At first a child's acts and thoughts are focused pretty thoroughly on his own immediate drives and rewards and on his need to adapt himself to his surroundings in order to satisfy his wants. His is a concrete world of action, surcharged with emotions and feelings and with an immediateness of stimulus and response. His inner tensions and incipient responses are not separated from the outer world of stimulus and reward. In adult terms, there is little or no distinction between the inner wish, the dream, the daydream, the overt act, and the external environment of things and persons. The point is illustrated in the stories which children tell of their own experiences.

For instance, a number of small children spent an afternoon at a zoo. While there they spent some time looking at Annie the elephant and listening to her keeper tell them stories of what elephants know and do, including their service as domesticated animals in far parts of the earth. Later that day, at the supper table, John, one of the children, when asked what he had done that afternoon, said that he had been to Vilas Park and had had a wonderful ride on Annie the elephant. The parents and the two older children all labeled this talk as lying. But to John, who had daydreamed about the wonders of elephants, the daydream, the discussion with the keeper, and the wish to ride had become intertwined. Children also often confuse their dreams and their waking experience—as do adults at times.

Gradually, in response to the demands of adaptation, a child learns to distinguish between his world of daydreams and his world of concrete habits—that is, between fantasy and logical, objective thinking. Let us ex-

amine some of the important steps in this development. Some aspects of this we have already discussed in connection with perception, imagery, memory, and the rise of conceptual thinking.

The many bodily habits which must be acquired play a part in the rise of the self. These have to do with feeding, elimination, sleeping, managing one's clothes, washing, bathing, and other actions involving the personal toilet. There is a definite relationship between the demands of others and the rewards and approval and punishments which follow. In terms of the building of the self we might say that the impulse or drive pattern, the biological "I" of Mead's terminology, becomes constantly qualified by the learning of actions imitative of others. That is, a child takes roles or "me's" from those around him. In time a series of habits—actual or expected—is built up between the child and his parents and other persons. In a sense this affords a certain consensus, an agreement and a common expectancy.

Along with the formation of these habits, and of habits related to social adjustment to parents, siblings, and others, the concrete object and the thoughts about it become separated. Imagination comes into play, influencing adaptation at many points.

Three children—Helen and Betty, aged five, and Henry, aged three and a half, were playing house on the lawn. There was the usual assortment of dolls, carriages, wagons, toy furniture, and dishes. Helen and Betty decided to play at having a large dinner party, and a place was marked off on the lawn and the "table" set. When the toy dishes and the few odds and ends of adult kitchenware were used up, Helen began tearing up some brown wrapping paper into shapes resembling plates, cups, and saucers. To this Betty objected, saying, "Go in the house and get some real dishes." This Helen refused to do on the ground that her mother would not approve. When Betty insisted, however, a discussion arose as to the continuance of the play. Helen maintained that it was all make-believe anyway and hence that paper would do for plates, while Betty said she would refuse to play unless they could have "real" dishes. When, after much argument, Helen still refused to get the house dishes, Betty, fulfilling her threat, refused to play and left for her own home across the street. Henry, who had not entered into the conversation, joined Helen in going on with the play.

The two girls had arrived at the stage of distinguishing between an inner and an outer world, but they differed as to the satisfaction to be derived from a make-believe world.

The fantasies of children and adults tend to take certain directions in relation to those around them. Some daydreams involve private imagery and subvocal talking to oneself; others may be brought into the social or interactional frame by means of communication. The first kind is seen in the fantasies (of young and old alike) which serve as a means of evading the demands of the physical and social world by building castles in Spain in line with one's secret wishes for power, beauty, romance, or what not.

Even the past, if considered unpleasant, may be the topic of daydreams. One of the commonest of these in our society is apparently the foster-child fantasy. E. S. Conklin found, in a sample of nearly a thousand high-school and college students, that about a fourth had at one time or another imagined that they were the children of other than their real parents. Many who had had such fantasies believed them due to a sense of avoidance and rejection or of injustice and punishment at the hands of their parents.¹⁹

Fantasies may also be anticipations of the future, and then they take on an intensity and a freedom which are not hampered by practical considerations. A boy's daydream of being an airplane pilot may be remote from anything overt, and, if he never makes any effort to carry his plans and anticipations into actuality, his wish becomes a pure fantasy. It may not do him any harm, provided he has concrete duties, obligations, and skills. If it absorbs his whole attention, to the neglect of the social and physical demands of normal adaptation, he becomes a pathological person.

Fear may have a place in stimulating fantasies. Neurotic anxieties are largely worries about imaginary dangers to health, fortune, social success, and other matters. All sorts of avoidant reactions may be set up, and elaborate means may be taken to prevent fearful fancies from becoming realities. William Stern puts it well: "Thus the terrifying fancies are twisted into causes for not *desiring* [to do a thing], while in reality they are the effects of not *being able* to desire it."²⁰

However, children and adults alike may bring their fantasies back into contact with others and thus socialize them. One child, beginning in the lower grades to write elaborate dramas, projected them onto her playmates, inducing them to play various roles or to aid in the preparation of the stage-settings. Some children bring out their daydreams by painting pictures, carving wood, or modeling clay. If the boy who dreams of being a pilot turns to making airplane models, and later to studying aeronautics and learning to fly, his childish fantasy may become an important motive in real life. Literature and invention and science are partially the products of creative fantasies. In these instances the daydreams are brought back to acceptable cultural relations, first, because other persons become involved in their realization, and second, because, in order to act out or realize or write one's fantasies, one must learn to handle certain media of expression, such as wood, clay, paints, pencil and paper, and the rules of composition. In the same way the fantasies of the would-be inventor or scientist must sooner or later be put up against the standards of usefulness and logical verification. (See the final section of this chapter.)

An interesting therapeutic application of this direction of fantasy back

¹⁹ E. S. Conklin, *The Foster-Child Fantasy*, University of Oregon Publications, 1922.

²⁰ From W. Stern, *General Psychology from the Personalistic Standpoint*, 1938, transl. by H. D. Spoerl, p. 335. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

into the stream of interaction and culture is seen in the well-known benefits derived from getting shut-in, highly introverted persons to express their wishes, fears, and anxieties through poems, plays, painting, and music, or in mechanical or other form. Remarkable cures have been effected in children and older persons once they learn to communicate their inner world to others and, hence, to make it a shared social act.

It is clear, then, that society and culture provide the setting in which both objective thinking and fantasy thinking arise and that, moreover, they give the direction which our thinking will take. We build some of our roles, with their accompanying ideas, habits, attitudes, and values, around situations demanding objective thought. The most obvious instances are those of personal day-by-day habits, our routine skills, and our handling of persons. At more specialized levels, the leaders—in science, arts, and management—develop a variety of objective techniques for solving the problems before them. Other roles are built around mixtures of fantasy and objectivity. Many of our common-sense reactions to public questions are of this character. Still other roles—largely the more intimate, private ones—are developed around the private fantasies which we may never divulge to others at all. The latter may be bizarre and as violent as we wish so long as we do not operate overtly on them. If we do so, we are labeled psychopathic and are usually put under some sort of control so that we shall not harm others.

In short, we must not imagine that fantasy thinking is pathological, childish, or primitive. It is as normal as the more logical cause-and-effect thinking. The social psychologist is interested in its rise, in its significance for the individual, and especially in its impact upon group life as creative persons project their fantasies upon their fellows.

Fantasy thinking, built on free associations which are largely self-centered and uncritical and are often diffuse and holophrastic, stands in sharp contrast to the impersonal, critical, exact logic and experimental method of science. Yet in everyday life most of us fluctuate between these two extremes, seldom reaching either limit. In some situations we employ common sense and habituated logical analysis to aid us in our work or play. In others we may indulge rather freely in the daydreams of our own private making. In still others we operate, with our fellows, on the basis of forms of thought which are a mixture of logic and fantasy, put together in terms of our values and the requirements of social-cultural adjustment. Much of our interpretation of political and economic life, and especially of religious and artistic life and play, is of this mixed sort.

Let us examine some examples of thought and language as they range from the extreme of pathology to that of abstract logic.

Some Pathological Forms of Fantasy. Mental abnormalities, especially those known as schizophrenia and paranoia, reveal some interesting as-

pects of fantasy. The verbalisms which often seem completely bizarre and unintelligible to us have their roots in the personal life and daydreams of the patients. In contrast to the reveries of normal persons, they fall outside the range of the accepted and approved.

One patient maintained that he was God because his name was William. To prove this he divided his name as WILL-I-AM, which he associated with the "direct will of God" and with the notion of "I am," an idea common in our culture with respect to divine power. Another, who identified himself with Napoleon, said he was this historical figure because his name was "Buonaparte, that is, born apart." This is a good instance of the clang or sound associations often found in schizoid fantasies.

The following comments of another patient typify not only the identification but the stereotyped fancies common in such cases:

The patient was asked, "What is your full name?" He replied: "Rebel, amber, emerald, American Golden King, ruler of the world, U.S.A., Uncle Sam, Maurice Farrington." Asked what he meant by "rebel and amber," he answered that it meant "higher than God." "I'm the fourth God myself!" The other three Gods were, first, God, then Jesus Christ, then Daniel Farrington (his father), and then himself. "I'm also Ku Klux Klan leader. One night they appointed me. I paid my fee of \$100,000."

This young man of twenty-two years had built up a delusional system that shut him off from the expected and normal social relationships. His inner fancy was not as systematic as that of the following patient. Rather he consumed his time with a monotonous round of verbal autisms.

The case of "Queen Anna," as the patient called herself, illustrates a form of paranoid schizophrenia which, had it been slightly less violent, might have passed unnoticed, or might have provided the basis for a new religious cult. This woman was well educated and had taught school for several years before commitment. She gradually developed a delusion that she was the bridal queen, a fourth member of the godhead, who was destined to bring about great changes in the world. At about the age of thirty-five she was confined to a state hospital and remained there for more than forty years. Although she became violent from time to time, for the most part she indulged in elaborating her religious fantasies. She would spend hours describing her role in the final salvation of mankind. She wrote endless letters to the superintendent of the institution, to the attendants, to the governor of her state, or to chance visitors, who came to see her. Frequently her writings took the form of doggerel, of which the following are sample stanzas:

"At Heaven's High Courts Above
The Courts of Supremacy Love
There e'er hath been
One Bridal Queen
She must be seen.

"Soon will all nations,
Vast congregations,
Right here convene
To crown the Queen.

.

"It has been the plan of ages
To bring forth this Queen of Sages
To recite Supreme Judgment Pages.

.

"This is the Queen of Exposition.
She's always in the right position.
This is the Queen of Golden Diction
Whose acute pen oft kindles friction.

.

"Queen of Wisdom,
Queen of Wit;
Sharp Her arrows
And they hit."

Most of her compositions, however, were in prose. The following passages are taken from two documents, one produced in 1919, the other in 1923.²¹

"We, God the Holy Trinity, created this Bridal Queen, for our Almighty Helpmate at the Throne of Almighty Jurisdiction. By our Almighty Decree our Almighty Bridal Queen Shares all of our Almighty Titles, and will forever more, for We are the Almighty Wedded Four, which We, the Almighty Trinity, gave our Eternal Bridal Queen Incarnation, in 1856. She brought down these Almighty Titles and continually asserts and classifies them, as Queen of Almighty Wisdom, Queen of Almighty Goodness and Queen of Immaculate White Law Supremacy."

"4 is Our Almighty Supremacy Seal Number, and signifies the Almighty Wedded Supremacy of God the Holy Trinity and Their Almighty Bridal Queen, the Church Queen,

"Royal 4 was set upon Our Declaration of American Independence. This land was predestined to become the native land of the Church Queen, Goddess Anna.

"We decreed to set Our Almighty Seal Number 4, upon the independence of the Church Queen's native land, July 4, 1776.

"We also decreed to set our Almighty Supremacy Number Seal Royal Four, upon the Government of the Church Queen's native land, as follows.—

"We decreed that United States Presidents should be elected to serve for four years, only, at each election. We also decreed that Presidents of the Church Queen's native land should be inducted into office on the fourth day of March, that month being revered by angel hosts as the Immaculate Conception Month of King Jesus and Queen Anna, nine months before nativity."

²¹ There was considerable minor variation in the details of her voluminous writings on the same topic, but in general her systematic delusions did not change much over the years. New details were added, however, especially if any event involved the numeral four, which she considered a sacred number in her scheme.

At one time she also worked out some fantastic associations with the number 12 and linked this to her concern for freemasonry. In 1919 she wrote one of the attending physicians:

"12 is the foundation number, 12 signs of the Zodiac, to rule the Heavens, 12 months in the year, 12 Covenant Sons of Jacob, Israel and twelve tribes of the Children of Jacob, Israel bearing the names of the twelve tribes.

"Twelve apostles, foundation stones upon which the Christian Church rests. We, the Almighty Rulers, decreed to give 12^a a grand triumph position in Our Climax Triumph here, Ward 12, right here, will soon be world-famed, two heroic Masons can work wonders but Dr. H. L. H. and Dr. G. B. will soon tell their beloved Masonic Brothers that the Crucified Church Queen is in ward 12, right in this house, and that Free Masons must write to institute legal proceedings to set Her Almighty Majesty free."

When she was angry at her treatment or the lack of attention, she often wrote vigorous protests about the mental hospitals, which she called "State Slaughter Houses for the Insane." In more pleasant and hopeful moods she said that the hospital would be the seat of her final triumph as Church Queen. She was a constant reader of newspapers and magazines and always added to her verbal fantasies if events could be fitted to them. For example, she once explained to me that she had arranged for a flight of a squadron of naval fliers to Europe: the insignia on the airplanes was NC-4. This, she said, was her royal, sacred number. Moreover, this trip was foreshadowed in her own childhood when she "took nearer-to-earth flights to church" in a carriage drawn "by Nancy," the family horse. In her thought she equated "Nancy" to "NC," the naval symbol.

Such cases as these just cited are considered pathological because the thought and conduct deviate too sharply from the acceptable and expected culture of our time. Much of the content of well-accepted religion and magic is as bizarre, from a psychological point of view, as the delusions of Queen Anna. But she was unable to get into sufficiently co-operative relations with others to get her views accepted. Her ideas and interests were directed only inward. She could not adjust her own responses to the reactions of others. Everything was made to fit into her own private world, one which was never modified with reference to the socialized world of others. Queen Anna, like other psychopaths of this variety, restricted her interactions to the most necessitous relations, such as concerned food and bodily protection. Despite a rich flow of language, there was little or no interplay of ideas between her and other persons. In her case, as in others like it, the self became confined, it failed to grow with regard to others, and it finally became completely centered in a childish ego.

Some Culturized Forms of Fantasy. There is a vast amount of fantasy in ordinary people. Some of it is as "wild" as that found in pathological cases. Usually, however, the fantasies of normal people are among their

leisure-time activities and are dissociated from their routine jobs of earning a living, maintaining a household, and taking part in civic life. Some reveries serve as wish-fulfillments, or vicarious satisfiers of the desire for power or love. Others, such as fear fantasies, are in one sense protective. Still others, like ambition daydreams, may or may not be linked to overt struggles to get ahead in school, in one's vocation, or in lovemaking. Some daydreams concern new inventions and, when tested by logic and operability in everyday life, may prove to be the inception of important new devices, machines, or institutions. In the world of the arts directed fantasies are of high importance. In other words, fantasy which is confined to one's inner self-conversation may be pleasurable or fearful. When daydreams are projected into the stream of social intercourse, they may take on creative importance in religion, art, and science.

On the other hand, some fantasies, if they become the basis of overt action, may be dangerous to life and property and require coercive measures. However, many fantasies, especially those of mildly paranoid persons, are projected onto public leaders—officials, teachers, preachers, and businessmen. These may have a certain nuisance effect, but otherwise are relatively harmless. We all know oversuspicious, bothersome individuals who pester prominent people with fantastic schemes from calendar-reform to "final and full" explanations of the cosmos.

In religion and art, of course, fantasy is culturized and by this very process changes its nature. It becomes objectified and accepted as a part of the body of culture. It seems correct and proper, not bizarre and abnormal as do the fantasies of the insane. Yet some of the religious fantasies appear to be in the borderland between normality and pathology considered, of course, from the norms of our culture. The following is from a tract of a small American cult:

SUN OF GOD

"I AM!

" 'The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live.' John 5: 25.

"The sun is the source of all life and all motion; all of the energy on earth comes from the sun. The Son of God is the Sun of God.

"This is modern science and ancient scripture. In the very last book of the Bible gods come down from the sun. The sunphone connects your son with the sun. You are a sun of God.

"The sun is double, male and female. The feminine sun is cool, her brilliance is dimmed and she is kept at such a distance by the male sun that she is hardly discernible. This is up-to-date science and good scripture; the spiritual feminine sun is the inner sun where the dead are now living.

"Sunphone treatments, given by either of US, will help you into your own sun, the light of your own divinity."

It would take us too far afield to make even a cursory sketch of the place of fantasy thinking in the formulation of the world's religions. As new sects arise or old ones change, variations in former associations appear. For example, Mary Baker Eddy, in line with her particular interpretation of the Old and New Testaments, gave new meanings to the names of Biblical personages. For instance, in the glossary of her *Science and Health*, she defines Adam as "Error; a falsity; the belief in 'original sin,' sickness and death; evil; the opposite of good,—of God and His creation; a curse; a belief in intelligent matter. . . ." On the other hand, she defines Abraham as "Fidelity; faith in the Divine Life and in the eternal Principle of being." Such allegorical meanings are common enough in morals and religion, and, if they become culturized, they are readily accepted by the believers as factual or "real."

Another fantastic association common in religion and magic is that of numbers and historical persons or events. Dabblers in Biblical lore have always been interested in ancient numerology. Not infrequently there is an attempt to tie up prophecies of earlier periods with events in our own time. To cite an instance: In the 1840's one William Miller, who had for a time accepted deism, became interested in certain religious movements in New England. On the basis of the *Book of Daniel* and certain other Biblical passages, and using certain calculations, he became convinced that the end of the world was due in 1843 or 1844.²²

1. The Bible provided two kinds of time: literal and symbolic. In the latter, a day signifies a year.

2. God informed Daniel, through a vision, that Jesus Christ would come in 2,300 years.

3. Daniel had this vision in 553 B. C.

4. The 70 weeks mentioned by Daniel are the first 490 years of the 2,300 years.

5. These two periods—490 and 2,300 years—begin together from the date on which the commandment was given to restore Jerusalem—that is, in 457 B. C.

6. If one adds 2,300 years to 457 B. C., one gets 1843 A. D.

Another calculation indicated that the end would come in 1844. Miller and his followers accepted this calculation, and there was much excitement in anticipation of the grave event. Although the prophecy failed, the Adventist movement later became formalized into a distinct denomination.

Playing with numbers is not confined to attempts at chronological prediction. For example, recurrent use has been made of *Revelation* 13: 18 to prove that the "beast" spoken of in that vision is the Roman Catholic Pope. A widely circulated anti-Catholic pamphlet has this:

²² See Elder James White, *Life Incidents in Connection with the Great Advent Movement*, 1868, pp. 35-37 (Battle Creek, Michigan: The Steam Press).

"Here is wisdom. Let him that hath understanding count the number of the beast; for it is the number of a man and his number is Six Hundred Three Score and Six." (Rev. 13: 18.)

"The words 'Vicar of the Son of God' which are inscribed on the crown of the Roman Pope are in Latin: 'VICARIUS FILII DEI.' Recall that in the Roman numeral system I equals 1; V equals 5; L, 50; C, 100; D, 500. Thus, in VICARIUS FILII DEI we find the following number combination:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} 6 \text{ 'I's'} & = & 6 \\ 2 \text{ 'V's'} & = & 10 \\ 1 \text{ 'L'} & = & 50 \\ 1 \text{ 'C'} & = & 100 \\ 1 \text{ 'D'} & = & 500 \\ \text{Total} & \overline{666} & \end{array}$$

This bit of fancy number-juggling is taken seriously to prove that the Pope represents the beast, the Anti-Christ. During World War I the same passage was used in propaganda pamphlets circulated in Catholic Belgium and France to prove that the Kaiser was this beast, bent on destroying the Christian world. The argument ran as follows:

The word KAISER contains six letters. The number 6 is thus a "constant" for each letter. If, then, we determine the number of each letter's place in the alphabet, and place this number to the left of the "constant," we get the following definite evidence of the "real" meaning of this passage:

$$\begin{array}{rcl} K & = & 116 \\ A & = & 16 \\ I & = & 96 \\ S & = & 196 \\ E & = & 56 \\ R & = & 186 \\ \text{Total} & \overline{666} & \end{array}$$

The manner in which a young person is taught a firm belief in the actual power of words and symbolic numbers is shown in the following description of the teaching of a Jewish boy:

"He learned that mysterious numbers rule the destinies of men; that the number three brings happiness and the number nine misfortune, as is proved by all Jewish catastrophes, which happen invariably on the ninth of the month; that the figure seven is neutral, sometimes good and sometimes bad, and that the lot of mortals changes every seventh year; that the Christians are abandoned to heathen worship and adore three gods at once, a dove, a man and a lamb, and that one ought to turn away one's face when one passes a church." ²³

²³ From J. and J. Tharaud, *The Shadow of the Cross*, 1924. Transl. by F. D. Little. By permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publisher.

The fantasy associations of numbers and events occur in all sorts of omens, superstitions, and magic everywhere. In our culture we find special potencies, good or evil, in such numbers as 3, 7, and 13.

Primitive and modern magic are filled with fantasy associations. To sophisticated persons sorcery is nonsense; to the savage it is all-important. The casting of a spell is often sufficient to kill an enemy. The following is a Malay magic spell:

"Take parings of nails, eyebrows, spittle, and so forth of your intended victim, enough to represent every part of his person, and then make them up into his likeness with wax from a deserted bees' comb. Scorch the figure slowly by holding it over a lamp every night for seven nights, and say:

'It is not wax that I am scorching,

It is the liver, heart, and spleen of So-and-So that I scorch.'

"After the seventh time burn the figure, and your victim will die." ²⁴

The language of secret fraternal orders, their titles, key phrases, and numerals, frequently reveal autistic aspects. The following section of a letter addressed to members of the Ku Klux Klan by its one-time leader illustrates the appeal of magical and magisterial words:

"To all Genii, Grand Dragons and Hydras of Realms, Grand Goblins and Kleagles of Domains, Grand Titans and Furies of Provinces, Giants, Exalted Cyclops and Terrors of Klantons, and to all Citizens of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan—in the name of our valiant, venerated Dead, I affectionately greet you. . . . [Then follows the message.]

"Done in the Aulic of his Majesty, Imperial Wizard, Emperor of the Invisible Empire, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan, in the Imperial City of Atlanta, Commonwealth of Georgia, United States of America, on this the ninth day of the year of our Lord, 1921, and on the Dreadful Day of the Weeping Week of the Mournful Month of the Year of the Klan LV.

"Duly signed and sealed by his Majesty

"William Joseph Simmons

"Imperial Wizard." ²⁵

Actually these Grand Dragons, Hydras, and Exalted Cyclops are not very different from the schizophrenic ravings of Maurice Farrington, cited above. They also remind one of the braggadocio of small boys who would outdo one another with big and powerful words. Yet such forms of thought and communication are accepted by thousands of hard-headed businessmen and others brought up in our mechanistic, rational age. The fact that people believe in these verbalisms and find them satisfying indicates that at many points emotionalized and culturized fantasies have a genuine place in our world. Such a world exists side by side with the complex technology which

²⁴ From W. W. Skeat, *Malay Magic*, 1900, p. 570. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

²⁵ Quoted by L. Percy, "The Modern Ku Klux Klan," *Atlantic Monthly*, 1922, 130: 125.

makes possible plastics, motion pictures, television, radar, dive bombers, and jeeps, and with the logic and experimentation which produce Einstein's relativity and electronics. Probably the very drabness of the daily life of many persons gives added zest to the donning of the military uniforms of knights or of white robes of secrecy, to the use of secret hand-grips and passwords, and to the expression of mystic purposes. Charles Merz has well described the appeal of these things in the mass society of our time:

"Here is John Jones, a plain bank-teller of 211 E. Fourth Street, almost anywhere. But here also is John Jones, on Tuesday evenings from 7:30 to 11, a Sir Knight Errant of the Mystic Order of Granada. It is characteristic of secret orders that the names they bear are high-spirited and resounding, on a plane above the routine affairs of daily living. The Shriners are not simply Shriners; they are members of the Ancient Arabic Order of Nobles of the Mystic Shrine. The Grottos are not simply Grottos; they are members of the Mystic Order of Veiled Prophets of the Enchanted Realm.

"There are many other 'Mystic' orders. There are many 'Illustrious' orders, many 'Imperial' orders, many 'Exalted' orders. Frequently there are orders which are several of these at once. On the heels of the Illustrious and Exalted Order of Crusaders comes the Imperial and Illustrious Order of the Mystic and Exalted Cross. . . .

"To live in a modern world and be an ancient; to live in a humdrum world and be a knight; to live in a gabby world and have a secret—all this is possible. It is the essence of fraternalism that it does its best to make it possible. An illustrious name is only a beginning. When the password is given and the inner door swings back, it is upon a world as different from the world outside as ingenuity can make it.

"No mere Presiding Officer sits upon the dais; we live in a democracy, but if there is one important secret order which has chosen to pattern itself on the Republic, and call its presiding officer a President, the name of that society is not on record. On the dais sits a Monarch or a Master, a Supreme Seignior, an Illustrious Potentate, a Grand Illuminator or a Maharajah. No secretary is a secretary in this world of dreams come true: he is a Thrice Illustrious Scribe. No treasurer is a treasurer: he is an August Keeper of the Strongbox. No citizen is a citizen: he is a knight, a monk, a priest, a dervish, or an ogre." ²⁶

Such high-sounding, mystical, impressive titles make up a reality which is vital and satisfying. The use of capital letters adds further stimulus to the emotions. Moreover, as Merz points out, the appeal of all this noble and aristocratic lingo in a political democracy shows that the human concern with prestige, royalty, and class power is by no means lost to us.

Closely akin to the culturized fantasies of magic, religion, and fraternalism are those found in art, be it literary writing, painting, sculpture, or music. It is not our aim to go into a discussion of these matters, but the importance of creative fancy in the growth of art is well known. Often, however, we fail to accept the new fantasies which appear in our own day.

²⁶ From C. Merz, *The Great American Band Wagon*, 1928, pp. 31-32. By permission of The John Day Co.

Such prose as the following from Gertrude Stein may seem to most readers sheer nonsense; to others it has a certain beauty and satisfying quality:

"They did then learn many ways to be gay and they were then being gay being quite regular in being gay, being gay and they were learning little things, little things in ways of being gay, they were very regular then, they were learning very many little things in ways of being gay they were being gay and using these little things they were learning to have to be gay with regularly gay with them and they were gay the same amount they had been gay." ²⁷

The later writings of James Joyce appear completely pathological to the uninitiated. Yet some, who understand that much of his material represents certain free associational experiences, may get a good deal from his work. Others take to him only because he is a literary fad.

Cubism, surrealism, and other nonobjective art of our day reveal similar developments in the graphic arts. In these the accepted rules of artistic creation are tossed aside, and the artist allows himself rather untrammelled associations as to subject matter, composition, color, and media of expression. Though the traditional critics may inveigh against such "offenses" against the canons of "good art," and the masses may see such products as evidences of madness or spoofing, in time these deviant forms of art may become accepted, first by a small coterie, and then by larger sections of the population. In the end they may be considered proper and standard. That is the way other culture patterns grow and expand; it is no different in the arts.

In this connection, however, a comment may be made about the cultural setting of such "extremes." Apparently it is chiefly in an age of great individualism and externalized interests that such products come into being and are accepted. They reflect our tolerance and encouragement of initiative and personal competition, and, *pari passu*, the absence of absolute values and standards of judgment. There is a cultural link between free economic enterprise, political democracy, individualized mass society, and the emergence of this kind of art. Surely society and culture give direction and content to man's fantasies quite as much as they do to his more material interests.

Other areas in which there is a rich mixture of fantasy and logic are economics and politics. Myths, legends, and stereotypes on these topics, as we shall note in the next chapter, are full of culturally accepted fancies. Some writers, of course, fail to realize that this sort of thought and verbalism is as much a part of culture as is more objective thought. But, as Stuart Chase aptly remarks, there is serious damage when the experts themselves do not recognize these phenomena for what they are:

²⁷ Gertrude Stein. Quoted in K. Young, *Social Attitudes*, 1931, p. 122.

"... It is easier to say 'the public' than to give a census enumeration beginning with Mr. Aaron. But when we go further and come to use the word 'public' in a trilogy with the words 'capital' and 'labor'—as is the habit with all our best minds today—it is to drain it of all sense and meaning. Consider the mutilations of such short-hand words as 'democracy,' 'liberty,' 'morality,' 'free speech,' 'individualism,' 'human nature,' 'spiritual,' 'the Anglo-Saxon race,' 'the consumer,' 'metaphysical,' 'Wall Street.' Carefully circumscribed these words often have a function, but hurled around as is their wont in the human sciences, they tend to reduce any honest truth-seeker to insanity."²⁸

Political life is rife with emotionally loaded words used to express faith and define situations. "Rugged individualism," associated with "big business," gave way to a "new deal" for the "forgotten man." Politicians are successful to the degree to which they are able to sway the masses with fine phrases and resounding imperatives. They operate pretty much on the aphorism of Joseph Conrad that in moving people one should put one's faith "not in sound argument but in the right word." We shall deal with mass persuasion in the chapters on public opinion and propaganda.

Fantasy thinking has played still another part in our economic life. It has given us not only high-sounding concepts but new words invented by manufacturers for their products. Many of these are built up on the principle of sound association. We note only a few; the reader will easily recall dozens of others:

Cutex: a cuticle remover.

Eversharp: a mechanical pencil.

Gloco: a floor polish, said to make floors "glow."

Jello: a jellylike mixture of gelatine, sugar, and flavoring.

Kleenex: a cleansing tissue.

Stacomb: a paste for making "unruly hair stay in place."

Super Suds: a flake soap, said to have exceptional qualities.

Tums: an antacid, from slang, "tummy," for stomach.

Most such words are protected by trade-mark rights, and many have remained attached to particular products; but some, like "eversharp" and "kleenex," have spread to a whole class of products.

Such neologisms come chiefly from advertisers; some, however, come from news commentators. In fact, one commentator, Walter Winchell, invented or popularized so many of them that the term "Winchellism" arose to denote such terms. "Guestar" for a guest performer on the radio is an example, and there are many others. In fact, the magazine *Time*, apparently taking a cue from Winchell, extended this type of free and fancy association into news reporting and comment. For instance, an "Opaster" is a man who works for the O.P.A. (Office of Price Administration).

From the everyday concepts of the man in the street as he deals with

²⁸ From S. Chase, "Junk," *The Nation*, 1923, 116: 747. By permission.

politics, economics, and related matters, we move on to the more abstract concepts that have furnished the social sciences with many of their verbal tools. Unfortunately, the social sciences have not yet developed a completely objective terminology. Much of their would-be technical vocabulary derives from the mixed forms of thought and speech of daily life. The social sciences are under the spell of semiautistic terminology partly because our whole conception of cultural reality is colored by emotions and feelings. We can hardly expect the mass of people to become objective. We may look for a continuation of fantasy thinking so long as emotions and feelings are dominant. The hope of the ultimate emancipation of the social sciences lies in the possibility of developing a set of concepts which will be definite, consistent, and logically universal. Despite handicaps, some progress has been made in these fields, especially where statistical and other checks may be made on analysis and prediction. The very data of personality, society, and culture, however, are so surcharged with emotional values that it is difficult for the social scientist or the psychologist to escape the pressures from the larger world.

Science and Logical Thought. It is in the natural sciences, physics, chemistry, and biology, that objective thinking and scientific method have made the greatest advance. This is not the place to examine in any detail the nature of logical thought, but, in order to contrast it with fantasy, we may note some basic characteristics of such thinking: it operates under strict rules of logic and scientific measurement; it is completely impersonal, critical, and unemotional; and it has practical effects when its analysis of cause-and-effect relations can be adapted to particular situations. Also, it must never be forgotten, logical thought is highly specialized, and reserved for limited data and relatively few persons of high ability.

Logic and science have only recently become embedded in human culture and have suffered continual attacks from institutional interests threatened by their operations. Our own time has seen what may happen to these forms of thinking when their results come into conflict with those in positions of political or economic power.

The most important features of the logical, or scientific, method may be stated as follows: (1) It is developed on the premise of necessary relations among events, which relations may be stated in carefully defined terms. (2) These necessary relations are usually first stated in the form of hypotheses, which may involve presuppositions, axioms, or propositions to be tested. (3) Such hypotheses may be capable of considerable check by the rules of formal logic. More especially, however, (4) the tests are those of the experimental method, which involves the use of precision instruments to measure and record as well as devices for controlling the variable factors which go into the experiment. (5) The results of observation and experimentation are arranged and treated by the logic of mathematics in such a

way (6) as to deny or support the hypothesis. (7) If the results support the hypothesis, we say that it is proved, and we base our generalization as to cause and effect upon the findings. (8) If the experiment is repeated successfully, and if supporting studies find like relations in closely allied fields of events, we may enunciate a general law covering a wide range of facts. (9) Upon the basis of generalizations and laws we may make predictions which enable us to adjust ourselves to environmental forces and, in some instances, to control events in advance.

The history of the natural sciences is filled with examples which show how logic and experiment go together. The conquest of yellow fever, smallpox, and other diseases is an illustration from biology. In psychology and the social sciences we have but recently begun to arrive at the stage of prediction and control in some matters. The use of mental tests to determine fitness for education or jobs has become widespread, and in sociology recent advances have been made in predicting success or failure in the parole of prisoners and in marriage.

Two points about scientists and fantasy thinking must be noted, however. First, the fact that their form of thought and method of experiment are rigid and objective does not mean that as personalities men of science are free of fantasy and emotion. Outside their specialties they are as full of bias and emotional values as anyone else, though they accumulate much prestige by virtue of being scientists. (See Chapter X.) And even in matters close to their own fields they frequently lack the capacity to imagine future developments, a lack which shows a certain rigidity and dogmatism. For instance, Simon Newcomb, one of America's most distinguished astronomers of the later decades of the nineteenth century, was thoroughly convinced that the airplane had no future and based his argument on physics. Sir Oliver Lodge, a great name in British physics, satirized modern relativity rather than examine its claims scientifically. On the other hand, scientists and mathematicians, like inventors, make ample use of fantasy thinking in the initial stages of their logical or experimental work. Through free associations and reverie some of their most fruitful ideas appear. Henri Poincaré, the French mathematician, has told us how unconscious and non-deliberative associations helped him in developing and solving problems on which he was at work.²⁹

In these matters the scientist is akin to the artist. Their fantasies, to be effective, must be related to the topic or problem at hand, and the free association of ideas must later be submitted to the tests of logic and experiment. Yet, if a scientist is too rigid and narrow in his deliberate control of these fantasies, he may not be so fertile as one who allows hundreds of ideas

²⁹ For a review of many instances of fantasy and unconscious factors in science and invention, see Joseph-Marie Montmasson, *Invention and the Unconscious*, transl. by H. S. Hatfield, 1932.

to come along and then, out of this welter, selects a few to test rigorously as possible aids to his research. It may be that in training scientists, as in teaching young artists, we adhere too closely "to the book." A too narrow attention to logical rules and laboratory technique may inhibit the more productive imagination of research workers. We might obtain better results in science, as we do in some art instruction, by encouraging and training individuals in the use of their free-flowing ideas rather than by the more traditional methods. At any rate, the problem suggests again our familiar point about striking a balance between fixity and flexibility in human adaptation.

To close this section, we must repeat that the difference between fantasy and objectivity in thought is a matter of degree. Both are normal so long as they operate within the framework of acceptance in society and culture. The difference between the creative fantasy of the artist or scientist and the fancies of the schizoid patient is that the former checks his associations with the rules of logic and the cultural consensus. The psychopath is completely ego-centered in his daydreams and makes no serious effort to bring them into relation with the rules of logic or the consensus. The ordinary daydreams of normal adults and children fall between the extremes of the mentally disordered and the rigidities of logic. For the most part they are harmless and even pleasurable, they touch only a segment of the total personality, they consume only a little time and energy, and they do not greatly detract from the main occupations of life.

LANGUAGE, THOUGHT, AND INTERACTION

As we have just noted, there is no sharp separation but rather a continuity from fantasy to logic. Shifts along the range from one to the other depend on the nature of our intention or drive and on the goal or purpose. The present section will discuss more specifically the relation of language or symbol to object, thought, and overt action.

There are four factors to be considered in the interplay of language and thought: the object, or thing; the thought, or reflection; the symbol, or word for the object; and the actor, the self, or person, who deals with these. As a visual aid in following our discussion the reader may refer to Figure 2.³⁰

First, there is the object, or thing, which, following certain logicians, we call the *referent* or *designatum*. This is what is pointed to or denoted, and is ultimately the object to be manipulated or otherwise dealt with. It is the nonlinguistic element, the environment that is handled, or the desire responded to, and so on. Second, there is the word or picture or other

³⁰ This figure was suggested by Stuart Chase's in his *Tyranny of Words*, 1938, p. 97. But, as a comparison with Chase's discussion of this topic will show, he neglects the fourth factor, the actor or person.

vehicle of communication which stands for the object. This we call the *symbol*. Third, there is the inner arena of thought, *reflection*, which may involve emotional wish, fantasy, and logic. Sometimes this is called the *reference* or the *interpretant*—that is, habit and attitude concerned with




FIG. 2—The interrelationships of object, thought, symbol, and person

interpretation. Finally, there is the person, or actor, or, more specifically, the action with respect to the object, the symbol, or the reflection. Using a behavioristic frame of reference, we may say that the course from *S*, the stimulus, to *R*, the response, is qualified, modified, and given meaning in terms of the symbol, *s*, and the reflection, *r*. This may be diagramed thus:

$$S - s - r - R$$

This is, of course, but another way of showing that the stimulus, be it internal or external in origin, is mediated through inner processes before it reaches the final response or reward.

The interplay of these factors varies greatly. For our purposes we may classify it under three modes: the logical mode; the common-sense, every-day mode; and the mode of fantasy.

At the logical level we are concerned with the universal and general symbols used in necessary correlations of events and in cause-and-effect relations. In such usage, says Charles W. Morris, (1) there must be some

impersonal universal symbol vehicle such as $a, b, c \dots x$; (2) there must be some specified form of expression, such as is found in the syllogism or other expressions of the logical relations of A and B , etc.; (3) there is also, implicit or explicit, some general denotation or extension of terms which indicate consistency and recurrence in the events symbolized; (4) there is some standard pattern of habit and attitude of interpretation which may empirically be considered as preparatory to the test of actual action or operation (this Morris calls the interpretant); finally (5), there is some social generality, some agreement and consensus, some acceptance and expectancy, built into the culture. In fact, of course, points 4 and 5 are closely bound together.³¹

Such an interplay of thing, reflection, and symbol must be completely divorced from personal wish and emotion. The symbols constitute what Rudolf Carnap calls "thing language."³² However, as every student of logic knows, in logical analysis a "thing" symbol may be replaced by another symbol. Yet the final test of logic is experiment or practical application to events in nature or society. No matter what flights mathematical logic may take, the empirical or pragmatic test is: will it work under the stated conditions?

At the common-sense adjustment level, the interplay of these factors is first of all on a more perceptual and simple classificatory basis. We noted in an earlier section that in ordinary circumstances most adults use concrete definitions of objects and react linguistically pretty much in terms of everyday habits. Of course, thing-language is used in certain skills that are necessary for material and social adjustments. In addition to these, and around them, are a host of connotative or intensional symbols and meanings, often charged with emotional and fantastic associations.

Most of our day-by-day social intercourse is filled with commands, threats, entreaties, persuasion, and suggestion. Here we find convention, manners, morals, and law in operation. This is the mixed objective-fantasy section of our thought, the world of half-logic, half-fancy in which most of us live.

From this middle ground we shift rather easily to the more thoroughly and more obviously emotional, self-centered, fantasy level of thought and language. In terms of our four factors, we note, first, that the symbols themselves often replace the objects, or referents. That is, they stand alone as significant and powerful objects of attention and action. Second, the symbols are loaded with emotion and wishful associations, as we saw in discussing fantasy in relation to poetry, magical formulas, and the like. In

³¹ See C. W. Morris, "Foundations of the Theory of Signs," *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science*, 1938, 1, No. 2. 1-59.

³² See R. Carnap, "Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science," *ibid.*, No. 1: 42-62.

these instances, the connotations and sound associations almost completely replace the denotative and extensional functions of language. The referent disappears, and reference, or reflection, is guided not by logic but by conscious and unconscious wishes. If such a shift is extreme, it reduces the communicability of words and thus removes them from their normal function. Language, instead of being a phase of social interaction, becomes short-circuited into the world of inner conversation. If such practice continues, it may result in mental and social isolation of the person from those about him. Any participation with others may be reduced to an elemental form. Such instances are found in catatonic stupor, in which the patient may indulge in fantasies but externally remain completely passive and dependent on others for survival.

Yet in no case are the relations of symbol, referent, and reference independent of the person, or actor. That is, normally, all these operations have some implication, sooner or later, for interaction with others. The individual mobilizes the object, the symbol, and the reference when he comes into contact with others. Unless he does so, he will tend in the direction of isolation noted above. In short, community of speech or writing is fundamental. It is most evident in the mixed level but does not always seem so clear with regard to logical thought, nor is it apparent in some forms of schizoid fantasy. We must not forget that science and logic rest on a cultural base. Some philosophers may argue the point, but for our purposes we take the instrumental view that thought, language, and action—even with regard to the physical universe—do not necessarily represent a point-to-point picture of the nature of the universe. This is a technical topic for the logician and the metaphysician. Certainly symbols such as -1 and “the point at infinity” are to be considered, not as corresponding to any non-linguistic structures in the alleged “real world” outside, but rather as convenient symbols or mental devices for dealing with certain aspects of generality and universality. Our common-sense use of the word “not” illustrates this point. It has practical use in permitting us to refer to something other than the thing specifically referred to without stating what this “other” is. It is pretty clear in modern physics that the nature of cosmic forces—that is, the meaning we give them—depends upon the premises, the logic, and the experimental tools we use. For example, today we can “demonstrate” either the corpuscular or the undulatory nature of light, depending on how we go about it.³³

At the fantasy level we may seem to be remote from social-cultural influences, yet the elements of reveries and daydreams have their source in society and culture. There is certainly no proof for the assumption of some

³³ See an interesting presentation of this in lay language in A. H. Compton, “What Is Light?” *Sigma Xi Quarterly*, March, 1929, pp. 15-33.

psychoanalysts that some of the stuff of such fantasies derives from a "racial unconscious."⁸⁴

It is, then, at the two extremes of our continuum of thought that we find the most complete detachment of thought and symbol from the interactional matrix in which most of our life takes place. There is this difference, of course: At the logical end, the accepted and demonstrated rules of scientific check and of logic control thinking. In the end we can test by prediction and control of material or social events. On the other hand, there are no such rules to control fantasy, except those of consensus and social agreement. These latter, however, are of tremendous significance. In the ordinary social-cultural world, in fact, they seem more important than logic when we deal with personal relations and such institutions as the state, the church, the economic order, and those of art and recreation. In our dealing with material objects, however, mere consensus has given way to logic and science. The wishes of a million soldiers on a battlefield will not make a battered tank or broken airplane operate again. But their voices in protest might stop a war. As we shall see in the next chapter and other chapters, an entire nation may become convinced that it has a divine mission to rule the world, or that its genes are superior to those of another nation, and on the basis of such ideology or social myth the course of human history may be profoundly altered.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On the nature and function of fantasy thinking, see F. L. Wells, *Mental Adjustments*, 1917, chaps. 1, 2, 3; and K. Young, editor, *Social Attitudes*, 1931, chap. 5.

On the nature of logic and science, see Morris R. Cohen and Ernest Nagel, *An Introduction to Logic and Scientific Method*, 1936, especially Book II; and John Dewey, *How We Think*, rev. ed., 1933.

On the nature of primitive mentality, see Ellsworth Faris, "The Mental Capacity of Savages," *American Journal of Sociology*, 1918, 23: 603-619; and R. R. Willoughby, "Magic and Cognate Phenomena: An Hypothesis," chap. 12 in C. Murchison, editor, *A Handbook of Social Psychology*, 1935.

On the relations of language and thought, see John Dewey, *op. cit.*; Frank Lorimer, *The Growth of Reason*, 1929; John A. Markey, *The Symbolic Process*, 1928; George H. Mead, *Mind, Self, and Society*, 1934; Henri Piéron, *Thought and Brain*, 1927; John B. Watson and others (a symposium), "Is Thinking Merely the Action of Language Mechanisms?" *British Journal of Psychology*, 1920-1921, 10: 55-104; and K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, chaps. 8, 10.

⁸⁴ See C. G. Jung, *Collected Papers on Analytical Psychology*, transl. by C. E. Long, second ed., 1917.

Chapter IX

STEREOTYPES, MYTHS, AND IDEOLOGIES

THE PRESENT chapter will examine further the individual's inner activity, especially the world of meaning that is vital to our understanding of external conduct.

The external environment is comprised of material objects and the personalities with whom we interact. In relation to these we have ideas, attitudes, and habits. The inner world is made up of images and ideas which modify and help determine the attitudes and overt actions. To know a man's image of his mother will aid us in understanding not only his reactions to his mother but also his reactions to other women. So, too, a man's image of his country—as symbolized by the map, the flag, or the national anthem—will assist us in comprehending his behavior in wartime. The "picture in our heads" of the Negro—that is, our concepts of, and attitudes toward, the Negro race in general—will definitely affect our relations with individual members of the black race. Obviously, the phrase "pictures in our heads" does not imply that all images and concepts are visual. They may be auditory or vocal-motor, or may involve other sensory-motor processes.

Both personal-social and cultural conditioning play a part in building up content and meaning. A man's basic image of his mother is fixed pretty largely, in fact, by personal-social interaction during his first years. In contrast, his image and concept of his country grow out of the cultural norms or values to which his family, the school, the church, and the state have exposed him. These concepts are the core of the values which grow out of our social participation. That is, we get our values and meanings chiefly from others. The attitudes, emotions, and habits around which such values develop are the partly, though not entirely, individual counterparts of the cultural—that is, the expected and accepted—stimuli.

A large segment of this inner world of content and meaning consists of stereotypes, social myths and legends, and what we call ideologies. Other segments of meaning, of course, are made up of more rigidly defined and logical patterns of thought. But even these latter are more often than not used as the instruments for attaining ends which are defined or determined by emotional values and meanings.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF STEREOTYPES

The term *stereotype* was introduced into social psychology by Walter Lippmann in the early 1920's. Strictly speaking, a stereotype is a metal plate cast from a mold of a surface of type. A number of such plates can be cast from the original mold. The term was first used in a metaphorical sense, however, by psychiatrists to describe the frequent and almost mechanical repetition of the same posture, gesture, or speech in such disorders as dementia praecox. But Lippmann used it in the broad and vague sense of determining tendency or composite of ideas and attitudes that make up the "pictures in our heads" or what an earlier psychology had called the "apperceptive mass." A number of writers, such as S. H. Britt, Charles Bird, and Gardner Murphy, have continued to employ it in this sense, in which it is hardly to be distinguished from the concept of attitude used by L. L. Thurstone.¹ But this meaning is so broad as to lose much of its usefulness for us.

It seems unwise to use *stereotype* as a name for the whole baggage of the apperceptive mass or the inner content, nor should it be applied to attitude, which is an action tendency. Rather it is best defined as a false classificatory concept to which, as a rule, some strong emotional-feeling tone of like or dislike, approval or disapproval, is attached. To illustrate this, the stereotype "wop" is used to classify all Italians without regard to individual differences, or without regard to any logically sound basis in fact for such a classification. Under this concept, then, a person is a "wop" first and then Signor Gioletti, the merchant; or a colored man is a "nigger" first and then an individual. It is also clear that such characterizations arise out of personal and group conflicts, into which goes a good deal of fantasy. Moreover, they have definite relations to emotions, attitudes, and overt reactions.

The Relation of Stereotype to Attitude, Situation, and Meaning. Attitudes and ideas are closely linked together, and such linkage is clearly shown in these illogical but emotionally powerful and socially important stereotypes. While the logical idea or concept presents in verbal or other symbolic form some classification, general quality, or relation of parts to wholes, there is also some association with an action out of which the idea arose in the first instance. Meaning, in fact, has been defined as a symbol and an action tendency, or attitude, toward an object or class of objects. The attitude, or action tendency, is illustrated by the like-or-dislike, for-or-against, approve-or-disapprove element, and, of course, always points to some overt response or habit. This linkage is equally obvious in those meanings in which stereotypes are involved. The stereotype, like a sound idea, then, is

¹ See L. L. Thurstone, "Attitudes Can Be Measured," *American J. Sociology*, 1928, 33: 529-554.

the imaginal core—carried chiefly in words or visual images—from which attitude and action spring. The function of the stereotype is to give meaning to the situation—that is, to delimit behavior with reference to it; it defines the situation in terms of acts, potential or actual. This definition of the situation involves the operation of expectancy and acceptance factors which make for regularity and hence for prediction. Moreover, when the stereotype has to do with moral action, it serves as the symbol of the cultural norm. The situations from which stereotypes develop and pass on in the culture are those concerned with group conflict and leadership. In our time these chiefly reflect class differences, race relations, and religious and nationality conflicts.

Studies of Stereotypes. The operation of stereotypes will be more evident if we summarize some of the studies made of these verbal forms in our own time. These investigations reveal the extent to which our judgments are influenced by such illogical concepts.

The classic investigation of the effect of stereotypes on human judgment is that made by Stuart A. Rice. He presented 141 Dartmouth undergraduates and later a group of Grange members with a series of nine photographs pasted on a sheet of cardboard and numbered from 1 to 9. The persons represented were a premier of France (Herriot), a prominent labor-union leader (Duncan), a Soviet ambassador at Paris (Krassin), a deputy comptroller of the currency (McIntosh), a former New York governor (Glynn), a bootlegger (Agel), a prominent steel-corporation official (Schwab), a food-manufacturer (Heinz), and a prominent United States Senator (G. W. Pepper). The subjects were told that the sheet contained the pictures of a bootlegger, a European premier, a United States Senator, a Bolshevik, a labor leader, two manufacturers, an editor-politician, and a financier. They were asked to identify these individuals by number. No suggestion was given as to the order of the photographs, and each subject made independent selections. The number of correct judgments was double the number one might expect by pure chance. But an examination of the results with respect to particular individuals shows how false some judgments may be as contrasted with others. Of Herriot, Duncan, Glynn, Agel, Schwab, and Heinz the judgments were considerably above what one might expect from chance. But those of Krassin, McIntosh, and Pepper were below or just equal to chance.

Ambassador Krassin, pictured in wing collar, Vandyke beard, and mustache, and evidently well-dressed and distinguished in appearance, was named 59 times as a United States Senator, 9 as a Bolshevik, and none as a labor leader. Duncan, the American labor leader, was named 25 times correctly, but 29 times as premier, 30 as manufacturer, 15 as Bolshevik, and 13 as financier. The highest number of correct identifications fell to the bootlegger, who was the only one in outdoor costume. He was pictured in a cap and a heavy overcoat with upturned collar, with tortoise-shell glasses, and with a cigar firmly gripped between his lips. The results with the adult farmers confirmed those obtained with the college students.

Rice also secured judgments as to the intelligence and craftiness of the persons shown in the photographs. The students were divided into three groups: those in the first were permitted to believe their original judgments correct; those in the second

were given different but, still false identifications; those in the third were informed of the real identities. The results were what might have been expected. The estimates of the two traits were definitely biased by the supposed identity of the portrait—that is, by the stereotypes concerning the man's supposed job or status. Disclosure of the true identities led to changes in the rating to conform to the other apperceptive elements which would go into such judgments.²

These results show not only that stereotypes may distort or direct human judgments, but also that stereotypes are not necessarily or entirely foolish. They grow up on the basis of common-sense contact with people and events or with verbal and pictorial communications about them. Their falseness arises from generalizations made from one or two cases and from the fact that the traits or qualities selected as the categories of generality are not those corresponding to actuality. It is interesting to note that the bootlegger had the highest number of correct judgments. But, if Krassin had been dressed in beaver cap and heavy winter overcoat flecked with snow, the correct judgments of him would probably have been more numerous than they were. Though the usual stereotype of the Bolshevik in 1924 (when this study was made) was a bewhiskered ruffian in a peasant smock and carrying a bomb, such a picture as that suggested would have brought up associations with known or imagined data about Russian winter costumes and would, in turn, have set loose potential associations with Bolshevism.

A number of studies have shown the effects of prestige-bearing stereotypes, particularly those connected with would-be experts and prominent public figures. Such devices are constantly used in advertising, as when Mrs. Astor-Ritz of New York's Four Hundred is pictured approving a cigarette or a facial cream or a particular brand of inner-spring mattress.

M. Saadi and P. R. Farnsworth secured from a long list of well-known individuals the names of ten uniformly liked persons and ten uniformly disliked persons. The former included Aristotle, Mark Twain, and Lindbergh; the latter, William Randolph Hearst, Al Capone, and Aimee Semple McPherson. Thirty statements of a controversial nature were then prepared. These were given to one group of students with the information that each statement was made by one of the "liked" group. Another sample of students got a set of statements attributed to the "disliked" ten. Finally, the statements were given to another sample of students with no names attached. The results are about what we would anticipate: statements were most readily accepted when coming from persons respected and carrying high prestige.³

Closely akin to these illustrations of prestige suggestion are those which show the power of attraction or repulsion of terms like *liberalism*, *conservatism*, *socialism*, *fascism*, and *communism*.

² See S. A. Rice, "Stereotypes: A Source of Error in Judging Human Character," *J. Personnel Research*, 1926, 5: 268-276. Reprinted in his *Quantitative Methods in Politics*, 1928.

³ See M. Saadi and P. R. Farnsworth, "The Degrees of Acceptance of Dogmatic Statements and Preferences for Their Supposed Makers," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1934, 29: 143-150.

George W. Hartmann gave an attitude scale dealing with liberal political reforms to a group of 107 voters, mostly farmers, small shopkeepers, miners, laborers, housewives, and women clerks. The results showed that on the whole the group was highly favorable to collectivistic or socialistic policies, such as public ownership of natural resources and industry, and extensive legal provision for social security. Yet, when such policies were presented as reflecting socialistic or communistic views, most of the individuals took conservative and opposite positions. For instance, two thirds of them would refuse a public-school license to a teacher who believed in socialism, more than three fourths of them were opposed to state ownership of land, and three fifths of them said they had no desire to be affiliated with a socialist party. Evidently they wanted many of the socialistic changes and alleged benefits, but, as Hartmann put it, they did not want them "labelled that way."⁴

In Seldon C. Menefee's somewhat similar study, nearly one third of his subjects rejected certain statements which they had previously endorsed when these same statements were labelled "fascist," "communist," or "radical."⁵ Ross Stagner presented a series of arguments or statements on economic and political questions drawn from German fascist materials. He found that 73 per cent of his subjects disapproved of these. Yet, when the same components were included in another questionnaire without being labelled as fascist, he got a very sharp rise in the amount of agreement.⁶

Racial stereotypes play a large part in human prejudice. (See Chapters XI and XII.) The manner in which stereotypes are used to characterize races and nationalities is well demonstrated in the work of Daniel Katz and K. Braly.

They first asked a sample of college students to write down the adjectives which they believed characterized ten nationalities or races. Eighty-four trait names were secured in this way. These, in turn, were presented to a hundred students with the request that they select what they considered the five most typical traits for each nationality or racial group. They were also to add new trait names if they wished. The results showed that the students, for the most part, reflected the stereotypes that were common in the public at large. Three out of four of the students regarded the Germans as scientifically minded, and four out of five thought the Jews shrewd. Half of them considered the Italians artistic and the Americans industrious, and slightly more than half thought the Turks cruel. More than four out of five considered the Negroes superstitious. Another phase of this study brought out that the judgments of the Negroes, Jews, and Germans were the most stereotyped as measured by the agreement on the specific characterizing traits. In contrast, with respect to the traits of the Japanese, Chinese, and Turks the students showed less agreement among themselves.⁷

⁴ See G. W. Hartmann, "The Contradictions between the Feeling-Tone of Political Party Names and Public Response to Their Platforms," *J. Social Psychology*, 1936, 7, 336-355.

⁵ See S. C. Menefee, "The Effect of Stereotyped Words on Political Judgments," *American Sociological Review*, 1936, 1: 614-621.

⁶ See Ross Stagner, "Fascist Attitudes: An Exploratory Study," *J. Social Psychology*, 1936, 7: 309-319.

⁷ See D. Katz and K. Braly, "Racial Stereotypes of 100 College Students," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1933, 28: 280-290.

Yet various studies have shown that American students in general are most prejudiced against Negroes and Turks. In the case of the Negroes there is, however, much more agreement among the traits as well as a more empirical basis for attitudes and stereotypes. Respecting the Turks, however, the number of traits attributed to them varies considerably, and few if any American students have ever seen a Turk. Yet the intensity of anti-Turk prejudice is very great. It is clear that knowledge and familiarity are far less important in developing stereotypes than are the emotionalized concepts and attitudes received from one's society.

Such statistical studies as those just noted provide us with facts about the averages and variabilities in trait names for groups, about faulty concepts of heroes or public figures, and about the frequency of various stereotypes. Some of them even attempt to provide some measure of the intensity of feeling and the definiteness of the fixed ideas about individuals, races, nationalities, and various out-groups or in-groups. However, in some ways the college students studied were in a restricted and even artificial situation. We need similar investigation of the stereotypes of the adult population outside the schoolroom.

A more serious defect of most questionnaire or test investigations is their failure to give us any information as to how stereotypes arise in the individual, or any knowledge of how they operate in day-by-day situations. To secure such facts we must look to qualitative or case-study materials. Not only are reports from individuals helpful, but an analysis of newspapers, magazines, and other printed matter, of radio speeches, and of motion pictures is extremely important. Since we shall have occasion later to indicate material from such sources, we shall not take up detailed instances at this point. Suffice it to say that the growing child is exposed to all sorts of stereotypes. These reflect the status of his family, their religious, political, and economic views, their attitudes toward and conceptions of their neighbors and various classes within the community. Long before the child has actual contact with members of other groups, stereotyped words predetermine his relations to them. In this way such terms serve to define the situation well in advance. In fact, this is one of the functions of stereotypes.

This point is neatly illustrated by nationality stereotypes. For example, many Americans view the British as lacking in humor, as highly egotistical, and as inclined to be patronizing toward Americans. In turn, many Britishers regard Americans as money-grubbers, as boisterous and boastful. Such differences in stereotypes tend to be accentuated in a time of crisis such as a war. During the early years of World War II, many noninterventionist groups fostered a variety of stereotypes about the British: their designs to get us into the war so as to save themselves; their unwillingness to fight their own battles—in short, a kind of cowardice; and so on. On the

other hand, the ability of the mass of Britons to stand up under the terrifying experience of almost continuous aerial bombardment tended to force considerable revision of many stereotypes about them. The occasional fist-cuffs and quarreling which broke out between our military forces in Great Britain and the British civilians or military indicate how deep some of the stereotypes go, and, as we know, efforts were made by means of books, periodicals, radio talks, and recreational programs to redefine the concepts which each group had of the other.

Clichés, Catchwords, and Slogans. Closely akin to stereotypes proper, and often included in the category, are slogans, clichés, catch phrases of popular speech, and much of the half-fantastic jargon of ordinary speech. When the newspaper reporter describes the victim of a murder as "lying in a pool of blood," he is using a phrase which, though often of perceptual rather than conceptual function, takes on the character of the stereotype. The same may be said of slogans. "Fifty-four forty or fight" and "Remember the Maine" are direct appeals to action. Slogans indicate demands, expectations, hopes, and a variety of established values. "Land for the landless" as a revolutionary battle cry may serve to define a purpose and a course of action. The Nazi political slogans for the mass, *Gemeinnutz geht vor Eigennutz* ("Community good comes before personal good") and *Du bist nichts; das Volk ist alles* ("You are nothing; your people or community is everything") are appeals for the sacrifice of personal wishes in the interest of the larger collectivity. They operated to solidify the German people around action tendencies and to define situations, and were a part, in fact, of the larger social myth and ideology of National Socialism.

As a matter of fact, the stereotype, the cliché, and the slogan are important counters in the more extended symbolic currency which we call the social myth and ideology, which we shall examine below. They may be used to describe every type of group toward which an individual is oriented, either as a member or as a nonmember. They operate in both primary and secondary in-groups and out-groups. Like attitudes and habits, they arise from and revolve around all sorts of critical situations: birth, puberty, marriage, and death; economic crises, such as strikes, lockouts, and depressions; political struggles, such as elections and wars; and disasters caused by flood, fire, or earthquakes. They are also found in situations which arouse pleasure, hope, and anticipation. The demand-symbols of mass movements for economic security and power are illustrations, and, as we shall note, stereotypes, slogans, and shibboleths have important functions in all sorts of utopian dreams of future justice and happiness. In other words, this whole verbal-symbolic baggage aids us in defining past, present, and future situations. New situations are almost inevitably defined in terms of past conditioning.

Since language is involved in the meaning of social-cultural reality and

in both objective and fantasy thinking, stereotypes, slogans, and clichés reveal both autistic and logical forms. In fact, these symbols would tend to fall into that part of our hypothetical continuum, from objective thought to extreme fantasy, which we called the common-sense mixed range. (See Chapter VIII.) The stereotype, the slogan, the cliché, and the catchword grow out of, and reflect, the nonlogical or illogical nature of our basic values. Stereotypes may be logically false concepts, but, since men live, not by logic, but by love and hate, fear and anger, anxiety and the sense of superiority and security, these verbal forms are as inevitable as they are useful in aiding us to get on with our fellow men. It could not be otherwise. Our values—the deepest desires, the most drastic demands upon us—are a mixture of our desires for power, prestige, and companionship as well as for economic and bodily security. Into these patterns fantastic as well as logical elements enter. True, toward the world of material objects and technology, controlled as they are by science, we have become somewhat more rational. But, as we have indicated previously, the rational side of our life is intermingled with, and in large part merely contributory to, the emotional, fantasy-determined wishes seen in our mating, companionship, recreation, politics, art, religion, and everyday philosophy.

IDEOLOGY, SOCIAL MYTH, AND FOLKLORE

The subjective, or inner, life of the individual, does not, of course, consist merely of bundles of stereotypes, catchwords, and clichés. These are but part of the inner world, and other elements go to make up a more or less systematic organization of ideas and values. Every man has beliefs, convictions, and values. These constitute his life philosophy, the pattern of which is determined by his basic motives and interests and the situations in which his daily life goes on. Besides his technical skills and knowledge, he has certain standards of conduct for himself and others. He expects certain actions from others, and he expects to make certain counter-responses, as illustrated in the interplay of rights and duties, or in polite intercourse. He has interpretations of his place in the world, in the family, in the neighborhood, and in the vast range of secondary groups. That is, his roles and statuses represent the larger meaning of his various functions. Linked to these interpretations of his generalized role, he has stories of heroes and villains and of the historic events of his society. Likewise he has belief about the future: the idea of an inevitable social-cultural progress, or of heaven and hell after death.

Such organized "mental pictures" of our world—comprising both ideas and attitudes involving beliefs, values, and knowledge—have been discussed in social psychology under various concepts. Émile Durkheim, the French anthropologist, and his followers called these subjective components *collective representations*. This term emphasizes not only their symbolic

and imaginal (representative) character, but the fact that they are precipitates of society and culture. Durkheim contended that they are the product of a group or collectivity, not merely an individualistic invention. Such inner components, as we have indicated in the previous chapter especially, result from the deposit of, and inner reorganization of, past experience. Their effects on conduct are derived from both conscious and unconscious operations. In fact, as Vilfredo Pareto, the Italian social philosopher, indicated, the residues, or nondeliberative, largely irrational factors, tend to outweigh the "derivatives," or elements which are expressed in rational fashion through conscious operation.⁸ We shall treat these factors under the more common terms *ideology*, *social myth*, and *folklore*.

Ideology. The concept of ideology stands for the organized system of thought and emotion out of which come the more specific verbal reactions in the form of stereotypes, clichés, folklore, legends, social myths, guiding fictions, and other elements in this all-important subjective baggage. The concept has only recently come into common use in American and British social science and social psychology, but the Continental writers in these fields had produced a considerable literature on the topic, especially socialistic and reformist writers.⁹ The term itself is said to have been first used by Napoleon, who contemptuously referred to a group of philosophers who opposed certain of his imperialistic ambitions as nothing but "ideologists," meaning, evidently, that they considered only ideas and had no understanding of action. From this and other early usage the term acquired a somewhat derogatory meaning. Karl Marx and his followers also used it in the sense of the underlying but, from their standpoint, false bourgeois conception of the nature of the social-cultural world.¹⁰ More recently Karl Mannheim, operating from a Marxian basis, has drawn certain distinctions between ideology as a body of beliefs, values, and rationalizations about the existing social order, and utopia as a projection of ideas, beliefs; and values of a more "realistic" sort into the future.¹¹ But this limits the term rather narrowly, and most writers on this subject have made no such distinction. We shall employ the concept, without any valuational connotation, to cover the whole thought content which is expressed in stereotypes, clichés, slogans, myths, and folklore, and into which both objective thinking and fantasy may enter.

Ideology, of course, is not to be confused with theory, at least not in a logical, systematic sense. Strictly speaking, the term *theory* should be re-

⁸ A convenient review of Durkheim and Pareto may be found in Talcott Parsons, *The Structure of Social Action*, 1937.

⁹ It is noteworthy that the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, published in the early 1930's, contains no separate article on this important concept.

¹⁰ For a review of the history of the concept see Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, 1936, transl. by L. Wirth and E. Shils, pp. 53-74.

¹¹ See *ibid.*

tained to mean a systematic, logical statement or view of cause-and-effect relations among events. Of course, in the popular sense, an ideology enters into the basic values and definitions which lie beneath the ordinary economic or political or religious theory. Moreover, even systematic theory and scientific method are not completely independent of underlying ideological formulations.

We shall have occasion in various connections to comment on the relation of popular ideology to prejudice, leadership, crowd behavior, fashion, war, and peace. For the most part ideology is involved in (1) in-group patterns, (2) contacts between in-groups and out-groups, especially conflictive ones, (3) leadership, and (4) various institutional devices, such as rituals, codes, and forms of control.

As examples of the first (1), we note the common-sense solidarity among in-group members and, in more highly institutionalized in-groups (those with rituals, codes, and conscious purposes), the conviction that the group as such is superior to the individual members. This deification of the group has at times confused some theorists in social psychology. Daniel Katz and F. H. Allport's study of fraternity and nonfraternity men at Syracuse University amply demonstrates this sense of some supra-individual unity in a group. They found that more than two thirds of the two thousand fraternity men accepted what they called the "institutional fiction" that the fraternity was some kind of reality of its own regardless of particular members. Moreover, many nonfraternity men accepted the same view. Without entering into a discussion of F. H. Allport's theory of the "group illusion" at this juncture, we may point out that the symbols and the functions of fraternities, as of other organizations, induce a belief that the group is a special entity.¹² Certainly the group is a stereotype with a vast ideological content. (2) In the interaction between in-group and out-group, we get not only opposition but further enhancement—stimulated by the opposition itself—of the idea of superiority of the in-group. There is a sense of the absolute rightness of the cause and aims. In groups concerned with the dynamics of change, such as reform organizations or more systematic social movements, there is often a feeling that success is inevitable. This is particularly true of believers in social myths about the future. (3) Leadership is endowed with a vast array of qualities beyond what a factual analysis might indicate, but the belief in them has become part of the whole content of dominance and submission. (4) There are many elements that rationalize and otherwise give meaning to rituals, codes, and the techniques of social control which grow up in institutionalized groups especially. Among these are myths and legends.

Myths and Legends. Every society has its myths and legends. All sorts

¹² See F. H. Allport, *Institutional Behavior*, 1933, pp. 141-142; and D. Katz and F. H. Allport, *Students' Attitudes*, 1931, pp. 195 ff.

of stories of past and current events, of heroes, and of institutions enter into our beliefs, convictions, and ideas. Social myths are imaginative interpretations of past, present, or future events. However, they are not created out of nothing, but have, as a basis, some crisis. They deal with economic needs, with warfare, adventure, success or failure in life, with birth, puberty, marriage, death, and the future life. They may arise as a wish fulfillment in some difficult situation, yet they serve to stabilize us in the presence of our own distresses. Becoming embedded in the culture, they are passed on from one generation to another. Legends are stories which have some factual basis, but which in the telling and retelling lose much of their objective accuracy and accumulate all sorts of imaginative and fictional details. Together myths and legends make up a body of folklore of immense importance. They are highly important components of the total ideology and give a basis for the continuity of social-cultural life. Without them the past and the present, as well as the future, would seem chaotic. With them the world takes on meaning and form, and does not need to be constantly recast by us or for us. They make our social-cultural reality stable, predictable, and capable of being endured.

The ordinary man today is unaware of the myths and legends about him *as* myths and legends, just as the primitive person is. Our rationalistic tradition is so well accepted that we imagine myths and legends to be fantastic, purely imaginative, make-believe stories which only ignorant, preliterate folk believed. Presumably in our own enlightened age they do not exist except in the pretty books which we buy for children at Christmas. Our own myths and legends are not something false to us. With us, as with primitive peoples, myths are a real and actual part of the social-cultural environment. What Bronislaw Malinowski says about myths in primitive groups applies equally well to our own:

"Myth as it exists in a savage community, that is, in its living primitive form, is not merely a story told but a reality lived. It is not of the nature of fiction, such as we read to-day in a novel, but it is a living reality, believed to have once happened in primeval times, and continuing ever since to influence the world and human destinies. The myth is to the savage what, to a fully believing Christian, is the Biblical story of Creation, of the Fall, of the Redemption by Christ's Sacrifice on the Cross. As our sacred story lives in our ritual, in our morality, as it governs our faith and controls our conduct, even so does his myth for the savage."

The myth is not merely a symbolic or superimposed story of creation, or an extraneous narrative of a possibly fictitious event.

"Studied alive, myth is not symbolic, but a direct expression of its subject-matter; it is not an explanation in satisfaction of a scientific interest, but a narrative resurrection of a primeval reality, told in satisfaction of deep religious wants, moral cravings, social submissions, assertions, even practical requirements. Myth fulfils in primitive

culture an indispensable function: it expresses, enhances, and codifies belief; it safeguards and enforces morality; it vouches for the efficiency of ritual and contains practical rules for the guidance of man. Myth is thus a vital ingredient of human civilization; it is not an idle tale, but a hard-worked active force; it is not an intellectual explanation or an artistic imagery, but a pragmatic charter of primitive faith and moral wisdom."¹³

Myths and legends, then, are considered true by the believers. We are conscious of our own myths and legends, not as strange or foreign stories devised for amusement, but as accounts of actual events and meanings.

It is evident that savage myths and legends mean little to us largely because they are outside our culture. Gomme, a great student of mythology, remarks: "The story into which the myth is woven is not a story to those who believe in the truth of the myth. It is just this belief in the truth of the myth or legend which sets it distinctly apart from romance or fiction."

Myth and Ritual. Myths tend not only to take on narrative and descriptive form but to become associated with various ritualistic or ceremonial performances. In fact, as myth has its roots in the association of fantasies, ritual or ceremony has its source in autistic manual and bodily actions and gestures.

By *ritual* we mean the repeated acts related to certain objects or situations considered significant for our survival. Ritual is a highly stable and habitual, and hence predictable, means of dealing with situations. It is the apotheosis of learned automatic action, and in some ways it takes on the features of reflex action. We must not think of ritual as mere mumbo jumbo indulged in by college fraternities. It is as vital to us in many ways as it is to primitive man. Just as people take the myths accepted in their own society for granted, so, too, they often do not recognize their own rituals for what they are. We noted in Chapter VIII the type of fantasy appeal which secret societies with their magic rituals have for the ordinary man.

It is well to indicate some further characteristics of ritual. Ritualistic acts are not to be confused with those of the practical arts of getting a living and making an objective adaptation to the world around us. The latter we term technology, or skills, and knowledge of how to satisfy our physical needs. The essence of ritual is the symbolism which provides meaning in terms of some supernatural or other over-all power. Ritual furnishes a link between our unfulfilled wants and the larger demands of our group. Ritual, like myth, of course, is traditionally closely associated with religion. Yet it is now realized that both myth and ritual are also functional parts of much of our political, economic, and other day-by-day activity. True, some myths and rituals become more distinctly supernatural than others, but even in

¹³ B. Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, 1926, pp. 18, 19. By permission of W. W. Norton and Company.

our mechanized secular world we find a place for both. Some illustrations will be given later.

A ritual is a repeated act with a symbolic meaning for a crisis such as death or birth, or for some economic, social, or political crisis; a myth rationalizes the ritual and gives it broader justification. There has been considerable discussion among cultural anthropologists and folklorists about the sequential relation of myth and ritual. Some have held that the ritual arose before the myth, and that the latter was invented to explain the former. Others have held the reverse. It is not our intention to enter into this controversy. There is much evidence that myths produce ritualistic symbols. The beginning of this process is shown in the story of the seagulls that saved the crops of the Mormons in early Utah. From this arose a worshipful attitude toward the birds, many taboos about them, and finally a piece of representative art in the form of a monument. As has been indicated elsewhere, under somewhat different conditions such an episode might have given rise to totemistic rites.¹⁴ The basic Nazi mythology was worked out in considerable detail before the Nazis put their rituals into full effect. Certainly there is evidence that primitive rituals have so arisen.¹⁵

Once a ritual is established, however, it may easily give rise to further explanatory myths. Man may or may not always take his rites for granted, and certainly in many cultures people embroider their rituals by additional stories to show what they mean. Moreover, as Franz Boas and others have amply shown, when rituals are transferred or diffused to new peoples, they tend to accumulate new myths and justifications and meanings. In fact, the relation of the rite to the myth illustrates an important principle in all the relations of subjective meaning to overt action. That identity of action does not imply identity of meaning is one of the first rules of social-psychological analysis. In any case, myths and rituals provide the individual with direction and meaning for basic fantasies and autistic actions, the roots of which lie in his motives and fundamental personal-social conditioning.

As we have noted above, ritual and ceremony are not confined to the sacred and magical, but extend into political, economic, and other activities. In primitive societies, of course, there is less distinction between the sacred and the secular, and very often technology, ritual, and myth are all interwoven. For example, magical rites and myths connected with plant and animal fertility are extremely widespread. Primitives and peasants not only use manures and other nitrate-bearing substances to fertilize the soil, but employ incantations, spells, and all sorts of magic to ensure good crops.

¹⁴ See K. Young, "The Story of the Rise of a Social Taboo," *Scientific Monthly*, 1928, 26: 449-453.

¹⁵ See Clyde Kluckhohn, "Myths and Rituals: A General Theory," *Harvard Theological Review*, 1942, 35: 52-53.

Bavarian peasants knew enough to prune their orchards, but they also dressed a barren tree in a woman's skirt on the theory that this would make the tree fertile again—a case of what is called contagious magic.

There are many ceremonies or rituals, of course, which have lost much of their earlier magical potency. This is true of some religious rituals and of the formalisms of military and diplomatic service. Other ceremonies have declined into the conventionalities of manners, handshaking, tipping of hats to women, and the like. Yet the saluting of officers, the presentation of the colors, the badges of merit and honor awarded in public, all give evidence of the continuing function of ceremonies and myths in our society. They provide stability and a sense of mutual identification among members. They arouse emotions in the participants and give the sense of power which is the counterpart of in-group solidarity.

The aesthetic features of rituals and myths must not be overlooked. Even the rhythm of the chant has an emotional artistic appeal, and many kinds of rituals take on beauty for us. The High Mass is not only religiously significant but, to the participant, beautiful. Even routine conventions such as manners have an integrative function. The repetitive niceties of greeting and parting, of table manners, of politeness, are not mere fluff and nonsense. They provide a smooth interactional relationship which gives us a sense of solidarity, of the familiar. They remove the dangers or threats implicit in all preliminary gestures of social intercourse and provide a solid and predictable basis upon which conversation and overt action may proceed. Like other habits, they save time and energy, and reduce tensions or drives which might otherwise disrupt or redirect a dynamic interactional relationship.

Superstitions and Popular Philosophy. Closely associated with myths are superstitions, proverbs, and popular sayings. In fact, in their psychological make-up and in their cultural functions they have much in common. Superstition is a firm belief in supernatural powers, in mysterious or magical procedures, derived from fantasy thinking which has been culturized or socially accepted as normal. As to content, superstitions may refer to any object, idea, or act. Just as we ordinarily are not aware of our own myths, but may recognize those of others, so we are amused at the superstitions of strangers and primitives, but often fail to realize our own for what they are. Superstitions, like other phases of fantasy thinking, arise in critical situations involving danger, uncertainty as to the future, chance happenings, accidents, and such unpredicted events as war, flood, famine, and fire. Gamblers are notoriously superstitious, and out of gambling have developed elaborate rituals—really magical techniques—which are used in dealing with chance. Superstitions are often accompanied by myths and legends, which give them a certain historical-cultural setting. Accidents at sea inevitably result in myth, legend, and superstition. Aviation is a particularly

good illustration of a modern activity in which magic, superstition, and myth arise. One of the most amusing and enlightening examples is the myth about the gremlins, those little demons who cause engine trouble, jam machine guns, and interfere with bomb sights. The American public was introduced to the gremlins by the British Royal Air Force, whose personnel wrote ballads and told stories of these strange little pixie folk who handicapped the fliers. The following, which appeared in a British service magazine, was the first widespread introduction of this myth and superstition to America:

“When you’re seven miles up in the heavens,
That’s a hell of a lonely spot,
And it’s fifty degrees below zero,
Which isn’t exactly hot,
When you’re frozen blue like your Spitfire
And you’re scared mosquito pink,
When you’re a thousand miles from nowhere
And there’s nothing below but the drink,
It’s then you’ll see the gremlins,
Green and gamboge and gold,
Male and female and neuter,
Gremlins both young and old.
It’s no good trying to dodge them,
The lessons you learned on the Link
Won’t help you evade the gremlin
Though you boost and you dive and you jink.
The white one will wiggle your wingtips,
Male ones will muddle your maps,
Green ones will guzzle your glycol,
Females will flutter your flaps,
Pink ones will perch on your perspex,
And dance pirouettes on your prop;
There’s a spherical middle-aged gremlin
Who’ll spin on your stock like a top.
They’ll freeze up your camera shutters,
They’ll bite through your aileron wires,
They’ll bend and they’ll break and they’ll batter,
They’ll insert toasting forks in your eyes.”¹⁶

By that time pilots had already come to speak and write of “gremlinologists” who were experts in detecting new types, such as the genus *Jockey* that guided seagulls or pigeons into the windscreen of a plane, and the genus *Optic*, with red or green eyes, that hid in bomb sights and produced an optic glow just as bombardiers would be lining up the sights on a target.

Interest in the gremlins spread rapidly. Originally born half seriously,

¹⁶ Reprinted in the *New York Times*, September 22, 1942. By permission.

half in fun, these creatures caught the popular fancy of the British and Americans. Stories were told about their origin—these varying with the narrator. The gremlins appear in both sexes and at all ages. A female gremlin is a *fifinella*, and a baby one is a *widgit*. Later, *chemlins* arose, creatures who got into test tubes and beakers and caused trouble to chemists. Though gremlins originated in the air, they were soon “grounded,” and distinctions began to be drawn between the “air-minded” and the “grounded” species. More stories and verse appeared. By February, 1943, we had “The Gremlin in the Kremlin,” which began thus:

“There’s a gremlin in the Kremlin
And his name is little Joe;
He hides in Hitler’s panzers
And wrecks them in the snow.”¹⁷

Gremlins appeared in advertising in early 1943, being used to explain the hardening of water as due to the gremlin *Aquaticus*, and automobile troubles as produced by gremlins named “Seepy Sam” and “Squeaky Squire.” They came into cartoons and the comic strips at about the same time, as bad consciences or suggesters of evil. They appeared on the radio, first on the Charlie McCarthy program late in February, 1943. Just as they became classified by sex, age, and genus, so, too, they tended to become conventionalized as to form and size. When asked what they looked like, people gave varying replies or sketched them to suit their own tastes. But, when Walt Disney and Boris Artzybasheff published *their* versions, standardization of form began to be accepted.

This emergence of a creature that may do evil or, in some forms, good shows the persistence of fantasy in modern man. Though generally accepted as a verbalization and visualization of make-believe origin, the gremlin also serves to give unconscious anxieties and unexplained situations some meaning. In crises such as are common in war, such fantasies serve a rationalizing purpose as well as one of escapist entertainment.

Health is a favorable area for the emergence of magic and superstition, as witnessed by the rise and persistence of health cults. Some take on the nature of diet fads and the like; others get embedded in the culture as serious religious-magical practices with elaborate ideologies. Intellectuals like some sorts, such as Couéism and Bahaism; others like their myth and superstition in less elaborate form. But the fact remains that superstitions continue from the past and are forever emerging out of man’s critical experiences.

It is but a step from myth, legend, and superstition to much of that homely wisdom which we call proverb and folk philosophy. The observations of men on their own and others’ conduct have produced a vast body of

¹⁷ New York *Times*, magazine section, February 21, 1943. By permission.

everyday concept and judgment into which apparently sound sense and much stereotype and fantasy enter. Proverbs are but cultural precipitates of the concrete experiences of men in society. "A stitch in time saves nine" is certainly applicable to the practice of being forehanded. "A soft answer turneth away wrath, but grievous words stir up anger" indicates that men had learned that words and the way they are spoken may inhibit aggression in another or enhance it. "A penny saved is a penny earned" arose at a time when thrift was considered a virtue, as a means of piling up interest-earning capital.

There are thousands of proverbs and folk sayings. Every tribe, people, or nation has them. An examination of them shows, of course, that they are not a consistent and ordered body of knowledge, but are common-sense though often contradictory distillations of prior experience. Moreover, they are often the results, from a logical point of view, of what we call "reasoning from one case" only. That is, they arise, evidently, in large part from specific situations and are then generalized into formal statements of wider application. In this sense they are illogical and come closer to the fantasy formula than to that of strict logic.

Myths, legends, superstitions, and proverbs come down to us from the past as a part of our cultural heritage. They are, however, never static. They are in the making today just as they have always been. Through modern propaganda, myths and legends are deliberately constructed for the purpose of social control. We shall leave the analysis of propaganda to a later chapter. Let us now examine the more or less unconscious growth of myths and legends.

The Psychology of Myth- and Legend-Making. Though there are individual differences in sensory and associative capacity, we see, hear, and otherwise perceive pretty much what we have been trained to perceive by parents, siblings, and others. (See Chapter VIII.) Perception is the synthesis of present sensation and past experience or meaning. The apperceptive mass or meaning is determined by personal-social and cultural conditioning. Stories of heroes and our childhood instruction in the meanings of our culture form the substratum on which all subsequent perceptions are built. Moreover, emotions and feelings color our perceptions, especially in the formative years. It is in this period of early childhood, in fact, that fantastic associations, with their emotional accompaniments, are most easily formed. These early conditionings, largely based on language, are the foundation of our adult social-cultural reality. In short, all perception is affected by individual differences in sensation, by the situation in which it occurs, by the direction of attention to particular aspects of the situation, by emotional factors, and by the traces of past experience.

Now, memory of past experiences is not an accurate photographic reproduction of perceptions and actions. It also is affected by other images,

other perceptions and emotional states, and by the lapse of time. The process of forgetting and recalling is as dynamic as perception or any other anticipatory response. Says G. M. Stratton: "The memory not only grows less clear, but it actually tells a different story as time proceeds." Not only do we find in memory transposition of items in time and space, condensation, typification, secondary elaboration and dramatization, as the studies of Freud, Crosland, Whipple, and Bartlett have shown, but in the very process of communication of memories from person to person these alterations are enhanced. A story may gather or lose detail in the retelling. Narration is thus a creative process. Although individuals may be certain that their accounts are accurate, we know how faulty they often are.

The will to believe may be so strong that outright fiction is accepted as fact. An interesting illustration of this was the popular reaction in the early 1900's to George Barr McCutcheon's novel *Graustark*. This book, a romantic fantasy about a "never-never land" in the Balkans, had an immense sale. People everywhere took the actuality of Graustark and its characters for granted. McCutcheon was constantly deluged with requests for more information about this place and its people. His comments were reported as follows:

"A woman in Cleveland asked him to give her directions for reaching Graustark by rail after landing in Europe. Her daughter was an invalid, and the mother was quite sure that the climate of Graustark would be 'of untold benefit to her.' Another woman wrote that her husband was dying of consumption and she felt that if they could buy or rent a house on the mountainside at Edelweiss they could avert the death that seemed so near. These were the letters that hurt him to answer. . . .

"A Washington man wrote that he was organizing a Graustark Club in his lodging-house with the idea of escorting the entire party to the principality as soon as the weather was favorable for the trip. Of course there were the tales of travelers who professed to know all about Graustark, and found Mr. McCutcheon seriously at fault in his local color. One such traveler, however, was generous. A San Francisco woman who wrote to ask the longitude and latitude of Graustark said, 'I have a friend here who has traveled extensively. She says she has been in Graustark twice and loves it very much.' . . ." ¹⁸

Many myths and legends arose during World War II. The atrocity story emerged chiefly from the conduct of the Nazis in occupied countries rather than from stories of the fighting fronts—with some exceptions from engagements with the Japanese and from the Soviet Union. Though they had much basis in fact, due in part to deliberate policies of the Japanese and Germans, there was doubtless not only unconscious elaboration and fabrication but some deliberate manufacture as well. The function of atrocity stories will be discussed in Chapter XXI.

¹⁸ From Arthur Maurice, "Buying a Ticket to Graustark," *Literary Digest*, 1928, 99: 51. By permission of the author.

At this point we may summarize the significant factors in the development of legends. Once a myth is started, many of the same mechanisms are found at work.

(1) The emotional state of the observers: This is usually intensified at the time of the perception if the situation is dramatic.

(2) Errors of perception at the time of observation: If the event is spectacular or unfamiliar, it is more difficult to perceive it accurately. Attention will be limited to a few details.

(3) Errors in recall: These are especially evident when the event is later being described to others.

(4) Predispositions, the apperceptive mass, of the witnesses: These predispositions are made up of old stereotypes, prejudices, and legends still persisting in the observers.

(5) False interpretation by the observers: As far as they imagine the characteristics of the observed individuals, the observers will err in interpreting their acts.

(6) The tendency to telescope and conventionalize into simpler form: Here stereotypes and other shorthand symbols take the place of longer and qualifying details.

(7) The operation of fantasy thinking in elaboration of the stories: This is related to the motives to be discussed below.

(8) The deliberate manufacture of legends or of details in those which arise unconsciously: This is done in propaganda.

(9) The time elapsing between perception and recall: After even a very brief interval, the event as recalled differs from the actual event. As the time elapsing between the event and its recall increases, observers begin to add or change or forget innumerable details.

The myth and the legend tend to become conventionalized—that is, standardized in terms of the values and interests of the group. The process at work here is essentially the same as that described in Chapter VIII with reference to perceptual judgments. So, too, the gestural background of rituals represents a fixity of habit which makes for smooth and predictable reactions. Ritual is psychologically closely linked to perseveration, the tendency to repeat stimulus-response patterns once they have been set up. In ritual, as in other actions revealing perseveration, the situation which gave rise to the action becomes progressively less important. That is, there is a reduction of the external stimulus, and the action becomes more and more automatic. In a sense the ritual exemplifies the extreme of conventionalization, which is seen in less marked degree in myth and legend. In the latter, the telling and retelling, especially when not checked by reduction to printed form, always allow the creative fantasies of the narrator to add a bit here and subtract something there. In ritual, the externalization of action and its sacred magical quality tend, on the whole, to prevent such inventiveness from operating. Nevertheless, in crises, or when new motives arise, even rituals grow and change.

Behind these psychological mechanisms which alter the myths and legends lies the motivation which sets up myth- and legend-making in the

first place. We have already noted this with respect to the situations which give rise to magic, myth, and legend. Let us explore this further.¹⁹

Any anxiety-arousing stimulus, any situation which sets up a cycle of activity that cannot be completed, any awakening of a drive that cannot be relieved by an adequate reward, produces frustrations and anxieties, emotions of fear and anger, and trial-and-error or planned intellectual efforts to resolve or reduce the tension. Birth, death, sickness, failure of food supply, and unemployment will serve as illustrations of such frustrating and anxiety-inducing situations. In the face of such unsolved problems, emotional uncertainty and distress tend to be elaborated, and, in an effort to solve the difficulties, fantasy thinking comes into play. Under emotional discomfort the dangers of the situation may be greatly exaggerated. The individual may develop what we call neurotic anxiety—that is, worry, uncertainty, and a sense of insecurity far beyond that considered normal in the circumstances by other members of the group.

Yet anxieties of this sort are not entirely the result of personal experience. Individuals tend to deposit their anxieties in the myth, legend, and ritual of their culture and thus to carry them over to others. Anticipatory reactions toward actual or imaginary dangers, as these are defined by adults or other group members, are often set up in the child. For example, Jewish children in the Russia of the Czars were often impressed with stories of pogroms against the Jews. Such legends not only served the immediate purpose of social control over the child, but also gave him a point of identification with his group and prepared him for future violence. While such culturized and transmitted stories may arouse anxiety in the child, they also reinforce the myths and legends of his in-group. So, too, Negro children in our country are told of white aggression toward the colored race, and these stories give meaning to the more specific instructions of parents and other persons to avoid open clashes with the dominant whites. And on the other side white children are instructed about Negro violence.

In somewhat the same manner stories about magical cures set up anticipation of recovery in the sick who seek relief in magic. As we well know, much illness has a strong psychological component, and the belief in the efficacy of magic may itself facilitate a recovery. Though the diffusion of medical science and practice has cut into this sort of myth and legend, much of the belief remains. Intelligent physicians and surgeons everywhere realize the beneficial effects for their patients of prayer and faith in a religion. In the face of death, civilized man is no braver than his primitive contemporary, even though his science and his medical and surgical skill are superior to the hocus-pocus of the primitive medicine man.²⁰

¹⁹ See O. H. Mowrer, "A Stimulus-Response Analysis of Anxiety and Its Role as a Reinforcing Agent," *Psychological Review*, 1939, 46: 553-561.

²⁰ This whole topic of the relation of disease to social-psychological and cultural factors has

The myth provides ample scope for the individual narrator or hearer to identify himself with the heroes and events of the tale. How thoroughly we do so is illustrated by the fact that children hearing fairy stories often correct adults who depart from the conventionalized steps of the story. In this sense even the myth or legend takes on certain ritualistic features. So, too, myths and legends about evil forces, such as disease, or evil men, such as our enemies, provide ample opportunity to project our aggressions and hostilities onto other groups or objects. This is notably shown in witchcraft.

We also have a means of sublimating our aggression in myths and legends, through talk and fantasy, and, in rituals, through overt but standardized acts. Purification rites and the mystery and miracle plays of the Middle Ages are good illustrations of identification, projection, and sublimation. For example, in seeing the devil undone in his attempts to lead mankind astray, we identify ourselves with the characters who successfully overcome temptation, and are provided with a rationalization of our recurrent difficulties in leading a moral life. The great dramas of human conduct—the stories of the fall of man and his redemption through Christ, the problem of good and evil presented in the story of Job, the fables of Aesop—illustrate certain universal patterns of man's adaptive struggle against death, disease, physical disaster, human cupidity, oppression, and the other recurrent but unsolved human crises. Despite the variations in details and in historical setting, primitive and civilized men have given us ample evidence that myth, legend, and ritual represent universal responses to the uncertainties, the disappointments, the unresolved problems of living. They give us some fixed points, some stability in a dynamic and often dangerous world. What Clyde Kluckhohn writes about these matters among the Navahos applies equally elsewhere: "Myths and rituals jointly provide systematic protection against supernatural dangers, the threats of ill health and of the physical environment, anti-social tensions, and the pressures of a more powerful society."²¹ Every society finds some definitions of and solutions for its insecurities and conflicts in fantasy-founded stories and rituals.

The Theory of Fictions. Both social psychology and philosophy have at times been concerned with the fiction, the *as if* aspect of myths, legends, and ideologies. The theory of fictions²² holds, in brief, that the concepts of science, art, religion, and social control are not real but are fictions devised to aid us in controlling practical situations. This is obviously a way of meeting the medieval problem of nominalism versus realism. That is to say,

not been sufficiently studied. See, however, the files of *Psychosomatic Medicine*, and K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, chap. 26, for further discussion. See also Clyde Kluckhohn, *op. cit.*, for cases and discussion.

²¹ Kluckhohn, *op. cit.*, p. 77. By permission of the author. See also G. C. Homan, "Anxiety and Ritual," *American Anthropologist*, 1941, 43: 164-173.

²² See Hans Vaihinger, *The Philosophy of the 'As If'*, transl. by C. K. Ogden, 1924.

are groups, culture, myths, legends, and concepts generally merely names for concrete perceptual objects or classes and qualities of such objects, or are they actualities or realities in and of themselves? For empirical research and social-psychological theory this old debate is futile. The utilitarian and operational standpoint of W. I. Thomas is in point when he says, "If men define situations as real, they are real in their consequences." For our purposes this pragmatic view should suffice, since we are interested in the effects of such thought forms on thought and conduct. The group is meaningful only as it is related to individuals in interaction. Culture is significant only as that dynamic precipitate of interaction which defines objects and situations and gives meaning to relations and events. So, too, ideology, myth, and legend are basic in social action. Cultured fantasies, ideologies, myths, and legends are among the data of social psychology and cultural anthropology. These are events and objects with which, in their functional processes, those sciences must deal. It is no aid to call them unrealistic, unscientific, or fictional. They are devices or instruments in the total adaptive process and are not to be dismissed as unimportant or as meaningless and unscientific fantasies.²³ The controversy, obviously, is chiefly linguistic, and for our purposes philosophic cogitations of this sort reflect an interplay of language and logic which can be checked, after all, only by empirical observations and predictions. The disputed concepts are deeply embedded in our culture and cannot be removed or made ineffective by mere verbal discussion.²⁴

THE SOCIAL-CULTURAL FUNCTION OF MYTH AND LEGEND

The most significant myths and legends emerge out of recurrent problems of adjustment to our physical and social-cultural world. They are part of our value system and are closely related to the devices of social control. The more common situations in which myths and legends have arisen and still arise involve religion and supernaturalism, economic matters, and political problems. Much of what passes for history is loaded with myths and legends of various sorts, and writers have repeatedly tried to characterize whole epochs in terms of basic myths or ideologies. For example, Peter F. Drucker holds that western Europe since the coming of Christianity has been dominated by four successive myths, the "Spiritual Man" found in

²³ See M. R. Cohen, "Fictions," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1931, 6: 225-228, for a view which looks askance at an operational definition of fictions.

²⁴ It is interesting to note how writers like F. H. Allport, while objecting to these so-called fictions, still make use of them, though labeling them with "illusion" or some such derogatory term. See F. H. Allport, *Institutional Behavior*, 1932, and D. Katz and R. H. Schanck, *Social Psychology*, 1938. The latter follow their former teacher, F. H. Allport, rather closely in theory, but frankly admit the great importance of the "fictions" in social action.

early Christianity and the Middle Ages, the "Intellectual Man" who developed in the Renaissance, the "Economic Man" of capitalistic and socialistic ideology and practice, and the recently emerging "Heroic Man," a characteristic feature of fascism and of the stress on political rather than economic controls.²⁵ Another attempt to characterize long historical periods by shorthand concepts is that of Pitirim A. Sorokin, who views all history as a swing between the extremes of what he terms *sensate* and *ideational* cultures. The former are marked by attention to material matters and by philosophies of hedonism and utilitarianism. The latter are directed to more introspective concerns, to spiritual, nonmaterialistic values, and to philosophies of idealism, mysticism, and other-worldliness. For example, the modern capitalistic-technological order is of the former sort, the medieval period of the latter.²⁶

These particular ideologies or myths, of course, are derived *ex post facto* from a contemplation of history. Though they draw on the past, they are not nondeliberative, unconscious products of the past. Nor are these ideological devices useful for predicting the future. Yet, like other myths, they are important because they tend to provide a frame of reference for interpreting the past, present, and future. As elaborate rationalizations they may serve some purposes of more specific planning for the future. However, it is our purpose, not to criticize these or other interpretations of history, but rather to examine the functioning of certain myths and legends as they have influenced behavior and thought. We shall confine ourselves chiefly to our own European-American culture and to religious, economic, and political interests.

Religious Myths and Ideologies. Man has long been interested in trying to explain his place in the universe. Primitive mythology is full of such explanations. Some of the creation stories collected by folklorists are products of indigenous invention; others are diffused accounts which have served the purposes of various tribes and societies. Our Judaic-Christian story of the Creation and of the Garden of Eden has played an important part in aiding men to interpret and rationalize their role and status. But we know that the story has its roots in still earlier societies of the Tigris and Euphrates valleys. So, too, the Greeks had a variety of stories of origins and early history. Certain passages in Homer reveal the belief that mankind had once lived in a state superior to the present. And Hesiod (about 776 B.C.) traced the downward trend of man from the Golden Age, in which there was no toil or hardship or infirmity, through the Silver Age and the Bronze Age to the Iron Age, in which man had no relief from hard work, sorrow, and disease. There was in this whole decline definite evidence of moral deterioration.

²⁵ See P. F. Drucker, *The End of Economic Man*, 1939.

²⁶ P. A. Sorokin, *Cultural and Social Dynamics*, 4 vols., 1937-1940.

Even a casual examination of these early myths and legends reveals a division between those which view the past as a golden age from which mankind has descended and those which look upon man as the maker of his own destiny or at least as a character in a vast drama which unfolds as man moves from lower to higher status, from sin to salvation, from degradation to perfection. Later this second ideology gave rise to the doctrine of progress as we know it in our time. (See p. 217.) Western man, at least, seems to have fluctuated in his daydreams between a belief in a golden age, in an Arcadian past, and a belief in some future state, in a millennium or utopia of perfection.

The concept of a fall from primeval innocence and beauty and hope of redemption came to be a main theme in Christian dogma. There was no notion of progress in this, but rather a view that the degradation derived from the Fall of Man would be wiped out in the plan of salvation in which Jesus Christ had a central role. On the basis of his sacrifice and his teachings mankind would be permitted to return to a state of perfection.

Certainly one of the most persistent myths has been the belief in a millennium or other future blissful state in which all problems will be solved and no difficulties will ensue. Such fantasies provide release from present hardship and a hope for permanent and lasting peace in the future. Such daydreams arise out of the historical crises of groups and are projections into the culture of the fancies of particular persons. In this way they become standardized into acceptable forms and as parts of the culture may last for hundreds of years as the basic beliefs of peoples. In our cultural history, the central idea was that human difficulties are caused by the operation of dark evil, of hostile spirits or forces who may be overcome in time by spirits or forces of light and goodness. It was within this dichotomy of good and evil forces that the idea of some future state of perfection, peace, and continuous well-being became injected into later Hebrew mythology and thence, in part, came down into Christianity. As Israel met disaster after disaster, the thought of the leaders tended to run either to programs of social reform or to fantasies of release from the intolerable situations by some fiat of Jehovah, or to some combination of immediate reform with divine intervention. These ideas were carried by Jesus and his followers into early Christianity, and in time they took on somewhat different form and content.

Rebuffed on every hand, persecuted, and denied social status, the early Christians developed a mythology of the early return of Jesus and a restoration of the saints. The hateful Roman Empire was identified with all that was evil. Later, with the triumph of the Christian church over its rivals, Greco-Roman and Hebraic-Christian elements merged, and a certain stability of myth and faith developed.

As the year 1000 approached, many began to imagine that the end of the world was about to come, and various fantasies were developed and spread through Christendom. The fact that the expected end of the world did not take place at the end of the first millennium of our era did not deter scholars from projecting the end of worldly events into the future. Joachim of Floris, a twelfth-century monk, had elaborate ideas on this matter. He assumed three historical epochs, the Age of the Father, or the Mosaic law,

that of the Son, or the gospel, and that of the Spirit, yet to come.²⁷ This final phase was to be an idealized monastic order, filled with mystic experiences in association with God.

The Fifth Monarchy movement, begun in 1633, is a later illustration of the same pattern. The advocates held that King Jesus would appear shortly and establish the predestined fifth and final kingdom on earth, the four previous kingdoms having been the Assyrian, the Persian, the Grecian, and the Roman. The last-named was held to have persisted in the Roman Catholic Church. The Fifth Monarchy group not only was bitterly opposed to the Catholic Church but also had strong leanings toward communism and mysticism. The followers of this myth believed not only in preaching but also in acting on their convictions as a means of demonstrating their fitness to enter into the Kingdom of Jesus. This belief expressed itself in two unsuccessful rebellions against the English government, one in 1657 and one in 1661. One of the women followers stressed mystical knowledge as a peculiar source of wisdom in the following stanza, which is supposed to have been composed while she was in a trance:

"Thou shalt read the visions John had,
Not after the learned doctor's way;
But thou shalt read them in plainness
And clear light in the day.
Thou shalt not read what's spoke of Dragon and Beast
With university art;
But thou shalt read with kings' seven eyes
And an enlightened heart.
Thou shalt not run to antichrist's libraries,
To fetch from thence any skill
To read the Revelation of Christ,
But be with knowledge fill'd." ²⁸

During the eighteenth century, a variety of millennial hopes arose in northern and central Europe. These were mixtures of religious utopian dreams and mystical experience. The Shaker movement in England and the United States is one instance. An outgrowth of one branch of the Quakers, the Millennial Church, as it was called, under Anne Lee, developed a movement based on celibacy, communism, and simple living looking forward to a rapturous union with God and the saints at the second coming of Christ. After the French Revolution, Napoleon was made the Antichrist in the ideologies of various groups which looked for a catastrophic end of evil and a sudden installation of the good. In the nineteenth century a number of sects built on millennial hopes arose in England—for example, the Catholic Apostolic Church (Irvingites) and the Plymouth Brethren

²⁷ For a description of this and other millennial hopes, see S. J. Case, *The Millennial Hope*, 1918.

²⁸ From Case, *op. cit.*, p. 193. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

(Darbyites). In America the rise of Mormonism, of the Millerites, and of other adventist sects had the same general pattern.

In recent decades the so-called apostolic and pentecostal churches represent somewhat the same sort of millennialism. These religious groups began as sects deviating from various established churches such as the Methodist. They were marked by revivalism, emotional expression of religious faith, and a return to what were considered the fundamental Christian doctrines and practices described in the New Testament (primitivism). The appeals were chiefly to the economically handicapped. All through the economically depressed South, and elsewhere too, these organizations grew in the interim between the two World Wars, especially in the 1930's.

It must not be imagined that millennial movements are confined to Christianity. A development similar in form and content is seen in the rise and spread of the Ghost-Dance religion among the Plains Indians during the 1880's. The story of the pressure of white population upon the native tribes in this country is well known, and from time to time Indian leaders preached that sooner or later supernatural powers would intervene to aid the Indians in driving the white man into the sea and in restoring to the tribesmen their lands and other resources. The most striking and widespread of these beliefs, however, developed as the white man spread rapidly into what the Indians considered their last free area, the western great plains. Various prophet-agitators arose and began preaching a kind of holy war against the whites. New religious formulations appeared, often a mixture of native and Christian theology and ritual, and concerned with the hope and myth of deliverance from white oppression. Some of the Indian outbreaks in the 1880's were partially motivated by these myths.²⁹

All these movements have much in common. They appeal to the imagination of the depressed classes and to those who cannot believe in any slow, evolutionary changes in the world. They appeal to those who look for some supernatural fiat to cure the world's ills. The return to a golden age of the past or the advance to a utopian state of perfection runs through these religious myths. But the myths concerning economic and political matters also reveal many of the same general features.

Myths of Economic Utopias. Many of the utopias of a perfect economic order are millennial. Some express an acceptance of cultural evolution; others advocate a violent overthrow of society and its culture. Religious and political fantasies, of course, usually give some attention to economics. Yet it is especially in modern times that men have announced schemes by which the depressed classes might raise themselves by their own bootstraps out of poverty, illness, and early death.

Most of these programs have been socialistic or communistic. The disas-

²⁹ James Mooney, "The Ghost-Dance Religion and the Sioux Culture of 1890," *14th Annual Report of the Bureau of Ethnology*, 1892-1893, part 2.

ters of the Napoleonic wars and the impact of the Industrial Revolution made millions wish for a better economic order. Some of these schemes, such as that of Robert Owen, the Britisher, were tried out in this country. Others remained pretty much at the verbal level. The most sweeping and dynamic economic myth of the nineteenth century, of course, was that developed by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Their dogmas were developed in terms of historical studies reinterpreted by means of a dialectic logic and a materialistic interpretation of history as a class struggle. This is the old familiar good-versus-evil theme. Here are a few sentences from the *Communist Manifesto* (1848), showing some of the basic conceptions aimed at uniting the working classes of all the world into one solid proletariat opposed to the property-owning class:

"The working men have no country. . . .

"National differences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and more vanishing, owing to the development of the bourgeoisie, to freedom of commerce, to the world-market, to uniformity in the mode of production and in the conditions of life corresponding thereto.

"The supremacy of the proletariat will cause them to vanish still faster. . . .

"In proportion as the exploitation of one individual by another is put an end to, the exploitation of one nation by another will also be put an end to. . . .

"... The first step in the revolution by the working class is to raise the proletariat to the position of the ruling class, to win the battle of democracy. . . .

"The Communists disdain to conceal their views and aims. They openly declare that their ends can be attained only by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions. Let the ruling classes tremble at a Communistic revolution. The proletarians have nothing to lose but their chains. They have a world to win."

"Working men of all countries, unite!"³⁰

The dynamic actionism of Marxism stands in considerable contrast to the more pacific hopefulness of other utopian programs. Yet even here there is predestinationism, a belief in the inevitability of the revolution that will in time not only put the proletariat in power, but lead, in the end, to the happy condition of a classless society.

The importance of the social myth as a central theme for revolution has been amply described by Georges Sorel in his *Reflections on Violence* (French edition, 1908). He was especially concerned with instilling in the masses a dynamic belief which would induce social solidarity and move men to the general strike, the first phase of the revolution.

Anarchism, though it shows some of the actionistic fantasy that is common in the radical thought of the nineteenth century, is based not so much on a utopian future as on a return to a primitive naturalism which shall free man from the political state and economic exploitation. In this sense,

³⁰ From K. Marx and F. Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*. By permission of the Charles H. Kerr Co.

anarchism has much in common with the mythology of the return to an Arcadian past. Its theory of a perfect world is not a building of the future, but a retreat to a golden age.

There are no more urgent needs than those for food, drink, shelter, sexual activity, and protection from common dangers. The failure of men to satisfy these basic drives leads them over and over again not only to attempt to satisfy them in overt action but to formulate dreams of a more satisfactory state or condition in which there is either a return to an imagined pristine purity or a construction of a new and perfect and everlasting society and culture. Here again is the fluctuation between fantasies of a return to a golden age and those of an advance to a millennial perfection.

Political Myths. Political utopias are as common as those of religion and economics. In fact, the three are frequently intertwined. Not to go further afield into ancient history, one may mention Plato's *Republic* as a projected wish for a perfect society done in the grand manner. In it we see an effort to attain justice, happiness, and social solidarity by means of responsible leadership, fixed classes, just economic arrangements, detailed measures regulating eugenics, education, and indoctrination, and other devices that remind us of recent totalitarian movements. In fact, Plato's dream has been the inspiration for dozens of later utopian pictures, religious, economic, and political.

Plato's dream was not realistic, but imaginary throughout. Another classical utopia, which professes to be historical, is Plutarch's idealistic description of the life of Lycurgus of Sparta. Similar utopias occur in Greek, Norse, Celtic, and Arabic legends which describe an earthly paradise to the west or in the Atlantic Ocean; all the stories of a lost Atlantis are of this sort. They were as firmly believed in their time as our verifiable facts are today. St. Augustine's *City of God* is an early Christian fantasy which divides the world into basic conditions, one divine, perfect, and eternal, the other mundane and transitory. St. Augustine, like Plato, became the basis for later discussions of perfect and imperfect societies.

The Renaissance writer Thomas More, in his *Utopia* (1516), set a new vogue in political and economic myth-making. Living during the emergence of capitalistic exploitation (as witnessed in the enclosure system then begun), when the greed and violence of the ruling aristocracy were countered by abject poverty, disease, and inhumanity, More described a far-off land in which such conditions did not prevail, but in which political justice and humanistic decency prevailed. More, who was a great classical scholar as well as an important statesman of his time, drew upon Plato and upon Epicurean and Stoic sources when they suited his purpose. His picture of a humane idealism set a pattern for many subsequent literary daydreams of a more perfect society.

In the next century Sir Francis Bacon's *New Atlantis* (1624-1629) revealed a new confidence in science as a key to universal happiness and as a basis for making a perfect society—a type of myth that has continued with amazing persistence to our day. The seventeenth and eighteenth centuries saw a variety of utopian fantasies. Of all

these, that of Jean-Jacques Rousseau had the greatest influence on subsequent democratic and socialist thinking. His picture of an idealistic, primitive society has a romantic appeal that reaches down to our own time.

In the nineteenth century we had Edward Bulwer-Lytton's *The Coming Race* (1871), Samuel Butler's *Erewhon* (1872) and *Erewhon Revisited* (1901), Edward Bellamy's *Looking Backward* (1888), William Morris' *News from Nowhere* (1890), and hosts of socialistic or communistic utopias, like Theodor Hertzka's *Reise nach Fresland* (1893), which depicts an imaginary communistic society in central Africa; and in the early twentieth century H. G. Wells wrote books of social prophecy.

The most striking political mythology of our time is fascism. Though the two leading varieties, Italian Fascism and German National Socialism (Nazism), are not identical, they have much in common. Since their general features are well known, we note only one or two of the major ideas of National Socialism. Though the mythology of this movement has never been as carefully developed as many others, notably the Marxian, it does have some basic ideas. The doctrine of racial superiority is linked with the mystic concept of the folk and the community, the divine mission of this folk implying a need for living space (*Lebensraum*). The principle of leadership, of the Führer, is closely related to the theory of a fixed class system. The racially pure folk and community operate through the state, which controls every aspect of life, communal, economic, religious, familial, and recreational. The mystic bond of the folk is made possible only through the program of *Gleichschaltung*, or complete co-ordination, which, literally, irons out all opposition.

On the basis of these faiths, the Nazi leaders promised the Germans the domination of the world and a thousand years of peace. National Socialism is a neat term combining the ideas of national pride and independence with those of socialistic equality among the superior folk. It became for millions a battle cry that promised the "new order."

Other Varieties of Myth. Closely related to many of these myths is another one known widely as the doctrine of social progress. This became a basic article of faith to liberals everywhere during the nineteenth century. The more extreme belief in some fundamental trend toward perfection was expressed by the Marquis de Condorcet, French mathematician and revolutionary. His faith was so unbounded that even in the shadow of the guillotine he was led to write:

"The result of my work will be to show, by reasoning and by facts, that there is no limit set to the perfecting of the powers of man; that human perfectibility is in reality indefinite; that the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to stop it, has no other limit than the duration of the globe upon which nature has placed us. . . . What a picture of the human race, freed from its chains, removed from the empire of chance as from that of the enemies of its

progress, and advancing with a firm and sure step on the pathway of truth, of virtue, and of happiness."⁸¹

There are, of course, many other myths or fictions. Diet fads and health cults represent popular types in a society which puts as much stress on health as we do. So, too, Yogi and all sorts of Oriental mysticisms have wide appeal. Many of these are not particularly well developed and trail off into mere superstitions. Moreover, in all these cults there is likely to be deliberate exploitation of gullibility and credulity. All the way from magic through religious revivalism to economic and political movements, we find those who use man's interests and faith in such fantasies as a means of making money and otherwise securing power. Charlatanry and sincerity are not always easy to distinguish.

History, Legends, and Values. Religious, economic, and political utopias give ample evidence of the tendency to project the solution of problems into the realm of fantasy. They are always expressed in contemporary phrases designed to catch the imagination of men who cannot come to grips with the concrete problems of their society. Yet we must not imagine that these fantastic pictures are without value to the groups that believe in them. They not only give emotional solace in everyday crises, but may, if they sufficiently fire the imagination, be the basis for attempts to alter the present order in the direction of the imagined better one. The ideology of a religious, economic, or political group may become the basis for attempts to change the whole social organization. There are doubtless forces which will control the direction which these efforts at change will take, for men do not live by faith alone. Their forms of faith, nevertheless, are important in determining their attempts to control their environment.

Not only are myths and ideologies highly important in any culture, but the legends of societies, heroes, and villains are also significant. In each generation the children of a tribe, community, or nation are early indoctrinated with the history of their society. This conveniently introduces them into the folklore of the group, its ways of doing things, and its ideals and standards of conduct. Moreover, this introduction is essential to the continuity of culture patterns. It is necessary to stability, order, and social control. One of the most impressive devices is the narration of the life stories of great men, the heroes of the past. Though political events may constitute the major part of even contemporary history texts, it is a fair assumption that the things which most impress children are the personalities of history. We need to believe in great men. If we do not have them, we create them out of any material at hand. This is a natural phase of our ethnocentrism. Every group believes in the importance of its own past, including therein

⁸¹ From Marquis de Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*. Translation from J. H. Randall, *The Making of the Modern Mind*, rev. ed., 1940, p. 383. By permission of Houghton Mifflin Co., publishers, and the author.

its heroes. In the telling and retelling of the great events surrounding our heroes, the imagination, rich in wish-fulfillment, is given free scope. Just as the narration of an occurrence before a court, or the retelling of experiences in war or other crises, is colored by emotional toning, so, in the frequent repetition of the tales of our heroes, bits are constantly added here and there until the original actuality of personality and event is completely obscured. Every historian knows this. He realizes that without the most careful and painstaking approach and use of his data history is not scientific in any ordinary sense of the word. It is more akin to literature and art than to science. Some historians do not like to admit this, but only because to be scientific is in the folkways and to believe in a place for fictions and art is not. The fact remains that men unconsciously construct pictures of their heroes to fit their wishes. Thus they satisfy their own egos by vicarious participation in the great events of their heroes. No one would maintain that Plutarch's *Lives* are scientific pictures of the characters he describes, and yet they live for us in an amazing way. We have a kind of scale of legends. The earliest go back to such mythical characters as Perseus, Hercules, and Odin. Then we have such heroes as Achilles, Ulysses, and Æneas, and in northern Europe the romantic legends of King Arthur. Yet colossal legends have grown up about historical figures like Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, Richard the Lionhearted, and Joan of Arc. In modern history one of the most tremendous figures is Napoleon. Around him has collected such an overpowering mass of legend and counterlegend that the historian is baffled and the layman is at the mercy of each new writer, as again and again the picture of this man is changed in color.

The legends of our own country begin with Columbus and Ponce de León and Hernando de Soto, but become more significant as we learn about Captain John Smith and Miles Standish, and then about George Washington, Patrick Henry, and other revolutionary heroes. We move on to Daniel Boone, Andrew Jackson, John Brown, and Abraham Lincoln—to note only a few in passing. And in more recent years the names of Theodore Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, John J. Pershing, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Douglas MacArthur take on large stature.

No character in American history is more interesting as a subject of myth and legend than Abraham Lincoln. Some see in him a man of great religious and moral courage; others view him as a rationalist on the ground that he once wrote an essay in defense of atheism. Many object to the ribald stories attributed to him; others find in these an evidence of his deep sense of humor and humanity. His life story helped build the "log cabin to White House" stereotype that is so potent in arousing individual aspirations. He is a positive character in Northern stories, but for a long time after the Civil War his name was unpopular in the South. There he was the villain of the piece, and Davis and Lee the heroes.

In our own time, moreover, there have been numerous deliberate attempts to foster legends as a phase of building up popular heroes, both in politics and in industry. But, whether the propaganda is deliberate or not, the fact remains that the masses live in these images, which serve a distinct purpose in arousing hero-worship, bolstering up in-group patriotism, and affording vicarious satisfactions for the common man. As with religious formulations, if tomorrow we destroyed the myths and legends about our heroes, we would the next day begin unconsciously to make new ones. And so the process of myth- and legend-making never ceases. Not only are political heroes made and unmade in this fashion, but great names associated with the economic development of this country take on heroic proportions. Men like Carnegie, Rockefeller, Morgan, and Ford serve as examples of what the rising young man may hope for. In like manner there are heroes of baseball like Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig, and the heroes of adventure like Peary and Lindbergh are of great importance in keeping alive the spirit of daring.

Great wars are prolific sources of new legends. These concern both higher officers and common soldiers. World War I saw our own Sergeant York and Eddie Rickenbacker. Germany had her ace flier, Richthofen, and her highly successful commander of sea raiders, Luckner. In World War II, one of the first of the great heroic figures was General Douglas MacArthur, whose brave defense of the Philippines against enormous odds gave rise to a wealth of legends. News stories told of his defensive tactics and of his long preparation for the Japanese attack. Editors and commentators discussed his ability and leadership. Newspapers and periodicals retold the story of his life with pictures. He was soon mentioned as a natural-born leader who should be made chief of staff of our army or candidate for the presidency of this country in 1944.

Yet the heroes were not all generals. The exploits of Captain Colin P. Kelly, Lieutenant John D. Bulkeley, and Colonel Philip Cochran became common talk, and the masses rejoiced that the American spirit had awakened to great deeds. Not only stories but songs, jokes, and cartoons added to the stock of our popular heroes. The heroism of the common fighting man was told and retold, and such a song as "Praise the Lord and Pass the Ammunition" not only provided a kind of divine sanction for battle action but showed how quickly legends arise and spread.

Many earnest persons belittle or regret myth-making. They consider it foolish or pathological and somehow a bit devilish or evil. This very attitude is an illustration of the persistence of the eighteenth-century cult of rationalism and of its myth that man is largely an intellectual, deliberate, and scientific creature. A man may object to what Bertrand Russell calls heroics and may do his best to "cure" the masses of its liking for them, but myth and legend are as inevitable in human society and culture as are me-

chanical inventions and the use of rational instruments for bending the physical universe to our utilitarian purposes. Moreover, as we shall see in Chapter XX, the deliberate manufacture of myth and legend shows that man is aware of the use he may make of deep-lying fantasies and irrationalities. As we shall note, the problem is not to try to prevent heroics and myths and legends but to control them within a moral framework which will prevent their abuse in the hands of unscrupulous men.

For the professional historian history may be objective and scientific in method and even in content, but for the masses it always was and still is rich in emotional suggestiveness. It is a dynamic part of our cultural environment. It is not something superimposed on us as cold fact; it teems with life; it gives us courage in crises, affords us solace in disaster, and provides all of us with a world of vicarious but nevertheless real living. We must remind ourselves that man does not live alone in a colorless universe of passive objectivity, but in a subjective, emotionally toned world of attitudes and images, and that myth, ideology, and legend determine his conduct more than does the purely physical universe.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

There is a vast literature in this field. The student will find the following useful as introductions.

On the nature and function of the stereotype, see Walter Lippmann, *Public Opinion*, 1922.

On the nature and function of myths and legends, see C. Macfie Campbell, *Delusion and Belief*, 1926; B. Malinowski, *Myth in Primitive Psychology*, 1926; R. R. Marett, *Psychology and Folklore*, 1920; G. Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*, 1914; F. van Langenhove, *The Growth of a Legend*, 1916.

On the place of ideology and utopias in Western society, see S. J. Case, *The Millennial Hope*, 1918; J. O. Hertzler, *The History of Utopian Thought*, 1923; Karl Mannheim, *Ideology and Utopia*, transl. by L. Wirth and E. Shils, 1936; and Lewis Mumford, *The Story of Utopias*, 1922.

Chapter X

DOMINANCE AND LEADERSHIP

THE ROLE of leaders in society is a matter of perennial discussion. There are scarcely any human associations in which leaders do not sooner or later appear. There are usually some persons who stand out and direct, while others listen, submit, and follow. Clearly the nature and function of leadership are important topics in social psychology and the social sciences. After a general introduction to the basic facts of dominance and leadership in animal and human societies, this chapter will take up certain psychological aspects, particularly the traits and the types of leaders. It will then go on to discuss social-cultural interaction as it affects leadership, and finally it will treat the relations of leaders to the masses.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF DOMINANCE

Much of one's behavior as leader takes some form of dominance. It may not be violent or very overt, of course, and it may take an impersonal or institutional rather than a personal form. Nevertheless, it is a self-assertive reaction which induces more or less submissive or acceptable responses on the part of others. Dominance always has a counterpart in the submission of others. It is also evident that dominance has some association with that larger response system which we term aggression. This is not to imply that what we commonly consider leadership is a direct, antagonistic outlet of some frustration. This would be too naïve and would ignore the profound effects of social-cultural conditioning. But certainly the basic forms of dominance have much in common, at least in their rudimentary expression, with aggressive reactions.

Dominance among the Animals. Like many other basic human interactions, dominance has its prototype among the lower animals. It, like maternal care, play, conflict, co-operation, group cohesion, and many other fundamental social patterns, is found among the lower species. In this sense, then, dominant-submissive interactions are precultural though fundamentally social. Since many details on this topic have been presented in Chapter II, we need but review quickly some of the striking examples of dominance-submission patterns among the lower animals.

Forms as low as lizards develop a hierarchy of dominance and submission in which a stronger and older member comes to control other members of the species within a

certain area. Such dominance, moreover, is established by fighting or attack, and, if threatened, will be defended by the same means. Many species of bird life show similar but much more complex interactions. The pecking of domestic fowl shows this; in some instances there is a gradient of power in which chicken A pecks B, B pecks C, and so on through a number of fowl occupying the same yard. In each pair there is evidence of what we term fear, avoidance, and submission on the part of one, and aggressive and attacking reactions on the part of the other.

The dominance-submission pattern among the monkeys and apes is more like that found among men. A number of studies have described the variety of such interactions. Sex differences enter into these situations, but the dominance of the male over the female may be modified by age and strength, and, among the apes studied by Yerkes, some females reversed the usual roles during the mating season and took the dominating part. On some occasions two apes may co-operate to attack another that has up to that point been dominant. If defeated, the former "master" may become subordinate to either of the pair that combined against him. Submissive reactions are at times used by some animals in order to secure the protection of a stronger member and to share certain favors in sex or food or both.

Such social patterns arise, as do others, in biosocial interactions prior to culture and independent of it. In other words, we have here the basic forms of dominance and submission which in the human species become highly varied and qualified by the impact of culture.

Dominance in Human Groups. It may be that in the comradeship or congeniality group little or no dominance appears, but every other human group, sooner or later, develops some form of ascendancy and submission. Perhaps the earliest human groups were families or clusters of families, in which male sex, age, and physical strength were the chief determinants of dominance. Certainly we find something like this in the highest ape societies, which in so many ways are like the societies of mankind. But, this assumption of origins aside, wherever we find the primary group, whether among tribesmen, in the folk-peasant societies of Europe and Asia, or in more complex civilized societies, there we find some form of dominance and submission. The parents direct and control the children; the elders of the community dominate the adult members and direct the moral and other controls essential to group solidarity and safety. In our historical past the essentials of this pattern have been carried down by tradition, and more elaborate, institutional forms of dominance, linked to what we term secondary groups, have gradually been added to them.

The social origins of dominance are clearly brought out in a number of careful observations of its emergence among young children. Forms of commanding behavior, due perhaps to variations in intelligence, physical maturity, parental encouragement, and the like, begin in the home. Personal-social conditioning seems to be more important than cultural conditioning in much of this development. One study, made under the direction of John E. Anderson at the Minnesota Institute of Child Welfare, illustrates how

dominant and submissive habits appear and become built into the child at an early age. Fourteen children, seven girls and seven boys, were observed. A summary of this study follows:

"A record was made for each child in terms of his behavior as directed toward securing the toy—whether he screamed, pleaded, bargained, threatened, pulled it away deliberately, slapped, pinched or pulled the other child, or relinquished the toy passively; in terms of the type of domination of the successful child, after the outcome of the conflict, i. e., whether he played with the toy alone, controlled it but let the other child participate, or controlled it but let the other child have his turn or share it, and in terms of the unsuccessful child's reactions; in terms of the subsequent behavior of both children—whether the dominant child relinquished the toy, and, if so, whether he still directed the activity, whether either child made a suggestion, and whether it was accepted or rejected by the other child. . . .

"In two behavior charts it is shown that one of these children used pleading as behavior directed towards securing the toy over two hundred times, the other child not ten times, but the latter child used commanding about as often as the former used pleading. When we consider the great number of combinations from which these computations came, the consistency of behavior is amazing. The pleading child pleaded consistently, whatever other child he happened to be with; the commanding child commanded all other children."¹

Eugenia Hanfmann, using a somewhat similar scheme of pairing nine five-year-old children, found a hierarchy of dominance developing. At least five of the children were dominated by those above and in turn dominated the ones below them in a graded series of frequency of dominance.² In our society such competitive patterns appear to develop wherever very young children come together. Obviously, parents and other older persons quickly direct or redirect children's conduct toward one another, and certainly in youngsters of five or more our culturized competitive system has begun to get in its work.

In these illustrations, as in those from the prehuman species, the actions of commanding, directing, and persuading children are qualified by the reactions of those who submit to such controls. Parents, siblings, and others, encourage or repress trends toward dominance, yet one can never be certain that later, through compensatory expression, children who have been suppressed may not become dominant. Alfred Adler and others have contended that the age position of the child in the family may influence these interactions. Adler believed that, when a parent transfers his major affection from the first child to the second, the first develops various compensatory aggressive means of securing attention and power. A number of attempts have been made to verify Adler's contentions by rating or testing

¹ From W. I. Thomas and D. S. Thomas, *The Child in America*, 1928, p. 520. By permission of Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., publisher.

² E. Hanfmann, "Social Structure of a Group of Kindergarten Children," *Amer. J. Orthopsychiatry*, 1935, 5: 407-410.

children and adults. The results have not been entirely in agreement with one another or with Adler. We cite but three investigations:

Florence L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy found for a sample of nearly three hundred kindergarten children that those who were the oldest in their families tended to be submissive, and that in 20 per cent of the oldest this lack of aggressiveness was manifested "to a rather extreme degree." These children were rated by judges as low in self-confidence, lacking in qualities of leadership, highly suggestible, and inclined to be seclusive and introverted.

They also report that the "middle child" tends to lack aggressiveness but not in so marked a degree as the oldest. The youngest child, on the average, showed no tendencies to be either dominant or submissive. As to the only-child group, they state: "The only children . . . are rated as more aggressive and more self-confident than any of the other groups." (Yet this group also were the most demanding in wishing demonstrations of fondness from others; they were the most gregarious; they were the most easily excited and the most given to variation in mood.)³

In these social beginnings the individual takes on various kinds of dominance. Mildred B. Parton found what she termed two kinds of leaders among nursery-school children, the "bully" and the "diplomat," the former attempting control by coercion, the latter by persuasion and suggestion.⁴

Certainly various kinds of leader-roles emerge, but the type will depend on both early personal-social and later cultural learning. In fact, it is often difficult to tell just how much cultural training is mixed with the personal-social. Professional or other higher-class status, furnished through the parents, will affect a growing child. If he is expected to take a lead, to stand out among other children, he may quickly acquire dominance roles. But some of the more aggressive actions, those of the bully or despot, may reflect not class status at all but the personal projection of a parent.

Ann A., the first child of the family, was deliberately instructed by her father to "stand up for her rights" and to "strike back" at her companions if they teased her or if she did not "get a fair deal." Such teaching began in the child's third year, and it was not long before Ann was, in the words of an observer, "the terror of the neighborhood." Her companions almost invariably were younger and weaker children whom she could "boss around."

This child was obviously the object of the father's projection. He confessed that he had always suffered abuse at the hands of other children, and early resolved that, if he ever grew up and had youngsters of his own, he would teach them to fight back at any slights. Such parental projection is not ordinarily expected in his culture, and the accepted manner of training children to superiority over those of lower social strata was not in this violent form. On the one hand, such instruction in dominance would receive some approval, and in this sense the father's projection would

³ See F. L. Goodenough and A. M. Leahy, "The Effect of Certain Family Relationships upon the Development of Personality," *J. Genetic Psychology*, 1927, 34: 45-71. Quotation from p. 70.

⁴ M. B. Parton, "Leadership among Pre-school Children," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1933, 27: 430-440.

fall within the cultural acceptances of his class (he had a high professional status). But the vigor and extreme form which this took led, not to acceptance by the neighbors, but to avoidance of the child by other children and censure of the father by the adults in the neighborhood.

In any case, in studying dominance in human society, we must take institutional and other cultural factors into account. Though the basic patterns of dominance and submission are found in the lower animals and among socially but not culturally conditioned children as well, their forms, as we know them in adult life, come into being largely through cultural conditioning.

Dominance and Culture. Details of the cultural influence on dominance will be presented in later sections, but enough has already been said for us to realize, first, that dominance is a particular interactional pattern which implies submission or acceptance on the part of another, and, second, that such an interactional form is given meaning only by cultural definitions. Of the various categories that may be used to distinguish the forms of human dominance, three will serve our purposes: (1) There is dominance which is more or less voluntarily accepted by those controlled, or at least by enough of them so that the others usually fall in line. This we broadly call *leadership*, though, as we shall see, it may take both democratic and autocratic forms. (2) There is dominance due to institutional arrangements, which we may for want of a better term call *headship*. (3) There is dominance that comes from the class system. This we call class dominance or *status dominance*. This is, of course, closely related to the second category, but here all the members of a stratum of society may be in a position, by virtue of their power, to command or control those below them. It is a kind of "pecking hierarchy" on a grand scale!

Leadership, then, is but one form of dominance, in which the followers more or less willingly accept direction and control by another. Such ascendancy may range over a number of social controls, from persuasion and propaganda to threats and coercive devices. We may, in fact, distinguish between democratic and autocratic leadership. The former is illustrated in a free-election system, be it in a political, an economic, or some other group. The latter is exemplified by political or economic or military dictators who depend on mass support but whose means of getting this may in the first instance be force or propaganda rather than free choice of the group members.

Headship, or institutional dominance, is the kind that comes from culturally transmitted power, such as that of the father in the patriarchal family, or of the appointed head of a corporation or a college, or of a foreman in a mill. Obviously, there is not always an easy or sharp distinction between leadership and headship. A college president may be so popular

with students and faculty that he takes on all the usual features of democratic leadership even though he was not elected by students and faculty and could not be removed by their votes.

Status, or class, dominance is an expression of what has sometimes been called the pyramid of power. This figure of speech derives from the common assumption that class systems may be described geometrically in the form of a triangle, with the masses at the bottom, successively smaller strata above, and, at the apex, the élite, who, though few in numbers, dominate the others. Individuals in the different social levels tend to reflect this hierarchy of power. In the caste system this is highly institutionalized; in the class scheme rather rigidly so; and in the open-class organization—such as we have in this country—the power factors are less evident and much more flexible. The upper classes induce in their members an expectation of ascendancy and stimulate the feeling of dominance. The political leaders of Great Britain have long been recruited chiefly from the aristocracy. So, too, there, and to a less extent in the United States, the sons of business and professional men usually follow in the footsteps of their fathers. The effect of class status on leadership has been shown in a number of studies. Leaders in our colleges tend to be recruited chiefly from men and women of high socioeconomic status. However, in our open-class system, the rise of a poor immigrant family to a place of opulence or political power is accompanied by a rise in class standing. The successful man and woman soon take on the distinctions of their new class and leave behind them the marks of the lowly, and their children will have the advantage of class position in the effort to get ahead.

BIOPSYCHOLOGICAL FACTORS: TRAITS OR TYPES

The psychological discussion of leadership and headship has fluctuated between the specific traits of the leader and his biopsychological type. This is but to say that the attempt to describe and interpret leadership falls within the wider scope of our efforts to deal with the structure and function of personality. We are confronted with the question whether we can understand the leader best by dissecting out of him his particular personality features or traits, or by studying him as a total personality, perhaps classifiable in one of the type schemes now in use. The social-psychological and cultural approach varies somewhat from both of these methods, for it deals with the leader chiefly as a personality with a certain role and status, whose conduct is an integrated combination of biopsychological features, interaction, and culture.

It is apparent that each of these methods may make its contribution. Moreover, it is our conviction that it is profitable to co-ordinate some features of one approach with those of another. The whole topic of the psy-

chology of leadership is too new and undeveloped for us to be dogmatic about any of these approaches. The present section will discuss the trait and type approaches. The third approach will be given a special section.

The Trait Approach. The attempt to view the leader as a combination of specific characteristics, traits, or features stems from the school of psychology which has stressed what is often called the atomistic, or analytical, viewpoint. This group holds that all learning is specific to the situation—in other words, that habits, ideas, opinions, and attitudes are particular, not general. If any general features appear, they are but co-ordinations or combinations of specific traits, due to the association of “identical elements” in the conditioning situations.

This is not the place for a discussion of specificity versus generality of traits, attitudes, and the like. Rather let us examine some of the particular features, physical and mental, which have been attributed to leaders and institutional heads.

The classic study on physique and leadership is that of E. B. Gowin.⁵ He found certain executives whom we should classify as institutional heads to be taller and heavier than the average of the groups they controlled. Weight, of course, is so much a result of diet and age that the difference may not be significant; the difference in height may be. He also found persons in executive positions—the so-called “doers”—to be taller and heavier than individuals who might be classified as thinkers. Though the differences were not very great, they do suggest that in certain types of leadership and headship, involving physical powers, height and weight are important in determining dominance roles.

Of more importance to us are various studies of intellectual and emotional traits. Most books dealing with leadership in business, in the professions, or in the military list the psychological characteristics which are considered essential to leadership and headship. The range of these is large. S. H. Britt, reviewing some of the better-known lists, notes that F. H. Allport puts down nineteen traits, L. L. Bernard thirty-one, and Ordway Tead ten.⁶ Charles Bird made a collection of seventy-nine traits listed by twenty different investigators of leadership. There was very little overlapping. The most frequently noted were intelligence, cited by ten studies; initiative, by six; extroversion and sense of humor, each by five; and enthusiasm, fairness, sympathy, and self-confidence, each by four. In fact, of the seventy-nine traits, fifty-one, or 65 per cent, were named but once. As Bird says, most of these terms are little better than stereotypes, and none of them is considered, apparently, as having any negative or derogatory meaning.⁷ An examination of the list shows that there is a variation in the degree of generality or specificity. Some traits, like “knowledge of human nature,”

⁵ See E. B. Gowin, *Executive and His Control of Men*, 1915.

⁶ See S. H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, 1941, pp. 277-278.

⁷ See C. Bird, *Social Psychology*, 1940, pp. 378-379.

"individuality," "mature," "cultured," and "competent," are so vague and general as to be practically meaningless. In contrast, "good memory," "talkative," "high intelligence," and "healthy" are fairly specific.

It is pretty evident that this list of traits is not unlike that used in general studies of personality. G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert have pointed out that more than 17,000 trait names are used in our language to describe and characterize individuals.⁸ It is a fair assumption that almost any approved trait in excess of the average might be used to characterize a leader. Despite the obvious vagueness of trait names, some studies have shown differences between persons who are in positions of dominance and persons who are not. For example, with minor exceptions most of the studies have shown that leaders have higher intelligence, as measured by the tests, than followers. One investigation by Keith Sward found that, when the intelligence scores of 114 college leaders were matched with those of 114 college students who were not leaders, 70 per cent of the former reached or exceeded the median score of the latter. The differences were statistically significant.⁹ However, many such studies are concerned only with executive and crowd leadership and not with pre-eminence in matters strictly intellectual. (See below on types of leaders.) If we define dominance so as to include attainment in scholarship, research, and the arts as well as in managing men, then, it seems to the present writer, intelligence becomes increasingly important as a basic element in determining dominance.

The studies of the nonintellectual traits of leaders are not satisfactory. It is extremely difficult to secure careful definition of the terms used, and there is often the so-called halo effect—that is, the tendency to rate a person high on all traits if he is rated high on one. Nevertheless, a few of the better investigations may be noted briefly.

E. D. Partridge's study of Boy Scout leaders showed a high positive correlation between a rating of leadership and specific traits. Rating of leadership correlated .87 with the score on intelligence, .62 with athletic prowess, .87 with dependability, .54 with acceptable and pleasant voice, and .81 with appearance.¹⁰ In his study of leadership among students at West Point, D. P. Page found that appearance and bearing correlated very highly with leadership ratings.¹¹ Yet it must be borne in mind that general ratings of leadership are consciously or unconsciously based on physique, appearance, and the like, so that such high correlations with specific traits may be somewhat spurious.

A rather elaborate study of intercorrelation of traits of a sample of seventy-one girl

⁸ See G. W. Allport and H. S. Odbert, "Trait-names: A Psycholexical Study," *Psychological Monographs*, 1936, 47, No. 211.

⁹ K. Sward, *An Experimental Study of Leadership*, Ph.D. thesis, University of Minnesota Library, 1929.

¹⁰ E. D. Partridge, *Leadership among Adolescent Boys*, Teachers College Contributions to Education, 1934, No. 608.

¹¹ D. P. Page, "Measurement and Prediction of Leadership," *American J. Sociology*, 1935, 41: 31-43.

leaders has been made by E. G. A. Fleming. He correlated ratings by teachers with a set of other criteria. None of the correlations with liveliness, intelligence, having wide interests, and being a "good sport" were statistically significant. From his factor analysis Fleming concluded that the combination of four traits that was most closely correlated with leadership was that of fairness, originality, liveliness, and a pleasant voice. The combination of eight traits that gave the highest correlation was that of intelligence, liveliness, having wide interests, being amusing, being athletic, being a "good sport," not being modest, and having a pleasant voice.¹²

A number of studies of the relation between educational attainment and leadership have been made in high schools and colleges, and it might be expected that there would be a positive correlation between leadership and scholarship. However, though such correlations are positive, they are not high. The most satisfactory studies report correlations ranging from .23 to .36.

Comparison between the scholarship of leaders and that of nonleaders is more important. Again there are some differences, none very striking. Sward, in the study cited above, found that both men and women leaders had higher college grades than the controls, that the grades of women leaders were as much higher than those of the men leaders as the latter excelled the nonleader men in the control group. Studies among high-school pupils reveal the same sort of findings.

We must be careful in interpreting these facts. In many schools, extra-curricular activities are not permitted till the student has superior grades, but whether high performance is due to innate ability or to social-emotional motivation to get ahead is not determined. Surely the sex differences, quite clear in a number of studies, do not reflect any such differences in the general run of girl and boy students; it may be that the kind of leadership activity in which high-school and college girls indulge acts as a selective factor. Since we have included, as evidence of leadership, high status in athletics and positions in college organizations that might be designated as "political" in the popular sense rather than intellectual, the lower scholarship standings of the men occupying such positions may be accounted for.

Though many psychologists of the laboratory and mental-test tradition put their chief reliance on the trait approach, hardly any of them, when confronted with practical everyday leadership, overlook the fact that traits operate in a social-cultural situation, not in a vacuum. Some stress the correlation of specific situation and specific trait; others allow for more general situations. The same thing is true of personnel officers in business and industry and of the ablest commentators on military leadership. For example, E. L. Munson, writing of military leadership in the American army, discusses such traits as tactfulness, cheerfulness, decisiveness, initia-

¹² E. G. A. Fleming, "A Factor Analysis of the Personality of High School Leaders," *J. Applied Psychology*, 1935, 19: 596-605.

tive, loyalty, and duty. But he nowhere ignores the basic fact that such characteristics are related to the officer-men contacts. In other words, he realizes, without saying so specifically, that military leadership and headship function only in the interaction between men and officers. This social factor is so important that we shall return to its discussion after examining some of the possible contributions to the topic from those who have stressed the type approach to personality.

The Type Approach. The attempt to consider leadership in terms of types grows out of the trend to deal with the larger topic of personality in these terms. We have already dealt with some of the basic aspects of typology in Chapter VII and need not repeat the discussion at this point. Rather we wish to see if the type approach yields anything for our analysis of leaders.

At the outset it is well to bear in mind the distinction between personality type and social type. The former involves mechanisms dependent on constitutional make-up and early conditioning; the latter is a generalization of roles and statuses. Such contrasting patterns as introversion and extroversion, cyclothymes and schizophrenes, and "strong" and "weak" illustrate the former. "Salesman," "bureaucrat," and the host of stereotypes in common use illustrate the latter. We may find this dichotomy helpful in dealing with so-called types of leaders.

The most commonly used types are Jung's, introversion and extroversion. As most American writers have interpreted them, each represents not a single characteristic but a recurrent cluster of certain traits or features. There have been only a few adequate investigations of these types among leaders, chiefly among high-school and college students. G. C. Bellingrath reports little or no statistical difference in extroversion between leaders and nonleaders in a group from a senior high school. In contrast, O. W. Caldwell and B. Wellman found that leaders in junior high school were rated as more extroverted than nonleaders, and the girls were more extroverted than the boys.¹³ Keith Sward's study of college leaders showed that, as measured by self-ratings on the Heidebreder scale, leaders were more extroverted than nonleaders. Moreover, when leaders were rated by others, their extroversion scores were even higher, a result which indicates how our culture tends to stress extroversion as desirable. This divergence was more marked in women leaders than in men.¹⁴

As was pointed out in Chapter VII, the personality type takes on more significance when it is examined for its correlation with the chief role which the individual plays in his society. Common-sense and clinical observation and statistical studies all indicate that, with exceptions due especially to compensations, extroverts are usually found in executive positions, in poli-

¹³ See G. C. Bellingrath, *Qualities Associated with Leadership in Extra-curricular Activities in the High School*, Teachers College Contributions to Education, 1930, No. 399; and O. W. Caldwell and B. Wellman, "Characteristics of School Leaders," *J. Educ. Research*, 1926, 14: 1-13.

¹⁴ K. Sward, *op. cit.*

tics, and in other positions of dominance from which people and social situations are managed. In contrast, and with similar exceptions, introverts are found in scholarship, writing, and occupations that call for little direct contact with others or contact that does not require close personal relations involving authority.

Keith Sward's report on campus leaders confirms these views. For example, men college debaters tended to have high intelligence scores, to reveal fairly marked inferiority feelings, and to be distinctly introverted. On the other hand, women debaters tended to be extroverted rather than introverted, again representing a selective factor in the social situation. In their striving for role and status, women of extroverted type are likely to be in the vanguard of agitation for equal rights with men, and college debating is a culturally acceptable outlet for them. The editors of the campus papers, though highly intelligent, were mildly introverted. In contrast, student leaders of both sexes in campus politics were markedly extroverted, though only slightly better than average in intelligence. Curiously enough, Sward found among his college women politicians distinct feelings of inferiority and lack of self-assurance. It is easy to assume that this shows definite compensatory reactions in operation, but we must not be too certain of this. The tests themselves may really fail to get at the underlying psychological capabilities.¹⁵

Just as there are various classifications of personality, or psychological, types, so, too, a number of attempts have been made to classify leaders by general social roles. Sir William Martin Conway noted the crowd-compeller, the crowd-exponent, and the crowd-representative. F. C. Bartlett divided leaders into the institutional, the dominant, and the persuasive. R. W. Nafe had a simple but vague duality of static and dynamic leadership. A. B. Wolfe indicated some important differences in his tripartite classification of radical, conservative, and scientific.¹⁶

Whereas the psychological type represents a set of mechanisms or features derived chiefly from the constitution and early experiences of the individual, the social type or general role comes from the play of cultural forces upon the individual as he becomes socialized. It is to be expected, therefore, that the classifications just listed reflect the culture from which they spring. Conway's *crowd-representative* is described as the creature of organized groups and falls partly into our category of headship, but sometimes such a person may represent a temporary aggregate. The *crowd-compeller*, by contrast, becomes dominant not because he mirrors the crowd but because he obliges the crowd to believe in him. The political dema-

¹⁵ See K. Sward, "Temperament and Direction of Achievement," *J. Social Psychology*, 1933, 4: 406-429.

¹⁶ See Sir W. M. Conway, *The Crowd in Peace and War*, 1915, especially chaps. 6, 7, 8; F. C. Bartlett, "The Social Psychology of Leadership," *J. National Institute of Industrial Psychology*, 1926, 3: 188-193; R. W. Nafe, "Psychological Description of Leadership," *J. Social Psychology*, 1930, 1: 248-266; and A. B. Wolfe, *Conservatism, Radicalism, and Scientific Method*, 1923.

gogue and the religious revivalist are good examples; such men have an almost hypnotic power over others. The *crowd-exponent*, sensing the vague feelings and drives of the masses, is able to lead them because he crystallizes their wishes and directs them to act.

The *institutional leader*, noted by Bartlett, we have mentioned under the concept of headship, or as related to class dominance. His power is more or less formalized into rules, regulations or procedure, and directives of various sorts. His ultimate authority rests on the traditions, customs, mores, creeds, principles, and legal forms of the state, the class, the church, the economic order, the school, or some other institution. Often there is little or no personal contact between the ascendant individual and the submissive. Higher executives often set up a barrier between themselves and those farther down the line of power. This isolation of the top man has a dual effect. It permits the rise of mystifying legend about his power, but it also tends to segregate him from the lower executives and the masses who are controlled. The *dominant leader* is said to be aggressive, coercive, and given to vigorous action. He is, in fact, essentially a man of action in the most literal sense of the term. He knows what he wants and goes after it with vigor and singleness of will. Men of this type are often prominent in revolutionary movements and in periods of grave social crisis, when decisiveness and rapid action are needed; they resemble Conway's crowd-compeller. The *persuasive leader* exercises his dominance chiefly by words and other symbols of control. He uses suggestion, flattery, and all the verbal devices of the crowd-compeller. In the political and religious fields men of this type are free with promises to the masses. They talk glibly of the rights of the common man, of correcting abuses, of reforming or revolutionizing this or that. Both the dominant leader and the persuasive leader try to secure the voluntary identification of their followers. In the terms of our introductory comments, both these types would fall within the category of the leader rather than of the headman.

Surely, in a world in which science and technology play such important parts, the expert must be accorded special consideration. If an expert's work is chiefly scientific research, he falls into what O. L. Schwartz terms the "thinker" type. If his work is applied science, such as engineering, he has, in addition to the characteristics of the thinker, others akin to those of the executive type. The research scientist, as such, has great intellectual acumen; he is, in his specialty, free from emotional and egoistic bias, and he develops impersonal and objective attitudes toward his work. His leadership is largely in advancing the frontiers of knowledge. He is able to arouse the enthusiasm and support of a small coterie of followers and of others who have confidence in his work. The masses seldom if ever understand him and his contribution; hence his audience must always remain small and specialized. The engineer is much nearer to the masses, for they can sense directly what

he does to change our world. To millions Edison and Goethals are far better known than the research scientists who made modern electrical appliances possible and whose studies in mechanics made possible the building of the Panama Canal.

These broad categories indicate certain generalities about leadership, but it is apparent that, if we would examine the genesis and meaning of the social role of the leader, and if we would get at the correlation between the role and the psychological type or trait, we must examine leaders in particular areas of action. One favorite field for such analysis is that of politics, and various writers have tried their hand at discussing types of dominance in the political field. No two of them quite agree, but they all appreciate the fact that there is no one type of political dominance. The city boss in American politics is different from the moral reformer, and both are distinct from the revolutionary agitator. For purposes of illustration we may note the following frequently discussed types: the boss, the compromiser or democratic leader, the functionary or bureaucrat, the diplomat, the reformer, the agitator, and the theorist. These by no means exhaust the possible list, but they are sufficiently common in our Western culture to warrant brief examination.¹⁷

The *political boss* is largely the product of modern democracies, although similar roles may appear under other forms of government. He may operate on a city, county, state, or national level. He is intimately associated with machine politics—a form of party control by a solidified dynamic clique which grew up in our society. The following thumbnail sketch may serve to indicate the more common and prominent mental features of the type and also to provide a basis for comparison and contrast with other types.

The boss is born of conflict and thrives in an atmosphere of struggle for political power. Therefore he must be a good fighter, with capacity for strategy and tactics in organizing his followers to win elections and control the distribution of the spoils. He must have ability to handle men and to induce in them confidence in his leadership and loyalty to him and to the machine. As a part of the machine organization for winning elections and controlling spoils, there is a hierarchy of power leading from the boss at the top down by various levels to the bottom of the organization membership. In such a scheme of power distribution, personal fealty akin to that of a feudal order is the rule, and those who depart from it either are disciplined as a means of bringing them back into the fold or are considered traitors and cast out of the organization. In his dealings with his henchmen at the various levels of authority within the organization, the boss must possess some ability for arbitrating or otherwise reducing rivalries among these aspirants to his favor. Being essentially concerned with gaining and holding political power, he is indifferent to political reforms

¹⁷ The material on political types is drawn chiefly from the following: W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*, 1934; F. R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics*, 1923; and especially H. D. Lasswell, "Types of Political Personalities," *Publications of the American Sociological Society*, 1928, 22: 164-166; and Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 1930.

unless they threaten to interfere with his operations. He distrusts and fears reforms and revolutionary ideologies and stands chiefly for the existing order. At times he may support mild reforms as a device to get into power or to retain power if it is threatened. But he is basically an opportunist, concerned with short-time manipulations of power. As Lasswell puts it, "he stares cynically at men who profess to live by principle."¹⁸

Yet the average boss is not lacking in human qualities as these are understood by the man in the street. In fact, both to his more immediate followers and to the mass of voters who support him, his sympathetic attitudes and conduct are particularly important. Bosses, especially those familiar to us in municipal politics, are notoriously generous to the poor. They provide food and help to the needy in times of stress. They often exercise rough but kindly forms of justice in settling petty disputes among their supporters. As Charles A. Merriam puts it, in a complex political system of impersonal institutions with fixed and automatic rules, the boss is a "humanizer" of importance. He restores to government some of the warm sympathy and personal friendliness which are lacking in a rigid bureaucracy. This is one of the methods by which rival parties win and keep their support. It is a cultural reality which the reformer, the revolutionary agitator, and the inflexible bureaucrat overlook.

The *compromiser*, or *democratic leader*, operates without the close-knit machine system, though he may have from time to time some organization behind him. He is the type which Lasswell calls the "responsible leader," but that name implies that the other types lack responsibility. Rather, the important feature of this type is that he is a product of our democratic system, which functions by compromise, toleration, and other devices of what the sociologist calls "accommodation." We find this type of leader characterized as follows:

He is usually willing to meet his opponents halfway. He is not cynical like the boss, nor is he intolerant and inflexible like the agitator. He is not given to viewing the world in terms of black and white. He is appreciative of individual differences and hence possesses human qualities to a considerable degree. He is a believer in law and order and is not likely to indulge in direct handouts to the masses, as do the political boss and his henchmen. In fact, in his competition with the boss the democratic leader's very adherence to principles may defeat him or undo some of his plans. As a public personality he is, however, a potent symbol of the essential quality of democratic life: he is tolerant of differences, he is unwilling to use violence to enforce his will, and he has a certain abiding faith in the common sense of the common man.

The *functionary*, or *bureaucrat*, develops as the political order becomes complex and as the field of administration expands so much that a paid body of individuals must be had to operate the government. We are not concerned with the somewhat mixed type of higher administrator whose work is largely that of policy-making; he is likely to be a combination of democratic leader and administrator, or perhaps of boss and administrator.

¹⁸ Lasswell, "Types of Political Personalities," *loc. cit.*

Rather we refer to the petty officials who are charged with the details of day-by-day execution of orders, rules, and laws.

The functionary is a man eminently practical, methodical, prudent, punctual, and disciplined in his particular job. He is unhappy when he must make his own decisions, and for the most part he abhors that kind of responsibility which carries with it the likelihood of taking blame for failure. He does like power, but it is the power exercised in controlling others within the narrow framework of office routine, inspection, or supervision. As a rule he lacks imagination and initiative and operates within an habitual frame that provides him with the necessary knowledge and skill. He is usually timid and motivated in his loyalty and action by the deep desire for personal security. He is the bookkeeper of the business world who wants nothing of the hazards of the entrepreneur, or the routine operator of the governmental bureau who would not dare risk his job on the turn of an election. He wants a fixed tenure or civil service and a set of simple and direct rules. He wants, in short, a world which is complete and narrow, and the horizons of which everyone can know and understand.

The *diplomat* has a still different function and different characteristics. His basic work is to play for large political stakes, and we usually think of him in terms of international relations. However, such roles appear in the relations of various departments of a government to one another and in the relations of a government to business. We can offer only the broadest of characterizations.

The diplomat operates on general principles set down by the government or agency which he represents. In general he is closely identified with these, though not always in details. He finds his satisfaction in manipulating individuals and situations, but he is not necessarily concerned with them in any personal way. He is essentially concerned with grand strategy in a struggle for power. He is suave, not above double-dealing if it is necessary to win his point, and able to dissociate sincerity from the job in hand. He is patient and averse to the passion of the agitator or the officiousness of the bureaucrat. He is skilled in the use of words, though they are frequently a cover for his aims. As one famous comment has it, if a diplomat says "yes," he means "perhaps"; if he says "perhaps," he means "no"; if he says "no," he is no diplomat.

The *reformer* is a common type in a liberal democracy. He is not a violent revolutionist, but he resembles the latter in being a man of high principles. The reformer is usually a perfectionist. His daydreams of a better world are seldom, if ever, qualified by a recognition of the difficulties of practical operation. His convictions are supported by strong emotional tone. He is usually incorruptible and uncompromising as to principles. His basic appeal is to man's rationality, and his elaborate verbal schemes for the future have little or no place for man's social-emotional impulses and habits.

The *agitator* is a more extreme reformer. He is excited about basic principles and easily transmits his enthusiasm to others. He aims at violence as a method of securing his perfect world, and, like the reformer, he leads

quickly over day-by-day difficulties. He idealizes revolutionary change and tends to exaggerate the differences between one set of institutions and another. That is, he tends to see his world in terms of black versus white, of good against evil, and is unwilling to offer compromises. In fact, he is intolerant of divergent opinion. Moreover, he is usually impractical when it comes to putting change into operation. A. B. Wolfe has so aptly described some features of the agitator that we shall quote his comment:

"The dogmatic-emotional mind holds to its beliefs, valuations, and 'principles' with intense conviction and unswerving loyalty. Its principles may or may not have been arrived at through objective processes of investigation and inductive logic. Its observational and reasoning processes are more or less strongly influenced by its emotional interests, and, while usually biased by them, may be at times aided by them, e. g., by sympathetic insight, where the colder critical intellectual would fail to sense essential realities. In any case, its convictions, once formed, are held to with dogmatic persistency. Argument will not dislodge them. They become the premises of its reasoning, and by emotional attachment are placed beyond the reach of criticism. In the more intense dogmatic-emotional types, convictions are held to with religious devotion. . . .

"Since the dogmatic-emotional radical holds to his principles, be they economic, political, or moral, with religious devotion, it follows that he will not easily be drawn off from the attempt to put them into practice. That is, he reinforces his balked desires with vigor and determination. Obstruction and opposition merely increase his reinforcement and intensify his resentment, until finally his 'cause' is made a matter of truly religious significance, of religious hope, and may even come to have some of the mystical and militant accompaniments of religion in the narrower sense."¹⁹

The *theorist* concocts a logical picture of the world. This may be an idealistic one, or it may be one which is unpleasant. But in either case the theorist lives in a world of verbal consistency and of complete pictures. He is impractical and not interested either in agitating for his views or in attempting to put them into practice. In a sense we may consider the political theorist as standing at the end of a continuum the opposite end of which is occupied by the boss.

As indicated above, these types are idealizations and frames of reference for comparison rather than pictures of actual individuals. Moreover, as H. D. Lasswell has pointed out, many political leaders are doubtless mixtures of two or more types. For example, he lists Herbert Hoover as essentially the administrator, the Old Testament prophets as agitators, and Karl Marx as the theorist. In contrast, he considers Lenin as a composite of administrator, agitator, and theorist.²⁰

Even these brief sketches show that there is some relation between social roles and personality structures or types. But just what this is we are not

¹⁹ A. B. Wolfe, *op. cit.*, pp. 177, 178. By permission of the Macmillan Co., publishers.

²⁰ H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 1930, p. 54.

certain. In general it appears that extroverts tend to be executives, including those we have called the boss and the democratic leader. Apparently the pure theorist is an introvert. But classifying the bureaucrat and the agitator is not so easy. In some ways the former appears to have a compensatory form of introversion, in which a fixed world of action satisfies a deep personal need for security. The perfectionism of the reformer and the agitator also seems to indicate introversive, inflexible features. It is evident that, even if we accept typology as valid, we need, in considering the relation of personality types to general roles, more than the simple dual types that are so common in psychological literature. At this juncture we must regard the types as highly tentative and must examine the dominant individual's basic personality elements as they arise in his interaction with his fellows. This interaction will bring into play biological foundations and both personal-social and cultural factors. Let us turn to the topic of human dominance with this multiple approach.

SOCIAL-CULTURAL INTERACTION AND DOMINANCE

It is already evident that neither the trait approach nor the type approach will suffice to explain the genesis and function of dominance. The head or leader does not exist in a vacuum but always operates in a social situation, and that situation is qualified by demands of the moment and by those historic factors which, as he reads back into his personal past, help to determine what he will do. Our view of this process was put forward in Chapter VI. In this section we shall merely extend that view with special regard to the present topic.

The basic determinants of personality are, first, the constitutional make-up, which is derived chiefly from inherited structures and from the earliest personal-social and cultural conditioning, and, second, the learned patterns derived from the dependence reactions to the mother and other adults and from the authority and deprivation of impulses imposed largely at the hands of the same adults. It is in this setting that the primary habits of eating, elimination, sleep, and organic survival are built. In connection with the basic satisfactions, patterns of affection, love, and sympathy arise. So, too, from frustration or inhibition of drives emerge aggression and resistance, substitution (chiefly compensatory), fantasy, and other forms of meeting the blockings of the primary and deep-seated impulses.

Whatever the instinctive sources of aggression and resistance, the particular meaning and direction of dominance are largely determined by the family and neighborhood conditioning. Yet what makes one child a leader or an otherwise ascendant personality and another a follower we do not know. At best we have only impressions and common-sense observation. There are always two questions to be considered: What are the basic personality traits or type? How do these get organized into the adult social

role? The genesis of some of the important personality features and the gradual emergence of the social role are well brought out in specific case studies. We cite only two of these in very brief form.²¹

The Agitator. Case A is the story of a prominent political agitator and ardent pacifist who held to his principles so firmly that during World War I he suffered a great deal of public censure for his views on peace and war.

A was the second son of an impecunious minister whose wife had died when A was two years of age. The father did not remarry and himself reared the two boys. The father was a fundamentalist and early and late warned his two boys about sin and instructed them in morals. There was a great deal of sibling rivalry, and A was envious and jealous of his older brother. On many occasions he manipulated statements and situations so that the brother would be severely punished for boyish pranks in which both had been involved. The younger son was the favorite of his father and continually took advantage of that fact. He was very bright in school, while the older brother was an indifferent student. This fact was exploited by A, by his father, and by relatives, to the advantage of the younger son.

Their home life was intimate. The father slept with the two boys, and A was very jealous of any affection the father might show for the older brother. When the latter approached puberty and began to indicate growing sexual maturation, the father solemnly lectured him about the sins of youth and the evils of masturbation, especially. He always did this at night when he thought A to be sound asleep. But the latter overheard these lectures, which greatly impressed and mystified him. Also he heard neighborhood gossip about his brother and the fear that he might, by reason of his self-abuse, become the village idiot. He blamed his brother for making his father suffer and determined himself never to do anything to disgrace his father.

A year or so later the "bad" brother amazed everyone by going through a severe and telling conversion to religion. He publicly confessed his sins and changed from a rather phlegmatic lad into a religious zealot. For this he got favorable public attention, which did not entirely please the younger brother. Later, after battling with similar impulses and sins, A was converted and set himself upon a path of righteousness. Sometime later he decided to be a minister—a neat instance of identification with his father.

As he grew older, A continued to show high intellectual promise. With the aid of an aunt he was able to continue his education. He made a brilliant scholastic record throughout high school, college, and divinity school. While in high school he shocked his relatives by becoming an ardent advocate of free trade—this in a family of high-tariff Republicans. He became converted to this as an abstract principle to be defended to the last ditch. Moreover, it pleased A to find that he got attention by opposing his family's views. Later he espoused other political and economic views of a socialistic nature and supported them with a like fervor. But his real career in this line was to come later.

In the meantime, in college and in the divinity school, he became engrossed in problems of sin and vice. He became well-known to local newspapers for leading drives against illegal grog shops accused of selling liquor to students. Also while in

²¹ For other case studies of leadership, see the Suggestions for Further Reading at the end of the chapter.

divinity school, A ardently accepted many liberal views, and he was frequently at odds with his father and brother on political and economic issues. These experiences broke the close emotional bond with the father and increased A's determination to follow basic principles in the face of all opposition.

After completing his training for the ministry, he accepted a parish in a poor section of a small city. He was not happy, for he felt completely superior to his dull-witted parishioners. After three years he resigned in disgust, but not until his advocacy of reforms had made him "good copy" for the local newspapers. He was continually stimulating campaigns against vice and corruption in the community and participated personally in raids on houses of prostitution.

His next pastorate was among the working class of a large city, where his drive against sin and political corruption became even more vehement. It was during these heated days that he became a socialist and a pacifist. Gradually his agitation turned from problems of reforming corrupt politicians and driving out gambling and prostitution to a consideration of the larger problems of political and economic injustice. He became thoroughly convinced that political democracy was a hollow sham until we had full economic democracy. He was candidate for governor on the Socialist ticket and threw himself into the new field with immense vigor.

After he became a minister, A had married a motherly woman, a former school-teacher. At first he had some difficulty adjusting himself to his marital role, but later he made a fairly satisfactory mate.

About the time World War I broke out, A resigned his pastorate to accept one which was more remunerative. But he denounced the war most violently and shortly found himself out of a job. Continuing his open opposition to the war, he was unable to get another position, and for some years his wife had to return to teaching to support the family. Yet such personal difficulties did not deflect him from his crusade for socialism and peace, defended in elaborate language and always with the intense emotional attitude which brooked no compromise on fundamental principles.

In analyzing this case, H. D. Lasswell points out the following examples of the continuity of A's basic patterns from childhood and youth to his adult years. (1) Because of his strong but repressed hatred for his brother he had a strong sense of guilt. This guilty feeling, however, was compensated for by emphasis on the brotherhood of mankind and on the need to love and uplift the downtrodden and depressed. As Lasswell puts it, "A's brother hatred, so manifest in his younger days, and so potent in arousing his guilt feelings, created this disposition to choose generalized brother-substitutes [that is, humanity] to love, and to elaborate brotherly ideologies to defend his position."²² (2) His efforts to maintain his deep-seated repressions regarding sex came out in his later life in his overconcern about prostitution. He never made an objective study of this social problem, but reacted by direct attacks on the evil. (3) A's sense of insecurity was alleviated by his public attacks on all forms of repression and economic injustice. He was continually busy with his socialist colleagues in planning large-scale

²² Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 1930, p. 94. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

controls for others, although he had a gnawing sense of futility and inadequacy about controlling himself. (4) His reaction to the father-authority took the public form of intense opposition to all kinds of capitalist control, Biblical orthodoxy, and militarism. On the other hand, his devotion to the cause of the poor and his delight in living a life of economic insufficiency reflected his continuing dependence on his father image.

As to his techniques of adaptation, he greatly overvalued words and ardent adherence to principles. He was a powerful speaker and an uncompromising debater. He was kind and gentle toward his friends and close adherents, but truculent and even vicious toward his enemies. He surrounded himself with an overindulgent group of admirers who fed his demand for support and attention. In contrast, his intense hostility toward those who differed with him was partly "motivated by the desire to punish those" who rejected his affection and his ideas. Moreover, there is considerable evidence that his extreme violence toward his opponents and their views was unconsciously motivated by his desire to be victimized, to suffer, as does the masochist, by being put upon by others. He obviously delighted in the martyr role. In fact, this is an ambivalent response to his sadistic-aggressive conduct. He wanted both to attack and to suffer at the hands of others. Such mechanisms permit a kind of personal integration that is not uncommon in revolutionary agitators.

It is unwise to generalize from single instances; nevertheless, this life story helps us to understand the genesis and development of certain personality characteristics and certain kinds of social role.

Before dismissing this line of evidence, let us present one other case, this time of a person who became an administrator. As a type, the administrator, or functionary, at least in the minor grades, tends to operate in a fixed world of regulations and routine activities that protect him from the necessity of making independent judgments.

The Administrator. Case B was a pedantic, conscientious, capable, and overscrupulous public servant, who felt a certain compulsion to attend to minute details and to be always hard at work, and who in his personal relations showed a touchiness that sometimes led him into difficulties with his fellows.

B was the youngest of four children. His only sister was five years, and his two brothers eight and eighteen years, older than he. Constant quarreling between his parents induced in B a strong sense of uncertainty and insecurity. When he was eight years old, his parents were divorced. Four years after this his mother died, apparently from tuberculosis, and B was dependent upon his brothers and sister. He felt utterly isolated and incompetent, especially after the death of his mother, whom he adored. He had few if any friends or playmates, partly because the family frequently moved. Toward his father he felt fear and a sense of guilt, the latter because his mother had set him to trailing his father in order to discover what the latter did

when away from home. B long feared that his father would some day get revenge for this spying.

The brothers and the sister sacrificed a great deal to put B through high school, but he never appreciated this at the time. Rather, his attention was centered on his restrictions and on his growing sense of inferiority. He had to work hard at the family business, and he made few friends. If he tried to evade his duties, he had an intense sense of remorse and guilt. Although in good health, he got the idea that he was physically incompetent. Later this took a sexual turn when he was unable to adjust himself to young people of his own age, particularly girls. He was good in his studies and respectful to his teachers. And he did, in high school, develop some friendships. He was dependable in his obligations and had considerable sympathy. Yet, on the whole, he had a persistent sense of social inferiority. This became enhanced during his college days.

Lacking funds, he was dependent on small scholarships and on work he could secure at fraternity and sorority houses. He was so embarrassed and inept that he lost what chances he might have had to be taken into a fraternity, and he felt thoroughly ashamed of having to do menial tasks in sorority houses, in one of which lived a girl with whom he was in love.

Although he was not particularly interested in the field, he took up forestry. After college he took a government position in this service and in time became a well-recognized expert. He married a rather dominating schoolteacher, with whom he made only a moderately good adjustment.

Many details of this case must be omitted, but we may summarize his chief developmental phases by pointing out that B's chief motivations were his intense uncertainty and sense of inferiority, with which went an elaborate effort to demonstrate his power and self-control. He developed a strong compulsion to work and was most unhappy when he had nothing to do. He accepted with zeal the routine obligations of the bureau in which he worked. He performed the required routine jobs with minute attention to detail and almost with an obsession to see that everything was in order. This compulsive scrupulousness may have been born of his anxiety and conflict with regard to his mother and father. Drawn in his affections and dependence between these violently clashing individuals, he sought safety and strength in forcing hard tasks on himself. They kept him from worrying about his parents and from having to make decisions as to where his loyalty should rest. To work with attention to every single detail was to prove his potency and to demonstrate that he had control of himself. Yet he was always sensitive to the criticisms or comments of others. This made for occasional difficulties with his colleagues and superiors, and on one occasion he quit the government service because a superior had been "uncivil" to him.²³

There is no pure case of the administrator, or bureaucrat. Some of the individuals studied show even more attention to routine than B did and a

²³ This example is also from Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*.

complete indifference to personal relations. That is, unlike B, they are not affected by close personal contacts with others. Any sensitive spots in their personalities are protected by the inflexible routines of their jobs. On the other hand, many top administrators, as we pointed out above, combine the characteristics of the boss or of the democratic leader with those of the compulsive bureaucrat.

We cannot present life stories of other social types, but we may close this discussion by introducing, with slight modification, Lasswell's scheme for indicating the major developmental phases in the change from the primary personality characteristics to those found in the social roles of adult life. The "formula" is as follows:

$$p \rightarrow d \rightarrow r = P$$

In this p stands for the motives and mechanisms which emerge in the primary-group and private life of the individual; d represents displacement, or transference, onto some public object or activity; r symbolizes rationalization in terms of what is publicly accepted; P is equated to the political man or public social role; and \rightarrow means transformed into.

"The p is shared by the political man with every human being. Differentiation rises first in the displacement of affects on to public objects, and in the molding of the life in such a way as to give an opportunity for the expression of these affects. The non-political man may feel himself aggrieved against a brother and against every fellow-worker with whom he comes in contact. His mind may be taken up with personal fantasies of love or hate for specific people, and his ideological world (his attitudes toward the state, the church, the destiny of man) may be very poorly elaborated. He is a fly in the meshes of his immediate environment, and his struggles are fought in terms of the world of face-to-face reality. When such a man displaces his affects upon a person who happens to be a public object, this does not make him a political man. Impulsively killing a king who happens to insult one's sister does not make a politician of the regicide; there must be a secondary elaboration of the displacement in terms of general interest. It is the rationalization which finally transmutes the operation from the plane of private to the plane of public acts. Indeed, the private motives may be entirely lost from the consciousness of the political man, and he may succeed in achieving a high degree of objective validation for his point of view. In the 'ideal' case this has gone so far that the private motives which led to the original commitment are of feeble current importance."²⁴

Now it is evident that the particular public object or social role upon which the displacement and rationalization depend will be derived from the culture of the time and place. It is certainly in this sense that history makes leaders and not vice versa. The important point to note is that by this approach we attempt to examine the continuity of the basic personality mechanisms and traits as they carry over into the public social role of the

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 76. By permission of the University of Chicago Press.

individual. We still are none too sure what makes a leader, but at least we have some foundations for further study. Moreover, we have some hint as to factors which make for followership also. We shall address ourselves to this topic in a later section, but before doing so we must examine certain other aspects of the relation of culture and circumstances to leadership.

Dominance Patterns and Culture. As we noted in an earlier section, dominance may be expressed in the institutional hierarchy of power and control or in the more voluntary and flexible relations of ascendant personalities to followers. The former kind we called headship; the latter, leadership. Actually the two are often bound together. Certainly what we term democratic leadership rests upon a broad cultural base of expectancies and acceptances into which both voluntary and obligatory elements enter. In some societies leadership and headship take quite autocratic and dictatorial forms. Yet in periods of persistent and grave crises it is easy for scholars as well as laymen to lose their perspective and to read into any discussion of dominance their own wishes and values. This is illustrated in certain American writings in which there is a hidden or open assumption that democratic leadership is inherently superior because it is based on sounder psychological and social-cultural principles.²⁵ The most striking instances of this are the well-publicized researches of Kurt Lewin and his associates.²⁶ We shall note the results of one of many interesting experiments.

Three groups of junior-high-school pupils were organized to do certain projects in mask-making. One group, designated as the "laissez-faire" type, had no fixed dominance or leadership plan, but was marked by a high degree of what we call individualism. A second group, called the "democratic" type, chose their own leader and engaged in group discussion of the details of the program. The third group, termed "autocratic," operated under definite and continuous command of the leader, who actively directed the work at all times. The results were highly informative.

The laissez-faire group wasted much time and energy in bickering, in lack of decisiveness, and in dispersion of aim. The democratic group got the most done and showed the least internal friction. The autocratic group accomplished a great deal but was marked by considerable hidden hostility to the leader, displaced upon new-

²⁵ A good illustration of this is found in Paul W. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 1935, which is frankly built around the thesis that there are basic psychological superiorities in democratic as against autocratic dominance. Somewhat similar views are implicit in E. S. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership*, 1934, and in the same author's *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, 3rd edition, 1942, chaps. 13, 14.

²⁶ See especially the following: K. Lewin, R. Lippitt, and R. White, "Patterns of Aggressive Behavior in Experimentally Created 'Social Climates'," *J. Social Psychology*, 1939, 10: 271-299; R. Lippitt, "Field Theory and Experiment in Social Psychology," *Amer. J. Sociology*, 1939, 45: 26-49; A. Bavelas and K. Lewin, "Training in Democratic Leadership," *J. Abnormal & Social Psychology*, 1942, 37: 115-119; R. Lippitt, "An Experimental Study of Authoritarian and Democratic Group Atmospheres," *University of Iowa Studies*, 1940, 16, No. 3: 43-198. Much of this material is reviewed and interpreted in various chapters of G. Watson, editor, *Civilian Morale*, 1942.

comers and other groups, and by a lack of aim and accomplishment when operating without the close direction of the leader. Both the laissez-faire and the democratic group expressed much more we-feeling than did the autocratic one. In the laissez-faire group, however, although group-centered discussion was high, the number of constructive plans developed was low. Apparently this came from the lack of a cooperative technique for carrying plans into effect. The dependence of the members on the leader was very high in the autocratic group.

This and many other studies have shown that people not conditioned to democracy do not consciously resent direction and control by a leader. However, variations may arise, once groups have been "treated" to democratic patterns. One group studied by Lewin, Lippitt, and White began with an autocratic leader, then had a democratic one, and finally closed the experiment with another autocratic leader. Under the first autocratic leader the members showed highly submissive and dependent reactions. After the training of a democratic situation, the group, now under its second autocratic leader, expressed only half of its former dependence, tripled the amount of effort directed to escaping from the dictatorial procedure, and showed a good deal more frustration in the form of personal aggressiveness.

Other studies on the training of leaders have contributed to this same body of data. For example, Alex Bavelas showed that he could successfully train persons to lead children's groups democratically in such a way that personal tensions would be lowered and the children would respond more satisfactorily to responsibility. To cite only one instance: Two matched playground supervisors, A and B, were first observed in their management of a recreational group. Both dominated the children by direct commands about 60 per cent of the time. In about 16 per cent of the time they gave a command only after a child had asked for direction. They handled only about 12 per cent of the situations by guiding the child to an activity through praise or by making their preference known in a friendly way. In only about 5 per cent of the situations did they vest the child with some responsibility of choosing what should be done. After instruction and training in democratic methods, A's use of the authoritarian method dropped from 77 per cent to 4 per cent, and the more democratic method of initiating play rose to 73 per cent.²⁷

During the years just prior to our entry into World War II, and during the war too, these studies received much attention, and, though the authors were rather cautious about wide generalizations, their findings were often quoted as "proof" that democratic leadership is superior to autocratic. But, before we make general application of the results, some basic considerations are necessary.

First of all, these investigations dealt almost entirely with preadolescents and young teen-age children. Second, the cultural background was that of middle-class midwestern America, which provides a definite democratic direction for conduct. The same results might not follow from similar ex-

²⁷ Described by A. Bavelas in chap. 8 of *Civilian Morale*, ed. by G. Watson.

perimental work among children in a society with a rigid class system and a different cultural setting of dominance. Children in Nazi Germany or in Japan, for instance, might do very well under a dictatorial regime and rather poorly under a democratic one. We simply do not have any final answer on this matter. All we can say is that in this sample, a section of a democratic society, such and such results were obtained. Certainly much in Nazi leadership has been amazingly successful, and, though we may object on moral grounds, we must interpret their dominance-submission reactions within their framework. To use studies such as those of Lewin, Lippitt, and White as a factual basis for attacking another system of dominance and submission is to confuse cultural with psychological factors and to introduce moral valuations. Neither procedure is scientific.

We really need investigations which, if possible, will separate the cultural factors from the psychological. The Nazis' so-called *Fuhrer* principle of graded dominance may not be a psychologically sound system for mature individuals. Certainly we do not like it, and it runs counter to what we consider democratic. But that individuals will not adjust themselves to it, or that it will necessarily break down under its own inherent falsity, has not been demonstrated. If such a system became widespread, it would alter many other patterns in our culture. For one thing, it would imply a highly fixed social structure and an operating concept of graded classes with a master and superior race or class at the top. We have not had a real test of such a scheme in a complex industrial order of global extent. It is one of those strange questions which can be answered only by history. In the meantime, democratic values and faith, being deep in our culture, will continue to be defended and rationalized. If the faith in them is lost, of course, then other values will arise and with them their adequate rationalizations. The implication of such cultural conflict over principles will be discussed in later chapters. At this point we can only repeat the caution that we must not prejudge leadership and followership in terms of a particular cultural system. In the next section we deal with other aspects of dominance and submission, especially in relation to leaders and followers.

LEADERS AND FOLLOWERS

As we pointed out earlier, dominance in any form implies some kind of corresponding submission. There could be no leaders without followers, no upper class without a lower, no headship without some individuals under authority. In the present section we shall discuss the nature of prestige, the leader as an ideal, and the veneration of the masses. We must also examine more closely the interactional foundations of this relation of dominant to submissive persons in terms of early training.

Prestige. Any discussion of leadership would be incomplete without an

examination of the relation of the leader to the followers whom he controls. One noticeable feature of leadership is prestige. The word *prestige* has itself an interesting history. Originally it referred to illusion, especially to the illusion produced by the juggler's tricks. From this it came to mean trick or illusion in general. Today it has been defined as a distinction attaching to a person or thing and dominating the minds of others or of the public. Often it refers to the reputation or influence arising from success, achievement, rank, or other circumstances. Prestige depends largely upon the qualities ascribed to the leader by other persons. It is a special case of our point that a man's personality reflects others' image and recognition of him. A leader's prestige rests upon the apperceptive background of the followers. The leader takes on the qualities which his adherents project on him. If he does not unconsciously do so from the outset, in time he comes to imagine that he possesses the traits and attitudes ascribed to him by others.

✓ One of the most interesting aspects of prestige is its almost inevitable spread from one field to another. A prominent engineer or physician quickly attains status in fields in which he really has no competence. The interplay of followers and a dominant personality leads to an easy extension of the latter's authority and prestige. A man who has won fame as an engineer or physicist may then begin to speak as an authority on matters political, economic, and theological. We witnessed this in the early years of the Soviet Union, when American engineers, artists, newspaper men, and travelers who were ignorant of political and economic forces became in the minds of the public, and in their own, experts on the Communist revolution. This extension of authority and prestige is well illustrated by scientists.

"In the relation of the scientist and the community the powerful factor of prestige comes into play. Men recognized in their own fields are under the constant temptation to offer their advice on the world in general. This arises primarily from the psychological effects of felt-recognition. The seeds grow rapidly in every one to speak as one having authority. Secondly, the populace, encouraged by the press, looks upon the man of science as a present-day miracle and magic worker. A headline reporting the lecture of a psychologist on abnormal behavior is likely to phrase it in terms of the occult and mysterious. W. G. Sumner pointed out how quickly the masses retouch the scientific notions to suit their own mental set. In view of this the newspapers and their clientele are apt to turn to the men of science in a given community for opinions, not only in their own fields, which are often too remote or abstruse for the ordinary person to grasp, but frequently on matters of the day. Some men of reputation unfortunately take newspaper notice too gravely. It means recognition in one's own neighborhood, a thing few scientists have or should much concern themselves with. The social pressure is effective. As a consequence we find Professor X, a specialist in a remote branch of natural science, quoted in the papers for opinions on prohibition, Bolshevism, and Margaret Sanger.

"Examples could be multiplied. In the social sciences the danger is peculiarly pres-

ent, since every citizen, in this country, at least, considers it almost a duty, if not a right, to speak on every conceivable subject which touches the body politic. Hence a natural scientist or an engineer may regale a business men's club with a discussion on rural economics, on the errors of proportional representation, or in defense of the Open-Shop. Some wonder when a professional politician makes an unscientific analysis of an international banking situation, but they marvel more when a natural scientist, say, speaks with arrogant authority on social questions.

"In short, there is a common tendency to universalize authority, both among the followers and by the assumption of authority by experts, executives, religious, political and military leaders. The mass of mankind desires an element of omniscience in its authorities. The populace demands an 'all or none' principle. It protects them from doing any thinking for themselves. All that is needed is reference to authority to settle doubtful questions."²⁸

The Leader as an Ideal. It is apparent that the very qualities of dominance depend upon interstimulation. As Emerson says, "it is natural to believe in great men.... The search after great men is the dream of youth and the most serious occupation of manhood." The subordinate identifies himself with the leader. Otherwise he could not be a party to the process of dominance. We identify ourselves not only with our living and dead heroes but, through vicarious joy and sorrow, with our heroes in the drama, in verse or prose, and in the plastic or pictorial arts.

Leaders give us a vicarious experience which is strangely satisfying. In our heroes we see ourselves as better, bigger, or more active men. We may even secretly admire the great criminal or other immoral individual because he represents to us a defiance of authority and the mores; in his actions we often sense our own secret wishes fulfilled. We often should like to display such aggressive attitudes, but in our timidity and conformity we dare not.

The interest of the masses in mystical literature is also validly explained. This literature satisfies deep emotional longings. It is often fantastic. Since each reader interprets the mystical element in his own way and inserts his own emotional needs and conditionings, its vague symbolism provides an outlet for emotions which otherwise must be rigidly suppressed.

While identification leads to vicarious satisfactions, it furnishes, in addition, a basis for emulation of the leader. The knowledge of a leader may become a stimulus for efforts to be like him. We make the leader an ideal, and forever afterwards we may look upon him as a model for our own activities. Charles Darwin said of Humboldt's *Personal Narrative* that "this work stirred up in me a burning zeal to add even the most humble contribution to the noble structure of Natural Science." Napoleon was a voracious reader of the lives of former military leaders. There is a common recognition of the importance of hero-worship in our educational scheme. To the

²⁸ From K. Young, "The Need of Integration of Attitudes among Scientists," *Scientific Monthly*, 1924, 18: 299-300.

schoolchild national heroes, Washington, Jackson, Lee, Lincoln, and others, are held up as worthy ideals.

The making of heroes goes on apace, but especially in a times of crisis, as in a war. After the United States got into World War II, a whole series of military heroes appeared. (See Chapter IX.)

Identification and emulation of leaders serve another function. The leader is the symbolic projection of an ideal. He stands for something outside the currents of the commonplace. To him are often attributed qualities which are not his at first, but with which he becomes invested by the social ritual of veneration. The whole process of making myths of our heroes and leaders arises, in part, from the unconscious symbolization of greatness. The power, wisdom, and fame which we ascribe to heroes may be thought of as something independent of them. That is to say, the holder of an office of traditional leadership in a social group may not himself be an ideal character, but the very office he holds, or the prestige the office carries with it, endows him with an ideal power and wisdom quite distinct from his actual capacities. In *The Public Life* J. A. Spender makes the excellent point that, once a man has entered the arena of public affairs, he becomes the common property of the public. He is no longer himself. He is more than that. His life belongs to the masses. Everything he does may be of profound importance. In a sense he thereafter has no private life. To be successful he must live up to the great expectations of his public.

Students of crowd behavior have frequently commented on the veneration of leaders by the masses. The adoration of Lassalle in the Rhineland is well known. Marx, Lenin, and Stalin are magic names among Communists. Among other classes Bismarck's dominance had great admiration and approval. In our country John Brown became a symbol for the North during and after the Civil War. Mary Baker Eddy has become a symbol of faith for the Christian Scientist. The canonization of the living and the dead goes on in our day, under the aegis of democracy, capitalism, or socialism, just as it formerly went on under the guidance or approval of a universal church. Every group has its heroes, living and dead. Every political convention hears speeches on the heroes of the past. It hears again how the present political party is carrying out their principles. The Republicans adore Lincoln, while the Democrats venerate Jefferson and Jackson as their special deities. Religious groups have their heroes in St. Augustine, St. Francis, Luther, Calvin, Wesley, and others. For that matter, the scientists have heroes too: Galileo, Copernicus, Newton, Curie, and Einstein in physics; Boyle, Lavoisier, and Dalton in chemistry; Darwin, Huxley, Weismann, Pasteur, and Koch in biology. All groups, moreover, invariably rationalize the adoration of their heroes. The veneration of scientists for their heroes is no less the result of their identification of themselves with great men in their own universe of discourse than is the veneration of the politician for

his hero or the small gang boy for his. The quality of the leaders may be different, but for the individuals within their own group it may be hard to prove that their own heroes are not the most important.

The Effects of Veneration on Leaders. Leaders are much affected by this veneration. They assume the characteristics thrust upon them by their followers. A kind of circular stimulus-response system is set up between leaders and followers.

"In the object of such adoration, megalomania is apt to ensue. The immeasurable presumption . . . sometimes found in modern popular leaders is not dependent solely on their being self-made men, but also upon the atmosphere of adulation in which they live and breathe. This overweening self-esteem on the part of the leaders diffuses a powerful suggestive influence, whereby the masses are confirmed in their admiration for their leaders, and it thus proves a source of enhanced power."²⁹

In brief, the masses attribute to the leaders certain qualities. These, in turn, influence the leaders, who react upon the masses in such a manner as to increase their power because they fit the very picture which the masses created for them. Again we see how leaders and followers always exist in a relationship of interaction. Moreover, the followers contribute more than idealization, emulation, and veneration for their leaders. First of all, the masses carry the culture patterns upon which the special functions of leadership rest. In any field which touches the mores or folkways at all intimately, leadership must fall in line with what the masses hold to be true. More than one ambitious man has destroyed himself by breaching the wall of conventional morality. In our own day, in some particulars at least, change is in the folkways. The masses expect alterations in our material culture—newer models of automobiles, better radios, faster mail service, improvements in comforts and luxury. In this dimension of behavior leadership is always welcome. It is not so evident, however, that the masses feel any need for changes in the economic and social bases of our material culture. In the mores of sex, of private property, of religion, and of political organization, their conservatism restrains the inventiveness of men eager to be leaders. Those who step ahead of current ideologies and practice may not secure any great following. We do not look very seriously for inventive leadership in these areas of life, partly, no doubt, because our moral and social values are sacred and thoroughly bolstered up by strong emotions and feelings.

The masses desire material change, but they do not clearly formulate the ideas and invent the means of alterations. Rather do the leaders crystallize the vaguer feelings and emotions of the masses.

²⁹ R. Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, transl. by E. & C. Paul, 1915, p. 68. By permission of Cosmopolitan Book Corporation.

"The function of leaders in defining and organizing the confused tendencies of the public mind is evident. . . . The originality of the masses is to be found not so much in formulated idea as in sentiment. . . . It is into the obscure and inarticulate sense of the multitude that the man of genius looks in order to find those vital tendencies whose utterances is his originality. As men in business get rich by divining and supplying a potential want, so it is a great part of all leadership to perceive and express what the people have already felt."⁸⁰

The masses are, however, important to leadership. One is the reciprocal of the other, and the notion that leaders somehow fling their ideas and practices upon a thoroughly docile and subdued people is a colossal bit of nonsense. Bolshevik Russia and Fascist Italy are contemporary instances of this reciprocal relation. In Russia, long abuses and the hardships of war gave the revolutionary minority an opportunity by propaganda to make articulate the deep reaction, long dormant, against the czarist regime. The minority control of the Communists is, of course, an instance of the leadership of great numbers by a small, militant group. Yet without the tacit support of the people the Communist revolution in Russia would have disintegrated. Fascism and the phenomenal rise of Mussolini to power in Italy came only after war weariness and the scandalous abuses of socialistic labor groups had created a tremendous desire for order and strength where there seemed only strife and disintegration. Hitler rose to power in Germany because he fulfilled the secret aspirations of the masses for revenge for the defeat of World War I and their desire to be identified with the power and prestige of their nation. Despite the ruthless methods of these revolutions, the fact remains that Lenin in Russia, Mussolini in Italy, and Hitler in Germany formulated the vague and uncertain feelings and emotions of the masses of their countries and put them into dynamic and striking form. Bringing order out of chaos is always significant: the uncertainty of daily crisis is removed, and life is again put into a framework of conduct where the present is understandable and the future is predictable.

Yet the picture of leadership and other forms of dominance is not complete without an examination of the roots of the ascendant person's relation to those who submit to him. If we are to understand these, we must again look to the genesis of these relations.

Dominance, Followership, and the Father Image. The fundamentals of ascendancy and submission—as of other aspects of the larger public life—develop in the family and in closely related primary groups. We have discussed H. D. Lasswell's efforts to trace the transition from the earliest conditioning in the family to the later public role, especially in the political system. We have also commented on some aspects of personal identification with, and veneration of, leaders. Clearly there is a reciprocal relation be-

⁸⁰ C. H. Cooley, *Social Organization*, 1909, pp. 135, 148. By permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.

tween follower and leader. But there is a second reciprocal relation, too, that between follower and follower. In this subsection we want to examine these interactional patterns and see what correlation, if any, they may have.

There is much evidence to show that the dominant individual, be he leader or institutionalized head, symbolizes the authoritative father or father image. The steps by which this develops in our society have been traced in Chapter VI somewhat along the following lines. First, following the usual basic attachment to the mother, there comes a strong attachment to the father as protector, friend, and source of strength. But, as the father comes to punish and control the child, certain frustrations or resistances to the father emerge. In some instances, if not all, some of this aggression toward the father may grow out of strong envy and jealousy of the latter's implicit inhibition of the child's complete absorption of the mother.³¹ As a result of this, an opposing or ambivalent reactivity to the father is developed. Part of the fear and hatred generated from the frustrations is transferred to other individuals and later to entire out-groups. Yet part of the resentment is held in check and may come out in disguised or sublimated forms. The identification with the strength and love elements is later carried over to persons of both institutional and voluntary dominant status.

The follower-to-follower relation also finds its prototype in primary groups. In the family, sibling rivalry reveals the initial struggle for power among relatively equal individuals. There may be conflict for parental affection and care, for possessions such as toys, food, or clothes. Furthermore, there is an ambivalence here: love and affection for the siblings, counteracted by fear of them and aggression toward them. By direct training of the parents, who reward or punish as their wishes are fulfilled or not, children learn to inhibit their sibling hatreds and to co-operate as dependent and submissive individuals with regard to the dominant and power-wielding father and mother. The children may jointly love or hate the father, and in such reactions is born a certain sibling sympathy. That is to say, the joint attitude of the children toward the father indicates a certain mutuality and comradeship.

This mutuality is again evident in the play group, where the children join under a leader to accomplish some project. Under these circumstances rivalries give way to co-operative action in which there is a kind of brotherhood.

This is essentially the form which follower-follower relations take in the larger public and secondary-group situations. The members of a party or movement or other organization join hands together, as it were, in their submission to the dominant or top person. Strength is attained in this type

³¹ It does not seem essential to posit a universal Oedipus situation, though it certainly does have a place in many children's resentment of fathers. Aside from this, the resistance to the father's power is a common response.

of identification, and the leader or head may use this strength for the ends in view. There is, in fact, a pattern of conformity which gives solidity to the group.

The form, then, is two-directional. With the leader there is a person-to-person identification, marked by obedience and veneration. With one's fellows there is identification in mutual love and sympathy, which may be designated as brotherhood and co-operation with the leader toward the goal he indicates.

In view of this dual identification, we may well ask what becomes of the components of the previous sibling rivalry. The hostility there engendered must be drained off into other channels, and again the out-group and its leader provide objects of hatred and antagonism. Of course, it is not always completely drained off, and some fear of the leader and aggression toward him may remain in disguised form. So, too, factional splits represent a breakdown in the complete mutuality of the followers and the complete identification with the leader. It is well for the would-be leader to bear in mind that, no matter how close-knit his organization is and how vocal and intense the adoration of the mass of followers may be, turn of circumstance or loss of confidence may bring out aggressive reactions to him or to fellow members. To prevent this he may find it well not only to abuse the out-group verbally but to give some opportunity for overt aggression. Pogroms, lynchings, revolutions, and wars serve, in part, just such needs.

In this connection another reference may be made to the studies of Lewin, Lippitt, and White. They found more hostility between members in the group under autocratic leadership than in the democratic and laissez-faire ones. Interesting, too, is the fact that overt aggression toward the dictatorial leader was not evident in his group. Apparently children reared in our rather democratic society, while they accept dictation from above without overt rebellion, compensate for any resistance or antagonism by developing more aggression toward their fellows in the group. How much general application may be made of these findings is not yet clear, but they are suggestive.

One of the best illustrations of this duality of the follower-leader and the follower-follower relation is found in the organization of modern military commands. It is also seen in many religious orders, in secret societies, and in other groups. We shall have occasion in Chapter XIV to illustrate this with reference to military life.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

For general and systematic discussions of leadership, see Charles Bird, *Social Psychology*, chap. 11; E. S. Bogardus, *Leaders and Leadership*, 1934; S. H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, 1941, chap. 14; John Dollard, and others, *Frustration and Aggression*, 1939; Maurice Krout, *Introduction to Social Psychology*, 1942, chaps.

11, 12; P. J. W. Pigors, *Leadership or Domination*, 1935; Ordway Tead, *The Art of Leadership*, 1935; Helen H. Jennings, *Leadership and Isolation: A Study of Personality in Interpersonal Relations*, 1943; K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, 1927, chaps. 20, 21.

On political leadership, especially in the United States, see Thomas Beer, *Hanna*, 1929; H. F. Gosnell, *Boss Platt and His New York Machine*, 1924; Frank R. Kent, *The Great Game of Politics*, 1923; H. D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics*, 1930; D. T. Lynch, "Boss" Tweed, 1927; C. E. Merriam, *Four American Party Leaders*, 1926; Robert Michels, *Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy*, 1915; W. B. Munro, *Personality in Politics*, 1924; H. Pringle, *Theodore Roosevelt*, 1931; J. T. Salter, *Boss Rule: Portraits in City Politics*, 1935; Harold Zink, *City Bosses in the United States*, 1930.

Part Two

SOME ASPECTS OF HUMAN CONFLICT

SINCE conflict presents the most serious and persistent problems in group relations (be they narrow or wide in scope), we shall devote several chapters to a description and interpretation of some of the most important areas of human aggressiveness. Since co-operation is the counterpart of conflict, we shall, in treating in-group-out-group struggles, at the same time give attention to some features of human co-operation.

Perhaps the most widespread form of conflict is found in prejudices, which are not individual, but group-induced, ideas, attitudes, and habits. Such culturized biases ramify into every relationship in which conflict appears. Chapters XI and XII discuss racial, industrial, political, religious, and other kinds of prejudice.

Revolutions and wars, however, are the most violent and most engrossing human struggles for power. These two forms of intergroup conflict have become the most serious problems in modern mass society. In fact, the very survival of the human race, its society, and its culture is dependent on our solution of these long-established forms of aggression. Three chapters—XIII, XIV, and XV—are given over to a consideration of these topics

Chapter XI

PREJUDICE AS A PHASE OF CONFLICT

CONFLICTS short of outright violence are expressed in social prejudice. Much of our avoidance and aggression, whether overt or verbal, has its roots in biased attitudes, sentiments, and stereotypes, in myths and legends about others. Wherever classes, races, nations, denominations, or any other groups have found themselves in conflict, verbal or symbolic rationalizations are associated with the overt manifestations. In this and the following chapter we shall study first the nature and function of prejudice and some of its psychological features. Then we shall review some of the chief areas in which prejudice is found. At the close we shall indicate some means of alleviating prejudice and indicate why it is so difficult to overcome completely.

THE NATURE AND FUNCTION OF PREJUDICE

About the middle of the seventeenth century, when the city council of a certain city in Württemberg gave some privileges to a Jewish physician on account of his admirable experience and skill, the clergy of the city protested, saying that "it were better to die with Christ than to be cured by a Jew doctor aided by the devil." This is a good example of the nature of prejudice, which we are about to examine in detail.

A Form of Stereotype. A prejudice is a composite of stereotypes, myths, and legends in which a group label or symbol is used to classify, characterize, and define an individual or a group considered as a totality. For instance, an Italian is not first Mr. Antonio Mazzini with a certain cultural background which sets him off from some other members of American society, but is first a "dago" and then perhaps "Tony the peddler." Only incidentally, or perhaps not at all, is he thought of as a person in his own right with abilities, disabilities, and all the other characteristics which we tolerate among those whom we consider our friends or think of as people of our own set. So, too, a Negro is not Mr. Thomas Johnson, but first a "nigger" and then Tom. In the South, white men seldom if ever even consider that Negroes have family names.

Like all stereotypes, such a racial prejudice is, by strict logic, a false concept; a word or a phrase is used to give to a person or a group general and abstract characteristics which are not supported by rational reason or

scientific facts. Furthermore, such stereotypes are supported by a variety of myths, legends, and ideologies. As we noted in the previous chapter, social-cultural reality is largely determined, not by the findings of logic and experiment, but by irrational beliefs, culturized fantasies, and all the psychological baggage which makes up stereotype, myth, and legend. This fact is nowhere better illustrated than in the case of prejudice.

More specifically, the meaning of prejudice is clear from the very word itself. It means "prejudgment," the making of a decision or the adoption of an attitude or a belief in advance. It is a perversion of rational judgment by self-interest or group-interest. It is usually accompanied by strong emotional likes or dislikes. Like most stereotypes and myths, it is particularly effective because it carries with it strong feeling-emotional tone.

Bigotry and prejudice go hand in hand. The prejudiced person is obstinate and unreasonable in his attachment to some particular creed, group, or symbol. Anyone who has tried to argue with individuals who are prejudiced against Jews, Negroes, Communism, or National Socialism sooner or later realizes that he accomplishes little or nothing by explaining that the Jews are not a separate race, that the Negroes are not—as a race—biologically inferior to other races, or that the success of either Communism or National Socialism would not mean the complete end of society and culture though it would doubtless mean a considerable alteration in our patterns of living.

Prejudice and Status. The function of prejudice is to facilitate the segregation of opposing groups from each other. In other words, prejudice is a specific expression of basic conflict between in-group and out-group. The conflict may take place between nations, classes, races, religions, economic groups, or any other human associations which come into sharp opposition with each other. The history of the word *prejudice* is interesting in this connection. Our word comes from the Latin *prejudicium*, which meant a preceding judgment. It took on more special meaning when it came to refer to a judicial examination in Rome held before a trial as a means of determining the social status of the would-be litigants. This status-defining function of prejudice has never been lost.

In Nazi Germany the courts have actually come around to something like the ancient Roman practice. All sorts of legal restrictions were put upon the Jews in Nazi Germany, regarding marriage, residence, schooling, property rights, occupations, and mobility; and, in dealing with legal contests, the authorities often had to determine the status of the persons involved, that is, whether they were Jews or not, before the litigation itself was begun. In an earlier day we had something approaching this in the "grandfather clauses" in various state statutes, which attempted to fix the status of the Negro at a certain point, dependent on whether he had parents who had been slaves. Likewise, both law and the mores set would-be

biological limits to determine whether a mixed white-colored person was to be labeled Negro or white. The stereotyped definition was that anyone with an eighth or more "Negro blood" was *ipso facto* a Negro. In democratic countries today we do not determine legal status by private or secret judicial hearings, but we do something similar to this in what we often call the "court of public opinion."

This fixing of status is the central function of social prejudice, and it may involve economic, nationalistic, religious, or any other set of attitudes and actions in so far as these are related to the social position of the individual and group. Where status and the accompanying roles are highly rigid and fixed in a caste system or in some other institutional arrangement making for segregation, prejudice, at least in the narrow and more proper sense, may not arise. Prejudice is really most striking when the strata of classes are changing, when one group is threatening another in its power and prestige. In short, it is most evident in periods of intense conflict. But, before we take up more particular instances of prejudice in our own time, let us examine some of its psychological aspects.

SOME PSYCHOLOGICAL FEATURES OF PREJUDICE

There is no evidence whatsoever that prejudice is instinctive or innate. Yet the biases of run-of-the-mill Americans toward the Negro, the Jew, and the Oriental—to note only three instances—seem to him so natural, are so taken for granted, that he believes that he is born with a strong dislike for these people. In popular literature such beliefs are accepted uncritically.

Yet physiology and psychology give no support to any theory that a man has inborn prejudices against persons of a different race and color or of a different society and culture. When unhampered by older children or adults, white and Negro children play together with ease and spontaneity. Nevertheless, despite the absence of innate dislikes, individuals quickly form attitudes and habits which lead them to respond almost automatically with avoidance or other biased forms of conduct toward persons of another color, religion, nationality, or class.

Personal-Social Conditioning: The foundation of prejudice is that of all opposition, be it conflict or competition. As we noted in Chapter VII and elsewhere, the roots of aggression lie in the family, in the play group, and in other primary situations which set the major frames of our adult behavior. However, the first manifestations of conflict arise not from culturally defined but from personal-social relations. It is only later that culture gives direction and content to our aggressions. We noted that the chief sources of conflict patterns are the resistance of children to parental discipline, sibling rivalry for role and status in the family, and the conflicts of the playground, and that aggressiveness spreads out from these to all sorts of group situations. Such early antagonisms may be called, as Josiah Royce

called them, "natural antipathies." But they are not prejudices in the cultural sense. The aggression may be directed against a mother or father, one brother or sister, one playmate or another, as an individual. So, too, white children and colored children playing together may engage at times in fisticuffs, but this is no evidence of prejudice.

A white man may find the odor of a Negro distinctly unpleasant, or an Oriental may have a like reaction to the bodily odor of the meat-eating white man. Gilbert Murray tells of a Japanese serving maid who fainted at the smell of a number of Europeans and Americans sitting at dinner. Oriental students have from time to time told the writer that they are quite aware of a distinctive and rather unpleasant body odor of members of the white race. Still, such avoidant responses are not enough to induce prejudice. Moreover, accommodation in the sense of smell takes place very rapidly. One man who spent his boyhood in the West Indies among Negroes and people of mixed American Indian and Negro descent told the author that he was never aware of these odor differences after he had associated with these people a few weeks. He played basketball and other games with the boys, went with them on picnics, and associated with them in school, but was never conscious of differences of this sort. Because of infrequency of contact many people never acquire such sensory accommodation, and odor furnishes one basis for an awareness of difference.

Still more significant, perhaps, is the consciousness of differences in color. Color is always more evident than odor, and it is accordingly more difficult to break down ideas and attitudes associated with color. A child coming into contact for the first time with a yellow- or black-skinned individual may naturally be somewhat uneasy because of something strange and unfamiliar toward which he has no definition of conduct. So, too, strangeness of facial contour and gross bodily physique also marks off others as unfamiliar. Habit plays a large part in developing either avoidance or adaptation to differences. David Livingstone said of his first contact with whites after his long sojourn in the heart of Africa: "One feels ashamed of their white skin; it seems unnatural—'like blanched celery'—or white mice."

If we touch a person of color, we may get a distinct sensation of different texture of skin. People report a distinct consciousness of the finer texture of a Hindu's skin or the different "feel" of a black man's hand. One man reported the touch of Negro skin as like the feel of a snake. Yet whites in the South have no such consciousness after they have been handled as children by Negro servants. Associated with odor, color, and touch are differences in costume, which are at once noticeable. Strange clothes, unusual cuts of hair, odd ornaments—these things are quickly noted and make us aware of the unfamiliar character of those before us.

Speech is particularly important as a basis for awareness of differences. A man's deep bass voice may cause a small child to cringe and move toward

its mother or father. Such an avoidance reaction is natural. More striking to older children and adults, of course, are outright differences in language. We cannot communicate with the stranger within our gates. We do not understand language which sounds like a mere jumble of sounds with no rhyme or reason.

Nevertheless, our natural, untrained avoidance of persons of strange odor, color, skin, or speech is not alone sufficient to build a prejudice. Children have such antipathies or negative responses to people of their own race or group. Some other factors must be superimposed on these physiological and psychological foundations if prejudice is to arise. These influences come from cultural conditioning.

The Cultural Conditioning of Prejudice. Attitudes may arise from generalization based on specific experience, from differentiation of response out of a larger context, from shock or trauma, and from imitation, either of the kind which we get from general immersion in a culture or of the more specific copying and "matched-dependent" forms. (See Chapter V.) As important as the first three of these means of learning attitudes are, prejudices develop in most instances from the fourth. A child may have a certain avoidant reaction to color or speech, but it is when older persons—chiefly parents, teachers, and preachers—give a name with a negative value to such a response that prejudice begins to emerge. Even if a child has no personal experience, we begin early to construct for him the cultural framework in which will be cast his behavior toward members of strange races, nations, and cults and toward other outsiders. Definitions of behavior toward these groups are laid down in concepts which have grown out of in-group attitudes of superiority, co-operativeness, and social solidarity. As status in our own group means definite, predictable relations to its other members, so our relations with out-groups come to be determined by cultural norms. Our elders define for us our relations to the Negro or the white, to the Jew or the goi, to the Catholic or the Protestant, to this nationality or that, and so on through a large gamut of out-groups with which we have contacts.

The feeling that our own group is set off from another has been called social distance. Social distance implies subordination and superordination. It indicates a tendency to move toward an object or person or to withdraw. There is an ambivalence of emotional attitudes which may approach love and hate in the most extreme forms. Social distance means aversion and avoidance, on the one hand, and friendliness and close contact, on the other. It means co-operation or competition and conflict. As E. S. Bogardus says, an analysis of social distance gives a measure of "acting together" and of "acting apart." A student recently remarked about the Negroes that "they are all right so long as they keep a good distance from you." He apparently meant, reflecting the proper attitude of superiority of the dom-

inant white race, not geographical or spatial but social or psychic distance. Social distance signifies not merely spatial isolation, but the more important isolation of ideas and attitudes. The Jew living in the ghetto not only is segregated spatially but is cut off from contact with Christians by his own ritual and folkways. Despite physical proximity to Christians and business relations with them, there remains a sense of remoteness, of isolation, which is a definite barrier to easy participation in a common life. In a caste system, such as exists in India, social distance is codified and standardized. In our society of "open classes" it is the function of prejudice to keep the "outs" from getting in with the "ins." Thus the Jew is excluded from certain jobs, the Catholic from certain social circles, and the Negro from some trade unions and from full participation in military operations. In a society of mobility and economic opportunity there is much class flexibility, but even so the shift from one class to another is not possible without some strain between those who are already inside the higher class and those who try to get into it.

Social distances may be measured in various ways. One may list in preferential order the races or nationalities or groups toward which one has attitudes or about which one has opinions. Or one may indicate a willingness to accept the members of nationalities or groups into certain relations, as in the study summarized in Table 4.

It is clear that the nationalities of northwestern Europe are generally accepted and that southern Europeans, Armenians, and Japanese are generally rejected. However, the frequencies of approval are not a precise measure of the variation in attitudes toward, and opinions about, these nationalities; at best this type of study gives only a rough measure of divergence in views, and indicates indirectly some of the ideational foundations of prejudice. More rigid measures of prejudice have been developed, and we shall refer below to some of the results of using them.

Prejudice, Class, and Caste. Where class lines are rigidly fixed by custom and law, there is ordinarily little or no strain in the relations of different classes. Definitions covering a wide variety of situations are standardized, and people accept them as final and often as divinely given. The chambermaid does not hope to become the *grande dame*, and Judy O'Grady and the colonel's lady are sharply separated by social barriers, despite the poet Kipling's suggestions to the contrary.

This fixity of relations is most evident in a caste system and is less rigid in the class organization widely known in European culture areas. In societies with an open-class system, which tolerates and even encourages mobility up and down the power-prestige scale, such flexibility fosters intense competition and personal rivalry. In fact, prejudice reflects the very instability of our open-class system, and the struggle for higher status tends to heighten the sense of frustration, anxiety, and insecurity both of those who

TABLE 4

PERCENTAGES OF 1,725 AMERICANS WILLING TO RESPOND IN THE
DESIGNATED WAYS TO SELECTED NATIONALITY GROUPS *

	English	American (native white)	Canadian	Scotch	Irish	French	Germans	Spaniards	Italians	Armenians	Japanese	Turks	Hindus
1. To close kinship by marriage	94	90	87	78	70	68	54	28	15	9	2	1	1
2. To my club as personal chums	97	92	93	89	83	85	67	50	26	15	12	10	7
3. To my street as neighbors	97	93	96	91	86	88	78	55	35	28	13	12	13
4. To work in my occupation	95	92	96	93	90	90	83	58	55	46	27	19	21
5. To citizenship in my country	96	91	96	93	91	93	87	82	71	58	29	25	23
6. As visitors only to my country	2	1	2	2	4	4	7	8	15	18	39	42	47
7. Would exclude from my country	0	0	0	0	1	1	3	2	5	5	3	23	19

* Items selected and slightly rearranged from E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes*, 1928, p. 25. Reprinted by permission of D. C. Heath and Company

have reached a certain social position and of those who are seeking to reach it. In short, the psychological mechanisms of avoidance and conflict are at work. Each class tends to become a tight in-group which resents intruders.

✓ The culture patterns of one group furnish names or stereotyped labels for other groups. This "categorical motive," as Nathanael S. Shaler called it,

this pigeonholing of persons into certain groups—niggers, wops, kikes, fundamentalists, reds, New Dealers, economic royalists—is the conventional method of handling out-group members who try to break across the barriers of our in-group. We may want them to come into relationship with us up to a certain point, but we do not wish them to come further. The Negro is all right in his place, as a personal servant or as a workman, but not as an equal. The Jew is all right as a rag-picker, a peddler, or a small tailor, but not as a social equal or 'as the member of a college fraternity. The technique is to give the out-group a distinguishing label. Henceforth all members of the group are known by the group stereotype. We brand individuals with stereotypes received from our culture long before we know them personally. Even relatively unbiased people cannot escape such comments as "He looks like a Jew" or "He is a red." It is doubly hard for people of different color to escape definition in terms of the group labels. For most of us such cultural patterns determine our reactions toward the members of out-groups, be they races, nations, classes, religious denominations, or others.

The situation of the Negro in this country is further complicated by the fact that, though in our white society we have an open-class system, the relations between whites and blacks are defined largely by what is, in essence, a caste system. In a society which prides itself on its political democracy and its economic freedom and individualism this cultural anomaly has made for many difficulties. Certain aspects of these problems will be examined later.

Prejudice and Conflicting Cultural Ideals. In this country the effect of prejudice is complicated by a certain inconsistency in our cultural ideals.¹ On the one hand, Americans, both white and colored, are taught the Golden Rule, love of mankind, sympathy, fair play, and the "American dream" of equality of opportunity, democracy, and other advantages attributed to our economic-political order. On the other hand, there is great stress on sharp economic competition in the effort to make money and rise in status, on the virtue of intense personal ambition, and even on outright aggression. The former teaching derives from our Christian religion and ethics and from our democratic ideals. The latter comes from our political-economic laissez-faire doctrine and from the individualism that is linked to our desire for success.

Such opposing patterns tend to confuse and distress people, and apparently this ambivalence has its effects in white-colored and other situations of prejudice. In the day-by-day life certain mental conflicts may arise within the white man who wishes to be humanitarian and democratic and yet finds himself utterly opposed to any suggestion of crossing the color barrier. In like manner a Christian businessmen, faced by competition from a Jew,

¹ See Gunnar Myrdal, *American Dilemma*, 2 vols. 1944.

would illustrate an ambivalence between following the Golden Rule and using sharp eyes and ears to meet the competition. Moreover, just as Negro-white contacts are complicated by *color*, Jewish-Christian ones are by the fact that a Christian can with moral impunity adopt an anti-Semitic attitude rationalized on religious grounds. So, too, an American on the Pacific coast might justify his aggression toward the Japanese—even those born in this country—not only in terms of *color* but in terms of his need for national survival, to which the Japanese would be considered a threat.

It is clear that prejudice is a mechanism which grows up to defend one's status—class, religious, or other—against those who threaten it. As in other situations in which habit, attitude, and value are in danger, the individual may have recourse to escape, aggression, acceptance, or other devices, any of which may be emotional and overt, or intellectual and disguised. Some of these devices will become clearer as we take up specific examples of prejudice in our own society.

WHITE-NEGRO PREJUDICE IN THE UNITED STATES

Like other social-psychological problems, prejudice cannot be understood nor dealt with unless we understand that it is a phase of a larger interactional system. In other words, whites and colored, Jew and Gentile, Catholic and Protestant, union workmen and employers, must be studied in their interrelation. Prejudice will never be understood if we merely attack one side or the other of this very complicated and emotion-arousing subject.

Background of Negro-White Relations. During pre-Revolutionary times slavery was accepted and practiced throughout the American colonies. Within a few decades after the founding of the United States it had disappeared in the North, but the expansion of the cotton and tobacco plantation system in the South gave it great impetus there. As inhuman and economically faulty as slavery was, it did result in fairly stable relations of whites and blacks.

In general the relations of the races in slavery did not lead to difficulty. Social distance was carefully defined. There was security for the slave. The question of tolerance did not arise, since it was not necessary in the system. The Negro had his place, and he remained in it. He had no desire to participate in the white man's world. There was no competition, no conflict of interests between the races, but accommodation in terms of the slavery patterns.

The loyalty of the Negro slave was, in a certain sense, given not merely to his master but to the white race. This attitude carried over to the period after the Civil War. Negroes of the older generation speak very frequently, with a sense of proprietorship, of "our white folks." This sentiment is not always confined to the ignorant masses. An educated colored man once explained to Robert E. Park "that we colored people always want our white

folks to be superior.”² In the days of slavery the white master accepted the Negro as a person, and often admitted him to intimate and trusted positions, but never accepted him as a race. The Negro still remained chattel property. Nevertheless, between white man and comely Negro women a sort of concubinage grew up. This practice gave the basis of the Southerner's sex attitudes toward the Negroes. These facts must be remembered, for they lie at the root of social attitudes which persist to the present day.

The Civil War, fought over political as well as economic differences, resulted in many changes. The Reconstruction days brought humiliation of the formerly proud Southerners by the carpetbaggers of the North and by the emancipated Negroes, whom the carpetbaggers exploited. The Southern whites were forced by circumstances into a type of undercover conflict in order to survive, while the Negro was filled with fantasies of abilities which he did not possess.

Booker T. Washington, the great Negro leader, described the fallacious notions acquired by the colored people in those days. They imagined that freedom meant imitation of the frills of white civilization. They tried to telescope the cultural ages which separated white from black by taking to useless education. They learned French, Greek, and mathematics instead of thrift, the techniques of farming, the sense of responsibility for property, and the habits of sanitation.

“During the whole of the Reconstruction period two ideas were constantly agitating the minds of the colored people, or at least, the minds of a large part of the race. One of these was the craze for Greek and Latin learning, and the other was a desire to hold office. . . . The ambition to secure an education was most praiseworthy and encouraging. The idea, however, was too prevalent that, as soon as one secured a little education, in some unexplainable way he would be free from most of the hardships of the world, and at any rate, could live without manual labor. There was a further feeling that a knowledge, however little, of the Greek and Latin language would make one a very superior human being, something bordering almost on the supernatural.”³

There was no adequate cultural preparation for the emancipation of the Negro from slavery. He was given little or no training in economic responsibilities, occupational skills, or political responsibilities. Nor was there any basic change in the attitude of the Southerner toward the Negro. The original Ku Klux Klan was the outcome of the attempt of the white ingroup to protect itself. The Negro could not be returned to slavery: the Union armies had settled that. But the Negro could be and was taught that he did “not belong.” The color-caste system that emerged from the conflict

² R. E. Park, “Racial Assimilation in Secondary Groups,” in *Publications of The American Sociological Society*, 1913, 8. Quoted in Park and Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 1921, p. 630.

³ From *Up from Slavery*, p. 81, copyright 1901 by Booker T. Washington and reprinted by special permission of the publishers, Doubleday, Doran and Company, Inc.

of those years has persisted in the South to this day and in a modified form has diffused into the northern and western states wherever the Negro has settled in considerable numbers.

The caste pattern in the South is evident in the segregated school systems and in the differentials in public expenditures for education. For instance, in 1935-1936, the seventeen southern states and the District of Columbia spent on the average \$13.09 per colored pupil for public schooling and \$37.87 per white pupil. There were similar discriminations in the salary of the teachers, in the length of the school year, in the condition of the school-houses, and in many other things. The caste system is evident also in the restrictions on occupations and on voting, especially through the poll tax. It is clear in the personal relations. The Negro tends to be deferential and even servile toward the whites. The latter tend to be superior and domineering.

Nevertheless, the Negro is often accepted, up to a point, as a person, but never as a race or class. The traditional relations of master and servant are often kindly and pleasant. But there are always distinct barriers which keep the colored people "in their place"—that is, in an inferior category. The relations, in short, are pretty clearly defined, and infractions of the mores bring punishment within the law and outside it, as in lynchings.

The situation in the North is somewhat different. Mobility and work opportunities brought a large influx of Negroes from the South, especially during World War I, and there has been a steady stream northward ever since. The North had no tradition of a shift from slavery to a caste system, but it erected barriers at many points. Though Northerners tend to accept the Negro as a race or group, the individual Negro is often more completely rejected and abused than he is in the South. While the schools and economic opportunities provide a democratic training, the color line is pretty sharply drawn, especially as to intermarriage, residence, and membership in lodges, clubs, and churches, and sometimes even as to membership in trade unions.

In fact, there seem to be more serious confusion of role and status and more personal conflict, mental distress, and anxiety among Negroes of the North than among those of the South, especially if we consider those in rural South and in the lower economic strata. Sociologically this means that institutional definitions of situations involving the two races in the North have not become stabilized. While the Northern Negro receives the dream of American democracy and fair play, he continues to find it difficult to move up the economic-social ladder, and the caste principle of isolation and segregation continues in force. R. E. Park has pointed out that the Southern Negro who has accepted his status is represented in the stereotype of the "happy-go-lucky, shiftless, singing Darky," which in many ways is not far removed from the facts. In contrast, the anxious, distressed, and

somewhat educated Negro in the North, who worries about his status and his future, tends to take on the aggressive patterns that we commonly associate with minority-group members who are desirous of getting ahead and who think that aggression and the demanding of rights will enable them to do so. In other words, the latter "type" of Negro comes to resemble the popular stereotype of the aggressive, pushing Jew in our urban mass society. The relations of blacks and whites are further qualified by the fact that there is a rather strong class system^f among the Negroes themselves. This matter will be discussed below.

Bearing these facts in mind, let us first consider some of the white man's attitudes and reactions toward the Negro, and then turn to those of the Negro toward the white. For purposes of description we discuss white patterns and then Negro patterns, but it must not be forgotten that basic to these is the interaction of members of the two races.

Patterns of Prejudice among the Southern Whites. The roots of conflict, aggression, and prejudice are found in the manner in which the individual's basic and primary motives or drives are blocked, qualified, directed, and later used by culturally acquired responses. More specifically, antagonisms developed between parent and child, between siblings, or in the play group may easily and quickly be transferred to members of another race, class, or country.

The culture of the Southern white provides a whole series of avoidant and aggressive outlets having to do with white superiority and "keeping the nigger in his place." We may assume that white children in the South have their component of socially induced aggression from home and playground. The next step is the direction of this toward colored children and adults. In the South, as elsewhere, Negro and white children play together unless interfered with by others. Yet the evidence is clear that parents and other adults very early begin to segregate the white children from the colored, and to furnish them verbal labels or symbols of avoidance, disgust, fear, and aggression. This is the old and familiar pattern of instructing children about those who "live on the wrong side of the tracks." It is but a special case, in which color becomes the obvious symbol of difference, of antagonism between in-group and out-group.

The study of E. and R. Horowitz is enlightening in this connection.⁴ In the course of a larger study they spent some time in two Tennessee communities, testing and interviewing students and adults—both black and white—regarding their social attitudes. They show clearly that the white parents interfere, often going so far as to punish their children, to get them to stop playing with colored children. The parents also provide verbal definitions. When asked why their parents told them not to play with Negro children, the white children frequently made some remark such as "Be-

⁴ From an unpublished study, discussed in G. Murphy, L. B. Murphy, and T. Newcomb, *Experimental Social Psychology*, 1937, rev. ed., pp. 239-241, 371-373.

cause I'm white and he's black." Also ideas of disease, filth, and unsanitary conditions are used as excuses.

On the other hand, the Horowitzes discovered, on inquiry, that the parents often denied ever giving their children any such instructions. A common implication was that the children instinctively knew enough to keep away from the colored children. It is also evident that older children and adults forget the specific instructions which they received. This is a common aspect of forgetting, of course. Once the attitudes become integrated into larger patterns of avoidance and aggression, the particular items in their genesis may disappear from consciousness.

With the white attitudes, of course, go those of the Negro. A culturally expected pattern of deference and submission, of keeping within his own caste, is imposed on him. And often the Negro takes a view of himself similar to that which the whites have of him. The fact that some do not reveals sophistication and opposition born of education, wealth, and demands to break the caste system. (See below on Negro attitudes.)

These avoidant and aggressive reactions of the whites are supported by a variety of stereotypes, myths, and legends. The Southerner's chief principle seems to be that the Negro is far less intelligent, that he is really a subhuman species, and that he has no sense of moral responsibility with regard to sexual matters or property. To the terms "stupid," "lazy," "shiftless," "irresponsible," and "highly sexed" are added the myths and legends about the original Ku Klux Klan in the 1860's and 1870's and the revived Klan of the 1920's. However, the two chief rationalizations of outright violence against the Negro have to do with his sexuality and his attempts to change his status. Popular superstition has it that lynchings have been chiefly for alleged or actual sexual offenses, but, as a matter of fact, these rank lower among "causes" given than the overstepping of the barrier of caste, either in personal relations with white men, in conflict over property rights and jobs, or in more general agitation for rights.

It is well known that the conflict between whites and blacks in the South has been kept alive partly by the growing economic competition of the lower whites and Negroes. The former have continually taken from the Negro, occupations that were formerly considered fit only for colored folks. So, too, in the rural areas, the intense struggle of poor whites for survival is influenced by their rationalization of the feeling that the colored people are a cause of their difficulties.

The retarded culture of the rural South is an effect of isolation, both physical and social. Religious revivals offer some release from mental ennui, but they do not absorb all the excess emotional drive generated in the common man. The motion picture has only recently penetrated the rural sections. As good roads become more common, isolation will further disappear. Yet for the most part the masses do not live in the same cultural world as the masses of the urbanized North. The rural Southerner has no ade-

quate technique for recreation. He does not know how to play. Gossip, religion, and fanciful pictures connected with religion and the Negro make up his subjective world and largely determine his behavior. Superstitions about planting crops, unlucky days and numbers, and magical cures are common. The more systematized myths of organized religion furnish even more of the rural Southerner's world.

Associated with the white Southerner's fear that the Negro will outstrip him economically is his strong feeling about white womanhood. In this matter, rich and poor among the Southern whites join hands in their fear of the Negro. The idea of pure womanhood carries great emotional freight with most Americans, and particularly with Southerners. As everyone knows, there is a curious double standard of sex mores in the South. The whites have access to Negro women within the limits of custom, but a definite barrier is set up against relations between Negro men and white women. It is true that lynchings for alleged rape constitute but a fraction of the total number of lynchings. Nevertheless, fantasy-born generalizations out of chance cases of sexual crimes have created a vast mass of superstition and a body of techniques for dealing with the Negro in these situations. In Jamaica, in South America, and in other parts of the world, the whites and blacks get on well enough without undue fear of sexual crimes by the Negroes. In the South this fear frequently becomes a genuine obsession. The terrific taboo against the sexual approach of a Negro to white women doubtless sometimes constitutes a powerful suggestion to the Negro. It is not surprising that he occasionally engages in a sexual crime.

According to the Freudian interpretation, the taboo arises, in part, from the white man's sense of guilt in his relations with colored women. Possibly this defense mechanism may be further affected by a feeling of sexual inferiority to the male Negro. In any case, a strong tradition segregates Negro men from white women. A world of rich fantasy surrounds this taboo. It is also evident that this intense sex consciousness is a partial outgrowth of the Christian attitude toward sex—a denial of its reality, a categorical statement of its sinfulness, and a technique of dealing with it by autistic thinking and acting.

Lynching as a means of social control is the most severe and extreme form of violence, and, though its frequency has declined sharply in recent years, it still serves as a powerful threat to the Negro. It is, as Southerners well recognize, a brutal but effective means of teaching the Negro to keep within the bounds of the caste system.

Psychologically a lynching does for the lynchers just what a war or any other crisis does for a larger group. It offers release from the tensions of a severe struggle for survival. After it is all over, it becomes the basis for elaboration into vivid myths. The events of a man-hunt are retold with enjoyment and zest. Souvenirs from the rope that hanged the victim, bits

of burnt clothing, or scraps of firewood picked from the bonfire are exhibited on occasion. A lynching is often an important social event for thousands. Its persistence, despite opposition from the North and from the more enlightened communities of the South, is simple evidence that it is not only a method of social control but a means of releasing pent-up emotions through a kind of socially sanctioned mob violence. It is the living-out of a daydream of superiority. It is new adventure in a world otherwise rather humdrum and dull. The decline of lynching in the South is correlated with the improvement of economic conditions, the increase in educational opportunities, the expansion of different culture standards, the breakdown of isolation by improved communication, and the gradual emancipation of the masses from superstition.

Anti-Negro Prejudices among Northern Whites. As noted briefly in another connection, the Northerner may accept the Negro in the abstract as a race or group, but often lacks a workable technique for dealing with the Negro as an individual. Yet it would be a mistake to assume that Northern whites do not for the most part accept much of the caste segregation. They do. The Negro is permitted to vote, his children attend the public school with whites, and he is accorded many rights not given him in the South. Yet there is a strong taboo on intermarriage, residential segregation is in the mores, and the occupational choices of the colored people are distinctly limited. Most race riots and mass violence against the Negroes have occurred in the North rather than in the Deep South. In other words, the northern sections have not yet got a satisfactory set of institutional relations between members of the two races. In one sense prejudice is more common simply because there are no generally accepted definitions of the relations of the races.

There are several sources of prejudice among Northerners. Southerners are constantly expressing their views to Northern friends and acquaintances. Motion pictures and literature, at least in the past, have tended to show the Negro in an unfavorable light. But the chief source is economic competition and its ramifications into housing, educational opportunities, and the like. That children are conditioned to prejudice is about as evident in the North as in the South. The Horowitz study, already mentioned, showed that even young children in the North had definite stereotypes not only about color but about Negroid facial features, and that these were basic in their negative reactions to a series of pictures of Negroes.

A number of investigations have shown certain differences in the degree of prejudice among Southern and Northern college students. On the whole the results show about what we should expect from commonsense observation. Northern students are more favorable, as measured by the tests, than are the Southerners. Charles S. Johnson, using one of Thurstone's scales about the Negro, reported regional differences. On a scale of 11 equal units from favorable to unfavorable the average scale values for students

from various regions were as follows: from the South, 5.6; from the North, 6.2; from the Far West, 6.2; from the Middle West, 6.4. The value for foreign-born students was 6.7. None of these differences is very striking, but they do reveal that individuals from regions where there are fewer Negroes have more favorable attitudes. But the most favorable attitude was expressed by foreign-born students, who had not been exposed to our American culture and who themselves represented minority groups that had suffered prejudice, an experience that made it easy for them to identify themselves with the Negroes' demand for more equitable treatment.⁵

A study by Sims and Patrick is interesting in this connection.⁶ They used Hinckley's scale on race opinions—similar to Thurstone's cited above—on three groups of college students: 97 Northern students at Ohio University, 115 Northern students at the University of Alabama, and 156 Southerners at the latter. The range and the mean (average) distribution of each of these are shown in Figure 3. It is clear that in each group there are great individual differences. Another interesting fact is that the Northern students at the Southern university were the only group which consistently showed an increase in prejudice as one moved from freshman to junior and senior classes. This would seem to indicate that Northern students are, with the passage of time, influenced by the dominant race attitudes of Southerners with whom they associate.




FIG. 3—Attitude toward Negro of Northern and Southern College Students

There is, however, one factor of importance which tends to distinguish the Northerner from the Southerner. The North does not have the South's persistent tradition, deriving from the slave culture and from the caste system which crystallized in the early decades after the Civil War. Despite the lack, in the North, of satisfactory accommodative institutions which would tend to alleviate conflict, the Negro is there given many opportunities of education, citizenship, and occupation not afforded in the South. Moreover, there are large sections of the North, Middle West, and Far West that have

⁵ C. S. Johnson, "Measurement of Racial Attitudes," *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, 1931, 25, No. 2, 150-153.

⁶ See V. M. Sims and J. R. Patrick, "Attitude toward Negro of Northern and Southern College Students," *J. Social Psychology*, 1936, 7, 192-203. Figure 3 is from p. 194.

only a few Negroes. In these sections prejudices do not seem to go very deep if they are present at all.

On the other hand, education and citizenship rights tend to stimulate the Negro's dream of better conditions and more participation in our civic and economic life. The limitations on occupation and residence, in particular, which still persist in the North tend to accentuate the Negro's anxiety and restlessness. The Northern Negro more than the Southern has been the object of considerable revolutionary and race-conscious propaganda and agitation.

Negro Patterns in a White World. Many white Americans may be astonished to know that there is a rather well-developed class system among the Negroes themselves. Some writers have attempted to fit this into a rather elaborate scheme of classes and subclasses, but we shall accept the more common threefold division into lower, middle, and upper strata used by E. Franklin Frazier in his investigation for the American Youth Commission.⁷ Cutting across the basic economic and educational determinants of this system are the differences in skin color. In general the top class represents a combination of light-skinned mulatto and high economic professional role. The combination of dark skin and lowly economic condition is commonest in the bottom group. But variations in both wealth and color qualify these combinations. In fact, Warner, Junker, and Adams point out that in the Negro community which they studied for the American Youth Commission the very lightest-skinned individuals tend to be less favored by the Negroes than the medium or brown-skinned ones, other things being equal. Their interpretation is that the very light-skinned are in some disfavor partly because they resemble the dominant whites and partly because it is from this group that members of the Negro community desert to "pass" into the white community as white.⁸

It is well to bear in mind that the very designations *white* and *Negro* represent broad group concepts that may become stereotypes if carried too far. Generalizations may be invalid because we neglect subgroups and individual differences. The answers to questionnaires and rating schemes, and also the reports of interviews, show marked individual variation in the responses of both whites and colored persons. Some of these divergences reflect subgroup membership, and some are peculiar to individuals. Bearing in mind these differences, we may note the variety of ways in which the Negro adapts himself to the caste system imposed on him by the white majority.

The ways of adjustment run the gamut from attempts of a few (the very light in color) to attain complete identity with the whites by "passing,"

⁷ See Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways*, 1940. A more intricate scheme is that used by W. L. Warner and others, *Color and Human Nature*, 1941, pp. 25-28.

⁸ See Warner, *op. cit.*, chaps. 4, 8.

through abject submission and acceptance of inferior status, to outbreaks of complete revolt. The Negro's conception of the world he lives in comes from two sources, the Negro culture and the white culture. The aspirations and hopes of the Negro derive not only from his own community but from the larger white culture in which it is embedded. Many Negroes accept what the whites say about them as correct. Often upper-class Negroes blame lower-class Negroes for the difficulties which they all experience. Many of those in the lowest class accept completely their inferior condition, without sign of protest, and apparently without experiencing mental distress or a sense of frustration and revolt, especially if they take menial jobs. E. Franklin Frazier points out that a considerable proportion of the lowest class in the sample communities which he studied tended to accept their lowly status. Occasionally girls and boys from this group would—under stimulation of school and general American idealism—attempt to rise in the world, but they soon became aware of the difficulties surrounding them.

The economic limitations of most Negroes definitely qualify their reactions to themselves and to whites. Frazier says that this is witnessed in the fact that the lower-class colored youth want above all clothes, food, and decent homes, whereas the upper-class youth desire rather money for conspicuous consumption and for personal attainment. In like manner the Negro's reaction to skin color depends on its function in his particular class and community. If a Negro girl, for instance, identifies herself with the upper stratum, where light skin has a high value, she will wish for a light skin and do everything to appear to have one. In circles where rich brown color is at a premium—the *chocolat au lait* value—a light skin may be considered a handicap. And dark-skinned boys, girls and adults of the lowest level tend to accept their color, for, to their minds, and often to that of whites as well, dark color, heavy Negroid features, and the lowest status go together.⁹

Warner, Junker, and Adams, in their study of Negro youth in Chicago, point out that cultural conditioning, North or South, influences the Negro's conception of himself. It seems likely that a Southern Negro child is already, at six, clearly oriented to the caste system, but a colored child in a Northern urban community may first become oriented to his world as "an American citizen—a person with full privileges in this society," and may discover only later, say at twelve or fourteen years, that he is caught in the vise of a caste system, which ideally has no place in a democracy.¹⁰

⁹ The writer has had several conversations with Southerners who distinguished sharply between the "coal-black" Negroes of heavy features and the brown or high-yellow type. The former were said, by one woman informant, to be dull, morally unreliable, lazy, and generally no good—a condition which, she alleged, came from their being, as she put it, "real niggers." The mulattoes, on the contrary, to her were smarter and more reliable and generally more acceptable. She made, however, no effort to attribute this—as some scholars have done—to the admixture of "white blood."

¹⁰ A parallel to this—without the caste feature, of course—is the experience of white

Some Specific Ways of Meeting White Prejudice. The means used by Negroes to adjust themselves to their castelike status are varied and many, and they have bearing on both inter-Negro and white-Negro relations. We shall discuss only those which appear most common.

(1) There is a small number of persons of mixed descent in which the percentage of Negro stock is so slight that they "pass" over into the white community. Such mobility, moreover, is confined to urban communities where anonymity makes it feasible. But such a transfer is not attained without considerable emotional strain. For the person who passes it means complete severance of relations with his colored relatives and friends. A shift is often accompanied by a sense of guilt and shame, which is not always completely compensated for by attainment of white status. And, if a crisis arises, such as illness or the death of a relative, the person usually dares not return to his former intimates for fear of detection. As a matter of fact, passing seems relatively infrequent, and there is often considerable social pressure from relatives and friends not to do so. Neglect of the opportunity to pass is likely to be socially rewarded as Negroes develop a strong sense of race solidarity. There are, in fact, several Negro leaders who could easily go over to the white community but refuse to do so because they feel that it is their mission to remain identified with the colored community.

(2) Among the upper-class Negroes one of the most common devices for escaping the implications of caste is the development of complacency and self-satisfaction within the Negro group. Various studies have shown that in this class, and in part in the middle class, individuals and families become more concerned with acquiring wealth and climbing up their own social ladder than with making contacts with whites. Negro business and professional men who deal entirely with Negroes illustrate this pattern. Such a person may seem well-adjusted and may be for the most part satisfied, but he may still recall painful experiences with whites, or he may, from time to time, despite his avoidance of whites, suffer humiliation in situations involving place of residence, travel, recreation, and hotel accommodations.

(3) There are some all-Negro communities where the isolation takes geographic form and where self-satisfaction and complacency are bought at the expense of severing all relations with whites. But, for the most part, the business and professional opportunities in the Negro community are not enough to support more than a small proportion of those in the upper and middle strata of ability and income. Ambitious Negroes with education and business ability therefore often suffer an intense feeling of frustra-

minority groups, especially of Jews, in communities where they constitute only a very small fraction of the total population. The child is first initiated into the American patterns of equal opportunity and freedom of social contact and acceptance, but later finds himself barred from clubs, occupations, and other contacts.

tion. There is little if any chance for the Negro physician, lawyer, or professor in white society. From such people are recruited the leaders of the race movement, of the movement for equalitarian treatment, and in some instances of the movement for outright revolution. Race leadership has become almost a special role. In some instances it expresses a genuine concern for the plight of the colored masses; in others it is largely a pretense. R. L. Sutherland cites the case of the Negro president of a Negro college who loudly bewails the hardships of the colored race when speaking before white audiences, but whose private life is almost entirely devoid of contact with the Negro masses, whom he evidently despises. For him the protest is but a professional front.¹¹

(4) The aggressive reactions of the Negro to the whites take varied forms. The sort just noted finds its outlet in support of a movement for race-consciousness. Such a position is rationalized on the ground that the Negro stands to gain more by stressing his color and minority status and rights than otherwise. Such movements stimulate pride in color and difference. If a scientist who is a Negro becomes prominent, his attainments are interpreted in terms of his race, not in terms of his participation in the larger American community. Great vicarious satisfactions come from the successes of prizefighters like Jack Johnson and Joe Louis, or of track athletes like Jesse Owens.

The forms of aggression concerned with racial pride and solidarity are supported chiefly by organizations that provide the symbols and the line of activity to make those sentiments seem real and substantial. The ordinary hero-worship and vicarious pride in scientist or athlete, on the contrary, are stimulated by the Negro press, abetted often by well-meaning whites who like to see the Negroes get ahead.

Outright aggression of adult Negroes against whites is under severe taboo, both legally and morally. The fear of lynching, of severe treatment by the police and the courts, and of loss of jobs keeps colored adults from giving direct vent to their violent attitudes toward the whites. On the other hand, open conflict between colored and white children in some neighborhoods is not uncommon. The reports of Frazier and others for the American Youth Commission indicate that it is among the lower-class colored children that such open conflict is most common. It is not unusual for parents to encourage and even train their children to call names and fight back when they feel abused by white children. The sources of such aggression, of course, often lie both within the Negro family and community and within the larger framework of relations with the whites. One case cited by Sutherland illustrates this:

"Julia feels that she is rejected—by her mother because she is the darkest of all the children, by whites because she is a 'nigger.' She adjusts herself to her rejection by

¹¹ See R. L. Sutherland, *Color, Class, and Personality*, 1942, p. 48.

aggressive behavior. In the theater she is a trouble-maker—"Sometimes I lean over the banister and spit down on them ol' white people's head." Repeatedly she says, 'I hate white people!' When a white woman called her a nigger, she threatened to beat the woman. Yet she has had a few pleasant experiences with whites."¹²

Upper-class Negroes look down on such aggressive behavior as crude and unbecoming to intelligent persons. The occasional fighting that occurs between adult Negroes and adult whites is regarded as aberrant conduct, and the more intelligent Negroes do not blame the individual white man for the black man's plight, but employ some convenient rationalization such as the "system" or the whole white population.

Stereotypes serve the Negro as a very handy rationalization for projecting his own difficulties onto the whites and their institutions. Such use of projection is very common among members of minority groups. If an incompetent Negro is dismissed from his job, it is easy for him to shift the blame to racial prejudice. As we noted above, prejudice always represents interaction, and in such instances it becomes a means of protecting oneself against normal competition in terms of merit. Moreover, such an interpretation by a colored employee may feed the latent prejudices of the employer or manager.

Another outlet is the deflection of aggression back upon the Negro's own group. It is pretty generally accepted that the large amount of quarreling, fighting, and killing in Negro communities is partly due to the fact that colored people work off their aggressions on members of their own race. Of course, it is difficult to state specifically just what kind and percentage of Negro crime and delinquency are due to such emotional displacement. Yet there is little doubt that some has its source in such displacement.

There are also two kinds of adaptation to white domination which, indirectly at least, express aggression, and yet which appear to fall into the category of servility, to be discussed later. One of these consists of minor exploitations of whites by Negroes, such as petty thievery and other appropriations of property. Whites often come to expect this of colored servants and workers and make no particular effort to counteract it. Such accommodation reminds one of the European customs by which large landowners permitted their peasants a certain amount of mild appropriation of property, such as game poaching or petty stealing.

The other sort of indirect aggression is what Hortense Powdermaker calls "unaggressive aggression." By this she means a form of outward deference and respect which consciously overlays antagonism. She has discussed the operation of this kind of adaptation, especially among Negro teachers and others who outwardly have to show the customary respect for and obedience to white superiors but who, among Negro friends, make fun of

¹² Quoted in R. L. Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 50. By permission of the American Council on Education.

the whites and tell with pleasure and even with gusto how they got what they wanted by pretending respect and deference.¹³

(5) Finally there are the various forms of servility which have long been accepted by Negroes as the right and proper way of adapting themselves to white dominance. Sometimes this is a conscious means of getting along with the whites, and in this sense it is closely akin to the type just described. While the humility of the Negro may be a conscious pose, among many Negroes, especially of the lowest stratum and in the rural South, there is a rather complete acceptance of the inferior status. Sometimes the servility is rationalized in religio-moral terms as a resignation to God's will that the Negro accept his lowly place. Sometimes the servility takes the form of master-servant relations which is often marked by real loyalty and affection on both sides. It is this type of accommodation which is often described by middle-class and upper-class white Southerners as the ideal form of relationship, and one which, they often remark, is rapidly passing away now that the Negro "is trying to get up in the world."

Closely associated with servility and yet showing a certain aggressive spirit is the adaptation which Sutherland calls "clowning." One youth described it thus: "I know, being a 'nigger,' there are places I can't go and things I can't do. I make a joke of it and act the clown." ¹⁴

Another instance, known to the author, was revealed in a letter of thanks which a colored soldier in one of the army camps in 1943 wrote to a club of white girls who had sent Christmas packages to the boys in uniform. He described how he "laughed" to himself every time he thought of what these nice white girls would think, say, and do, if they only knew that their packages went to a Negro troop. Such conduct gets attention, tends to relieve interracial tensions, and is frequently just the reaction expected by whites.

These various ways of adjustment to the white castelike pattern of superiority are not unknown in other situations involving caste and class. In a democracy, however, they present a particular problem, for they are a serious threat to cultural consistency and hence to personality-integration. Some of the possible devices for peaceful accommodation will be discussed at the close of the following chapter, after we have treated other areas of prejudice.

WHITE-COLORED RELATIONS IN OTHER PARTS OF THE WORLD

It has long been recognized that the British and Americans carry in their culture a much deeper sense of color prejudice than do Latins and some other Occidental peoples. In general, one finds less prejudice against col-

¹³ See H. Powdermaker, "Channeling of Negro Aggression by the Cultural Process," *American J. Sociology*, 1943, 48: 750-758.

¹⁴ Sutherland, *op. cit.*, p. 57. By permission of the American Council on Education.

ored races in France, Italy, and Spain than in the British Isles or in this country. The contrast is shown in R. T. LaPiere's study of color prejudice in France and in England, made in the late 1920's. He made systematic inquiries in both countries of people he met and in particular of hotelkeepers. Despite a wide range of individual differences, he found the British definitely biased against the blacks and the French definitely favorable to them. Table 5 gives a tabulation of his results.

TABLE 5

COMPARATIVE COLOR PREJUDICE IN FRANCE AND ENGLAND *

	Total Number of People Questioned	Without Prejudice	Doubtful Cases	With Prejudice
France	360	279	72	9
England	315	14	47	254
	Number of Hotels Questioned	Admit Colored People	Do Not Admit Colored People	
France	31	24	7	
England	20	4	16	

* From R. T. LaPiere, "Race Prejudice: France and England," *Social Forces*, 1928, 7: 108. By permission.

Something of the American Negro's reaction to the more favorable circumstances in France is cited by LaPiere. He talked to a colored ex-dough-boy who was living in France with his white wife and three children. LaPiere suggested that he might wish to return to the United States. " 'Boy,' he said, 'over here I's a man, over there I's a nigger.' "

The different attitude of the British is evidently related to their sense of racial superiority and pride, to their traditional avoidance of contact with colored peoples. The British at home have had little, if any, direct contact with Negroes. Moreover, they, like most Americans, draw no distinctions between Negroes and Hindus. The French, on the other hand, like the Latins of Spain, Portugal, and Italy, have seldom held such prejudices. Latins have mixed with their colored colonials wherever they have gone, whereas the British, the Dutch, and the Americans have, as a rule, tabooed intermixture. There is here, of course, no instinct in operation but rather a powerful cultural taboo on biological mixture with colored races.

Present-day racial prejudice in Europe has doubtless been stimulated by the spread of National Socialist ideology. In order to unite the Germans in the plan to control Europe, and possibly the world, Hitler and his party for

years spread their racial theories of Aryan superiority. And in the scale of races they put the Negroes at the bottom. Other colored races and subraces, including the Japanese, were considered but little better than the Negroes.

The Dutch and the British colonies, in Africa, in Asia, and in the Pacific islands, have all seen the rise of castelike relations between colored and whites. In South Africa, for instance, the racial conflict is omnipresent, and many of the problems there are not unlike those which we face in this country. The spread of Christianity and of democratic ideals has induced conflicting ideas among the colored peoples ruled by whites.

In South Africa, in India, and in the Pacific islands, despite taboos, a certain amount of intermixture has taken place. This has tended to increase racial friction, just as the light-skinned mulattoes have stimulated class organization among our American Negroes and have furnished leaders to agitate for the rights and privileges of the colored minority.

The matter is illustrated in the situation which confronts the Eurasian in India, Burma, and the Malayan provinces, and the Indo-Europeans in Java. Among all the minorities of India perhaps the most pathetic are the Anglo-Indians, or Eurasians. They are often ostracized by both British and Hindus. The caste system in India, which in part stems from racial divergences, frowns upon such mixtures, and the British class system—carried chiefly in the military and civilian administrators—protects itself by a similar taboo.

These hybrids are set off from their parental racial stocks by a mixture of the physical traits of both, and psychologically they live in a conflicting dual world. Eurasians in India often talk of England as "home," though few if any have ever been there. They are subservient to their British employers, and try to be superior to the Indians. They are particularly sensitive to social situations. They are often given to ostentatious dress and manner, partly as an attention-getting device. They are said to be less responsible, less dependable, and emotionally very insecure in contrast both to the other natives and to the Europeans who have settled in the country. Their chief occupations have been clerical work, teaching, and nursing.

The situation of the Indo-Europeans in Java is said to be somewhat better than that of the Anglo-Indians in India and Burma. In a population of more than 40,000,000 they number perhaps not more than 130,000. Though legally considered Europeans, if the fathers were European, they usually lack the social status of full whites. They have inferior positions in government and industry. For the most part they are ill paid. They are distinctly subservient to their white superiors, and they look down upon the other natives. They despise manual labor and are seldom found in agriculture, except in supervisory positions. In recent decades the pressure on them as a group has been increasing, from the continuing influx of Dutch officials from Europe, and from the full Javanese, who have become better educated and are striving to rise in social-economic position. As a result of these changes, it is increasingly difficult for the Euro-Javanese to identify themselves with the whites, and they are such a small part of the population that they cannot hope to compete with the mass of natives. On the other hand, there is some evidence that many of them are more and

more identifying themselves with native movements, and they may become the leaders of Indonesian nationalism.

In addition to the Anglo-Indian and the Dutch-Javanese mixtures, people of partly Chinese descent are scattered all through the southeastern Asiatic region, and they constitute still another problem.

Into this situation still another element has entered in recent years. As a part of her imperialistic policy, Japan has systematically propagandized the mixed-breeds and the other natives of the Far East to the effect that the colored races must stand together against their agelong white "oppressors." It is not possible to tell just how effective this deliberate myth-making has been, but there is no doubt that it has a great appeal in some quarters, especially when it combined with the evident reality of the defeat of the proud British and Dutch by the Japanese in the early phases of World War II.

Such a program, backed by powerful military and economic forces, may well, in time, provide a basis for solidarity of the mixed-breeds and the other natives, who may combine in the process of transferring their aggressions from each other to the white race as a whole. Some further aspects of this matter will be discussed later. But, before we take up the larger social-psychological aspects of growing racialism, we must look into problems involving other minority groups, in this country and elsewhere. This we shall do in the next chapter.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

See the list at the end of Chapter XII.

Chapter XII

OTHER AREAS OF PREJUDICE

THE PRESENT chapter will be concerned, first, with some other areas of prejudice in which color is important; second, with prejudice related to nationality conflicts; third, with prejudice involving religious differences; fourth, with social biases which arise out of economic, political, and class conflicts. The chapter will close with an interpretation of the place of prejudice in culture and society, and with suggestions as to how it may be alleviated, if not eliminated.

OTHER WHITE-COLORED PREJUDICES

In the United States, aside from the Negro, the chief color prejudices have concerned the American Indian, the Mexican, and Orientals. Again the factors of numbers, cultural differences, and economic conflict are to be considered. The native Indian population was the object of prejudice when it was in conflict with the expanding whites. The prejudices almost always arose from fear of attack and from divergences in culture, for except in rare instances, the native American race was never a serious economic threat. When the Indians were so few in number that they offered no threat to the safety of the whites, there was no prejudice against them

Mexican-White Contacts. The Mexican has been the object of social bias chiefly in the Southwest, where his numbers have made him a factor in economic and political relations. Most of the social-distance studies in which Mexicans are rated along with other nationalities report the Mexican as falling, on the average, in the lowest quarter of the rank-orders. Thus about two hundred and fifty students and workers in Los Angeles placed the Mexicans at 6.8, along with the Japanese, in an order-of-merit listing permitting of 10 ranks.¹

There are really two Mexican groups in this country: those who migrated recently from Mexico, and the much larger group who call themselves Spanish Americans. The latter are indigenous to our Southwest, chiefly to New Mexico. Many Americans make no distinction between the two groups. Moreover, because of their dark color, the Mexicans frequently suffer from a carry-over of anti-Negro prejudice. Generally, however, un-

¹ See Elsie Monjar, "Racial Distance Reactions," *Sociology and Social Research*, 1937, 21: 559-564.

less there is economic, political, or class conflict, the whites and the Spanish Americans get on satisfactorily. The whites, traditionally well off, are merchants and large landowners who earlier engaged chiefly in stock-raising but in some quarters now raise citrus fruits, cotton, and other commercial crops on a big scale. The Spanish Americans have kept to their own villages or have served as seasonal laborers on ranches and farms, in the mines, and on the railroads.

The Mexican immigrant began to arrive in numbers to supplement this labor supply, especially in the expanding commercial agriculture of California. The whites have reacted to this influx in the traditional manner. The Mexicans were accepted at the outset as necessary to the economy, but conflict and prejudice arose as they began to rise in economic status, become politically important, and send their children to school. Occasional anti-Mexican riots have revolved chiefly around economic matters, although the so-called zoot-suit riots of 1943 in Los Angeles involved certain sexual elements suggestive of anti-Negro aggression in our South. This prejudice is compounded of the color line drawn originally for the Negro, of our historical contempt for Mexico as a country and for its people as of no particular consequence, and of resentment at the new competition.

The Mexican has resented our identifying him with the Negro. As to race, he is actually chiefly American Indian, and possesses a culture which is a mixture of native and Spanish elements. He has a great deal of cultural pride and in-group solidarity. Confronted with the ideals and the practices of Anglo-America, he is baffled, as other immigrants often are, by an inconsistency between the democratic ideals presented in the schools, in the press, and in the pulpit, and what he finds in the stiff competitive world of economic survival. He comes to resent the laws and mores which he does not understand, or, if he acquires the "American dream," he comes to resent his inability to participate in it freely with the whites.

The white-Mexican conflict is localized pretty much in the Southwest and does not implicate a large part of the population. Yet, in Southern California, Arizona, Texas, and in New Mexico, prejudice definitely interferes with the development of a more integrated American way of life. On the other hand, this is no such serious problem as that involving the Negro.

White-Oriental Prejudices. The relations of Orientals and whites in this country have gone through a rather typical race-relations cycle.² First with the Chinese and later with the Japanese, the cycle has run through (1) toleration or even mild acceptance of the small numbers of Orientals; (2) an increase in the number of immigrants and growing economic competition with the white natives; (3) the rise of conflict and prejudice, rationalized in conventional and acceptable terms by the whites; and (4) efforts to restrict

² This concept as an aid to the study of race contacts and prejudice has been developed by E. S. Bogardus. See his "A Race-Relations Cycle," *American J. Sociology*, 1930, 35: 612-617.

competition by stopping the influx of additional Orientals by legal or other means.

The contact with other Orientals, particularly with the Filipinos, has been somewhat less intense, and the full cycle has not yet been run. Because of political factors and the fact that few Filipinos have come here, the prejudice toward this race has not been strong or widespread. The gallant stand of the native troops of the Philippines in the defense of their islands in 1941-1942 has doubtless induced, at least temporarily, a highly favorable view of these people, not unlike the long-time favorable view of the Chinese.

The prejudice against the Chinese, like that against some other races, has both a color basis and an economic basis. When the Chinese first appeared in California during the Gold Rush, they served as cooks, fishermen, gardeners, and laundrymen and in other occupations considered beneath the dignity of native whites. Later, when the economically expanding region called for cheap labor in large numbers, especially in railroad construction and commercial agriculture, the immigration of thousands of Chinese coolies threatened serious competition with Americans. As a result, open conflict arose, with all the usual marks of group antagonism, bolstered by stereotypes, slogans, myths, and legends. Not only were the Chinese said to be unassimilable and able to exist at a frightfully low standard of life in comparison with decent and respectable Americans, but they were accused of being treacherous, wily, given to violence, and altogether a dangerous minority in our midst. Finally, under public pressure from the Pacific Coast states and elsewhere, the Chinese-exclusion legislation (1882) was passed, forbidding the coming of any more Chinese to this country for purposes of permanent residence.

Since that time the Chinese in this country have resided in or near our large cities and have come to constitute a series of small cultural islands in the middle of urban America. In 1940 there were only 77,504 Chinese in continental United States, chiefly in California. They are no longer considered a threat to our economy or racial purity.

Furthermore, a curious change has taken place in our attitude toward the Chinese. In its international dealings with China since the exclusion act, this country has pursued a rather favorable policy. It developed considerable trade with China but did not attempt to extend its political and economic control over the country to the same extent as did some of the European powers. Its friendly attitude became even more apparent after the Boxer Rebellion. It required reparations only for the actual damage done to property of Americans. The excess was returned to the Pekin government, who used it to educate Chinese students in this country. As a result of these events, abetted by the fact that the Chinese were no longer considered any menace as immigrants, the American public, for the most part, no longer feared the Chinese but came to regard them with tolerance

and a certain friendliness. A number of studies showed that American college and high-school students—who doubtless reflected adult opinion—were more favorably disposed to the Chinese than to the Japanese. Yet certain popular stereotypes about the wily and treacherous Chinese remained.

Later the coming of a democratic movement in China impressed our people and further stimulated friendly attitudes. Finally the growing Japanese imperialism, shown by the conquest of Manchuria and North China and finally by the Sino-Japanese war, helped to further the cordial relations of this country and China. In World War II they became open allies in their fight with Japan.

Just what this means for our future relations remains to be seen. Certainly our sympathetic and cordial relations are, for the mass of Americans, still rather abstract and vague. On the whole most people reacted favorably in 1943 to opening the doors of immigration to the Chinese on a quota basis. But that the majority of Americans would welcome large-scale immigration from China is dubious.

The cycle of our relations with the Japanese in this country has been shorter than that of our contacts with the Chinese, and in some ways more dramatic. Even at first, apparently, we were less tolerant, partly because of our prior experiences with the Chinese. As the number of Japanese immigrants increased, there was a definite reaction against them. This was facilitated by the fact that the Japanese immigrants, unlike the Chinese, were economically aggressive. Furthermore, many of them brought an intense nationalistic spirit—a cultural item almost entirely lacking in the Chinese of the 1870's and 1880's. The agitation for exclusion of the Japanese brought vigorous protests from Japan, and, when restrictions were finally put into force, the national pride of the Japanese was seriously hurt. Finally, our interests in the Orient came into open conflict with those of the Japanese. The Japanese rationalized their actions as efforts to defeat what they regarded as our attempt to encircle Japan and to hamper the fulfillment of her divine mission in the Far East. We viewed Japan's growing aggression not only as a threat to our economic interests in the Far East but also as a threat to our friend China and even as a threat to the white races and "white culture." This last threat is not openly discussed by British and American politicians, but there is no doubt that behind Anglo-American resistance to Japanese imperialism lurks the fear that the Pacific may be dominated by a militaristic colored race. Such a fear, of course, is expressed in the heightened prejudice and antagonism.

Conflict and Prejudice in Hawaii. Racial and cultural relations in Hawaii constitute a unique situation in American history. Our first adjustment there was to a friendly people who offered no threat to the continental United States in terms of race mixture or economic competition. In Hawaii

itself, however, a variety of racial and cultural mixtures have induced certain conflicts and prejudices. The natives have intermarried with the Portuguese and the Chinese for some generations. Today, there are few, if any, pure Hawaiians left. The Japanese arrived in considerable numbers, and some of them have intermingled with Hawaiians and part-Hawaiians. In addition there have been a few American-native mixtures. The product of this biological melting pot is largely a mixed white, Polynesian, and Oriental population, which in time may develop into a somewhat more stable physical type.

The social-cultural contacts are apparently controlled by considerations of both class and color. At the top of the social pyramid are the white Americans, mostly officials, rich landlords, and merchants. In the remaining population the class lines tend, for the most part, to be drawn along economic lines. Yet color and other cultural considerations play a part, especially with the Japanese, who have tended to remain aloof. In fact, Japanese born in Japan have not been very much assimilated to American-Hawaiian ways. Rather they have viewed themselves as advance agents of the expanding Japanese empire. Their children, however, educated in American schools with American ideals, have willy-nilly picked up Western ideas and practices. Many of them have broken with their cultural heritage and moved toward the American-Hawaiian culture. There has been some intermarriage of these people with the Hawaiians of various mixtures.

Prejudices are evident in this class-and-color system, but the total numbers involved are small, and the crisscross of race and class is so complex that there is no sharp dichotomy such as exists between whites and Negroes in the continental United States. Of course, the Japanese-American war produced a crisis the effect of which on the future Japanese population of Hawaii is not predictable. There is no doubt that during the war and thereafter fear and distrust will mark most of the relations of the Hawaiians with the Japanese, whether the latter be born in Japan or in Hawaii.

NATIONAL PREJUDICES

The prejudices of nations with respect to one another are modern man's continuation of intertribal antagonisms. There is nothing new about them, and they are an inevitable aspect of international conflicts. During periods of open warfare, however, writers sometimes try to make out that the enemy's behavior is peculiarly savage and tribelike while their own is highly civilized, but this is an expected and accepted response to conflicts large or small. (See Chapter XIV.)

However, national prejudices are not always directed against people on the other side of a national boundary. They also operate in the modern world of mass immigration whenever a considerable number of people

move from their native land to one of their adoption. In the present section we shall deal first with the national prejudices that operate within our country and then with those that operate between peoples of different countries.

Anti-Foreigner Prejudice in the United States. Our chief prejudices are directed against newly arrived immigrants. Those who have been in this country for some time soon take on the standpoint and habits of the older population. The "native American" movements preceding the Civil War and the "100-per-cent Americanism" of World War I were expressions of the desire of those already in power to maintain their status and superiority against the newcomers. Antagonistic reactions of this character began almost with the inception of our national life. Even in colonial times each colony wanted to have its own way and resented divergences in religion, race, or political program. The upsurge of nativism during World War I was but a recurrence of a pattern which has a long history with us.

As a matter of fact, the same treatment of foreigners, almost the same attitudes, have been prevalent since 1817, when the Irish first began to appear in considerable numbers in this country. In 1817 the *American Daily Advertiser* commented on the coming of the Irish:

"Let us not forget, before it is too late, what motive brings these people to our shores. Let us remember that it is cheap lands, high wages, food in plenty, and freedom from military service; not a love of our institutions, or a belief that our form of government is better than they have. Let us remember that they come with all the prejudices which are the result of race and early training, and that in welcoming what seem to be the oppressed of other lands, we may really be taking an adder into our bosom."

This statement has a contemporary sound, and the prejudices of the old against the new population have been of like nature throughout our history. Only the objects of the prejudice have changed.

In 1835 the Democratic Association of Native Americans pledged its support to William Henry Harrison in his presidential campaign. In July, 1837, the Native American Association of the United States was founded in Washington, D.C. Riots and disturbances of various sorts ensued between the foreigners and the Native Americans. The causes of friction were basically economic, but were rationalized in political and religious terms. Religion was a common excuse for opposing immigration; we still have the legend of a papal plot to undo American democracy. As early as 1838 the citizens of Sutton and Millbury, Massachusetts, petitioned Congress to inform them:

"Whether there are not designs against the liberties of our country by means of this great influx of foreign emigration? Whether the character of many of the emigrants does not augur a vast increase of pauperism and of crime in our land? Whether there

is not a foreign conspiracy existing against the government of this great republic and measures adopted and plans now in operation for its execution?"

The agitation continued down to the Civil War. Various associations were organized for the defense of native American Labor. The Know Nothing Party founded in the 1850's was distinctly a nativist movement. It adopted the technique of a secret society to gain its ends. The organized prejudice of this group incited fear and antagonism in the foreign-born and in some instances led to open conflict. Abraham Lincoln is worth quoting for a calm and rational criticism of the whole prejudice. In 1855 he wrote to his friend Speed:

"I am not a Know Nothing, that is certain. . . . How can any one who abhors the oppression of Negroes be in favor of degrading classes of white people? Our progress in degeneracy appears to me pretty rapid. As a nation we began by declaring that 'all men are created equal.' We now practically read it 'all men are created equal, except Negroes.' When the Know Nothings get control, it will read 'all men are created equal except Negroes, and foreigners and Catholics.' When it comes to this, I shall prefer emigrating to some country where they make no pretense of loving liberty—to Russia, for instance, where despotism can be taken pure, and without the base alloy of hypocrisy."

When the Irish had established themselves in our political, economic, and social life, the newly arrived Germans came in for adverse treatment. Afterwards, when the German Americans were assimilated, prejudice was directed against the still newer arrivals—Italians, Jews, and Slavic peoples.

The 100-per-cent Americanism which blossomed during and right after World War I received considerable support from the racial myth of Nordic superiority. The origin and spread of this myth from Gobineau's *The Inequality of the Human Races* (1853) and later from Houston Stewart Chamberlain's *Foundations of the Nineteenth Century* (1899) are now too well known to need repeating here. Modified to suit our English and Puritan tradition, the doctrine became popular in the United States with the publication in 1916 of Madison Grant's *The Passing of the Great Race*. This Nordic myth was spread far and wide through the writings of such men as Lothrop Stoddard and Charles J. Gould. Since it fitted into their scheme, the Ku Klux Klan took up the battle cry. So did the Daughters of the American Revolution and other patriotic associations bent on bolstering up the older population against the inroads of divergent peoples and cultures. The popular literature of the period from 1917 to 1925 is filled with this ideology.

The thesis is, briefly, (1) that races vary in intellectual and moral qualities, with the Nordic branch of the white race at the top; (2) that race determines culture; hence (3) that the Nordic and his culture are supreme; (4) that, being supreme, the Nordic is entitled to dominate society; and

finally (5) that racial intermixture destroys racial strength and hence culture.

The following editorial, from an American newspaper of 1924, reveals so clearly the attitudes and views of certain groups, and resembles so closely the arguments found in Adolf Hitler's writings, that it bears quoting:

"Do you believe in 'White Supremacy'? Of course you do, if you are a white man. Then why in a country that is so preponderantly of the Nordic race should the right of 'White Supremacy' be questioned? Not because of the Jap on the west coast. Not because of the few of every race under the sun which are within our borders.

"The Mongolian, the Semite, the Ethiopian, the Malay each have a 'pride of race' as they have a perfect right to have. What is the answer? Miscegenation. The half-breed, the quarter blood—the taint.

"The real black man does not want to be white. The Chinaman is proud of his nationality. But each Being with white blood in his veins aspires to the place of a white man and tries to put himself on a plane of equality with a white man in a white man's country. He will use every means that he can find in order to attain his ends. Even will he call upon the colored race from which he sprang to assist him in accomplishing his designs.

"Anyone who has lived in the South will tell you that the dangerous element is the 'mulatto.' But you say I know many white people who advocate social equality of the races. So? Can you prove that statement? May it not be that there is a taint?

"Think it over." ³

Like all other attitudes, prejudices against foreigners and their children are developed through early conditioning. The home, the neighborhood, the school, and the church all play a part in the process. In the younger children avoidance and aggression are built up-out of fear, cruelty, combativeness, and ridicule, and in adolescence condescension, rivalry, and class-consciousness are added.⁴ As we have already noted, prejudice is only slightly personal-social in origin and is largely an outgrowth of culture patterns built around in-group-out-group relations. Parents forbid their children to play with Italian or Jewish or other children whom they meet on the street or in the public parks, and thus induce negative reactions toward these minorities.

These prejudices are fed by class differences, and, since such differences are closely linked to economic status, variations in residential areas, playgrounds, and other ecological factors in our cities have a place in setting the cultural direction of prejudices against minority peoples.

Though the school may break down some of the antagonism developed in the home and the neighborhood, it often accentuates it. Schools reflect the attitudes of the home and the neighborhood. Teachers are often of the older American stock, and they naturally share the attitudes and ideas of the parents of the American children. If the foreign child is backward in

³ Editorial, *Western American*, Feb. 28, 1924.

⁴ See Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children*, 1929.

learning, he is certain to be singled out for attention and even ridicule by the teachers and pupils. If an Italian or Polish lad appears in school with unclean hands and face, he is often reprimanded in the presence of the other children. Not infrequently the reprimand enhances national prejudice.

The very school subjects often keep national biases alive. The anti-British tone of most American histories is notorious. So, too, the place of Negro and white minority groups in the making of American culture is seldom if ever given any attention in our schools.⁵ Every nation indoctrinates its young with patriotic attitudes and values, and in doing so it often stimulates prejudices not only against rival nations but against minority groups within its own borders.

Even the Christian churches are not entirely free from prejudice-building. In Sunday schools and in sermons, pictures of benighted heathen peoples—chiefly colored—are added to other mental images and stereotypes about other nations and races. Foreign missions are supported by a combination of piety, condescension, and a sense of superiority to non-Christian peoples.

Prejudice in International Relations. The political organization of the nation-state tends to foster international conflict and prejudice. The concept of national sovereignty is basic to the values and practices of nations in their relations with one another. It is assumed that each nation-state will determine its actions entirely in line with its own interests. The accommodations made between nations—treaties and agreements—are not enforced by any third party and may be revoked by the stronger nation if its interests change. In short, peace in a world of opposing nations rests on a balance of military strength and on an international morality which grows chiefly out of national interests in trade and other economic activities.

The idea of complete and independent sovereignty belongs to a world of simpler socioeconomic organization, of slow travel and relative economic self-sufficiency. Modern technology, especially in transportation and communication, has broken down the traditional barriers. Yet people's values, myths, stereotypes, and prejudices keep our political organization operating at the rudimentary level. This divergence between modern technological and economic development and the retention of political sovereignty and national self-determination constitutes our greatest international problem. Serious students of the question are constantly asking, in one form or another, how we may preserve what seem to be the positive values of national integrity and yet have an international order which will reduce warfare, prevent the disruption of world trade and intellectual communication, and foster the growth of global good-will.

Not only do modern wars produce a crop of prejudices which lay the

⁵ In recent years efforts have been made to introduce materials into the schools, both elementary and secondary, which indicate the cultural contributions of various minority groups.

foundations in peacetime for future wars, but the very nature of the nation-state requires the conditioning of individuals to ambivalent in-group and out-group references. Through the home, the school, and various community agencies, the individual is provided with a national history and a myth of national destiny which supports the integrity and continuation of the nation, with a mythology of national heroes with whom he can quickly identify himself, and with a vague but emotionalized concept of the nation-state as a sacred basis for personal security, welfare, and hope. The transfer of identification from the father and mother and other primary objects of affection to the hero and to the state as an abstraction is accomplished by easy stages in the child's training. The process is like any other shift from primary-group to secondary-group attachment. For modern mass man the nation-state is the most convenient and appealing symbol of identification and hence the best basis for emotional stability and integration.

Ambivalent to these attitudes, values, and habits are the stereotypes, prejudices, and myths that concern potential or actual enemies of one's nation-state. Other nations are graded in an order extending from those considered friendly and near to us in ideals and practice, through those that are remote and strange, to those that threaten our safety and happiness. Toward the last especially are directed our fears, aggressions, and rationalizations. They often receive the blame for our troubles. Against them we must be prepared to defend ourselves. This modern version of intertribal conflict is, in our political order, a natural and inevitable form of opposition, which, under other circumstances, might take other forms, such as class, religious, or economic conflicts.

We have already mentioned various social-distance ratings of nationalities. These offer only an order-of-merit array of differences and do not tell us how far one group or nationality is considered to be from another. This fault in the Bogardus method is corrected by Thurstone's scale of equal-appearing intervals. In general the results of both methods agree. The English, Canadians, Scotch, Irish, French, and Germans fall in the upper range of the ratings, the Greeks, Armenians, Turks, and Orientals in the lower range. Differences in sense of psychological distance among the nationalities along a sigma scale are shown in Figure 4 (p. 293) from L. L. Thurstone.⁶

J. P. Guilford, using a system of paired comparisons, secured the preferences of 1,000 college students from seven institutions. The order of preference for fifteen nationalities is shown on the following page:⁷

See, for instance, W. E. Vickery and S. G. Cole, *Intercultural Education in American Schools*, 1942.

⁶ "An Experimental Study of Nationality Preferences," *J. General Psychology*, 1928, 1: 405-425. Figure 4 is reproduced here by permission of The Journal Press.

⁷ See J. P. Guilford, "Racial Preferences of a Thousand American University Students," *J. Social Psychology*, 1931, 2: 179-204.

English
German
French
Swedish
Spanish
Italian
Russian
Jewish
Greek
Japanese
Mexican
Hindu
Negro
Chinese
Turkish

It must be noted, however, that these results reflect the prejudices against the national minorities in this country as well as against the nation-states. In fact, it is not easy to tell whether students were responding to the minorities in this country or to other countries considered as units. Most Americans, for example, have had no experience with individual Turks and Hindus, and their places on the Thurstone scale may represent reactions to them as foreign nations. But the reactions to the other nationalities must be the results both of experience with national minorities in this country and of ideas and stereotypes about the nation-states. A similar comment applies to the Guilford study.

We should not forget that other peoples have more or less fixed pictures of Americans, and that these notions and myths influence their reactions to us in the international drama. The Japanese, as we noted above, have been told that we and the British have deliberately followed a policy of encircling Japan to keep her from her "rightful" place as leader of the Orient. European ideas and stereotypes about us are compounded from books, periodicals, motion pictures, and radio programs, and from conversational and other contacts with Americans, chiefly tourists.

One common image of America is that of an untamed country, peopled by gun-carrying cowboys and desperadoes, or by mobs that lynch Negroes as their principal sport. The reputed greed of the American, and his curious spendthrift ways while he is in Europe, make two mutually contradictory pictures for the European. Contemporary European cartoons depict Uncle Sam, the stereotype for Americans in general, as a money-grabbing fellow chronically intent on picking other nations' pockets, and on the other hand, as a foolish spendthrift on a holiday, the easy prey of exploitation. Political prejudice against us is usually added to this image. The political prejudice is the result of the European concept of our international politics. Cartoons show perfidious Uncle Sam offering with one hand the olive

Scale of Nationality Preferences




FIG. 4—Scale Showing Differences in Sense of Psychological Distance Among Twenty-One National or Racial Groups

branch of perpetual peace and reaching with the other hand toward territory south of the United States or in the Orient.

Recent nationalistic propaganda in Europe and in the Orient has modified the traditional stereotypes and myths about us. The Nazis have included us in what they term the plutocratic-Jewish-Communist threat, psychological devices intended both to bolster Axis morale and to divide the United Nations. As we shall see in our chapter on propaganda, this is a common method of persuasion.

The national prejudices of individuals, then, are largely the results of the cultural forces which have played upon them. Of course, propaganda and contemporary events will have a profound effect. There is no doubt that the racial dogmas of German National Socialism have greatly influenced both racial and national biases in the present-day world. The Aryan myth, directed especially against the Jew, has set up counterreactions against National Socialism and Germany. It is a reasonable inference that the rating of Germany on a Bogardus social-distance scheme, on a Thurstone scale, or by Guilford's method would now be different from what it was in the mid-1930's before Hitler's imperialistic aggression became so evident. Likewise the position of Japan would be altered considerably. One minor study made in one liberal-arts college in 1942 shows this. In a fivefold rating from strong like to strong dislike, the positions of Japan and Germany were distinctly on the unfavorable side. The place of prejudice in national morale in wartime and its function in personality-integration with respect to conflict and co-operation will be discussed in Chapter XIV.

PREJUDICES INVOLVING RELIGIOUS DIFFERENCES

What are commonly considered religious prejudices usually turn out, on closer examination, to involve much more than matters of divergence on creed and faith in the divine. Economic, political, and class conflicts are frequently intermingled with religious biases. In some instances prejudice as to religion is but a rationalization of deeper anxieties over economic or class status. In this section we shall confine ourselves chiefly to biases between Christians and Jews, and between Protestants and Catholics.

Jewish-Christian Prejudices. The Jew has long been a symbol and an object of aggression for Christian and Mohammedan groups. Yet the conflict is no more one-sided than is Negro-white or Catholic-Protestant or any other conflict. There is always an interaction—verbal or overt—predetermined by deep-seated cultural differences, which, moreover, are by no means only religious but concern economic, political, and other areas of action. As in other conflicts, all these differences may easily become involved in the reactions of classes.

The place of the Jews as a minority people throughout history is well-known. For centuries before the Christian era they were a small but mili-

tant nation caught up in the mighty struggles between Egypt and her allies, on the one hand, and the nations of the Tigris-Euphrates valley, on the other. Much of their social and religious philosophy was born of their persistent efforts to prevent absorption by their more powerful neighbors. In attempting this they developed a strong sense of separateness and an intense in-group unity, such as have seldom appeared elsewhere in the world's history, and which have been interpreted as compensations for numerical inferiority. Severe persecution was familiar to them long before the time of Christ.

When Christianity became fully established in the decaying Roman Empire, and when it was triumphant in medieval Europe, the Jew was the culturally accepted object of scorn and oppression. His function as a scapegoat for Christian aggression became deeply embedded in Western culture. He was denied any civic rights, he was segregated into the ghetto, and he was not permitted to own land. On the other hand, he developed important economic functions as merchant and moneylender. Since, from the Christian's standpoint, the Jew was damned of God anyway, he was permitted to buy and sell on holy days, something those of the "true faith" could not do. Thus the Jew served the community and increased his wealth at the same time. But his economic and political insecurity and the Christian taboo on his religion turned him more and more inward toward his own people. A distinctive ethos arose, with a firm conviction of being God's chosen people, an intense family and communal solidarity, a desire to exploit the Christians economically, and a persistent fear of Christian aggression. The Christian counterpart of this was a taboo on any but the most impersonal relations, and a stereotype of the Jew as a money-grabber and sharper, and particularly as a scapegoat on whom the Christian could, with impunity, vent his antagonisms.

The emancipation of the Jew from the medieval handicaps was not accomplished in Europe till the days of the Industrial Revolution and of political democracy. It was as late as 1831 before the Jew was given full suffrage in England. Such legal barriers were removed elsewhere much later. Other barriers remained and were reinforced as older class lines began to disappear and the Jew entered into competition for role and status in an increasing number of occupations.

There were few Jews in this country before the middle of the last century. The first important immigrants of this faith began to come from Germany and elsewhere in continental Europe in reaction to the intensive anti-revolutionary movements following 1848. But the great influx of Jews did not take place until this country began to tap the population resources of eastern and southern Europe. From about 1880 till the beginning of World War I, thousands of Jews from Poland, the Ukraine, and the Balkans settled in this country. Moreover, most of them settled in the large cities on

the North Atlantic seaboard and in and around Chicago. In 1940 the city of New York had approximately 2,500,000 Jews—about half of the total in the entire country. Present-day anti-Semitism in the United States stems largely from the economic competition between Christians and Jews which followed this great immigration.

In the development of the modern capitalistic system the Jew has played a distinctive role. Yet his business interests and methods are not essentially different from those of other people who attempt to make profits in their work. Accusing the Jew of being a money-grabber is probably a defense reaction of the Gentile to competition. We tend to find in others what we find in ourselves. When we blame others for practicing what we ourselves practice, we may fairly suppose that our resentment is a reaction to our own manners and morals.

The Jew is often accused of being antinationalistic. Some patriots accuse him of being an international, radical laborite; others, of being an international banker. In the propaganda of the Ku Klux Klan much was made of the fact that some of the prominent Communists in the Soviet Union, Germany, and America were Jews. Good citizens of the country could want no better proof that the Jews were attempting to control the world by spreading disaffection among the laboring classes, by making them class-conscious, restless, subversive, and skilled in the technique of revolution. But this was not all. The wily Jew was also fast obtaining control of the great international banks. Hence, unsuspecting Gentiles were caught between two attacks, and with his usual craftiness the Jew would win in any case. If the world became communistic, the Jews would be in control; if it continued to expand along capitalistic lines, the Jews would retain and increase their power over the rest of us. There was to be no escape from this deep Jewish plot to rule the world. Thus ran the arguments for the need to curb the expansion of Jewish activities.

This same alleged dual role of the Jew was one of the key arguments of Hitler and his followers in their intensive anti-Semitic campaign. Over and over again, during World War II, the Jew was blamed both for communism and for the "decadence" of the "plutodemocracies." In our country many anti-Semites consider the Jew a poor citizen, more interested in internationalism, either financial or communist, than in building up and defending a strong America.

Apropos, it is well to point out that about 0.1 per cent of the Jews in America are Communist Party members; and that, in a community of which a third is Jewish, 7 per cent of the directors of the New York Clearing House, and 18 per cent of the members of the New York Stock Exchange, are Jewish.⁸

There is, of course, a cultural foundation for some of the most striking

⁸ See S. H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, 1941, p. 459.

features of the modern Jew. On the one hand, he still has his old sense of in-group solidarity; on the other, no one in our society typifies modern industrialized mass society better than he. As a city-dweller he has developed sophistication, mobility, restlessness, and an impersonality in his dealings with others that is unknown to the stolid rural or small-town population. He is often associated with radical political-economic movements. Various studies of college students indicate that Jewish students are less religious and more radical than Christian students. H. B. Carlson's investigation of 215 college seniors at the University of Chicago showed that the Jewish students were more opposed to national prohibition and showed less belief in the reality of God than the Catholics and Protestants. On the other hand, they were more favorably inclined toward birth-control, communism, and pacifism. On these last three issues the Catholics were the most conservative, and the Protestants took an intermediate position.⁹

Of course, the Jews vary in their radicalism or conservatism in terms of their class status within their own group and within the larger society. Yet these studies do reveal a certain factual basis for the popular conceptions about the political and economic attitudes of the Jews.

The strong intellectual tradition among the Jews stimulates their desire for academic success. Out of their striving to get ahead in medicine, law, and teaching—the three professions most congenial to their traditional roles—there has arisen a distinct bias against them in these professions. There is considerable evidence that, by psychological tests, quota systems, and other means, some institutions of higher learning have tried to restrict the number of Jewish students. Such practices reflect the influence of professional competition.

The social pressure in the colleges continues. Where there is no limitation of numbers, as in publicly supported schools, discrimination by fraternities and clubs is the principal form of segregation. Jewish young men and women may have their own fraternities and sororities, but they are not generally admitted to the Gentile organizations. This inevitably develops an antagonistic attitude on the part of many Jewish students. The daughter of a New York City family of unusual social prestige expressed intense disgust and disappointment at the manner in which she and other Jewish women at a middle-western university were treated socially. Gentile college men hesitate to be seen with Jewish girls because they fear the ridicule of their fraternity brothers or friends. A Gentile fraternity man recently remarked apologetically: "Yes, I went out with Z. F. once or twice;

⁹ See H. B. Carlson, "Attitudes of Undergraduate Students," *J. Social Psychology*, 1934, 5: 202-212. See also, G. B. Vetter, "The Measurement of Social and Political Attitudes and the Related Personality Factors," *J. Abnormal and Social Psychology*, 1930, 25: 149-189, and A. J. Harris, H. H. Remmers, and C. E. Ellison, "The Relation between Liberal and Conservative Attitudes in College Students and Other Factors," *J. Social Psychology*, 1932, 3: 320-335.

"I didn't realize that she was Jewish." The social patterns are set by the Gentiles. The Jews may win academic prizes, but they are considered outside the pale of the most exclusive college sets. The social life of the campus is divided by racial lines. As one sorority girl put it, "The Jews are noisy, impolite, and smelly." She admitted that she knew but few Jews and none well. She had simply acquired the current stereotypes of her group and applied them to all Jews. Many Gentile students recognize the irrationality of this attitude, but they are afraid of the ridicule which they would experience should they violate social convention.

In the professions the competition is keen. Many brilliant Jews have been forced out of the teaching world by social pressure. The Jew is felt to be forward, overcritical, and not co-operative; and there is, of course, sometimes a factual basis for this feeling. The writer recently learned of this incident: A young Jewish instructor in a large university complained bitterly to an older professor, also a Jew, of the inferiority of the men in his own and another department where he had intended to pursue graduate work. The instructor had been on the campus only a few days and had hardly met the men of whom he complained. Even in tolerant Gentile faculty members this sort of thing tends to set up a stereotype against the Jew in general. It often happens that the possession of a Jewish name is a barrier to securing fellowships or teaching positions. Jews frequently take Christian family names in order to cover up their origin.

L. P., who had begun his scientific work about the time this country entered World War I, changed his name from one definitely Jewish to one distinctly British. He then moved to another part of the country. Later he finished his graduate work, married a Gentile woman, and succeeded in his profession. Without doubt changing his name greatly aided him to make successful social adjustments.

This case stands in contrast to an unsuccessful effort to continue in the academic profession. C. A., who had already made a good reputation as a scientist, at the completion of his doctorate was under consideration by a department chairman for a good position in a large middle-western university. When it was discovered that he was Jewish, he was immediately denied further consideration. The department chairman had no prejudice against Jews, but he had learned that he could never get the dean, the president, and the board of regents to accept a Jew, no matter how able he might be. After a few years of teaching in mediocre institutions, C. A. went into administrative work for a Jewish social agency.

The interactions of Christians and Jews are qualified by a large number of factors. The more one gets to know this minority group, the more one is impressed by its class structure, by the extreme individualism of the educated Jew in particular, and by the variation in Jewish religious ideas and practices.

Not only do the Jews reflect the threefold class system of this country—lower, middle, and upper classes—most of them falling in the middle

class, but the class lines are rather sharply drawn. These reflect not only wealth, but degree of orthodoxy, in some instances, and especially the point of European origin. The Spanish and Portuguese Jews of wealth have long looked upon themselves as the élite. Next in status are the wealthier Jews of German origin. Since this group is much larger than the Spanish-Portuguese in this country, its members may be considered the top class of the Jewish minority. They have acquired, moreover, many Germanic culture traits of arrogance and superiority and for the most part despise the Polish or Russian Jew. The Austrian Jews tend to follow the German. Hungarian and Balkan Jews are looked down upon by the German and Austrian Jews. The Polish and Russian Jews are the lowest stratum. As members of the lower classes rise in the economic scale, they press their German coreligionists for position. As a result, there has long been an intense competition for status among the Jews, and, despite the Christian stereotype of complete Jewish solidarity, there is evidence that anti-Semitism has been encouraged by the divisions among the Jews themselves.

The American Jew is a strong individualist, and this very quality sets up resistance in his Christian competitor. People do not like to see in their rivals the same qualities which they possess themselves. Just as we despise the weakness of ourselves which we see in others, we also fear their strength. This individualism of the Jews, in many situations, also tends to keep them from developing an intensive solidarity. When associated, as it frequently is, with a sense of class difference, it may well keep one Jew from defending another in a crisis.

In religious ideas and practices the Jews vary considerably. There are at least three major groups or sects: the Orthodox, the Conservative, and the Reformed. Though they share the fundamental Judaic faith and the pride of the Chosen People, the divergences are so great as to prevent complete solidarity—despite the Gentile stereotype to the contrary.¹⁰

Yet it would be a mistake to ignore the general elements of Jewish culture, however difficult it may be to define them. The following must certainly be considered: (1) the basic Judaic faith, and, among a large number, the deep conviction of being a separate and chosen people, bolstered by the strong tradition of persecution; (2) an intense family solidarity, which is linked to the religious beliefs; (3) an abiding faith in intellectualism and rationality, which stems out of Talmudic teachings and carries over, especially in the more educated Jew, into business, science, philosophy, and art; (4) a strong individualism, which is expressed in intellectual, artistic, political, and economic activities.

As already indicated, these emotional and rational elements have long been embedded in, and have partaken of, the larger Christian culture. One

¹⁰ For an accurate account of the American Jew and his culture, see *The American Jew: a Composite Portrait*, edited by Oscar I. Janowsky, 1942.

of the unsolved difficulties in Jewish-Christian relations is the fact that the Jew wants to remain distinctive as a culture group and as a person and yet be a full participant in the larger European-American culture. This is impossible culturally and psychologically. This aspect of minority problems is so important, not only for Jews, but for Negroes, Catholics, and others as well, that we shall return to it at the close of the chapter, when we attempt an over-all interpretation of the place of prejudice in the modern world.

The responses of the individual Jew to Christian prejudices may take a variety of forms. Among the Jewish élite there is sometimes a complacent retirement behind the sense of superiority, an avoidance of unnecessary and conflict-arousing situations. Among lower-class Jews who are intensely orthodox somewhat the same retreat from the Gentile world may be made. Though there is always some unavoidable contact with the Gentile world, at least in economic matters, in these groups there is no striving to be accepted socially into the same clubs, fraternities, and so on. In contrast to these are the aggressive individuals—just how many there are depends on the definition of aggression—with whom the Christian comes into conflict, and out of that situation prejudices tend to develop.

As we have already indicated, aggressive individuals easily set up like responses in others. This is particularly true of the Jew in our highly competitive society. There is no conflict so long as there is neither business nor personal-professional competition. If a community has a Jewish junk-dealer, or even one merchandiser, no one gets excited about his presence. It is when the Jew arrives in numbers and begins competing in fields long regarded as the sole domain of the Gentile that prejudice emerges. This cycle of events, of course, is just as true with regard to other minorities as it is with this one. It is the pushing, forward-striving minority man who gets ahead and who at the same time irritates those who would retain the old status. In a sense prejudice may be considered a form of defense reaction designed to retain the existing status.

In recent years anti-Semitism, not only in Germany and Europe but in this country and elsewhere, has been greatly stimulated by the rise of Hitler and National Socialism. The dogma of Aryanism puts the Jew in a distinctly inferior category. Moreover, in terms of the racial mysticism of the Nazis, the Jew is blamed for most of Germany's and the world's ills. This revival, on a large scale, of the scapegoat role of the Jew has coincided with prolonged unemployment, decline of trade and industry, and political upheaval. It is very easy for the masses everywhere to follow the subtle and planned suggestions of the Nazi propagandists that the Jew is the root of their troubles. Such projection of blame and guilt on a global scale has never been witnessed before. It is a threat to many basic values of democracy, free enterprise, science, and humanitarianism.

Protestant-Catholic Prejudices. Although the earlier violent conflicts between Catholics and Protestants have been dissipated, there still remains a large body of myth and stereotype which interferes with co-operative and friendly relations between these sections of Christianity. These divergences are often affected by competition for jobs or business and by political struggles in which, whatever the ostensible issues, the domination of local party organizations is really at stake. So, too, reactions against certain minority groups are colored by religious differences. Some political issues, such as those concerned with state support of parochial education, have, of course, direct religious sources. In any case, on both sides are a variety of notions and beliefs which influence personal relations.

Common Protestant stereotypes about Catholics are that they are "idol-worshippers," that they "have no Bibles," that they are "inherently dishonest." Many otherwise tolerant and well-informed Jews and Protestants misunderstand the attitude of the Catholic Church toward modern science, and refuse to listen to Catholic expositions of the attitude of the Church.

These stereotypes do not necessarily arise only among Protestants living in Catholic neighborhoods. Nothing could be more intense than the anti-Catholic prejudices of many rural communities in the South, where there is hardly a single Catholic family in a whole county. The writer found this distressing conflict in a family which lives in an almost exclusively Protestant village. The father is Protestant; the wife and her mother are Catholic. The father persists in openly telling his children shocking stories about Catholics, and he points to their maternal grandmother as a member of the Church which promotes these shocking practices. He, of course, is striking at his wife also for being a Catholic. He is producing disastrous inner conflicts in his children by causing them to side with him against their mother, and at the same time is creating in them distinct attitudes toward Catholics in general. In another instance, a father of liberal views who has given his family no formal sectarian training, and who prides himself on keeping his children free of religious prepossession, was quite chagrined to find that his ten-year-old daughter had acquired the notions that Catholics were "bad," that they practiced horrible rites, and that they had various other evil practices. The youngster had spent a summer with a Protestant aunt, who had piously told her weird anti-Catholic tales. Though the child had earlier played with Catholic children, she had never singled them out as being at all different. Now she had definitely antagonistic images which disturbed her relations with all Catholics.

In sections of the country where political and economic competition operates between Protestant groups and Catholic groups, there are prejudices on both sides. During the 1920's the Ku Klux Klan spread a great deal of propaganda among Protestants about Catholic plots to control the government. "The Catholics control the army because most of the officers are Catholics"; "the pope plots to seat a Catholic in the presidency"; and so on. Historical legends serve as a background for these contemporary feelings and attitudes. The whole tradition of the Protestant revolt against the pa-

pacy has been carried down to the present time. It has become a part of the mental-emotional freight of the average Protestant.

The presidential campaign of 1928 is an excellent example of how religious prejudices may be revived and exaggerated when occasion demands. The propaganda carried on against Alfred E. Smith during the summer and autumn of that year stirred up old prejudices and added new details to the tradition of a "Catholic menace." Adherents of Smith, in turn, responded quite in the manner of their opponents. Old prejudices were phrased in new terms. We have no way to discover how much the campaign actually altered the fundamental prejudices. Possibly it merely made them more explicit in action. Without the development of critical attitudes adults can change their basic prejudices only with difficulty. At best, the changes are confined to minorities, no matter what the country or the creed involved.

Quite naturally, Catholics have many stereotyped prejudices about Protestants: they have fallen away from the true faith; they will not be saved hereafter; they possess no true church or true priesthood armed with divine authority; born in heresy, they develop worse heresies as they go; some of them tolerate divorce and even the conscious limitation of the number of children born in their families. Just as Gentiles frequently talk as if a Jew of today had personally assisted at the crucifixion of Jesus, so Catholics talk as if Protestants of today had personally conspired with Luther and Calvin against the unity of the Mother Church. A child born in a Protestant family finds Protestantism quite as "natural" as a Jew finds his Judaism or a Catholic finds his Catholicism; but it is a Catholic stereotype to refuse to recognize this simple fact. Many perfectly honest Catholics, who probably have well-behaved liberal Protestants as neighbors, seem heartily convinced that the liberal wing of Protestantism menaces civilization itself. The attachment of liberal Protestants to modern science is well known; the occasional change in scientific theories is also evident. Apparently it is a Catholic stereotype to point to these shifts as an evidence of the complete unreliability of scientific theory in comparison with the assumed unchanging character of Catholic dogma. Obviously, the fact that the first chapter of *Genesis* does not change is small proof that it is a better account of the origin of man and a modification of any particular theory of evolution. A number of studies have shown that not only on science but on many other issues there are sharp divergences between Catholics and others. (See the reference to Carlson's study, p. 297.)

In both Catholic and Protestant stereotypes we should note the implication of the superiority of the in-group to the out-group. Each group has stereotypes attributing to itself the socially essential virtue of religious loyalty. The attitude is identical, but its object is the Church for the Catholic and the Bible for the Protestant. The notion of Christian suffering for the truth is the same for both; but the Catholic remembers English perse-

cution of Irish Catholics, and the Protestant remembers St. Bartholomew's Day. The ego of the individual Catholic expands in its association with an historic social group of such obviously unique virtue, and thus also does the ego of the individual Protestant expand and receive sanction.

During the years prior to World War II, there was considerable Catholic-Protestant conflict over our probable role as a nation in the struggle between Axis powers and Britain and France. The background of some of this lay in the attacks on the New Deal program by certain Catholic leaders and groups who interpreted it as a definite step toward communism, which has been a bugaboo of Catholics everywhere since the rise of the Soviet Union. Later, in the intense public discussion of isolation versus intervention in the early years of World War II, some of these same Catholic groups took strong isolationist views, motivated, so they said, by anti-British sentiments. Still later, after Germany and the Soviet Union were at war, the fear of communism was used as an argument against aid to the U.S.S.R. These reactions, religious and partly economic and political, show the complications of dealing with so-called religious prejudice. There seems little doubt that in many liberal and radical circles in this country there is a strong fear of Catholic conservatism and reaction. Some radicals openly accuse the Catholic Church of being pro-fascist by its very institutional nature.

These trends indicate the shifting areas of conflict and the fact that religious biases become entangled in many others. Whether the future will see a rebirth of strong anti-Catholic sentiment in this country remains to be seen. It is quite possible that such a trend may be counteracted by one built around racialism or around a revolutionary class struggle. The content and meaning of a prejudice for the individual depend largely on these deeper social-cultural trends. Prejudice is but the outward expression of underlying conflicts between human groups.

SOME OTHER AREAS OF CONFLICT AND PREJUDICE

We have already pointed out that economic and political issues are traceable in the conflicts and prejudices involving racial status, religion, and nationalism. We have already discussed some political prejudices in treating nationality conflicts. We need make only a few additional comments about party politics and prejudice.

Party Politics and Prejudice. Party rivalry is not merely a matter of intellectual differences on public issues. It ramifies into all sorts of emotionally conditioned values and attitudes, which become expressed in stereotypes and myths about the opponents. In the Deep South, with its strong tradition of the Democratic Party, a Republican is likely to be considered not a true Southerner, and he may be dubbed a "nigger-lover" because of the emotional link between the Republican Party and the emancipation of the slaves. In strongly Republican sections the Democratic Party is looked upon

as a combination of highly biased Southerners and corrupt city politicians of the Tammany Hall variety. "I'd rather vote for a yellow dog for office than a Democrat" was once a popular saying in the Middle West.

In political attitudes, as in other attitudes involving conflict, any number of linkages may be made. In the minds of many Republicans of rural and small-town areas, the opposition to the Democratic Party was associated with the fear of "Romanism" or "popery" and of the immigrants of southern Europe who undercut our American standards of life. For the Irish-American and Italian-American minorities who voted Democratic it was easy to view the Republicans as representing great wealth, a hated Protestantism, and perhaps a pro-British view of international affairs.

In recent decades more violent political prejudices have arisen with regard to the small political minorities that are viewed by Democrats and Republicans alike as being revolutionary. The word "socialist" has long had a strong negative loading for Americans, and every effort to disabuse the ordinary citizen of this has been useless. Since the rise of the Soviet Union "communist" has become an even greater fear-arousing stereotype than "socialist."

After World War I, which saw the emergence of the Communist revolution in Russia, this country experienced an upsurge of nativism and an intensive campaign, waged by the states, the federal government, and patriotic agencies, to rid the country of elements considered subversive. This "red-baiting" period, as it has been called, coincided with the sharp restriction of further immigration, with the refusal of the country to join the League of Nations, and with a strong trend toward what was called "normalcy," all of which were parts of our reaction to our participation in the European war and in international affairs generally. It was our particular brand of intense nationalism coming to full bloom.

In the early 1930's, however, liberal groups in this country began to pay attention to the Soviet Union. The ruling party in that country had developed a very efficient propaganda program for arousing good will, and the Communist leaders in Moscow were quick to see and exploit this growing interest in the Soviet Union on the part of American businessmen, educators, and writers. From such propaganda, from conducted tours and educational programs, all designed to convince Americans of Russia's interest in a better world, emerged a much more tolerant view of Russian communism.

With the rise of National Socialism in Germany and with growing evidence of its impending conflict with democracy, the same liberal groups made a further swing toward the Russian "experiment"—as it was so often called—and developed negative attitudes toward Fascism and Nazism. This was most apparent in the period of the "Popular Front."

What emerged out of this was a strong bias in some quarters toward both communism and fascism—the latter term covering Italian and German brands of totalitarianism. In discussing stereotypes in Chapter IX, we cited studies by Menefee, Hartman, Stagner, and others which showed that people might at first accept various social reforms quickly and enthusiastically but then reject them if they were labeled “fascist” or “communist.” Another interesting illustration of stereotypes and prejudice emerged out of the intrusion of communist and fascist ideologies into this country. Liberals and left-wingers generally now had in the term “fascist” a powerful word with which to label those whom they considered conservative and reactionary, just as, in the 1920’s, many businessmen, politicians, and others had quickly labeled reformers and liberals as “communists.” Thus into our older party rivalry and the related economic struggles were introduced—from outside sources—two of the most powerful stereotypes of our time. They were used by groups in their conflicts and helped in time to redefine some of the ideas and situations traditionally associated with our older two-party system.

Conflict and Prejudice among Economic Groups. Our economic system has long been characterized by antagonisms between laboring groups and employers. Yet these conflicts have, for the most part, taken place within the accepted framework of capitalist enterprise: the private-party and profit systems.

The prejudices which the laboring man feels for the rich employer are determined for him by historical legends and by the conflict of in-group with out-group. The prejudices, myths, and legends among organized union men have a long history growing out of intermittent controversy with their employers. The prejudices of the unorganized common and semiskilled laborers have their roots in more general myths of the hard-fisted rich man, and in vague and inarticulate resentment at low pay, poor working conditions, and irregular employment. The capitalist employer is blamed for every kind of economic hardship. These accusations became more vocal during the economic depression of the 1930’s, and, abetted by a prolabor administration in Washington, laboring groups made considerable gains both in unionization and in various measures for social security.

Employers, managers, and property-owners, in turn, have their biases against the laboring classes, especially against organized labor. The worker and his union representatives are blamed for all sorts of industrial difficulties. These prejudices have historical roots in the relations that have existed between capital and labor since the rise of the modern industrial system.

Aside from the conflict between employers and employees, economic factors play a decided role in all forms of contemporary prejudice. Much of what passes for race or color prejudice is basically economic. The fear of

losing economic position is often rationalized in terms of racial, national, or religious prejudices. This fact confirms Robert E. Park's definition of prejudice as a form of defense reaction against loss of status.

Class System and Prejudice. Some aspects of our Negro-white conflicts were seen as phases of our castelike relations to the Negroes. Except for this caste based on color, this country is characterized by what C. H. Cooley called the "open-class system." Class lines are not sharply drawn, and movement up and down the class scale is relatively easy. Surveys of opinion indicate that representative Americans think chiefly of three loosely defined classes, lower, middle, and upper, and that between 75 and 85 per cent of them consider themselves in the middle class.

Because movement up the prestige ladder has been relatively rapid and easy, there has been little or no sharp class feeling in this country. It would, however, be a mistake to imagine that class lines have been based entirely on wealth. This is not so. In colonial times class status was related not to wealth alone but to religious condition, political affiliation, length of residence, and other qualifications. To this day in many communities, especially in the older sections, the mere accumulation of money is not an open sesame to the top class. Yet with the decline of economic opportunity and with the rise of revolutionary agitation expressed in class terms, chiefly Marxian, there has been a growing consciousness of class differences in this country and a corresponding rise of class prejudice.

The sharpest distinctions are drawn between those who follow a revolutionary "line," or are imagined to do so, and those who represent property and the customary-profit system. Between these are many who, believing they see trends toward what is called a mixed economy (mixed capitalist and state-socialist), try to counteract the revolutionary movement.¹¹

The rise of class-consciousness indicates that areas of conflict and prejudice are shifting. However, the segregation of classes has not become so sharp, nor the chances of movements between them so restricted, as to shift aggressions from other areas to this one. Of course, the Marxian program of revolution calls for just such a transfer of all conflict and prejudice from international relations, religion, and other fields to the struggle between the proletariat and the propertied employer class. The Marxian dualism of classes is itself an attempt to foster a world of sharp black and white, of good and evil, in which there is no compromise. Nothing approaching this sharp dichotomy, which would redefine the political state in these terms, has appeared in this country; but it is true that prejudices along class lines have been somewhat sharpened in recent years. Nevertheless, these tend to

¹¹ One of the most striking evidences of the growth of class-consciousness in this country is the amount of attention given to class structure by sociologists, political scientists, and economists, beginning about 1930. Raising the topic to the level of intellectual consideration is itself indicative of a wider awareness of the growing importance of the class system in our country.

be counteracted by the resurgence of democratic ideology and practice which has developed out of the struggles of minorities for recognition and out of labor-employer conflicts. The serious attempts to remedy racial and minority-group discrimination in the military forces and in industry during World War II may result in a reduction of conflict and prejudice. On the other hand, if those desiring to improve their status and participation in political and economic controls try to secure these advantages by violence and revolution, they may find that strong countermeasures, born of the old and long-continuing prejudices, are sufficient to destroy even the gains already made. As we shall see in discussing the psychology of revolution, in the end such violent means of cultural and personal change usually fall far short of the ideals toward which they were projected.

EFFORTS TO ALLEVIATE PREJUDICE

Since prejudice is but one aspect of the larger topic of individual and group conflict, it cannot be interpreted or dealt with practically without regard to the larger field in which it is embedded. Since the larger problem of individual conflict will be treated at the close of Chapter XIV, on war, we shall now deal with certain more practical and normative matters, particularly democracy and prejudice, the reduction of prejudice, and the relation of prejudice to personality.

Democracy and Prejudice. Unless carefully defined, the term *democracy* easily takes on the features of a stereotype. In our ideal of democracy we emphasize equality of opportunity rather than equality of ability and action; advancement and status for merit and performance rather than for birth and class inheritance; individuality and tolerance of divergence of view and action. Democracy is, psychologically, one of the most challenging patterns of human thought and conduct, for it demands a reasonableness, a live-and-let-live attitude and practice, that runs counter to man's socially inevitable aggressions and needs, his emotions and fantasies, and his inevitable drive for power and security. We may say, in other words, that the practice of democracy is a measure of emotional and intellectual maturity. That we have fallen short of the ideal demonstrates that most of us are still motivated by childish and adolescent wishes for power and security, that we are dependent on obvious mother and father substitutes. We do not yet seem very desirous of sublimating our conflictive and competitive drives into channels of thought and action that remove them at least from their more violent and personal forms. Our continuing undemocratic ways show that we are not ready to accept in practice a mutuality and a cooperativeness which recognize the strength and wisdom of the other person as well as our own.

In view of these practical limitations it is difficult to see how we can expect a complete sublimation of conflict or a thorough removal of prej-

udice. At best we must retreat to the compromise and accommodation which have historically characterized our Anglo-American democratic conduct. The idealist may wish for a perfect world, and others may scoff at democracy because of its habit of half-measures and compromise, but in the long run this pattern of life has given man a formula which is less violent and more mature than any other so far developed.

Reduction of Prejudice. So long as we have human conflict, prejudice can never be completely eliminated, for the two go hand in hand. But the reduction and redirection of conflict, its sublimation into competition, and especially the development of institutional controls of various sorts, may do much to prevent and reduce the more intense prejudices. Let us comment on this matter with respect to some of the more serious areas of conflict in our society.

Negro-white prejudice is perhaps one of the most crucial problems not only in the United States, but in South Africa and in some other areas of the world. To be honest and frank, the chief stumbling blocks are color difference and intermarriage. Every anthropologist and social psychologist, when he views this problem with complete objectivity and in long historical perspective, realizes that full cultural assimilation is not possible until there is biological amalgamation. Yet in view of the deepest racial myths and stereotypes, and in terms of a defensible theory of cultural relativism and variability, racial intermixture is *not* really the basic social-cultural problem of our time, and in view of the strength of our present moral-religious values about racial purity it is sheer nonsense to suggest widespread intermarriage as a practical measure.

Rather we may make other approaches to this matter. We may assume that a workable democratic order can be developed in which there will be considerable cultural variability and in which some satisfactory compromises and institutional arrangements can be made to alleviate and reduce greatly the present conflict between the colored and the white. Two historical factors must be fully understood: the old white Christian taboo on racial mixture, especially strong in the Anglo-American and Teutonic peoples; and the fact that, culturally speaking, the Negro masses are at best little more than a century removed from their primitive roots. This second point is important, not because people cannot be rapidly reconditioned to new and advanced cultures, but because the combination of the old patterns and the slave status which disrupted them produced an unsettlement of Negro culture and mentality which has not yet been fully overcome. It seems unwise for would-be reformers to fly in the face of these deep cultural facts.

Certain important steps toward a more satisfactory biracial relationship have long been recognized. These include: (1) greater economic opportunity, training for skilled occupations, and participation in labor unions if

desired; (2) extension of free schooling; (3) participation in political rights and responsibilities; and (4) improvement in the Negro's standard of living, with better housing and better recreational facilities. Since these steps involve both white and colored, some alterations in the values, attitudes, and habits of both may be indicated.

The Southern whites must come to realize that they have a responsibility to deal with the Negro in their midst. Merely denying that there is a Negro problem or preventing other Americans from discussing and dealing with it will not improve conditions. Already there is a growing awareness of the problem among Southerners, and a realization that institutional changes must be made such as involve the poll tax and Jim Crow laws, and that the protection of the Negro against white violence, either of individuals or of mobs, must be improved. Perhaps the basic need is to treat the Negro as a person on his own merits. There is no reason to believe that we could not loosen many of the taboos of the color-caste system without completely abandoning moral restraints on widespread racial mixture, which seems to remain a bugaboo of those who do nothing to improve racial relations.

On the part of the Negro there must be a recognition, especially among the leaders and the press, that social changes are slow and piecemeal. All too frequently, in their eagerness to improve the lot of their fellows, the leaders of the colored minority have indulged in a counsel of perfection and have anticipated the quick disappearance of old traditions and customs which are rooted in deep emotional conditioning. Those who take a political and revolutionary approach to the Negro-white problem are particularly apt to do the Negro a disservice.

This radicalism may take one of two different directions. Some American Negro intellectuals and reformers emphasize racial consciousness and segregation. They make much of the Negro's contribution, as a Negro, to American life. They stress a separateness which is conducive, not to accommodations within the framework of political democracy, but rather to compromises between two conflicting groups, one black and the other white. Along that road lies the modern danger of racialism, with the potentiality of future wars fought under the symbols of color. This is not the democratic road to satisfactory adjustments. Other Negro intellectuals have followed Communist Party propaganda with its stress on equality all along the line. Just what the Communist Party of this country has intended in its approach to the American Negro is not now clear. It may be that in pursuing its general revolutionary tactics it agitates among the Negroes in order to disturb the working arrangements of our political and economic system rather than with any humanitarian intentions for the Negro masses. On the other hand, there is no doubt that many Negro Communists look specifically to benefits for the American Negro and pay mere lip service to the Communist slogan of world revolution.

In any event, both racial separateness and communism tend to arouse deep-seated fears and prejudices not only in the Southern whites but in most whites elsewhere. Most liberals shun such approaches and, taking the more conventional democratic view of the virtue of compromises and half-measures, hope for gradual improvements with the passage of time. This, of course, is both the strength and the weakness of the liberal position. But that view is firm among the white groups who wish to alleviate the Negro's condition, and, should the trend run in more revolutionary directions in the future, the liberals would probably desert their mild course and avoid further concern with the Negro, or would perhaps join in forcible suppression of a revolution which encouraged outright and complete color equality. Most people hope, however, that we are moving in a middle course and that relations between the races, both in the North and in the South, may be greatly improved as a result of the struggle of the democratic peoples against the fascists and other undemocratic forces.

Next in importance to the color question is anti-Semitism. Since there is no real racial difference involved, intermarriage, essential to the full merging of cultures, is not difficult to handle, at least in our country. The conflict of Jews and Christians can be resolved, however, only by alterations on both sides. So long as the former keep their belief in being God's Chosen People, and so long as they emphasize their right, as many Jews who are not particularly orthodox do, to be a separate culture group and yet insist on full participation in the wider culture of the Christian and Occidental world, they continue to foster recurrent conflict and prejudice. The sense of difference among the Jews is evidently not due entirely to contemporary pressure on them by non-Jews. It is, as we noted earlier, deep in Judaic culture. This very separateness, with its tradition of persecution, sets up in the Jew from his earliest training, the expectation that he will be the object of prejudice. In a similar way many Christians are brought up in anticipation of difficulties with Jews, especially in business and the professions. This builds attitudes that quickly turn minor avoidance or divergence into a serious conflict.

What we need most is a practice based on the conviction that in a democratic society there is a place for cultural variation and that the Jew, like others, may have divergent religious or other interests without disrupting the larger national community in which all have a place. More specifically, the reduction of prejudice will be helped by a lessening of extreme orthodoxy in religion, and by the development of more co-operative relations in business, industry, and the professions, to replace the traditional competition that quickly turns to open aggression.

Prejudice in other areas of interaction may be reduced by acceptance of similar principles, applied to the particular situations. It becomes most serious when it reflects deep rifts in our national and international society.

Changes are needed to close these rifts. This is basic to a preservation of democratic processes.

Prejudice and Personality. What does prejudice do to and for the individuals who express it? It is evident that it has definite effects upon them. In the first place, much of the more violent prejudice bespeaks an immature form of opposition and conscious or unconscious emotional insecurity and distress that are projected upon the victims. Numerous studies of white-Negro relations have shown that the white's fear of the Negro's sexual aggression stems from the white man's sense of guilt and shame for his conduct, overt or imaginary, toward Negro women. Moreover, the placing of white women on a pedestal of purity bespeaks the white man's unresolved sexual wishes for white women. Also, apparently, the white feels inferior to the Negro because of the latter's potency as a man. Dr. Hortense Powdermaker has stated the matter in this way:

"Those who have the most prejudice seem to be the people who are most insecure, people who are afraid, scared they will lose their jobs, wondering if they will succeed, uncertain about their status in society, people who are frustrated in one way or another. Those are the people who use the Negro or Jew or Mexican or someone else as a target for their frustration. Those are the people who are scared of competitors and see the Negro or Jew or immigrant as a rival. Does having prejudice help those scared and frustrated people? Quite the contrary. It acts as a blinder and prevents them from seeing the real cause of their insecurity, and from doing anything realistic about it. Instead they pick out some group to be the scapegoat and the real situation which is responsible for their insecurity is left unchanged. Hence, prejudice prevents people from solving their difficulties. Also prejudice warps the personality of the one holding it. Hate is destructive and uses up a lot of energy. If energy is used in hating Jews, or Negroes, or Catholics, there is not much left for creative and constructive work. The prejudiced person becomes small and mean, and the kindlier and co-operative side of his nature becomes dwarfed. In time his whole nature may become affected and all his human relationships suffer. It is impossible for him to get along with a wide variety of people, or to mix well with anyone who is different from himself. And this is not conducive to success."¹²

The object of prejudice, the Negro or other minority person, easily develops a persistent fear of his oppressors. This inhibits his reactions, forces him into a variety of dodges to escape abuse, and otherwise makes for a personality given over to deceit, double meaning, and any other devices making for an adjustment. In a democratic society this type of reaction is not conducive to healthy interaction on public problems or in more intimate personal adjustments. Prejudice, then, induces childish anxieties and dependence on the master group, whereas mutuality should be the rule. In other words, the interactions resemble those of children and adolescents rather than of mature adults who are concerned with common public mat-

¹² From H. Powdermaker, "Prejudice, What It Does to People and Society," a radio address over station WNYC, March 13, 1943. By permission of the author.

ters. Such reactions may fit into a dictatorship but hardly into a society marked by individualism, initiative, and democratic processes of consensus and conjoint action for the public good.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

The literature on prejudice, touching as it does nearly every phase of group conflict, is rich and extensive. We shall cite only some of the more standard works, most of which contain references to more detailed materials.

On the psychological and cultural roots of prejudice, see E. S. Bogardus, *Immigration and Race Attitudes*, 1928, chaps. 2-7; S. H. Britt, *Social Psychology of Modern Life*, 1941, chap. 23; Otto Klineberg, *Social Psychology*, 1940, chap. 14; Bruno Lasker, *Race Attitudes in Children*, 1929, chaps. 6, 8, 9, 10; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, 1921, chap. 9, sec. D, pp. 616-623; Donald R. Young, *American Minority People*, 1932, chap. 1; K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, 1927, chap. 18; H. Powdermaker, *Probing Our Prejudices*, 1944.

On Negro-white conflicts and prejudices, see, H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, 1941, chap. 4; Allison Davis and John Dollard, *Children of Bondage*, 1940, chaps. 2-8, 10; A. Davis, B. B. Gardner, and M. R. Gardner, *Deep South*, 1941, Part I, chaps. 1-10; J. Dollard, *Caste and Class in a Southern Town*, 1937, chaps. 3, 4, 5, 13, 14, 15, 16, 18; E. Franklin Frazier, *Negro Youth at the Crossways*, 1940, chaps. 1-7; Charles S. Johnson, *Growing Up in the Black Belt*, 1941, chaps. 9, 10, 11; Charles S. Johnson, *Patterns of Negro Segregation*, 1943, chaps. 2-6, 10-14; O. Klineberg, *op. cit.*, chap. 11; O. Klineberg, editor, *Characteristics of the American Negro*, 1944; N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, 1941, chap. 15; Gunnar Myrdal, *An American Dilemma*, 2 vols. 1944, chaps. 4, 28, 29, 30, in vol. 1; R. E. Park and E. W. Burgess, *op. cit.*, chap. 9, sec. D, pp. 623-637; Hortense Powdermaker, *After Freedom*, 1939, chaps. 1, 6; R. L. Sutherland, *Color, Class, and Personality*, 1942, chaps. 2, 5, 6, 8; W. Lloyd Warner, B. H. Junker, and W. A. Adams, *Color and Human Nature*, 1941, chaps. 1, 8; R. A. Warner, *New Haven Negroes*, 1940, chap. 8; Donald R. Young, *op. cit.*, chaps. 4, 7; K. Young, *op. cit.*, chap. 19.

On other areas of prejudice, see I. Graeber and S. H. Britt, eds., *Jews in the Gentile World the Problem of Anti-Semitism*, 1941; C. E. Silcox and G. M. Fisher, *Catholics, Jews and Protestants*, 1934, chaps. 2, 3, 7, 9; "Jews in America," *Fortune*, 1936, vol. 13, No. 2, pp. 79-85 *et. seq.*, Donald Young, *op. cit.*, chap. 15.

Chapter XIII

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF REVOLUTION

CERTAIN writers on social-cultural change distinguish between orderly change which they call "evolutionary," and that marked by disorder, chaos, and dislocation of the social order, which they term "revolutionary." Actually no revolution can take place unless a tremendous alteration in beliefs, attitudes, and habits has gone before. Nothing is further from the truth than that a revolution is the sudden birth and acceptance of absolutely novel values and practices. Yet the concept has important meaning and represents a phase of conflict which we must examine.

THE NATURE OF REVOLUTION

The term *revolution* has been used in at least three ways. By far the commonest conception is that a revolution is a sudden political shift in the locus of sovereignty—that is, in the seat or source of political power in the state. The French, Russian, and Nazi revolutions would be illustrations of this. Another conception is that a revolution is any abrupt cultural change, which may include not only political but other forms of alteration, such as religious and economic. Thus the Protestant Reformation may be considered a revolution. A third view is that a revolution is a change in the entire social order in the fundamental social institutions, in the social classes, in the distribution of power, and in the entire set of attitudes and habits of a people; the entire social fabric is torn apart and has to be rewoven. The so-called Industrial Revolution, which began in England about 1760 and which is still going on, would come under this category. But most writers dismiss this conception of revolution as so vague and broad as to be meaningless.

The analysis and interpretation of revolution as a social-psychological and cultural phenomenon with general features or processes must, of course, depend on facts derived from the history of particular revolutions, counterrevolutions, and attempts at revolution. Many historians, with their attention fixed on the uniqueness and variability of human events, resist any efforts to derive generalizations about the social process or individual and group conduct from a study of particular revolutionary movements. But such writers usually object to any generalization from history; in fact, many of them scout the idea that there can be a social-psychological or

cultural science. Granted that particulars are often difficult to disentangle from universals, there still seems to be a defensible basis for making some attempt to get at those social-psychological aspects of revolutions which have common and general qualities.

Definition of Revolution. Revolution, sooner or later, involves shifts in political power. We define it as an abrupt change to new forms of authority within a national state or society. This involves a shifting of the relations of superordination and subordination. New forms of legal control arise. Many writers have made much of the nonpolitical aspects of revolution; yet when all is said and done, any profound change in the religious or economic order will sooner or later influence the form of political control.

Such profound changes have a previous history and a subsequent effect. Yet, in discussing revolution, we must confine ourselves to the time in which the crisis of change rises to its climax and then recedes to a more gradual process of social change. One cannot set the time limits of any revolution with precision. Certainly historians and sociologists may differ profoundly about this point. Still, particular social conditions and social events mark the revolutionary crescendo and diminuendo, and these we shall have occasion to examine.

A revolution is, then, a more or less sudden social change, usually accomplished by forcible overthrow of the existing political order and leading to the establishment of new forms of social and legal control. Overt violence, however, is not an essential feature of revolution. It may be avoided, largely through the seizure of the military power. The Nazi revolution illustrates this.

Beginning with the extraordinary powers assumed by the coalition regime of Chancellor Brüning, a dictatorship gradually developed; under Papen and Schleicher, in the summer of 1932, the threat of military power led to the surrender of Social Democratic control of the government of Prussia; by 1933, Adolf Hitler, in conjunction with the big industrialist and Junker groups, destroyed the German Republic. There was some violence in the form of street rioting, but nothing resembling organized and armed opposition or conquest.

The essential point is that there was a new form of legality, a new pattern of political control, backed by military force. Open violence was not used, but the shift in the source of power was fundamental.

A word may be said about revolutions which fail, such as the German one of 1848, or that of 1905 in Russia. Abortive revolutions are often preliminary to later successful ones. Certainly there is continuity between the Russian attempt of 1905 and the success of 1917. When a revolution fails, the conservative forces are usually in such a position as to recapture or retain their political and legal power. From the social-psychological point of view, the basic social attitudes, beliefs, and mythology have not sufficiently changed for the revolutionary party to carry out its purpose. We may say,

in fact (and it will become more apparent shortly) that no revolution is possible until the psychological moment has arrived. There must be a definite "readiness," as the psychologists would say, for revolutionary behavior.

Although, in our conception, a revolution is essentially a shift in political power, the economic, cultural, and psychological "causes" are profoundly important. The relative importance of various factors making for revolution varies with time and circumstances. Let us trace some of the more generally accepted "causes."

CHIEF FACTORS MAKING FOR REVOLUTION

The search for the cause of revolution has been an exercise of many scholars. Some find it in repressed instincts or drives, which under adequate stimuli break through the bonds of convention and the mores to overthrow the forms of authority. The thesis of repression, in turn, is closely linked with that of the unconscious.

For example, Gustave Le Bon, the French journalist-psychologist, associated revolution with mob behavior, in which the unconscious and lower impulses express themselves, chiefly through the lower classes, which seek to wrest power from the upper and more able classes.¹ Followers of Freudian psychology often hold that revolutions are the expression of deeply submerged, unconscious desires to destroy the state or other forms of authority as symbols of an all-powerful father whom the masses fear and hate. Others, like Pitirim A. Sorokin, accept the psychology of Pavlov rather than that of Freud, and hold that revolution is a release of inhibited unconditioned impulses. Sorokin says, "The immediate cause of revolution is always the growth of 'repression' of the main instincts of the majority of society, and the impossibility of obtaining for these instincts the necessary minimum of satisfactions."² Though not accepting either the Freudian or the Pavlovian standpoint, Lyford P. Edwards also makes the repression of the basic wishes for power, status, and security a fundamental factor in revolutions. He puts it thus: "People come to feel that their legitimate aspirations and ideals are being repressed or perverted, that their entirely proper desires and ambitions are being hindered and thwarted."³ Though Edwards does not rest his analysis entirely on the theory of balked impulses, he, like many others, finds in the psychological factors the deeper foundations of revolution.

Other writers derive revolutions from intolerable economic injustices. Still others view them as symptoms of widespread social-cultural disorder.

¹ See Suggestions for Further Reading at the close of the chapter for references on various theories of causation with regard to revolution.

² P. A. Sorokin, *The Sociology of Revolution*, 1924, p. 383.

³ L. P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, 1927, p. 30.

ganization, as pathological phenomena. For example, Crane Brinton uses the analogy of a "fever" which attacks the body politic, and Robert Hunter seems to believe that most revolutions are the product of evil men who take advantage of social and economic disturbances, such as prolonged crop failures and monetary disorganization, to impose their will upon the long-suffering masses.⁴

In approaching such a complex topic, however, we should avoid "particularistic" or single-track explanations. Certainly there are two sets of underlying factors, the social-cultural and the social-psychological. But, as we have indicated throughout this book, the latter are closely bound up with the former. Which is stressed is a matter of standpoint and emphasis. For our purposes we may profitably consider the broader social-cultural factors as well as those that are more distinctly psychological.

Important Cultural Factors. First of all, the old institutions begin to fail in their functions because they no longer fit the needs of the social situation. The failure may be due to new inventions which produce stresses and strains within the older institutions. Abuses in the economic, political, religious, and other special spheres develop. Mass activities, organized or unorganized, frequently arise, such as peasant uprisings, food riots, industrial strikes, and widespread sabotage. The élite, who wield the dominant power, may fail to reckon with these changes. Often the rise of a new class which competes with the old is important, as in the French Revolution, which was largely a middle-class or bourgeois attack on the landed aristocracy, although the peasant uprisings and the economic demands of the city laboring classes helped bring it to a focus. The rise of new classes, which compete for power with the older, often leads to the organization of militant minorities who fashion the actual revolution.

Another factor which fosters discontent is the growth of cities. In the modern city hordes of men and women are cut loose from any fundamental attachment to the soil or to primary groups and become mere atoms in a mass society. Mass suggestion, through organized agitation and a propagandist press, is more quickly mobilized for revolutionary action in the cities than in the rural districts.

The introduction of a new ideology from the outside and the development of novel ideas out of the other cultural and class changes help people to interpret and rationalize the stresses around them. Moreover, these new ideas and beliefs often run counter to the old, just as the practices of the newly emerging institutions conflict with those of the older ones. Gradually, out of this conflict, as we shall see, are built the new social myths with their utopian dreams which catch the imagination and faith of the masses.

⁴ See C. Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 1938; and R. Hunter, *Revolution: Why, How, When?*, 1940.

Prince Peter Kropotkin, the Russian geographer and revolutionist, understood the basic social-cultural factors when he described the two great currents which made the French Revolution as "the current of ideas, concerning the political reorganization" of the state, and "the current of action" which arose from abuses felt by the population. When these two great currents united, wrote Kropotkin, the revolution was at hand. This statement seems to apply to all revolutions.

Some Psychological Factors. As noted above, many writers believe that the foremost factor in revolution is the repression of the fundamental desires. But it is not alone the repression of the basic instincts, impulses, or wishes which produces revolution. It is rather a failure to condition the primitive impulses of certain classes to the cultural and social changes which have already occurred; it is the failure of the learning processes to sublimate the primitive tendencies into behavior which is socially adequate in the new conditions; and it is the failure of such reconditioning in the dominant group rather than its failure among the masses. Yet without doubt the mechanism or repression and its release must be reckoned with in our discussion.

Another important psychological factor is leadership. We have already discussed leadership and need but note again that leaders are neither born complete leaders nor completely made by circumstances. The qualities of the leader are the result of a combination of a drive directed to certain ends, opportunity, and particular objects of attention. That is, in revolutionary times, leaders direct their activities either to the possibilities of the new order or to the retention of the old. Certainly no revolution could take place without leadership. Often the leader but verbalizes and makes conscious the feelings, emotions, and wishes of the masses. Without this verbal function the masses can do little; without language effective plans and programs cannot be worked out and communicated to others. The dreamer, the reformer, the agitator, and the executive all find a place in revolutionary activities.

Let us now take up the development of a revolution, dealing first with the remote and fundamental causes and then with the events which precede and mark the shift in social-legal power.

We may discuss the background of revolution in terms of what Lyford⁵ P. Edwards has called the "master symptoms." He defines a master symptom as "one which, in a marked degree, conditions others and without which a great revolution is impossible."⁵ Edwards names the two principal symptoms as economic disorganization and the rise of a new social myth. To these, however, two others must be added: the development of militant minorities and the rise of able leadership. True, these do not come into full evidence until the revolution is under way, but they are important

⁵ L. P. Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 90

throughout, in one form or another. Moreover, other cultural forces than the economic are important. We shall discuss the development of a revolution under these four major heads: economic and other institutional factors, militant minorities, leadership, and the new social myth.

Economic and Other Institutional Causes. Most revolutions, and certainly those of modern times, have been closely linked with economic problems. There are no more fundamental culture patterns than those built around the demands for food, clothing, and shelter. Discontent with the economic order, especially with the distribution of wealth, is highly important. Among societies dominated by agriculture, land hunger has been a crucial problem. During the eighteenth century the French peasantry, having emerged from serfdom, developed a growing craving for more and more land. So, too, the Russian peasants, in the last half of the nineteenth century and in the first decade of the present century, showed the same sort of land hunger. Absentee ownership produces added discontent. An increase in taxes or rents, crop failures, a decrease in the market demand, and deflation or inflation—all tend to heighten distress.

Often the peasant may be ignorant of the wider economic situation which produces this dislocation in his affairs, but he develops a strong and unpleasant emotional reaction to a system of ownership or tenancy which seems to give him nothing but hard work and the merest necessities. His debts increase; he may lose what land he has; and other hardships prey upon his emotions until he is ripe for revolt.

In somewhat the same way, the city workers—in mill, factory, and shop—develop a sense of injustice at the unequal distribution of wealth and the lack of economic opportunity. Although at the outset of the present commercial and industrial period, say in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, serfs and the peasants fled the land to enter the cities as workers, in time their opportunities for improving themselves became restricted, and the urban workers felt the pinch of extreme poverty, especially in periods of unemployment. The growth of absentee ownership, the development of the factory system, and the specialization of occupation increased the difficulties of living for the city worker. Instead of having a well-rounded trade or craft, he had become merely an adjunct of a machine turning out pieces or sections of products which had no meaning to him. He became a "wage-slave," receiving always just what the labor market would supply in the way of money but always under the fear of loss of his job, and with the knowledge of a blind alley ahead so far as advancement was concerned.

We must, however, utter a caution about serious economic conditions as a cause of revolution. We must not imagine that it is the complete submergence of the peasant or the factory worker that makes for overthrow of government. This is a mistaken belief. When peasants, farmers, or city laborers are so reduced in economic status that they "can scarcely keep body

and soul together," there is little likelihood of revolt. Degradation, complete discouragement and resignation to one's fearful lot, do not produce revolutionary action. Quite the contrary, there must be a combination of hardship and sense of injustice with a relative improvement of conditions over the past. The peasants and city dwellers of prerevolutionary France were better off than those of other countries in Europe. Compared with conditions in the fourteenth century, when revolution failed, their circumstances were good. In both prerevolutionary France and prerevolutionary Russia the peasants already owned a third of the land. The American colonies in 1776 were the best-governed colonies in the world. They were certainly better managed under George III at the time of the Declaration of Independence than they had been in 1700. So, too, despite economic and industrial dislocation in Russia during World War I, the lot of the factory workers was much improved over that of twelve years before, when the abortive revolution of 1905 took place. And in Germany, despite the horrible conditions of war, the laboring and peasant classes were far better off in 1918, when they overthrew the Kaiser and set up a republic, than they had been in 1848, when a revolutionary attempt failed. Even with six million unemployed in 1933, when Hitler came to power, the economic situation was not entirely hopeless.

To be completely beaten down and to accept such a situation will lead not to revolt but to resignation. Revolutions are not made by downtrodden masses who can not and will not stand any more repression. There must be faith in improvement; there must not be such repression that revolt may not be successful, and there must be leadership and a new myth. Edwards says: "The emotion which furnishes the driving power of revolution is hope, not despair."⁶

Yet economic causes alone, among the cultural factors, do not determine the revolutionary trend. Other abuses than the distribution of wealth and property foster popular discontent.

Social status is connected with the ownership of land and wealth. The submerged classes want to emulate the upper classes. The poor peasant wishes to live like the rich peasant. The rich peasant becomes infected with the luxury virus of his landlord. The city worker wants to possess the comforts of his employer. The rich merchant or manufacturer desires to be knighted and sit in Parliament. Human envy and the desire for prestige in the eyes of one's fellows are deep in all of us. It is the social implications of wealth—what it will buy, the prestige it gives, the improved social status it brings—that count.

Other inequalities also stimulate discontent. Closely linked with social and economic position is political status. Certainly in modern revolutions the desire for political participation of groups hitherto denied it has been

⁶ Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

a factor in popular unrest. Property and birth qualifications prevented many newly developed classes from taking part in government. Not only were legislative functions often denied these groups, but administrative offices, both in the civil government and especially in the military, were withheld from persons not of noble birth or background. Sometimes religious issues enter into revolutionary movements. The Puritan revolt (1640-1660), although dominated by the economic demands of the rich middle class in opposition to the crown and the nobility, was also a religious revolt. Though considerable toleration had been developed in England before this, the power of the crown, which was Roman Catholic and then Anglican, led to a desire for greater freedom for worship, outside the regulations of the state church.

The Russian revolution, although predominantly economic and political, was also in part, religious. In Russia the state church, which was closely associated with the czarist regime, abused its power and stimulated discontent in the masses, especially the city workers.

The Rise of Militant Minorities. Revolutions do not make themselves. Persons and organizations play an important part in bringing about the radical changes. Let us look first at the general intellectual climate and the kind of groups which foster revolution. The specific place of leadership will be dealt with below.

In the history of modern Europe and America there is a causative relation between the growing freedom of expression of ideas—of teaching and preaching, of science, and of proposals for economic, political, religious, and other cultural reforms—and the development of revolutionary movements. This is particularly clear in Great Britain, France, and this country. The conception of natural law, the critical attitude toward religious institutions, the philosophy of individualism and democracy, the undermining of the idea of the divine right of kings, were all factors behind the revolt against the old order. New ideas in science, politics, economics, and religion were not the only factors in the new intellectual climate. The growth of cities, which increased mobility and interstimulation; the breakdown of the feudal folkways of class and status; the freeing of the individual from the station or guild into which he was born, so that he might work for any master he chose—all these changes abetted the rise of the intellectual classes. The French Revolution offers an illustration. In no other country of Europe, perhaps, were education and enlightenment so far advanced as in France during the seventeenth and the early eighteenth centuries. Although one hears much about the corruption of the courts of France during this period, the power of Louis XIV and the intellectual stimulation provided by his court and those of his next two successors were positive gains for the future revolution. During the three quarters of a century preceding the

revolution itself, science and thought continued to advance. Physics, chemistry, and mathematics made great progress, and also important for social change was the development of literature and the arts, and of history, political science, economics, and philosophy. Applied science in the form of invention, engineering, and business practice furnished a certain rationalistic ground from which to attack the old order. The emergence of the machine age itself did much to stimulate revolutions in class organization and political control.

In general there are two kinds of groups which foster and abet revolution: those which stimulate critical attitudes toward the old regime, or propose moderate reforms, and those which, in time, become outright radical in program. Organizations such as the Freemasons on the Continent have from time to time been a force behind reform. So, too, the intellectual associations linked to the salons in prerevolutionary France and those organized into scientific or literary societies stimulated intellectual criticism of the established order and encouraged programs for change. Such groups do not make the revolution, but they take an important step toward it. The more dynamic groups arise out of this older social and institutional and intellectual soil. They foster not new ideas alone but action. These minorities are often organized in secret and carry on their propaganda under cover. In prerevolutionary France radical clubs developed in Paris and spread over France. Before the American Revolution there were Sons of Liberty, merchants' associations, and committees of correspondence which undertook the spread of rebellious ideas; and sometimes local units of government took over these functions. In Russia, groups of students organized propaganda societies two generations or more before the revolution, and their work was effective in building the background. Later more active organizations sprang up. As a revolution gets under way, such minorities become political parties and prepare to seize power. The manner in which the real revolutionary minorities operate will be discussed later.

The Place of Leadership. Just as there is a shift from moderate to radical groups, so there is a change of leadership. The intellectuals, for example, who criticized the old regime in France were highly important in providing the background, but they shrank from the violence and force that were necessary to make the revolt a success.

The Enlightenment in France gave rise to the Encyclopedists, who had a part in undermining the old order. These were a group of scholars, headed by Diderot, who compiled a huge body of informative and critical material on various phases of contemporary and historical culture. This work had great influence in stimulating ideas and making people aware for the first time of their own society. So, too, other critics of contemporary institutions were found on every hand. Although in 1700 leading political philoso-

phers in France, like Fénelon and Bossuet, defended the doctrine of the divine right of kings, by 1750 almost every intellectual leader in France believed the same doctrine to be nonsense.

When men begin to criticize their own social order, to question the mores, law, and forms of government, that society is already in the process of change. Institutions and forms of social control are losing force, and a period of transition from old to new forms is at hand. We all know the names of the brilliant writers who helped to bring about the change in France. Voltaire, the popular philosopher of his day, wrote critical essays about almost all phases of contemporary society, sparing no one. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, known to us for his influence on modern education and on the romantic movement in both letters and politics, raised basic questions about the foundations of the political and social order in his book *The Social Contract* (1762). In this work he argued that the forms of social control had destroyed the natural goodness of men. His book served as an important intellectual stimulus and helped to build the social myth of a better social order. Men like the Marquis de Condorcet, with their firm belief in the doctrine of progress and the inevitable perfectibility of mankind, appealed to thousands, although their theory was largely a rationalization of the tremendous commercial, industrial, and nationalist changes that had followed the Renaissance and the Reformation.

The role of the intellectual is witnessed in other revolutions. John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Tom Paine, and many other Americans supported the revolutionary agitation for years before the break with England finally came. In Russia the line of philosophic, literary, political, and economic writers from Gogol and Pushkin through Tolstoy and Kropotkin to Gorky, Lenin, and Trotsky runs like a thread through the complex social pattern of Russia for nearly a hundred years.

These early intellectuals operate as individuals or as members of associations of scholars which were never designed to encourage overthrow of their governments. As a rule, intellectual leaders are not the type to make good agitators or to manage the revolution once it is under way. In time, however, this stimulation from the upper classes comes into sympathetic contact with organizations and leaders that intend to make the revolution itself. As Prince Kropotkin said, when these two sources of discontent coalesce, the revolution is near at hand, provided the oppression is sufficient, the political disorganization and weakness are increasing, and the economic system is becoming increasingly unstable. Lyford P. Edwards calls this meeting of the two influences the "transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals," and Crane Brinton plainly names it the "desertion of the intellectuals."⁷ The literary men, editors, artists, teachers, priests, preachers,

⁷ See Edwards, *op. cit.*, and C. Brinton, *op. cit.*, pp. 52-63.

and other professionals trained in verbalization "become infected with the overt discontent of the repressed classes of society." From this point the revolutionary movement takes on added strength.

The early leaders prepare the groundwork, the substructure, upon which the later more carefully organized minorities and their leaders hope to build in order, eventually, to control the entire social order. The prerevolutionary writers and talkers are important because they express the wishes and discontent of the repressed classes. Out of this talk—these "speech reactions," as Sorokin calls them—a new set of beliefs and attitudes, the new social myth, is built.

The Social Myth and New Symbol. As we indicated in Chapters VII and VIII, the emotionalized symbol, the stereotype, the myth, and the legend are basic to an understanding of behavior. It is the ideas and attitudes which people carry about with them, and not merely the objective, material features of their environment, that determine the kind of world they live in. Unless men believe in their own folkways and institutions, unless they have faith in their own culture, they will not carry on. So long as the social myths of the old system remain intact, there is little likelihood of radical upheaval. When the social myths begin to change, the break-up is already under way, although the obvious features of it may not appear for a long time afterwards. The rise of a new social myth means that the desires, beliefs, attitudes, and habits of people have been altered. The new myth is the promise of "a new heaven and a new earth." It may contain inconsistent and contradictory elements, but these are lost in the total picture of a new social order about to come into being.

The moderate and kindly intellectuals who begin to criticize the old social order also begin to fashion the new mythology, and the active, militant minority leaders who bring the revolution into being complete the process. Let us examine the major features of this changing mythology. In the next section we shall show how it grows and changes as the revolution gets under way.

The new social myth begins when the intellectuals commence to describe the present order as "bad," "evil," "decadent," "corrupt," and so on. The rich are blamed for all ills, and the redistribution of wealth is said to be essential to happiness. The terms of opprobrium are caught up by others and carried on and become in time stereotypes to define the ruling class. Ridicule is applied to rulers and their practices. Along with this goes the use of labels to distinguish the exploiting class from those who are their victims. In Roman history there were the patricians and the plebeians. In the mythology of modern revolutionary minorities the exploiters are often called "absentee owners," "capitalists," or "bourgeois." The exploited productive workers are called "working men," "wage slaves," or simply "the

proletariat." The intellectuals are called "the intelligentsia" or "highbrows." This conception of a society fundamentally divided into antagonistic classes is highly important in the development of the social myth.

Under the domination of an oppressive order free speech is taboo. The intellectuals help to loosen these bonds. In fact, speech is one of the first habits to be freed from repressive restraint, and, although speech and writing are censored and suppressed by those in power in an effort to stop the spread of revolutionary ideas, a flood of talk nevertheless precedes the overt action of the revolution. This talk serves as a kind of thermometer of unrest. It is one of the first means of loosening the inhibitions built up under the older culture.

Yet the social myth is not merely negative and critical. Its greater function is positive and constructive. It builds a picture of a world that will be far more just, honest, and delightful for all than the existing society. A utopian picture of the coming day is put before the oppressed and underprivileged, who accept the picture as valid and begin to work for its realization.

Education plays a part in this, as do religion and public discussion. The function of the intellectuals is self-evident, for they are the guardians of education, morality, and religion. As teachers, preachers, and writers, they express our concepts of right and wrong, good and bad, vicious and virtuous, noble and depraved, orthodox and heretical. Though they tend to be dominated economically by the ruling political and economic élite, they have ample opportunity to insinuate novel ideas and values into their audiences.

The particular words and phrases used in constructing the new social myth depend upon the culture of the time and upon the purpose or nature of the unrest itself. The Protestant reformers ran counter to the established church in their talk about the individual's finding his salvation in direct relation to God, in their talk about "calling," "justification by faith," "election," and "predestination." The English Puritans, falling back upon ideas of primitive Christianity, were going to restore the "reign of the saints," they being the "saints." The social myth of the French Revolution is epitomized in the phrase "liberty, equality, fraternity." This phrase became a shibboleth for all France, and the enthusiasm for it—not necessarily for the practices implied in it—swept over France like a new religion. A new political or economic myth has the same function as a religious one. There is much in common, psychologically, between the revolutionary agitator, with his faith and enthusiasm, and those who have sought salvation through conversions, revivals, and religious ecstasies.

As the revolutionary ideology develops, social myths about earlier revolutions and about how to conduct revolutions grow up. Out of the French Revolution, street fighting and the barricade become the symbols for

revolt. The socialists, communists, syndicalists, and anarchists have all developed their own ideas about how a revolution should evolve out of the historical past and how it should be conducted.

As this revolutionary mythology is developing, those in power, the conservatives, who wish to retain the existing order, also indulge in various devices to bolster up the old mythology. Often their efforts are directed chiefly to suppression of freedom of assembly, speech, and writing. Sometimes, however, there is an attempt to expand and foster the old myths and legends of the country and its heroes, in order to counteract the undermining forces moving in the opposite direction. In Russia, for example, the czarist regime spent large sums of money on counterpropaganda in the hope of bolstering the old order, but the situation was so far advanced toward revolt that its efforts did not stem the tide. In interesting contrast to this, the Communist dictatorship, soon after Hitler's rise to power in Germany, endeavored to build a strong national morale by resurrecting the legends and myths of Russia's long history.

Before we discuss the revolution in operation, we must comment on two other questions: how long it takes to complete a revolution, and what classes are involved.

Edwards, using materials from early revolutions, decided that there was not "a real revolution in all human history which developed in less than three generations."⁸ According to him, the first generation suffers greatly but imagines that reforms and minor improvements will save the old order to which they are accustomed. If this belief proves false, the second generation becomes more critical, for it experiences none of the benefits which its parents saw in the "good old days," and more radical hopes for the future emerge. The third generation goes through even more hardships and may end by destroying the old system. However, Edwards believes that it takes even a fourth generation to liquidate the former institutions and set up new ones. It is apparent, however, that cultural change is much more rapid than it used to be; with modern means of mass communication and militant organization, revolutions may be produced in much less time than in the preindustrial world.

The makers of revolution are the groups and classes, under dynamic leadership, which have felt cramped by the power of the dominant élite. Few, if any, revolutions are spontaneous outbursts of the submerged part of the population. Peasants may riot and burn crops or houses belonging to the lord of the manor; factory workers may strike or sabotage. But these actions are not revolutions. It takes a determined and organized minority which represents some emerging section or class in society to do the job.

The Puritan revolution was born of the rising middle classes, which resented the restrictions of the decaying feudal order and the divine right

⁸ Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 16.

of kings. The English peasants had little to do with the Whig revolution. The French and American revolutions likewise were bourgeois, not proletarian. Though the French peasants supported the city-made revolt, they did not start or guide it. Similarly our own revolution was stimulated and carried through largely by the mercantile class of the central and northern colonies and the large planter class of the southern. The masses had little to do with any of these.

It is not till we get to the nineteenth century that we see the beginning of truly mass revolutionary movements, made up largely of organized city workers and led by persons recruited from the middle or upper strata. The revolutionary attempt of 1848 in Germany was such, as was the short-lived revolution in Paris in 1870, when for a few short months the Commune reigned. It is in the period since World War I, of course, that we see the most marked evidence of the influence of urban workers in the revolutions in Russia, Austria, Hungary, Italy, Germany, and Spain. But even these were largely stimulated and directed by small militant political parties that had the technique and leadership for taking and holding political power. The chief leaders were recruited from the upper and middle classes.

THE REVOLUTION ITSELF

With the four "master symptoms," or background factors, in mind, let us examine more specifically the process of making the revolution itself. As every commentator has remarked, there are certain phases or stages in this human drama of conflict.

The Preliminaries. The prologue opens when the current of intellectual criticism and suggestion meets that set in motion by the agitators and revolutionary parties. The former becomes less moderate, and radical demands are made upon the government. People, in public and in private, talk more and more about the inevitability of revolution. Its coming is taken for granted. The radicals undertake more vigorous agitation and organization. The earlier theorists have less weight, and people eager for action move into control of the movement.

Throughout this period the new social myth continues to grow. There is sharper criticism of the existing order. "Revolutionary" plays, diatribes, poems, art, sermons, cartoons, forums, lectures, and debates become more common unless suppressed. There is scandalous rumor about the lives of the privileged classes. Gradually public dissatisfaction concentrates upon some one institution or public situation and upon the persons associated with it. This focusing of attention is highly important: moderate policies, the "good man in office" thesis, and all attempts at further amelioration are thrust aside in favor of much more drastic ideology and plans. At this point the more enthusiastic radical minority parties, with their more definite programs and plans of action, begin to take over the leadership.

It is during this period that what Herbert A. Miller called the "oppression psychosis" develops rapidly. The population begins to take on more and more the attitudes and actions of an emotional crowd. Long suppression, the feeling of inferiority, the sense of being the underdog, and the secret craving for power develop in the masses an intensified hatred of their oppressors, who represent all that is evil and bad. Everything those in power do is looked upon with suspicion. The usual crowd paranoia, or sense of being persecuted, develops. The agitators feed this suspiciousness wherever possible, first by indicating that any mild reforms of those in power are mere sops to the revolutionaries. Further, following the pattern of paranoia, the agitators and radical minorities develop the idealization of the repressed class itself, and offer a daydream picture of the utopian future which is just around the corner but which can be reached only through revolution. Discussion seems futile. The time for action is at hand. And, when action begins, sadistic and repressed wishes finally become overt.

During this time unrest spreads, strikes become more common, people refuse to pay taxes, and outright agitation to overthrow the government appears. Those most active in political and economic matters tend to divide into two main camps—those for the old order and those against it. The issues are drawn.

At the same time those in power attempt to block further development of revolutionary activities. They usually try severe censorship of the press and restriction of freedom of speech and assembly. If more wise, they set up positive counterpropaganda in favor of the established order. Sometimes those in power try to divert the movement away from revolution by arousing patriotic fervor for a foreign war. This happened in England in the reign of Henry V, who diverted attention from evils at home by a successful campaign against France. And historians have pointed out that, had James I of England been intelligent enough to follow Parliament at one point and intervene in support of the Protestants on the continent in the Thirty Years' War, the Puritan Revolution might have been averted or, at least, might have had another character. It has been said that the attempt at revolution in Russia in 1905 failed, in part, because the czarist regime still had considerable popular support for the Japanese-Russian war.

During the prerevolutionary phase those in power may lose control of the functions of government. The agitation for radical overthrow is partly caused by governmental inadequacies, monetary and taxation difficulties, and the like. In the preliminary phase those in power lose confidence in their ability to govern. Sometimes members of the ruling class desert to the liberals or revolutionaries. So long as the dominant group or class retain their self-confidence and will to power, they cannot be overthrown. If they have strong moral convictions and are willing to apply force to compel obedience, they cannot be put out. They have all the power of the state and

the sanctions of morality and tradition, and they can commandeer the industries and sufficient manpower to keep control. In this sense revolutions are as much the result of weakness as of strength. When those in the saddle doubt the rightness of their position, when they are disturbed by feelings of guilt, and when they lack the will to rule, they are ready to be unseated.

The Beginning of the Revolution. Often enough the immediate situation which sets off the revolution is insignificant. It is often difficult to say just what particular act does set it off. It is usually some minor, though illegal, act, which becomes symbolic and meaningful as people look back upon it in history. Actually there are often many minor and even major infractions of the law which do not precipitate a revolution. The firing on the hungry crowd who went to petition the czar for help in 1905 brought on an abortive revolution. Yet breaking a few Communist heads in Union Square in New York City in 1930 and 1931 did not start a revolution in the United States, nor did the eviction of the Bonus Army from Washington, D.C., in the summer of 1932. An act, if it is to light the conflagration, must be correlated with the psychological *readiness* of which we have already spoken. In the French and Russian revolutions a combination of hunger, bread riots, dislocation of the social and economic order, and loss of confidence in the established government produced the readiness for revolt. Yet even this did not start the conflagration.

The seizure of power may come in various ways. The popular notion that angry mobs seize the arsenals and defeat the police and the army is largely fictitious. True enough, the ruling class often finds itself unable to cope with riots and public disturbances, but the cause of its failure is a loss of will and techniques rather than anything else. The restless masses are organized and put to effective use by leaders and minorities that are ready to seize power. In the Puritan, French, and Russian revolutions the ruling élite proved itself unable to manage its affairs, and moderates and reformers, supported at first by more radical minorities and by sufficient military power, took over the reins of government.

The Shift to the Left. This first shift in legal and political power from the old rulers to moderate groups, if not universal, is certainly common. Soon, however, there ensues a struggle for control among the revolutionary factions. The moderates often become incapable of controlling the public. They are unable to keep the promises they have made. Their government, often made up of diverse elements not bound together by any really consistent program, temporizes with the conservatives of the old regime and also tries to keep the support of the radicals, whom it really fears. The mismanagement of affairs both at home and abroad becomes daily more apparent. Both the conservatives and the radicals attack the moderates. Often the reforms introduced by the latter are excellent and just what the intellectuals have talked and written about for years. But the

time of revolution is not like that of peaceful parliamentary rule in a liberal or democratic country. The class which has been dispossessed of wealth and political power plots to return. The more radical groups and their followers are dissatisfied with the first fruits of revolution. It is a time of open conflict. In such a period temporizing and mild measures will not do. There ensues a struggle for power between the moderates and the radicals. Sometimes the moderates compromise with the conservatives who have been driven out of the country. This increases the radicals' fear and hatred of them, and they are accused of selling out the revolution, of being traitors to the new state. Autocratic and dictatorial powers are necessary. A military regime is essential to preserve the gains already made and to go on to new ones. This calls for a dictatorship of one form or another. And, sooner or later, this is what we get in almost all revolutions.

The masses, now acting as an emotional crowd, put their faith in determined and bold measures. They identify themselves, as always, with strength and power, because power in a strong man gives the weak man courage and a sense of strength. This simple psychological fact is the basis of all social control and of all domination and submission.

It is at this point that the bold and ruthless revolutionary minority, led by men of courage and often of cupidity, comes into power. To be successful these leaders must have absolute faith in the righteousness of their cause. Their courage and severe measures quickly bring support from the masses. There is often an amazing outburst of energy, enthusiasm, and, under able leadership, genuine accomplishment—at least temporarily—of many of the aims of the revolutionary dreamers.

The rise of a dictatorial minority of radicals is illustrated in the Puritan Revolution by the coming of Cromwell and his fellows to leadership, late in 1648. Even in the rather mild American Revolution it was found necessary to confer rather dictatorial powers upon George Washington in order that the struggle might be carried on. In the French Revolution, the Commune of Paris overthrew the milder government, and Danton, Marat, and Robespierre came to power. After a period of control by these radicals, the Directory ruled for a time, and then came Napoleon and the end of the revolution proper. The situation in the Russian and Nazi German revolutions was much the same.

The Reign of Terror. The ordinary man associates the shift to the left, to the radicals, with revolutionary mob activity and a reign of terror. Both these forms of behavior have been much exaggerated in the popular conception of revolution. From Charles Dickens' *Tale of Two Cities* we have pictures of the storming of the Bastille and the operation of the guillotine. From popular accounts of the Russian Revolution we get distorted pictures of mob violence and of the Red Terror. So, too, the Hitler Brown Shirts are accused of widespread mob behavior. Spontaneous rioting, street fighting,

and other mob activities are found in nearly all revolutions, but they are far less significant and far less bloody than most of us imagine. There is a common misconception that a revolution is a period of anarchy. Quite to the contrary, it is a period of intense and concentrated political power in the hands of a new group. The swing to radical and violent measures does not mean chaos and anarchy. Actually a successful revolution is anything but anarchy. Edwards describes it thus: "It is a period of despotism, with instant destruction to everyone opposing that despotism. Caesar and Cromwell, Robespierre and Lenin, were not anarchists; they were autocrats."⁹ In the first place, leaders of the parties who have or seek power are usually afraid of mob action, and they attempt to restrict it unless it seems to serve their own purposes in the struggle for power. This was certainly true in the French and Russian Revolutions. In the latter Lenin exerted himself to prevent street mobs in Petrograd from wrecking the plans of the Bolsheviks.

The stereotype of the revolutionary reign of terror causes cold shivers to run through the spines of conservatives and liberals. In terms of actual numbers killed, the terror is probably a very humane affair. In terms of its effect upon the public, both inside and outside the revolutionary country, it is almost unavoidable. The purpose of the reign of terror is to consolidate power in the hands of the new minority. Since the people will support any strong government after the temporizing and vacillation of the moderates, the new revolutionary party is in a position to carry out its wishes with force. The enemies within the country must be dealt with firmly and decisively. It is not individuals that must be eliminated so much as what they stand for in the minds of people both inside and outside the country. The imprisonment or execution of these enemies, some of whom are the moderates, gives evidence of power and shows the people that the new dictatorship "means business." Such actions enhance the prestige of the new government and feed the tendency to identification of the "man in the street" with the "man on horseback."

The terror has another purpose, implied by its name. Within the revolutionary country it strikes terror into the hearts of enemies and lukewarm supporters of it and shows the ardent followers what may happen to them if they should betray the cause. After all, fear is a strong incentive; it prevents certain acts and makes others seem the part of wisdom.

The terror has still other purposes. To the people of other countries, especially of countries which may harbor refugees from the revolution, it demonstrates that the revolution is fact and not fiction. Naturally, it arouses counterrevolutionary agitation. It gives rise to endless myths and legends about the horrible treatment of those who oppose it. While it

⁹ Edwards, *op. cit.*, p. 107.

frightens foreign conservatives into redoubling their efforts to stamp out subversive movements in their own countries, it makes them accept the actuality of the revolution elsewhere.

Often associated with the terror is the new government's need to raise, discipline, and equip an army in order to wage a war against the counter-revolutionary forces which attempt to restore the old regime. The war intensifies the patriotic faith of the masses as they follow the new élite in protecting the country against the counterrevolutionary invaders, and it gives those in power a military backing with which to enforce the terror at home if necessary.

For the masses the reign of terror may also serve as an emotional catharsis; that is, it is psychologically like a religious revival. The identification of the common man with the deliberate violence of the new order toward its enemies acts as a safety valve for the discharge of repressed attitudes. The terror has great dramatic qualities; it is deliberate melodrama acted out in real life.

The Method of the Terror. The technique of the terror is simple. It is based essentially on the use of fear. Yet it is not anarchy, but is literally a *reign* of terror. It is a deliberate method of social control. Its purpose is to frighten people into obedience, to prevent civil war, and to solidify sentiment for the new regime. The principal purpose is not to kill people, but to threaten and scare them. A propaganda of horror is set in motion. Speeches by the leaders are filled with expressions of the new rulers' intention to apply the terror to anyone who opposes them. The impression is created that the secret police system set up to carry out this purpose is greater in number and far cleverer than it could possibly be. Executions are directed at key persons and are staged in a manner to produce the most widespread effects both within and without the country. The guillotine became the symbol of terrorism in all revolutionary France.

The history of revolutions affords ample evidence that this interpretation of terrorism is correct. Cromwell's tactics in Ireland are a legend to this day, but the number of persons slaughtered was far less than popular fancy would have it. He knew how to employ the terror, and the two massacres which he ordered at the beginning of his military campaign against the Irish were well calculated to arouse fear both in Ireland and at home. Even the American Revolution showed some of the marks of terrorism in the treatment of the Tories who remained loyal to the crown. For the most part, however, this terrorism was locally instigated and, aside from a few instances, was never very violent or murderous. It consisted chiefly of mild tortures, imprisonment, and banishment. It is the terror of the French Revolution which most catches the ordinary person's imagination. Yet the total number of victims of the terror in all France is put at about 17,000,

including 1,200 women. Not all of these were aristocrats by any means: 4,000 were peasants and 3,000 were workingmen.¹⁰ In Paris 2,625 persons were put to death by the guillotine.¹¹ These numbers look large in themselves, but seem insignificant when it is recalled that 400,000 persons died in the revolt of the Vendée, and that nearly three quarters of a million Frenchmen were killed in Napoleon's military campaigns of 1792-1800. The Red Terror of Russia was a byword in the years just following World War I. It was instigated after the attempted assassination of Lenin on August 30, 1918, and lasted into 1919. Edwards quotes figures from the national Tcheka, or "extraordinary commission," showing that 6,185 persons were put to death in 1918, and 3,456 in 1919. Reports of local and district tribunals do not seem available.

The Fascist terror in Italy was a mere bagatelle compared with the French and Russian episodes. The Nazis, however, made prolonged and widespread use of terrorist methods. The concentration camp and the firing squad came into use almost as soon as Hitler took over the state. We have no reliable figures on the total killed, slowly by deliberate starvation and cruelty, or outright. But as a part of the Nazi program of *Gleichschaltung*, or co-ordination and integration of every aspect of life into their pattern, thousands were put to death. Apparently the Jews and the Poles suffered most, especially during World War II.¹²

It is true, of course, that during the terror mobs come into action. Then, often, not only are persons killed, but valuable cultural products, such as public buildings and art objects, are destroyed. However, the Russian revolutionists who wished so completely to turn their backs upon the past were far more careful to preserve the relics of the past than were the Puritan and French revolutionists.

The reign of terror is generally concluded by the same forces that set it in motion. When the counterrevolutionary armies are defeated, when something approaching unification of power within the country is established, when malcontents are silenced, converted, or driven out, there is little need to continue the terror. Of course, it lingers on in the myths and

¹⁰ Peter Kropotkin, in his *The Great French Revolution, 1789-1793*, 1909, p. 561 states that Louis Blanc, the great historian of the French Revolution, classified the known social status of 2,750 persons who had been guillotined and found that "only 650 belonged to the well-to-do classes."

¹¹ These figures are from Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. 180-181, Kropotkin, *op. cit.*, pp. 560-561, puts the figures somewhat higher. He states that in Paris alone between April 17, 1793, and June 10, 1794, 2,607 persons were executed by the terrorist tribunal, and from June 10, 1794 to July 27, 1794 after an even more severe law was passed an additional 1,351 were sent to the guillotine.

¹² The use of terrorist methods as a phase of military conquest of course is not quite the same as the application of such means on the population of the country of the revolution itself. In this sense the careful student of World War II may care to make distinctions between the practice after the Nazis began their territorial expansion and that confined to Germany proper.

legends of the masses, and the threat to reinstate it is often effective for years in quelling any sort of organized opposition. In all this we see how the new social myth, which began with the first criticism of the old order, gradually develops through the events of the revolution: seizure of power, mob action, reign of terror, and defeat of counterrevolutionary movements. It needs but the carrying out of the revolutionary plan to become complete. Let us examine this aspect.

Consolidation of Political Power. The most obvious feature of the revolution, of course, is the relocation of political and legal power. All revolutions produce their own particular rationalizations or defenses for this redistribution of power. The change is rationalized in terms of public welfare: the property and power of the former oppressors and exploiters were being abused, and this "new deal" was good for them as well as for the classes now in power. The confiscation of property is made moral and legal by conscious and unconscious revision of the codes of morality and law. In the transfer of faith from the old order to the new, the intellectuals again serve an important function by dressing up the justifications in neat, legal and revolutionary phraseology which will soothe the consciences of the leaders and masses.

We have made clear that the revolution starts with the breakdown of faith in the old order long before overt violence begins. Yet even the forcible seizure of power cannot wipe out the effects of slower changes or the persistence of many old customs and folkways. Such cataclysmic changes as revolutions always end in accommodation and compromise or, better still, in fusion or assimilation of the new and the old. The reconstructed social order is essentially a merging of the old with the new in which the old system often contributes more than the new. It is difficult to overthrow a political and economic order, to destroy the forms of worship and marriage, and to abolish the historical forces in art, literature, and ideas. A new order cannot easily scrap the material culture of its time even though it may give new meaning to it. Certainly the "war communism" of the early phase of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia gave way in time to a dictatorial state socialism. Nevertheless, although still far from the communistic ideal of Karl Marx, the Soviet Union has made enormous strides in really building a new social-cultural order. Even there, however, the materials, physical and mental, cannot be cut off from their sources in older Russian and nineteenth-century Western culture. Finally, the U.S.S.R. has moved, as did earlier revolutionary countries, toward a stable order in which a new leadership and new patterns of behavior became dominant. The function of the prerevolutionary agitator has passed. Stable administrators, faithful bureaucrats, and technologists acquire high prestige because their functions are essential. In fact, when a country arrives at this stage, one may rest assured that the revolutionary process is, for the time, completed.

The new state, in short, represents another form of domination and submission. A new class is in power, and old classes are submerged. There arises a new élite, but there is still a class organization, accompanied by many or few changes in the basic institutions.

This notation of the rise of a new ruling class provides a convenient point at which to comment on the social origins and types of revolutionists.

Types of Revolutionists. Those who view revolutions as signs of evil and degradation are likely to consider the revolutionists as recruited from the dregs of society. The proponents of particular revolutions, on the other hand, are pretty sure to describe them as men of virtue. Viewing the matter somewhat more objectively than either of these standpoints permits, we may say that most political revolts are led by persons of the middle and upper social strata—that is, by persons who have had opportunities for leadership and education. Furthermore, the rank and file of the small revolutionary minorities who stand at the center of the movement are by no means recruited from the lower classes of the population. This was certainly true of the Puritan, American, French, Russian, and Italian Fascist revolutions. And, whether one considers the rise of National Socialism as a counterrevolution or as the shift from moderates to extremists (as the usual pattern would indicate), the same thing may be said for it. The Nazi Party contained chiefly lower middle-class people who in nonrevolutionary times might have been occupied in relatively stable and traditionally accepted roles. The outright scoundrels among revolutionists, especially among the leaders, are few. This is not to say that their rise to power may not be bought by cruel and unscrupulous means or that many of them do not exploit the benefits of their new power for personal ends. They do. But such exploitation is among the rewards that go to all new élites.

When asked for statistical proof on this question, however, one is hard-pressed to produce the evidence. Unfortunately we have no adequate enumeration from the Puritan and American instances, but we do have supporting data from the revolutionary correspondence of those times. Our data on the French Revolution are fortunately more satisfactory. Crane Brinton has made a searching analysis of the lists of members of the Jacobin clubs between the years 1785 and 1790. From the taxes paid and the occupations noted on these lists, he has been able to give us a pretty accurate picture of the socioeconomic status of the groups that were the focus of the French Revolution. He states:

“For twelve clubs, with a total membership of 5,405 over the whole course of the revolution, 1789-95, in both its moderate and its violent phases: 62 per cent of the members were middle class, 28 per cent working class, 10 per cent peasants. For twelve clubs in the moderate period, 1789-92, with a membership of 4,037: 66 per cent were middle class, 26 per cent working class, 8 per cent peasants. For forty-two

clubs in the violent period, 1793-95, with a membership of 8,062: 57 per cent were middle class, 32 per cent working class, 11 per cent peasants."¹³

Leadership is perhaps even more restricted to the upper and middle classes than is the general membership of the revolutionary clubs. Most of the leaders of the Puritan revolt were of middle-class origin. Our American revolutionary leaders were of the aristocratic and middle classes. Thirty-three of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of Independence were college graduates. Among the total there were five physicians, eleven merchants, four farmers, twenty-two lawyers, and three ministers. The French leaders included the King's cousin, the Duke of Orleans; noblemen like Lafayette, Condorcet, and Mirabeau; many lawyers, including Camus, Robespierre, and Danton; scientists, like the astronomer Bailly and the chemist Lavoisier; and journalists, like Marat and Desmoulins. The Russian Revolution was planned and executed chiefly by men of bourgeois background. The moderates were led by men like Miliukov, an historian from a good family; Tereschenko, a millionaire sugar merchant from Kiev; and Kerensky, a lawyer from a family of upper bureaucrats. In fact, Kerensky and Lenin came not only from the same town on the Volga but from the same social class. The latter's father was a school inspector, a position of high status in czarist Russia. The other Bolshevik leaders had varied backgrounds: Trotsky (born Bronstein) and Kamenev (born Rosenfeld) were highly educated men of Jewish origin. Felix Dzerzhinsky was of noble Polish-Lithuanian stock. Kalinin has been called a "professional peasant." Stalin came from a petty bourgeois family and had been trained for the priesthood before turning revolutionist. There were even some high-born army officers who went over to the Soviets and helped make the revolution a success. Certainly few if any of the more prominent leaders sprang full-fledged from the mass of peasants or workers. Anyway, the true Marxian always admits that the proletarian revolution must be led by an able and especially trained minority. Marx was not naïve enough to believe that revolutions are made by spontaneous uprisings of degraded masses.

As to the personality characteristics of revolutionists, they are too varied in role and purpose to be easily pigeonholed. Yet in terms of the phases in the revolutionary process itself, we may say that certain types seem best suited to certain functions. For example, the theorist who prepares the criticism of the old order and the intellectual blueprint of the utopian future tends to be introverted, given to intellectual analysis, and not much concerned with programs of action. His main job is intellectual preparation. As the drift toward revolution becomes stronger, the agitator and the

¹³ C. Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 118. By permission of W. W. Norton Co., publishers.

organizer come into prominence. The former stirs up the masses with his vigorous attacks on the old order and his purple pictures of the millennium ahead. The latter develops the revolutionary minority party which plans and trains itself to take over the revolution. The initiation and carrying forward of the revolution demand bold and ruthless men of action. This is no time for the theorist and even the agitator has only a minor place except as he serves the militant purposes of the leader. As the more violent aspects of the terror and other revolutionary activities give way to a restoration of order, the organizer and the administrator become increasingly important. In time the agitator and the violent but effective leaders of open revolt give way to men who can organize a bureaucracy and a judiciary, develop a stable police force and military, and revive the economic life of the country. The revolutionary process or cycle has been completed. In fact, the ousting of the extremists, called, in terms of the French experience, the Thermidorean reaction,¹⁴ is the final phase of the revolution. During this time there is a direct shift to more moderate methods of control, and, as noted above, property rights, the individual's roles, and the general pattern of life become legalized, accepted, and relatively stable. The "Republic of Virtue," the "revolutionary honeymoon," with its Spartan and Puritanical and violent controls, gives way to a milder order in which many of the former forms of life reappear. Some writers consider such a reactionary period to be universal and to indicate that for the most part revolutions fail to accomplish anything but cruelty, mass murder, and the rise, for the time being, of a new and more brutal ruling class.

This view, however, seems either naive or biased. It can hardly be said that revolutions are nothing but instances of social-cultural pathology. Though they may be, in the analogy of Crane Brinton, something like a fever in the body politic, the recovery may leave the "patient" considerably improved and cleansed of disorders. Such dubious analogies aside, let us turn to the accomplishments of revolution in relation to the general topic of cultural change.

INTERPRETATION AND EVALUATION OF REVOLUTION

A naturalistic approach to revolution must view it in the larger context of social-cultural change. Its accomplishments, however, are hard to appraise, because revolution, like war, induces great and varied emotions in the individuals who experience it. Some liberals find comfort in the somewhat ambiguous words of P. A. Sorokin, who personally experienced the treatment which the moderates in Russia received from the radicals. He says: "Revolution does not tend to socialize so much as it tends to biologize the people; does not only increase but also reduces the sum of liberties; does

¹⁴ So called from the fact that it was on July 27, 1794, the ninth Thermidor of Year II of the revolutionary French calendar, that Robespierre's terroristic power came to an end.

not improve alone but also impairs the economic and spiritual state of the working classes. Whatever gains it yields are purchased at a prodigious and disproportionate cost."¹⁵ Others, approaching the matter somewhat more objectively, would find the comment of R. E. Park helpful: "What a naturalistic account of revolution seeks is such a description of the revolutionary phenomena as will tell us not what ought to happen; not what we should do, but *what we can do*, in a given situation."¹⁶

Bearing these different views in mind, we may indicate some positive gains which come from revolutions.

Revolutionary Gains and Cultural Change. For the most part revolutions do end the worst features of the older order. All sorts of abuses disappear. The new laws fit the cultural needs more closely. Social legislation may benefit the masses. And, despite political interference by the revolutionary party in power, there is often a considerable improvement in the administration of government. The transfer of property and economic organization to new hands may result in a more effective use of the productive capacity of a nation, though it is not always easy to prove such a contention. Certainly a new ruling class comes into being, and this may mean that a vital and vigorous source of energy replaces the depleted and even decadent former ruling class.

Yet a revolution is the product of previous slow changes. In other words, it is embedded in the slowly accumulating alterations which we often call evolutionary. Abuses arise and become more distressing until under militant leadership the opportunity to overthrow the older order arises. Yet, before this occurs, the old is already passing away by a process of decay. At best, a revolution seems to accelerate such modifications and leads to a reorganization of society along different lines. Nevertheless, the final results of a revolution are never so marked as the idealists imagine they will be. No matter what sweeping changes are made in the heyday of the revolution, in the end there is always a great deal of accommodation to, and assimilation of, the old in the new order.

The Puritan, American, and French Revolutions were all sharp turning points in the expansion of laissez-faire capitalism and in the rise of the nationalistic state dominated by the middle classes. These revolutions marked the triumph of the doctrines and practices of individualism, private profit-taking, and political democracy—the three most characteristic features of the capitalistic ethos of the Western world in the nineteenth century. But these features were already becoming prominent, and the revolutions but speeded up the process. It may be that Crane Brinton is correct in saying of these three instances and of the Russian that "in many ways

¹⁵ P. A. Sorokin, *Sociology of Revolution*, 1925, p. 12. The author of this book was a member of the Kerensky government in Russia in 1917.

¹⁶ R. E. Park, "Introduction" to L. P. Edwards, *op. cit.*, pp. x-x1. Italics not in the original.

[they seem] to have changed men's minds more completely than they changed men's habits."¹⁷

To those who were brought up on the notion of peaceful and evolutionary social change, the suggestion that we use revolution as a method of cultural change, even in time of grave crisis, may come as a shock. Although most Americans are highly sentimental about their armed revolt against England, and although their patriotic societies decry any attempt to picture the leaders of our revolution in other than favorable colors, we are extremely timid about revolutions during the present epoch. Certainly most Americans would disclaim Thomas Jefferson's contention that a country requires a revolution every twenty years in order to keep the spirit of liberty alive. The domination of the middle-class ideology has become so pronounced that even the mild suggestions of the Socialists in this country are frowned upon as highly dangerous and subversive. And more strictly revolutionary parties are really quite foreign to our thought.

Yet the revolutionary changes in Russia, China, Italy, Spain, and Germany provide examples for leaders and masses in this country and elsewhere. In other words, the idea of revolution may become embedded in the social myth of cultural change. If we ever experience a widespread breakdown of our culture, we may witness new attempts at a revolutionary overturn of the existing order. Much depends, of course, on the development of our domestic and foreign policies. The problem of revolution, like that of war, is related to the larger issue of the nature and use of power. If nations, in both domestic and foreign relations, can develop some kind of moral order which will make for general economic security, general justice, and the practice as well as the ideal of "live and let live," then both war and revolution may be reduced in frequency if not completely eliminated from human society. Conflict and competition cannot be done away with, but they can be turned to productive and moral uses.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

There is a vast literature on various historical revolutions and a growing amount of social-psychological and sociological interpretation. With a few obvious exceptions, the following titles relate chiefly to the interpretative approach. Among these Brinton gives an excellent bibliography of important histories of the Puritan, French, American, and Russian Revolutions.

Brooks Adams, *The Theory of Social Revolutions*, 1913; Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, 1938; Hadley Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, 1941, chaps. 8, 9; L. P. Edwards, *The Natural History of Revolution*, 1927; Robert Hunter, *Revolution: Why, How, When?*, 1940; Gustave Le Bon, *The Psychology of Revolution* (English translation), 1913; V. I. Lenin, *The State and Revolution* (English translation), 1935, Curzio Malaparte, *Coup d'etat: the Technique of Revolution*

¹⁷ C. Brinton, *op. cit.*, p. 283.

(English translation), 1932; Alfred Meusel, "Revolution and Counter-Revolution," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1934, 13: 367-376; R. W. Postgate, *How To Make a Revolution*, 1934; John Reed, *Ten Days That Shook the World*, 1919; Leon Trotsky, *The History of the Russian Revolution* (English translation), 3 vols. in 1, 1932, 1933; S. D. Schmalhausen, editor, *Recovery Through Revolution*, 1933; P. A. Sorokin, *Sociology of Revolution*, 1925; Sorokin, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 3: *Fluctuations of Social Relationships, War, and Revolutions*, 1937, chaps. 12, 13, 14, Albert Rhys Williams, *Through the Russian Revolution*, 1921; and V. Steryansky and M. Mishin, eds., *Strategy and Tactics of the Proletarian Revolution*, 1936 (selections from Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin *et al.*).

Chapter XIV

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WAR AND OF MILITARY MORALE

OF ALL modern human experience wars produce the most widespread and profound effects upon the person, upon group life, and upon culture. The roots of war lie both in our institutions and within the individual as he is influenced by interactions with his fellows. The recurrent debate as to whether man is instinctively warlike remains undecided because the basic premise of this approach rests on faulty presuppositions of *individual* psychology. From our standpoint, individual aggressiveness stems from early interactions, associated with either personal-social or cultural conditioning, and the institutions of war may offer a person an outlet for aggressive motives built up in the early years.

Since our chief concern in this chapter is not with the institutional aspects of war¹ but with individual responses, we shall begin with the selection and training of military personnel. Then we shall discuss leadership and morale in wartime. The chapter will close with a consideration of mental breakdown in military personnel.

THE CITIZEN ARMY IN TOTAL WAR

Modern wars involve the complete mobilization of manpower and of economic and industrial resources and a distinctive use of psychological as well as military weapons. Earlier wars were fought either by mercenaries or by relatively small bodies of volunteers or conscripts. Today war must be examined against the background of our mass society, technology, and intense nationalism.

The idea of a citizen army arose out of the revolutionary movements of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Oliver Cromwell raised forces from the masses, and our own Revolutionary army was recruited on the theory of the citizen's responsibility for military effort. The idea of a "nation in arms" became highly significant during the French Revolution, when a large army was developed not only to defeat counterrevolutionary attempts but to carry the message of liberty, equality, and fraternity throughout Europe. Although this crusade, under Napoleon, turned out to be another

¹ On the institutional features of war, see Suggestions for Further Reading at the close of Chapter XV.

expression of national imperialism, the fact remains that the idea of large-scale citizen armies grew out of this period. Moreover, the success of the French stimulated strong nationalist sentiments, especially in Prussia. As one phase of Prussia's recovery from defeat emerged the practice of conscription from all social strata.

In the United States it was not till the Civil War that the idea of general conscription rather than individual volunteering was put into practice. The drafting of men at that time was not very successful. During World War I, however, Americans quickly accepted general conscription as the most democratic means of raising a large army. In World War II this system was again put into operation for the male military. For the auxiliary forces made up of women we retained the older volunteer system.

Yet most Americans have not held the belief, common in some countries, that war in itself is a glorious and moral occupation. For the most part we have considered war chiefly as defense of our land. But in the global war of the 1940's the conviction that attack is the best defense became widely accepted. Moreover, the belief that the entire population must take part in total war, either in the armed forces or in essential war work at home, became commonplace. Total war has become an expression of mass societies in conflict. Let us see how large modern military forces are built up.

Selection and Training of Troops. A military unit, large or small, is a disciplined body of individuals trained to win battles. Obviously, not all members of a military force become engaged in front-line action. Operations in the field depend on large forces for supply, communication, and transportation. The highly specialized nature of military work has made it necessary to select and train personnel for particular jobs. There are some variations in the way manpower is selected and trained, but the major features are pretty much alike everywhere. We shall use our American experience as an example.

The chief characteristics sought in military personnel are physical fitness and good health, intellectual ability, special occupational skills, and the proper social and temperamental qualities. A program of examination and training is set up to take individuals from civilian life and make them into competent military personnel.

On the fundamental theory of democratic selection, the chief steps in securing and allocating manpower are as follows:

(1) Some form of general registration of manpower by the government provides information on the number of available men and on each man's age, birthplace, residence, marital status, degree of education, and major occupation.

(2) The registered men are classified by local or other boards into broad categories of availability and usefulness; for the most part workers in essential war industries, married men, and older men are put into deferred

classes, while younger unmarried men who are not vitally needed in the home-front economy are listed for the first call to arms.

(3) From such manpower pools, districts or communities are required to send quotas of men at stated periods to designated military examination or induction centers.

(4) At these places, located at convenient points over the country, the initial "screening" is done.² Obviously, the foremost consideration is physical fitness. Heart, lungs, muscular capacity, posture, eyes, ears, and other organs are examined. From the data thus collected, from other examinations, as of sputum and urine, and from interviews, a medical report is made. Those clearly unfit on physical grounds may be eliminated at this point. Those who pass these tests are sent on for mental examinations, such as the "General Classification Test," designed to reveal the capacity to learn rapidly and solve problems of graded difficulty, and for tests and interviews to determine occupational fitness. In a modern army or navy technical skill is highly important, and an effort is made to secure a reservoir of men of certain skills or of men who have the mental-motor ability to acquire such skills quickly.

Warfare also demands social-emotional or temperamental stability, and attention is given to weeding out men who are neurotic or otherwise unfit for active duty. In order to find noncommissioned and commissioned officers of strong will, able to meet difficulties, to command under stress, and otherwise to perform successfully under the hard conditions of modern warfare, the Germans have used formal and informal interviews, paper-and-pencil tests, psychiatric examinations, and performance tests. In the last the candidates are put through physically and mentally severe trials which tax their strength, their ingenuity, their patience, and their emotional stability and flexibility. In one test the men, with full packs, are required to scale a high, smooth wall and are rated not only for the number of successes, but for their persistence and willingness to continue despite fatigue and other difficulties. The Germans also have an elaborate program of examinations designed to weed out the highly egocentric, the extremely introverted, and those who might be broadly labeled potential "trouble-makers," and, before 1939 at least, they gave attention to philosophic outlook, literary apprehension, and other evidences of general cultural interest in order to get a rounded picture of their officer candidates. In general, the Germans emphasized the total personality, while the Americans—in line with their psychological research—stressed specific traits for specific jobs.

In fact, the American military used no elaborate methods of selection except in special instances. Psychiatrists were employed to discover the

² Sometimes, besides the classification of draft status, local boards made quick and superficial physical examinations. But these examinations were not considered official by the military. Later they were given up, and all examinations were made under strict military direction.

obviously neurotic and psychotic, but the chief stress was put on physique and a certain grade of intellectual ability. The less obvious but important social-emotional characteristics were often neglected. As the war went on, the high percentage of mental breakdowns seemed to confirm the psychiatrists' argument that more attention should be given to these characteristics in the early examinations. (See below on mental breakdown.)

The chief grounds for rejection by the American army were physical, but men who had serious mental handicaps were also released from further military obligation. Clearly, the number rejected would depend on the standards set up. During the earlier period of World War II a fourth of the men called were rejected. Later the standards of physical fitness were lowered. Many of those who had been rejected at first had relatively trivial difficulties, visual, auditory, or dental.

(5) The next step in the process is the induction of the men into military life. Certain basic training and indoctrination are required in all armed services. They may take a few weeks or a few months, depending upon the urgency of the national situation, the previous education of the men, and, of course, their learning ability. After this initial period, during which further examinations may be given, the men are sent to various military units for additional training. For most American boys, military life is a highly novel experience. Their adaptation to it depends on their physical fitness, intelligence, and social-emotional traits, and on their zeal, interest, and other elements of morale.

Life in the army or navy is certainly unlike that under ordinary civilian conditions. A small number of American men get some peacetime military training, but most get none at all. Adjustment to military routine is often difficult. Unlike our loosely knit democratic world, an army—to use this branch as an example—is a closely ordered and disciplined body in which nearly everything is prearranged. The new soldier is put through intensive physical drill; he must learn all sorts of new motor habits; he must accommodate himself to obeying commands. He gets up and goes to bed, eats, works, and goes through the day under regulations and orders. He must accustom himself to living with a large number of his fellows in relatively new and often uncomfortable situations. In short, he must adapt himself to what someone has called an “institution of segregated care,” in which he is but one small unit of a highly complex and regimented mass.

It is a world where the rewards go to those who conform and the punishments to those who do not. Moreover, though the demands of superiors often appear silly and inconsequential to the novice, his response to them is often considered highly indicative of his future adequacy as a soldier. Some men take to this life more easily than others, and the qualities which make for successful adjustment are sometimes not revealed in the usual intelligence tests or in those designed to show occupational skills.

However, Americans are not completely lacking in training for the new demands. In school, if not earlier, in such organizations as the Boy and Girl Scouts, and elsewhere, young people get some drill in marching, in taking orders from superiors, and in otherwise working together as members of disciplined units. The mild regimentation of our classrooms, with fixed seating, rules of conduct, and training in obedience, punctuality, and politeness, forms habits and attitudes on which more specific training in wartime may be developed. Moreover, our high level of general education has its effect. In World War I the average drafted American had had but a sixth-grade schooling. In World War II he had had a year of high-school work. Only 9 per cent of the men drafted for the first war had finished secondary school; 41 per cent of those in the second war had completed high school, and 25 per cent had attended college at least a year.³ Since modern wars are fought largely by technological methods, not only formal skills but the general cultural attention and habituation to mechanical things are important. The American boy's familiarity with automobiles, radios, and all sort of machines and gadgets can be put to good use in military life.

Yet an army or navy today does not depend for its operations entirely upon technical skill and the habit of obedience. Spontaneous teamwork and co-operation are required. In fact, the small fighting unit, or tactical team, has become very important, whether it be the crew of a bomber, of a tank, or of a PT boat, an infantry squad, a signal or reconnaissance group, or any other functional unit of fighting men. To become a part of such a group, a man must learn to co-ordinate his individual and specialized skill with the skill of his fellows through the command and leadership of the officer in charge. The very initiative and freedom of choice encouraged by the individualism of our culture may provide a foundation for a strong and effective military force; previous training in originality, in dependence on personal judgment, in tolerance, and in a sense of humor, all of which are highly rewarded by approval, may be of great use. American recreation in teams and games provides an excellent foundation for the military tactical team. Moreover, as George H. Mead has pointed out, training in teamwork in games is one of the most effective ways to build up a generalized role that will give an intellectual and emotional basis for serious co-operation. In fact, not only in the smaller combat units, but at every level of military organization, these three elements are fundamental: individual skill and intelligence, teamwork and co-operation, and leadership or command.

Military Leadership. In training and operations a tremendous stress is put upon what is termed the chain of command, that is, the hierarchy of power and authority from the top commander down to the lowest non-

³ See W. V. Bingham, with J. Rorty, "How the Army Sorts Its Man Power," *Harper's Magazine*, 1942, 185: 432-440.

commissioned officer. In theory this is a fixed system of responsibility. Though military operations are organized around what we have called headship, or institutional dominance, an effort is made, in most democratic countries, at least, to stimulate genuine leadership, which will call forth willing loyalty and obedience and the other characteristic responses of free followers. However, the institutional gradation of power remains the norm.

How American soldiers view the qualities of leadership was shown in a study in which some thousands of enlisted men were interviewed regarding army leadership and morale. The men noted seventy-seven aspects of army life as definitely associated with morale, and, of the twenty most closely related to morale, sixteen had to do with man-officer relations. The following are statements of the twelve most significant items in the order of their importance with respect to what the men considered good leadership:

- (1) The officer must have ability and competence; these qualities are basic to confidence.
- (2) He must have the personal welfare of his men at heart, both their physical needs and their need of friendly and helpful advice.
- (3) He must be prompt in making his decisions.
- (4) He must have patience, ability, and clarity as a teacher.
- (5) He must show tact, judgment, common sense, and, above all else, the ability to get things done.
- (6) The good officer does not boss just to be bossing; there is no unnecessary stress on rank for its own sake.
- (7) The effective officer tells the men when they have done a good job; the men like commendation and praise when they are deserved.
- (8) An officer should possess a strong physique and good bearing.
- (9) He should have a "good education," a "sense of humor," and "guts," or courage. (This was the order of preference.)
- (10) He must be impartial and fair in all his dealings.
- (11) The officers must be industrious and not "do as little work as they can get away with."
- (12) They should give orders in a clear and concise way so that there can be no misunderstanding as to what is expected.

Other matters noted were calmness, keeping promises, and not showing off rank. But above all else the men wanted competence and a real interest in their welfare.⁴

These findings agree with the views of most experts on military leadership. Almost without exception the most important traits of the officer are given as decisiveness, clarity of orders, sense of justice, insistence on obedience, initiative, cheerfulness, understanding of his men, and readiness to provide at all times for their welfare.

The commander, high or low, is responsible for the success or failure of a mission or action. He is charged with certain tasks, and he must see

⁴ See the report of this study in *Psychology for the Fighting Man*, 1943, pp. 373-374.

that they are carried out. The amount of detail in orders handed from those above to those below differs with the military tradition of the country, the commanding officer, and the nature of the military engagement to be undertaken. In highly militaristic nations complete power and authority are often vested in the higher officers, and little initiative or free choice of alternatives is given the lower officers, noncommissioned officers, and men. In the huge armies of total war, in which a large proportion of the men is secured by universal conscription, there is less evidence of sharp distinctions. This is true in the German army, even though it has a long officer-caste tradition. Such a democratic pattern—and it is this—keeps the purely institutional aspects of military control from becoming completely hardened into a ritual. Perhaps the only army which is still largely dominated by a relatively small militaristic caste is that of Japan, and even there opportunity is given all young men of high ability and promise to become officers.

In countries like the United States, with a strong individualistic tradition, rigid discipline and sharp distinctions between officers and men have not been as common as in the army of Frederick the Great and in the German army of World War I. Yet even in our army, during basic training and the arduous work of preparing for combat duty, the chain of command is closely adhered to. In actual combat, especially with the modern use of the small tactical team and the need of careful communication between specialized units, there is much decentralization of command, and the lower officers, the noncommissioned officers, and the men themselves develop some initiative. The very demands of modern warfare, therefore, encourage a certain democracy among our fighting men and, in turn, produce a leader-follower relation that has much of the voluntary character which we consider a high value in human affairs. Many stories of World War II illustrate this point.

"Carlson's Raiders," a handpicked unit of Marines which performed valiant and difficult commando service in the Pacific Southwest, developed a high *esprit de corps* and a camaraderie between officers and enlisted men which was highly democratic. In the days of their selection and training, their commander, Colonel E. F. Carlson, abolished the formalities of rank. "He required that the officers wear the same clothes as the men, carry the same equipment, live and suffer in as much discomfort. This his officers did willingly. It was not until after Guadalcanal that they even got a separate mess, and that, according to one officer, was only because the Raiders as a whole thought the officers had earned it."⁵ The men operated in small teams of three, called "fire groups." They traveled light, as raiders must. They carried dehydrated food, did their own cooking, and were

⁵ From D. Burke, "Carlson of the Raiders," *Life*, Sept. 20, 1943, 15:58. By permission of the publishers.

able to continue for weeks without direct contact with the main body of troops. Their motto was from the Chinese *Gung Ho*, meaning "Work Together—Work in Harmony."

Similar accounts are found in the annals of our PT boats, in which small details of officers and men undertook important jobs of attacking enemy craft under most difficult and trying circumstances. In such situations rank as such was of little importance in the co-operative action by which each man contributed his part to the common goal. The spirit of such fighters is obviously the product of careful selection, training, and the dangerous nature of their operations.

Such units represent a certain departure from customary military procedure, and they may become the basis of considerable reorganization of combat forces. Yet most military experts still hold that it would be a mistake to advocate or practice complete equality between officers and men. An army or a navy is a disciplined mass of fighters organized and trained to win battles. Some officer-leaders can maintain their dominance and yet make their relations with their men personal and intimate, but a great many officers are not capable of going very far in this direction without losing the respect, loyalty, and obedience that are necessary to their command. Hence it is well—say the experts—to maintain the institutionalized social distance, the chain-of-command control, for in the end responsibility rests with the officer.

This view, of course, has wider acceptance than in military affairs alone. It is common in industry, business, government, the church, and most civic and other public organizations. In fact, strict equality of members' authority is relatively rare in any group, with perhaps the exception of associations of the comradeship and congeniality type. Certainly, public and other large groups function successfully only when special roles, rights, duties, and skills are co-ordinated under leadership to some common end. Complete individualism and equality result in anarchy, not in order. Lewin, Lippitt, and White found in their "laissez-faire" group much personal strife and a lowered total accomplishment. (See Chapter X, p. 244.) So, too, among men and officers, co-operation and initiative must be integrated in a hierarchy of power and responsibility if the purpose of the military unit is to be attained.

This excursion into the patterns of military dominance and submission again makes clear the two-directional character of these relations. There are the followers' obedience, loyalty, and sense of duty toward the leader, and there is the mutuality or more or less equalitarian identification among the men themselves. Sigmund Freud has put the matter thus: "A soldier takes his superior, that is, really, the leader of the army, as his ideal, while he identifies himself with his equals, and derives from this community of their egos the obligations for giving mutual help and for sharing pos-

sessions which comradeship implies." ⁶ The root pattern of this is the patriarchal father and the family under his control. There are affectional and sympathetic ties between the officer-father and the men, who take the role of sons. There are also affectional links among the men, as there are among the sons. Most hostility among the men is, in part, directed toward the enemy, and, in part, sublimated into healthy competition for the special roles and statuses which come with the performance of their duties.

The family pattern is, in fact, recognized by many writers on military leadership. In describing one particularly successful officer, Edward L. Munson, Jr. says, "His attitude was that of a father toward his sons." And in another place Munson acutely observes that the successful officer must "bring himself as close to the enlisted man as he can without impairing his own status and weakening his authority . . . ; this relationship should be personal, frank, and candid—mutual and not one-sided. Military and social status should have nothing to do with it, for it is essentially the controlling relation between the head of a family and its members." ⁷ One British psychiatrist goes so far as to say: "Every officer in the army is a parent surrogate for every person under him." ⁸

The successful officer, in the role of sympathetic and understanding yet stern father, must at all times retain the position of the dominant person in the interaction with his men, no matter how friendly and familiar their relations may become. He may be kindly, jovial, and familiar in one segment of his personality, but this must always be kept in check by another segment, his role and function as the commander. This duality is found in other forms of leadership; it is common in successful interviewers, and it is an essential quality of speakers, politicians, and successful industrial and business leaders.⁹

It is a question how rigid the father-son relation should be. If institutionalized at a parent-child or parent-adolescent level, it may be quite different from the relation existing among mature adults when circumstances, training, and ability dictate that one shall lead and others shall voluntarily follow. It may be that our military traditions call for a relation that is too much like that between father and child. T. A. Ross, who has had much experience in dealing with mental disorders among troops, writes:

"One wonders whether all this reduction of the soldier to a state of childhood has been really necessary or even advantageous. There must, of course, be leaders and led,

⁶ Sigmund Freud, *Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego*, 1922, p. 110. By permission.

⁷ E. L. Munson, Jr., *Leadership for American Army Leaders*, 1941, pp. 53, 56. By permission of The Infantry Journal, Inc.

⁸ T. A. Ross, "Anxiety Neuroses of War," chap. 16 in A. F. Hurst, *Medical Diseases of War*, 1940, p. 139.

⁹ This double role, or mirrored self-image, is discussed in K. Young, *Personality and Problems of Adjustment*, 1940, pp. 172-173.

but I wonder whether all this spiritual dependence on a father-substitute to the extent which it is the purpose, perhaps not quite conscious purpose, of the army authorities to achieve, is altogether good.”¹⁰

In a highly individualistic society like ours, and in a war in which tactical units must operate with a certain independence and yet in closest co-ordination with other units, it might be well to modify somewhat the customary fixity of the chain of command. It is the present writer's impression, obtained from reading many soldiers' letters and from conversing with soldiers, especially with those who have attended college, that considerable frustration and unnecessary resentment often arise from training procedures based on an elementary conception of the officer-men relation. Men who fully appreciate obedience, loyalty, and tough training believe that better morale and better results would accrue if a somewhat more mature attitude and procedure were adopted. This is a subject on which few, if any, military experts have expressed an opinion.

The Nature and Function of Military Morale. The psychological resources of a country include not only intellectual abilities and special skills but also the social and emotional traits which we call morale. Briefly, morale consists of deep faith in, and zeal for, one's cause; zest for combat—a “fighting heart,” in military parlance; and capacity and readiness for sacrifice. Linked to these three are loyalty and complete obedience to orders, pride in oneself and in one's military unit, and positive identification with one's commander and fellows in relation to the general and specific military objectives.

Morale, like other qualities, reflects the cultural setting from which it springs. In a country where individualism, personal choice, and participation in government are expected and habitual, the problems of military morale will be somewhat different from those in a society marked by such characteristics as faith in a divine ruler or a mystic cause. In any case, morale has both an individual and a group aspect. The former includes personal identification with the cause and willingness to die for it, if necessary, desire for adventure, and other positive attitudes of attack and aggression, operating under self-discipline and strong conviction of their moral justification. These qualities are counterbalanced by fears for one's personal security and safety and by deep convictions, among our people at least, that individual life is precious and that killing other persons is both a crime and a sin, punishable by the law and the mores, and accompanied by a terrific sense of shame and guilt. The group aspect of morale is seen in the interaction among those working toward a common goal, the sense of solidarity in comradeship and teamwork, and the identification

¹⁰ T. A. Ross, *Lectures on War Neuroses*, 1941, p. 112. By permission of publisher, Edward Arnold & Co., London.

of oneself with others in relation to both means and ends. In short, group morale is a special instance of in-group conflict with an out-group.

For most Americans the development of military morale is a new form of cultural conditioning. In countries with a long tradition of military life, such as Japan and Germany, the shift from civilian life to the barracks and the battlefield is not so difficult. Of the changes required by the new cultural value system of warfare, those most important for morale are: (1) learning to kill other human beings and to deal—by training and indoctrination—with the sense of guilt and shame that is ordinarily associated with such actions; (2) learning to react to danger with positive action rather than with fear; (3) becoming accustomed to all sorts of deprivations, such as loss of affectionate companionship with family and friends, interference with normal sexual life, and loss of opportunity for personal choice of work and play; and (4) learning new habits and attitudes.

To meet the demands of the war, the military set up training programs to prepare the officers and men for active duty. (1) Basic discipline is taught, as we indicated, in terms of the chain of command, in which the habit of obeying orders is thoroughly fixed in the soldier or sailor. In this training the role of the officer is most important, and hence his own preparation must follow the order-obey form, and he must learn to carry this over to his own troops. The close-order drill, the teaching of routine conventions, and the indoctrination in military custom and tradition are parts of disciplinary routine. (2) There is also an enormous amount of instruction in special knowledge and skill. This is particularly important in modern warfare, with its high specialization and mechanization. Clarity of instruction, full explanation, and especially day-by-day practice are important. (3) Once the soldier has had basic training in discipline, knowledge, and skill, he is put through a period of what is called "induration"—that is, simulation of battle conditions in maneuvers. Such experiences not only add further information and skill, but train a man to face hardship, fatigue, tactical difficulties, and other conditions similar to those of real fighting. In particular it makes the teamwork more meaningful. (4) The means of getting rest, relaxation, and other relief from severe duties are provided by the military organization itself and also by various civilian agencies. It is well recognized that opportunities for change and rest are important in building morale. (5) In modern war not every man is called upon to fight; supply, communication, planning, and many other functions are not combative in fact. Solid morale, however, can develop only when all arms of the service recognize the place of each.

Some Components of High Morale. Some important elements of high military morale may be listed as follows: (1) Complete and zealous faith in one's country and in the war it is fighting. (2) Efficient, just, and courageous officers who instill complete confidence. (3) A strong "we" or in-

group feeling, which is generally known as *esprit de corps*. The sense of pride in one's squad, platoon, company, battalion, and regiment must extend to the division and higher echelons. (4) Good food, good billets, periodic rest, relaxation and recreation, and frequent delivery of mail from home and dispatching of the personal letters of the troops. (5) Ample and adequate medical care. Not only care of the wounded, relief of their pain and their safe removal to the rear, but the customary faith of people in physicians and surgeons enables the latter to raise the morale of all troops. The surgeon not only renders first aid but by his very presence calms the troops and restores confidence. Furthermore, adequate medical care bolsters the faith of the soldier's family. (6) Efficient and ample equipment and supplies with which to fight or carry out other tasks. Obviously, equipment alone does not make or break morale, but it maintains the men's confidence in their own abilities. In modern warfare one cannot combat tanks, dive bombers, machine guns, and flame-throwers with pitchforks or blunderbusses. There is some danger in overstressing morale as such without realizing that it is related to what the soldier or sailor is doing and to the matériel with which he is doing it. In fact, inferiority in morale may be partly compensated for by the men's awareness that their equipment is superior to the enemy's. (7) Thorough training in the knowledge and skill that are needed for the job. The shock of the first battle, the anxiety of the first assignment in supply or communication work, will be lessened by sound preparation. Confidence in oneself and in the unit are born of efficient training. (8) Participation, actual or vicarious, in victorious battles is a tremendous stimulant to high and persistent morale. The satisfaction of successful aggressive attack is tremendous. To wait in a defensive position for the enemy to attack is difficult enough; it is made more serious by the subjective states of the men.

Factors Making for Low Morale. Obviously, the elements of low morale are the opposites of those mentioned in the preceding paragraph. But behind them all, as a fundamental factor, is fear. Any situation or element which does not build up adequate defenses against fear may be considered destructive of morale. Coupled with fear are the conscious and unconscious feelings of guilt produced by the need to kill. This factor of conscience may not be present in all soldiers, but it often is in those of Christian and pacifistic societies.

Without attempting to catalogue all the major "causes" of low morale, let us note those which are generally considered most serious. Some are temporary and may be easily corrected; others are more persistent and may lead in the end to defeat. The loss of the will to fight, defeatism, and lack of patriotism are clearly basic factors. Such conditions may be induced by any of numerous causes.

(1) A lack of good officers is of prime importance. Recalling the basic

relation of son to father which runs through all military command, we see that inexperienced officers, or those indifferent to the welfare of their men, or, worse still, those who have become mentally fatigued and despair of success, will have a bad influence on those under their control. The effective officer is he who can share with his men their hardships, problems, and triumphs, but at the same time remain sufficiently apart to maintain discipline and keep the control and final responsibility in his own hands. If an officer cannot do that, the men lose confidence and, in time, hope.

(2) Military life carries with it many deprivations: loss of family relations, sexual deprivation, lack of habitual physical comforts and of other gratifications common in civilian life. Homesickness and sense of personal isolation may arise, although the soldier is surrounded by his fellows. When there is physical isolation, as on lonely outposts, homesickness may be accentuated. Adequate communication with the outside world, recreation, opportunity for intimate companionship, and the development of genuine comradeship or congeniality will help offset the sense of personal loneliness.

One of the most difficult problems in military life is that of sex. A realistic treatment of this matter is hampered in our society by our Christian mores, and the problem of finding opportunities for sexual relations is complicated by the danger of venereal disease. Though prophylactic and other medical measures may be enforced to reduce the incidence of infection, there still remains the problem of providing for one of man's deepest and most persistent drives. Moreover, the very nature of military life, with its rigid discipline, authority, and severe physical strain, induces emotional states which find orgiastic release on furlough. Some men may find substitutions in drink, gambling, or milder sublimations, but many do not. Certainly attempts completely to repress sexuality among the troops are likely to undermine morale.

Protracted marches, lack of rest and sleep, poor or insufficient food, long exposure to inclement weather, and inadequate billets, all tend to lower morale, especially when they continue for a long time without any compensating victories.

(3) Combat conditions obviously affect morale. Long-continuing bombardment from the enemy artillery or air force puts a severe strain upon the men. In World War II, in order to depress the fighting spirit of their enemies, the Germans produced terrorizing sounds by means of sirens and devices attached to dive bombers; and the Japanese employed various tricks to frighten our men and disturb their sleep. Provisions for adequate cover, and support from one's own artillery and airplanes, help offset these effects.

Waiting for something to happen is also a strain. It is said that patience is one of the most difficult traits to teach new troops. Waiting to go over

the top in the trench warfare of World War I always put a strain on the troops. It is reliably reported that we lost many men in the initial engagements in jungle fighting with the Japanese because inexperienced soldiers could not wait and took dangerous chances against hidden enemy troops. Forward movement over terrain sprinkled with land mines is always hazardous, and many of our raw troops in North Africa were lost because they would not pause for the engineers to go ahead with their mine-detecting apparatus. Such losses may reduce the zest for battle.

Uncertainty and surprise may lower morale. Ignorance of where or when the enemy will strike sets up anxiety and sometimes fantasies. When a person does not know, he will usually imagine what may happen to him, and, if he passes his fantasy on to others, it may in time infect a large number. (See below on panic.) Related to uncertainty is surprise. The Germans built *Blitzkrieg* into a fine art; they employed it not only in action in the field but as a threat in their psychological warfare. (See Chapter XXI.) The handicap of waiting for the enemy to strike may be overcome by initiative. As in other conflict interactions, two may play at this game, as the Germans finally learned from later Allied campaigns in World War II.

(4) Superstitious beliefs may influence morale. The development of superstitions is favored by the soldier's separation from normal life, his ignorance of the intentions of his own command, and his uncertainty as to the enemy's plans. All sorts of magical beliefs may arise. Luck may take a prominent place in this thought. Men talk about a shell coming over with their "number on it"; they carry magical charms to fend off danger and disease; they may resort to mystical interpretations of meteorological and astronomical phenomena. The symbols of superstition are widespread and extremely contagious and may in time engulf an entire army. Though some superstitions may foster morale under certain conditions, most commentators think that they depress it under the severe conditions of warfare. Officers are advised to counteract the rise and spread of superstitions and magical beliefs.

(5) Rumor may also affect the mental state of the soldier. The important elements in rumor-making and rumor-spreading will be dealt with in the next chapter. For our purposes at this point we note only certain features that affect morale. On the whole, unfounded stories seem to be most deleterious in their effects upon men who are about to enter or are actually in the combat zones. One reason for letting the troops know at least the major outlines and the larger objectives of a campaign is to allay fear, stop rumors, and give the men a sense of participation.

Evidences of Low Morale. Rumor not only affects, but also reflects, the morale of the men among whom it spreads. Rumor is always self-propelled. It gives a sense of satisfaction for "being in the know"; its repetition carries

no sense of personal liability, for it usually comes from someone else. It often verifies one's secret suspicions; it relieves tensions; and it may allow vicarious satisfaction of dislikes. In a military body most rumors are either of the wish-fulfillment variety or are based on fear. By keeping track of rumors, an officer may learn a good deal about the hopes and fears of the troops under his command.

More serious evidences of low morale are found in panic, desertion, and outright mutiny. The chief emotion in any panic is fear. Raw troops are more subject to panic, but under certain conditions even seasoned campaigners are not immune. Panic may arise from a cumulation of morale-destroying circumstances: repeated and contradictory orders, unreasonable mixing of troops, operations in fog or in unfamiliar territory, prolonged action leading to overfatigue, high casualties in battle, retreat, loss of confidence in officers and cause, and defeat. Panic is always facilitated by rumor and other forms of mass suggestion. Sound indoctrination, adequate training, habituation to danger, confidence in leaders, and other elements of good morale are the best preventives of panic. If panic does break out, severe measures to suppress it at the very outset, even by force of arms, are necessary.

By its very nature panic is temporary, and its effects may be quickly countered by positive measures. Mutiny, on the other hand, is attack and is obviously much more serious to military discipline and morale. Whereas panics usually arise momentarily and from more or less immediate circumstances, mutinies are usually planned in advance. For this very reason measures may be taken to prevent mutiny if the ringleaders and their plans are detected in time. Once under way, a mutiny disrupts the whole military organization involved, and the news or rumor of it may spread to other units with disastrous effects.

Desertion is the flight of individual fighting men from their units. All military organizations experience some desertion. If it reaches large proportions, it is clear evidence that morale has broken down. Desertion is not necessarily the expression of defiant men who refuse to take orders or merely a coward's reaction, but it is often a form of neurotic response. It is said that the rate of desertion is higher among men at isolated posts, in barracks, or behind the combat zone than at the front.¹¹

In concluding this section we may note that, despite the tremendous mechanization of modern war, the psychological resources of enlisted men and officers remain fundamental. Napoleon is reported to have said that morale is to matériel as three is to one, and General George C. Marshall, on one occasion, stated that he would raise this ratio to "six to one."¹²

¹¹ See L. Farago, ed., *German Psychological Warfare*, 3rd ed., 1942, pp. 97-98.

¹² See Brigadier General James A. Ullo, "Military Morale," *American J. Sociology*, 1941, 47: 330.

Mental Breakdowns Among Military Personnel. One of the serious human costs of modern wars is the loss in man power which comes with mental breakdowns. This is certain to be high in armies where inadequate provision is made for weeding out potential mental cases at the time of selection and during initial training. Military authorities have come to accept the intelligence test and the devices for measuring skills, but they are still reluctant to install a full-fledged program of psychiatric examination, which seems expensive in time and money. But, in view of the loss of man power and the cost of later hospitalization, there is no doubt that it would pay to select men more carefully. Modern psychiatry has demonstrated that it can make preliminary tests to eliminate a large proportion of the men who are unfit for military duty. Many neurotics and potential psychotics can find a place in wartime endeavor, but not in combat, which calls for men of strong will, emotional balance, and ability to stand novel and difficult situations.

Psychiatrists divide mental disorders into two broad categories: the milder, called neuroses or psychoneuroses, and the more severe, the psychoses. It is from the latter group that those declared legally insane come, though not all psychotics are committed to mental hospitals. The former include the types of mental disturbance which seriously interfere with normal living and efficiency, but which do not require the medical care and close personal supervision required for the more severe cases.

Another important distinction in psychiatry is that between "functional" and "organic" cases, which reflects older ideas about a sharp distinction between mind and body. The functional disorders are those like the manic-depressive, schizophrenic, and paranoidal states, in which no obvious brain lesions or other structural disturbances in the nervous system are found. The organic cases are those considered definitely related to neuromuscular disturbances, such as we find in paresis, senile dementia, and disorders of speech and writing related to brain lesions. True epilepsy is usually considered an organic disorder, though the precise structural foundation is not known.¹³

Mental breakdowns under military conditions show practically the same range of symptoms that is found in the peacetime population. Injuries to the brain or spinal cord or nerves, due to gunshot or accident, precipitate a variety of mental conditions. Infectious and contagious diseases sometimes induce mental disturbances. Yet the most serious problems seem to be those connected with the functional neuroses and psychoses. Apparently

¹³ We cannot give even a brief description of these various classifications of mental disturbance. The student may consult such texts as E. S. Conklin, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, rev. ed. 1935; S. L. Pressey and C. L. Pressey, *Mental Abnormality and Deficiency*, 1926; A. Maslow and B. Mittelman, *Principles of Abnormal Psychology*, 1941; A. J. Rosanoff, *Manual of Psychiatry and Mental Hygiene*, 7th ed., 1938; and W. A. White, *Foundations of Psychiatry*, new ed., 1921.

these are the most numerous disturbances and have the most serious effects on military operations, morale, and medical costs.

Let us first note some statistics on the extent of mental disorder in our armed services. Because of differences in methods of classification and record-taking, a completely clear picture of the extent of such cases is not to be had. The following sample figures suggest the type of problem which military authorities must face.

Because of inadequate tests and lack of agreement on the criteria of elimination, only a few of the men rejected at the time of initial selection are classified as mentally disordered or as neurologically incompetent. Yet that mental breakdowns constitute a serious problem in military operations is amply shown by statistics from the two major world wars of our time. Some comparisons between peacetime and wartime admissions to mental hospitals are significant. Neil A. Dayton, after an analysis of 61,161 first admissions to mental hospitals in New York and Massachusetts, reports a rate of 3.29 per 1,000 population for the age group 20-24 years, and a rate of 3.58 for ages 25-29.¹⁴ It is from the same age groups that most military cases come. For 1940 the army admission rate for psychoses was 6.13 per 1,000 population, or about double the civilian rate.

As a war goes on and more and more men are involved in actual combat, the incidence of mental breakdowns increases. During World War I as many as 40 per cent of the British soldiers evacuated from France were classified as psychoneurotic.¹⁵ One report in 1943 stated that soldiers with mental disorders were entering our mental hospitals at the rate of 27 per year per 1,000 enlisted men, that from 15 to 20 per cent of the war casualties being returned at that time to this country were classified as "neuropsychiatric" and that in some theaters of war 40 per cent of the total casualties returned were mental cases.¹⁶ C. M. Hincks reported in 1940 that 16 per cent of the Canadian soldiers invalidated home from England since the outbreak of World War II suffered from "neuropsychiatric" disabilities and that 26.5 per cent had duodenal ulcers, a condition often associated with severe emotional disturbances.¹⁷

During mobilization the chief disorders are hypochondria, neurasthenia, and psychasthenia. Under combat conditions anxiety states and hysterias are most frequent.

Certain types of mental disorder affect officers much more than enlisted men. According to the official medical history of the American army in Europe, 1918-1919, "neurasthenia" was five times as common among the officers as among the men. Moreover, the condition of the former seemed more serious than that of the latter. Only 25 per cent of the officers affected recovered sufficiently to be sent back to the front; the recovery rate for the

¹⁴ See W. C. Porter, "The Functions of a Neuropsychiatrist in an Army General Hospital," *Psychiatry*, 1942, 5, 325. Dayton's figures are for both sexes, which makes the comparison not quite accurate.

¹⁵ W. H. Dunn, "War Neuroses," *Psychological Bulletin*, 1941, 38, 498.

¹⁶ As reported from Colonel Roy D. Halloran in the *New York Times*, May 10, 1943.

¹⁷ Cited by Dunn, *op. cit.*, p. 499.

enlisted men so diagnosed was 61 per cent.¹⁸ The British experience in World War I was much the same. At one British casualty-clearing station, over a period of thirteen months, there was one officer to every fourteen patients of other ranks. Yet in the British army the ratio of officers to men in the combat troops was 1 to 30.¹⁹ In general, officers suffer from anxiety neuroses characterized by exaggerated concern about health, or by lack of vigor, undue introspection, sense of guilt and shame, overcaution, and general emotional preoccupation, or by phobias, obsessions, morbid doubts about one's ability or future, and certain feelings of unreality and inferiority. Under battle conditions intense and abnormal fears and anxieties, jumpiness, strong sense of fatigue, irritability, and difficulty in concentration are frequent. Strong fear of death, the fear of showing fear (especially likely among officers who are proud of their status), and even extreme but compensatory courage are common. There are often harassing dreams and persistent reveries of the carnage one has witnessed. In extreme cases a stuporous state may ensue, or outright panic or terror.

Enlisted men tend to express their mental disturbances in the form of hysteria. So-called conversion hysteria—marked by functional paralysis, blindness, and other bodily symptoms—is almost completely confined to noncommissioned officers and privates. What was incorrectly called “shell-shock” in World War I is an example. Often men who had been buried in trenches or shell holes and had received only superficial injuries complained, after they were taken to the rear, that an arm was paralyzed, or that a part of the body was insensitive, or that they could not see—the last complaint often being associated with the fact that they had received dirt in their eyes. These are the familiar “conversion” symptoms. Fear, worry, and mental conflict unconsciously and autonomically find expression in functional forms. A. F. Hurst has reported many such cases from his clinical experience in World War I.²⁰ Time and again it was demonstrated that there was nothing neurologically wrong with vision, hearing, or tactile sensibilities. Yet the soldiers were incapacitated for further front-line duty. Some, however, quickly recovered when told that they would—on getting well—be put in noncombatant units. Others recovered very rapidly after the armistice was signed.

Such hysterical manifestations are well-known. They are often found in industrial accident cases and are a constant problem wherever institutional provision is made to compensate workers for industrial injuries. Battle conditions especially predispose men to exactly this sort of defense reaction. It is not deliberate, but is controlled by autonomic and unconscious factors. It is interesting that this kind of functional illness seldom happens to officers. Their pride of status, their fear of showing fear, their

¹⁸ Cited in Emanuel Miller, *et al.*, *The Neuroses in War*, 1940, p. 15.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

²⁰ See Hurst's striking account, *The Psychology of the Special Senses and Their Functional Disorders*, 1920.

high conscience, and perhaps their moral sensibility about killing, seem to predispose them to the anxiety neuroses.

Psychiatrists who have dealt with military cases tend to classify the men who break down into two broad categories; those in whom there are predispositions to mental disorder, and the healthy-minded persons in whom the strain of war alone induces breakdowns. It has been shown that a high proportion of soldiers affected by mental disease were known beforehand to have symptoms or conditions generally accepted as conducive to mental disorder. There are two schools of thought regarding the basic source of such predisposition, however. Some, especially psychiatrists who have dealt chiefly with brain lesions and other neurological problems, tend to stress hereditary and organic foundations. Those who treat the milder disorders—hysterias, neurasthenia, psychasthenia, and anxiety neuroses—tend to take the position that the predisposing causes are the result of training in the early years of life.

There is no point in reviewing or entering into this endless debate. For us the main point is that a large proportion of the mental casualties of war are the result of predisposing conditions and could be prevented were adequate selection made during the initial examination and during the first months of training.

R. D. Gillespie cites some interesting comparisons which bring out the importance of early conditioning. Of fifty-six distinctly neurotic soldiers, 44 per cent had shown definite morbid fears in their early years, 44 per cent had had habits such as bed-wetting, sleep-walking, nail-biting, and stammering, and 74 per cent had revealed timidity and lack of normal aggressiveness. In contrast, the percentages in a considerable sample of strictly surgical cases were as follows: morbid fears, 15 per cent; "physiological" instabilities such as bed-wetting, 10 per cent; undue timidity and lack of aggressiveness, 4 per cent.²¹

We cannot describe in detail the wide variety of symptoms found among the military. It is evident from what has been said that the nature of mental breakdown will vary with physical predisposition, personal history, and class status. To show their wide range, we may summarize the more serious disorders: (1) Among those with psychosomatic or bodily features are the "effort syndromes" of those who complain of heart trouble, sensory or motor paralysis, exhaustion fatigue, rheumatism, and gastric ulcers induced by anxieties. As noted above, these are most common among enlisted men. (2) Another group of hysterics experience lapses of memory, or amnesia. (3) Some suffer from severe shock or trauma, often epileptoid in form. (4) Others, especially the officers, show true anxiety states. (5) There are a few true psychoses, however: dementia praecox, manic-depres-

²¹ The categories here are obviously not mutually exclusive. From R. D. Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier*, 1942, p. 171.

sive psychoses, and paranoia. It is rather doubtful if such severe breakdowns are induced by war. Rather the evidence seems to show that most of the men affected by these disorders either were psychotic or had definite prepsychotic symptoms before they were taken for military duty.

On the other hand, the stress of war, especially prolonged exposure to battle conditions, lack of sleep, poor food, and persistent bombardment, may break even healthy-minded individuals. This is illustrated in the evacuation of the British at Dunkirk. Not only did the British suffer heavily in battle, but the defeat was psychologically demoralizing, and the evacuation, under horrible though heroic circumstances, left a high proportion of them completely broken.

Our American troops on Guadalcanal went through somewhat the same kind of harrowing experiences at the hands of the Japanese, especially during the first months after the Marines began occupying that island in August, 1942. To jungle conditions, tropical rain, difficult terrain, insects, dysentery, and malaria, the Japanese added their own methods of breaking the fighting spirit of our men. Night and day they used sirens, dive bombing, shelling, forays, and abusive language with a view to undermining morale. Their night actions, in particular, were aimed at disturbing the sleep of our men and making them nervous and jumpy. The strain lasted for weeks. The proportion of breakdowns under battle conditions was not high, but, once the men were relieved and embarked, what has been described as a "group neurosis" appeared. Lieutenant Commander E. Rogers has described it thus:

"The similarity of complaints, symptoms, and objective findings is almost beyond comprehension. In this group we have all types of physiques and mentalities and emotional, environmental, and educational types, yet clinically they were all the same individual with identical complaints and symptoms.

"Even after their arrival at our hospital (on Mare Island) the slightest sharp or sudden noise would cause them to jump or run from the room. A mild reprimand might produce some sort of outburst or an A.W.O.L., and the fear that they would be thought 'yellow' was universal. . . .

"The onset of the clinical picture is so variable that little conclusive information can be offered. We cannot successfully evaluate the resistance of any individual to such a strain as these men experienced."²²

In other words, it is difficult, without careful study of individual cases, to know how large a part predisposing neurotic conditions would play in a situation of stress. Part of the answer, of course, will be obtained by studies of recoveries. In general, it might be assumed that those with neurotic

²² Quoted in the *New York Times*, May 12, 1943, from a paper read at the American Psychiatric Association in Detroit, May 11, 1943.

dispositions would be less likely to recover than the more normal; but one cannot be certain until the evidence is at hand.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

See the list at end of Chapter XV.

Chapter XV

CIVILIAN MORALE AND OTHER PROBLEMS OF WAR

IN THE present chapter we shall first consider civilian activities in total war, civilian morale, family readjustment, and mental disturbances due to aerial warfare. This will be followed by a discussion of postwar adjustments, especially among the ex-soldiers. The chapter will close with a consideration of the larger problem of personality as it is affected by war and conflict.

THE ROLE OF CIVILIANS IN TOTAL WAR

In modern wars the old separation of the battle from the home front has largely disappeared. Formerly the citizen at home might take a vicarious part in the success or failure of his nation's army or navy; now he is made conscious of his direct part in the international struggle. In countries in which fighting is going on, and in those liable to air bombardment, the civilian population is exposed to the stress and hazards of combat. In this section we shall deal chiefly with the effects of changes in industry and occupation on individuals, with the reactions to rationing and price- and wage-controls, with civilian morale under actual or threatened attacks by air or land, with effects of war on family life, and with some of the important relations of military and civil life.

Effects of Wartime Economy on Occupations. The heavy demands for material with which to carry on total war require that factories, farms, and transportation facilities be more or less completely mobilized for war. Obviously, no country can completely eliminate the production of consumers' goods for civilians unless such goods are supplied from outside. But this normal activity is reduced to a minimum. It is said that 60 per cent of industry in Great Britain in mid-1943 was devoted to the war effort. In the United States, about that time, between 40 and 50 per cent of the total productive capacity was so directed.

Such profound changes, of course, are reflected in the distribution of man power. One striking effect of total war and of the mobilization of industry for armament is the rise in the number of women, both married and unmarried, engaged in gainful work. In Britain, for instance, in 1942, 45 per cent of all women between ages of 14 and 64 years were gainfully

employed. In the age group of single women, 18 to 40 years, 91 per cent were employed in some form of war effort. In this country for 1943 about one third of the available women over 14 years old were at work for wages. This was the highest percentage of gainfully employed women in our history.

Such changes mean, for a country like ours, at least, a marked shift in the location of workers. There has been a great internal migration from areas with excess population, like the southern Appalachian region, to industrial centers in the South and East. There is also a great shift from civilian to wartime types of skill.

Effects of Rationing and Price-Fixing. An increase in employment almost always brings a rise in national income. Yet, with more and more productive capacity devoted to war goods, there is a reduction in the available consumption goods. In the absence of public controls such a condition leads to inflation. To meet this threat most governments, whether autocratic or democratic, resort to fixing of wages and prices. While in our country most people accepted the idea of rationing as just and proper, in actual operation a wide variety of attitudes and habits appeared.¹

For example, in September, 1942, the American Institute of Public Opinion reported that 84 per cent of their sample said they would be willing to accept gasoline-rationing and reduce driving if the President should ask the country to do so in order to save rubber. Yet, when gasoline-rationing was first put into effect on the Atlantic seaboard and not elsewhere, at least a third of the people in the rationed states were not fully convinced that rationing was necessary. A considerable number actually believed that the whole program was merely a scheme to make the population "war conscious." In October, 1942, after the Baruch report had shown the dire need for rubber conservation, the percentage of those favoring nation-wide gasoline-rationing rose from 49 to 73. By the summer of 1943, as judged by the polls and other evidence, rationing had become pretty well accepted. People reported (in the poll of April 16, 1943) that the rationing of meat, coffee, gasoline, and sugar required the most difficult readjustments.

A study of attitudes toward rationing was made by Hortense Powdermaker, who got her data from a sample of families living in a federally sponsored low-cost housing unit in a metropolitan area. The following findings are pertinent for us:

(1) In 1941 and 1942 the residents generally agreed with the idea of rationing. There were many complaints that the rich were hoarding food, and the tenants of the low-cost housing project felt that rationing was democratic and would equalize their position with the rich. A study made a year later in the same residential area, but on another sample, showed that, on the whole, the idea of rationing was widely accepted. Nearly a third were "completely favorable," and three fifths were "favorable with reservations." Less than 6 per cent of the total of nearly five hundred families were

¹ For example, the compilations made by the *Public Opinion Quarterly* of public polls on various aspects of rationing showed that, while agreement with the rationing program varied with the region of the country and with the rationed item, the majority of Americans said that they believed in rationing. See *Public Opinion Quarterly*, vols. 5 and 6 especially.

reported as completely unfavorable. Moreover, no differences were found between families that were actively participating in the war—with sons in the military or with members working in war plants or active in civilian defense—and families that were not.

(2) The chief complaints about rationing had to do with children's shoes, coffee, and rising prices. A considerable number of the respondents believed there was a causal relation between rationing and high prices. Many thought that to ration children's shoes was unjust and others felt the reduced consumption of coffee as a hardship.

(3) Few, if any, understood the relation between rationing and the need to send food abroad. Those who approved of the latter policy rationalized it in terms of America's traditional humanitarianism or on the assumption that we had boundless food resources. On the whole, the older group, in which there were many foreign-born, were more favorable to sending food abroad than were the younger adults, most of whom were born here and most of whom had younger children.

(4) The respondents did not understand the causal relations between rationing and price-fixing.

(5) Few, if any, felt the need of formal instruction in eating habits.²

Though no general conclusions may be drawn from the Powdermaker study, since the sample was from the low-income stratum, it does show how rationing in wartime influenced a certain segment of our population.

Individuals react differently to rationing and price-control in terms of their economic-social status. Many farmers regard the rationing of gasoline and tires as an imposition; the urban middle class accepts it more easily. Workers want curbs on price rises but often resent ceilings on their own wages. These responses all reflect a certain conflict between people's patriotism and their allegiance to their own socioeconomic standards. The real test of their support of the war effort—in short, of their morale—is, of course, what they do rather than what they say. The rise of black markets is quite properly considered evidence of willingness to dodge the legal restrictions. The extent of popular support of such operations is one of the most significant indexes to the state of public morale. There are no adequate studies of such support, but, from newspaper accounts, interviews, and investigations made by state and federal officials, it is clear that black markets in meat and gasoline, in particular, were widespread in this country during World War II.

It is apparent that the extent and intensity of civilian support of the war effort will have much to do with the outcome of any war. Let us examine more closely some of the elements that make for high or low morale among the civilian population in wartime.

Civilian Morale in Wartime. The basic factors in civilian and military

² From Hortense Powdermaker, "Report of Field Research on 'Food and the War,'" Queens College, July, 1943. Mimeographed. Published under the auspices of the National Research Council. By permission of the author.

morale are the same, and many of the points made in Chapter XIV about the men under arms apply equally well to the people left at home. If a war is to be successful, the civilian must have faith in, and zest for, his country's cause. He must be ready to sacrifice and to co-operate with others in the attainment of the national goal. He must identify himself thoroughly with the national cause: there must be a goal toward which he strives, a sense of support from others, and a sense of movement toward victory.

Yet sound morale is not measured only by such general attitudes and values. Specific situations expose its many components. One summary analysis of such elements lists twelve assets of personality that make for high morale in a democracy.³ They are: (1) sound physical health; (2) sound mental health, marked by zest, ability to strive, sense of humor, and purpose in life; (3) "economic health," or a job and income sufficient to maintain a good standard of living; (4) sound religious and family values; (5) a goal or aim to fight for, with confidence and faith in our democratic system, and full identification with the country's aims; (6) something definite to do, a job or avocation which distinctly contributes to the winning of the war; (7) realistic understanding of the past and present situations, of the dangers, the enemy's plans, the consequences of defeat, and the implications of victory; (8) a high degree of confidence in the leaders, qualified by freedom of constructive criticism; (9) a sense of solidarity, including tolerance of, and co-operation with, all classes and minority groups which also support the war; (10) faith and confidence in ultimate victory, qualified by sound and realistic knowledge of the enemy's strength; (11) a wise fear of possible defeat or stalemate, not neurotic but of a kind which will stimulate effort to win; (12) a sense of personal hostility to the enemy, grounded in righteous wrath, a will to fight, and freedom from shame over warlike acts and attitudes.

In contrast to such positive features, we may note some characteristics of low morale: (1) apathy with respect to the war—this may range all the way from a "do-nothing policy" and a sense of personal remoteness from the war to overemphasis on rights and neglect of duties, or the belief that conditions could not possibly be any worse under enemy rule; (2) skepticism and distrust—these may include disbelief in democracy as a system of government, confusion as to our war aims and our procedures in carrying on the war, and cynicism about the motives and abilities of military or civilian authorities, about employers or union leaders, and about war aims or promises; (3) displaced hostility—misdirection of aggressive attitudes and action is distinctive evidence of low morale: habits of destructive criticism, hatred of leaders or of other classes or groups in one's own nation, and distrust and hostility toward the country's allies; (4) misapplied

³ From G. W. Allport and H. A. Murray, "Worksheets on Morale," 1942, Harvard University, Department of Psychology. Mimeographed. Section entitled "Component of Morale." by permission of the authors.

allegiance: loyalty to the enemy country, outright traitorous thoughts and acts, secret acceptance of the values of the enemy, or extreme devotion to some cause, religious or other, which opposes the war effort on moral grounds; (5) lack of knowledge of the war: failure to understand our nation's place in this complex world of peoples, resources, trade, and communication, and to understand war aims, strategy, democracy and other basic values in our society, and the need for national solidarity; (6) various maladjustments: an inveterate tendency to spread rumors; prejudices against minority groups, against workers who make high wages or employers who get war contracts; lack of emotional balance with respect to national aims and values; mental conflict between selfish interests and the country's call for work and sacrifice; a tendency to exploit the war situation for "all one can get out of it personally"; emotional reactions against governmental and rationing regulations, necessary for successful prosecution of the war; and taking the war and its sacrifices as a personal affront.⁴

It would take us too far afield to attempt to get at the major causes of apathy, skepticism, ignorance, misplaced hostility, and all these varied evidences of low morale. But a few things stand out. Man in modern mass society is easily confused as to his role and status as a citizen. In our country the high stress on competition and individualism has dwarfed the growth of the co-operative spirit and of mutual understanding. There is no doubt that the foreign policy of one's country is difficult to understand or judge. Yet under democratic traditions the citizen is supposed to understand it and to make decisions about it, at least through elected representatives. A lack of confidence in elected leaders easily undermines morale and offers an opening for divisive enemy propaganda.

In this country, at least, pacifistic and antiwar propaganda has added to the misunderstanding of the nature and place of man's conflicts in human society. Young people indoctrinated with antiwar sentiment and the debunking myths about our place in World War I found it difficult to adjust themselves to World War II. There is no doubt that sharp social-economic distinctions and discriminations, prolonged unemployment, and other economic disturbances foster a breakdown of morale. (Some features of this will be treated in Chapter XXI, where we take up psychological warfare.)

The two areas in which high or low morale among civilians is most evident are industry and community life. The wartime indicators of industrial morale are similar to those of peacetime. Such external criteria as frequency of strikes, labor turnover, extent of absences from work, and level of production are common measures. On the part of owners low industrial morale is evident in slowness in conversion to war economy and resentment regarding curbs on profits. In this country during the early part of the defense program and later during World War II there were many

⁴ See G. W. Allport and H. A. Murray, "Liabilities in Morale," *loc. cit.*

strikes. For the most part these strikes were short, and, in view of the rapid rise in output, they apparently did not greatly retard the total war effort. Most of the strikes were in previously unorganized industries or were called, not to obtain higher wages, but to settle jurisdictional disputes or to secure the closed shop and the check-off. Later, by agreement, strikes were tabooed. (See below.)

But our principal concern here is with attitudes and values: first of the workers, then of managers and owners, and finally of the wider public. There was considerable variation in the relations of employer and worker. In older industries, where wages were good, hours were reasonable, and collective bargaining had been worked out satisfactorily, relations were, on the whole, sound. In many new and rapidly expanding industries, such as airplane manufacture, where unionization was absent or recent, relations between the owners and managers, on the one side, and the workers, on the other, were often marked by suspicion and conflict; and morale, as measured by turnover, absenteeism, and strikes, was often not satisfactory.

As an aid to fostering industrial peace and enhancing morale, management-worker committees were set up in thousands of plants. These got little publicity but did a great deal to improve the relations of managers and men.

On the other hand, many workers thought business and industry were profiting unduly by the war, although objective evidence showed that the greatest increase in national income, which threatened inflation, came from the increase in wages of workers and not from higher incomes in the upper brackets. The chief factor in low morale among owners and managers came from unwillingness in certain quarters to make an "all-out" effort and in the consideration of profits ahead of patriotism. On the whole, however, both labor and owners co-operated amazingly well during the national emergency.

Public opinion on some of these matters during the early months of our participation in World War II is shown by the following tabulation of polls taken in the spring of 1942.⁵ It is apparent from these figures that the

QUESTIONS	PERCENTAGES		
	<i>Yes</i>	<i>No</i>	<i>Undecided</i>
Do you think business and industry are going all-out to win the war?	58	33	9
Do you think labor unions are going all-out to win the war?	37	50	13
Do you think farmers are going all-out to win the war?	69	12	19

⁵ "Gallup and Fortune Polls," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 1942, 6: 480.

patriotism of labor unions was more suspect than that of other groups. Another reflection of American views on unions is the number who were in favor of laws prohibiting strikes in war industries. In the *Fortune* poll completed the day before Pearl Harbor, 78 per cent of the respondents were in favor of such a measure, and only 11 per cent opposed it. Three months later the same polling agency reported that 86 per cent of their sample favored a law to forbid strikes in war plants.⁶ A year later a poll of war workers themselves showed that 72 per cent favored such a law, and of the workers who were also union members 64 per cent approved such a step.

From the point of view of the nation as a whole, it sometimes appeared as if the union members were more loyal to their labor organization than they were to the nation's cause. It seemed to some that they tended to displace their aggressions on their employers and managers rather than on the country's enemies. At times owners and managers acted in much the same way toward workers.

In any case, disapproval of strikes and persistent stress on higher wages was particularly evident among many men in military service. This fact of incipient conflict between soldiers and sailors and the working class at home was disruptive of national morale. All sorts of myths and legends arose—often stimulated by newspaper and radio—about labor's refusal to work in certain critical situations, such as embarking and disembarking men and supplies and of labor's selfishness as against the great personal sacrifices of our fighting men.

The wartime morale of the community as a whole is more difficult to measure. The role of the ordinary citizen in war, aside from pursuing his occupation, paying his taxes, and sending his children into war industries or the armed forces, is hard to define.

During World War I the bond-buying campaigns offered evidence of popular participation, and community and state rivalries were exploited as a means of exceeding quotas.

In World War II not only the buying of bonds but the prevailing attitudes toward rationing and price-control (noted above) and the extent of community activity in support of the war were good evidence of public morale. In every community nearly everyone had some part to play in community effort for the war, and the activity ranged from the work of the United Service Organizations to campaigns to collect scrap metal, save kitchen fats, and recruit members for the Civilian Defense Volunteer Organizations. There was criticism in some quarters of the organization and management of the air-raid warden service, of scrap drives, blood banks and the like, but on the whole the public participation was excellent. There was a general acceptance of the idea that all adults should register

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 308.

for some kind of civilian defense or war work. In polls taken in New York, Philadelphia, and Massachusetts, in the late winter of 1942, it was shown that more than 80 per cent of the respondents approved such a registration.⁷

A social-psychological analysis of the institutional aspects of this work remains to be made. Competent observers suggest that many individuals got an emotional lift out of the authority and prestige which went with some of these community services. The customary "joiners" of any new public movement came out in force. The power-seekers, large and small, often came to the front. There was considerable pride in wearing uniforms, arm bands, and the insignia of organizations. These are the outward evidences of co-operative participation which lend themselves to individual satisfaction. In most localities, behind this façade of status, a great deal of serious work was accomplished. But to some individuals, no doubt, the form was more important than the substances.

In addition to the morale-building effect of active participation in the war through one's occupation, through civic organizations, or both, there remains the reaction to warfare itself. The widespread moral acceptance of killing which war entails tends to foster attitudes of violence in individuals who are unable to work off their reborn aggression directly against the enemy. For many people these satisfactions come vicariously in reading of the slaughter of the enemies on the battlefield or from aerial bombardment. In some civilians sadistic impulses are given an aggressive outlet by violence toward those suspected of being unpatriotic or subversive. There was much of this kind of reaction during World War I against persons of German ancestry. If the aggressions take the form of oppositions to minority groups, such as the Jews or Negroes, or to labor unions, it tends to lower public morale. If, in a small fraction, it takes the form of criminal action, it requires serious community controls.

Effects of Total War on the Family. The direct participation of the whole adult civilian population in modern war, either in war industries or in various community services, has many and varied effects on family life. Statistics on this influence are not usually available, and for our purpose the most important effects are psychological changes which are not easily put into statistical form.

The enlistment or induction of fathers into the armed services obviously affects the customary interactions of the family. Fathers who do not enter the military often make occupational shifts as war industries replace peacetime work. During World War II our country witnessed an enormous amount of internal migration, which meant pulling up the family's roots in one community and setting them down in another. This involved new adjustments in housing, neighborhood relations, schooling, and other mat-

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 316.

ters. So, too, night shifts often disrupted old habits, and wives and children had to adapt themselves to new household routines of eating, sleeping, and recreation.

Sometimes the wife has to seek work outside the home to help support the family, and then there are bound to be many alterations in traditional family life. Day nurseries may provide care for young children whose mothers are at work. Yet, in any case, changes in the household routine of shopping, meals, and many other matters are inevitable.

The demand for workers is often so great that adolescents are drawn into the labor market. This further modifies family life. Youngsters who earn relatively large sums of money often change their views as to their importance in the community and in the family. New problems of discipline and responsibility may arise between parents and children.

Influence of War on Children and Youth. The effects of war conditions on children and young people are widely recognized. In Britain there was a definite rise in the rate of juvenile delinquency, especially in the age groups from fifteen years to the early twenties. The blackouts, the raids, and rationing stimulated crimes against property chiefly, though there were some periodic difficulties with increased personal violence as well.⁸ In the United States delinquency rates tended to rise though not so sharply as certain critics believed. But the statistical facts aside, some psychiatrists, especially those influenced by Freudian doctrines, believe that a war period tends to unleash repressed and previously sublimated aggressions in young and old alike.

Many students of juvenile delinquency seriously hold that increases in offenses is perhaps more due to the release of aggressions than to increase in spending money and the relaxation of moral codes.

With regard to younger children the matter is somewhat different. Many American parents, teachers, preachers, and social workers were shocked to discover that young children, even of preschool age, were enthusiastically playing at war and at killing. It was felt by many that this was further evidence of the brutalizing influence of war on human character. Sometimes adults tried to prevent such play but discovered that it reappeared in secret or in other forms. Wiser counsel and practice, however, recognized that such reactions not only were to be expected but were in many ways normal.

First, aggressiveness lies so deep in all of us that, if it does not express itself in one way, it will in another. It is true that as the child grows up much of his tendency to violence is repressed or sublimated into morally accepted forms; the aggressiveness of older children and adults normally finds outlets in play, in verbal abuse, and especially in dislike for members

⁸ See H. Mannheim, "Crime in Wartime England," *Annals of Amer. Acad. Political & Social Science*, Sept., 1941, 217: 128-137.

of various out-groups: people of other classes, races, and religions, and especially of nations not on friendly terms with one's own. Second, killing and war are deep in our culture. Children delight in stories of Jack the Giant-Killer. Older ones enjoy the comic strips and yarns about Buck Rogers and Superman. Then come the legends of the heroes and battles of national history. It is next to impossible to keep young children from enjoying the vicarious aggressions suggested by such tales, especially if the stories are re-enacted in play. Finally, during wartime itself, with an entire people given over to killing the enemy or helping others to do so, it is futile to attempt to stop youngsters from playing at war.

Writing of the response of British children to air raids, Anna Freud and Dorothy T. Burlingham say, "It is a common misunderstanding of the child's nature which leads people to suppose the children will be saddened by the sight of destruction and aggression."⁹ The same, of course, may be said of the idea that children are depressed when they hear of a slaughter or read of it in the newspapers. In fact, children's interest in killing may even be made to serve the learning process. Agnes E. Benedict has described how a class acting out the exploits of the Marine Corps on Guadalcanal were led to an intensive study of the geography and life of the Southwest Pacific region. Discussion of the progress of the war on the many fronts offers a chance not only for war games but for instruction in world geography, logistics, and many other topics.

The negative and overaggressive features of the exciting experience of playing at killing may be offset by certain positive features. As Benedict states, in the midst of a wild battle play, a wise teacher will skillfully ask what has become of the hospital unit. This diversion may well set the group to playing at being nurses and doctors, and, in turn, may lead to some recognition of humanitarian demands in the midst of carnage.

The interest in war games may be displaced into efforts to gather scrap metal, to buy war stamps, and to instruct parents on rationing or saving fats, and into many other practical channels. Such play and such useful work may occur within the framework of democratic give-and-take, in which leadership, followership, and voluntary participation all have their part.¹⁰

The observations of children in Britain during the months of the German air raids in 1940 and 1941 are instructive. As we shall note in more detail later, there is little or no evidence that aerial bombardment has serious effects on large numbers of children. Soon after air raids had destroyed houses and streets, children might be seen playing at war games in bomb

⁹ Anna Freud and D. T. Burlingham, *War and Children*, 1943, p. 21.

¹⁰ See Agnes E. Benedict, "The Children's War," *New York Times Magazine*, November 8, 1942, p. 25. Also, Lucien Aigner, "The Impress of War on the Child's Mind," *New York Times Magazine*, February 22, 1942, pp. 12 ff.

craters, with blasted furniture for toy weapons, and throwing bits of rubble as if they were hand grenades. Anna Freud and others believe the problem is not such overt expression of aggression, which is normal for the child growing up in our society, and which is later sublimated. Rather, the real problem is that habits and attitudes are built up which are later easily displaced to outright killing—rationalized as moral by adults. Once deeply embedded in children and young people, though glossed over in times of peace, violent attitudes are quickly re-aroused at any later time under threats to national security.¹¹ We shall return to this problem at the close of the chapter.

Mental Disturbances among Children in Wartime. Since large numbers of civilians may be exposed to combat conditions through aerial bombing and invasion, the problem of mental breakdown among civilians—young and old—during war has become important. Such direct contact of the civil population with mechanized warfare is a new human experience. Since our most extensive data come from the British, we shall draw first upon their report of the effect of severe bombing on children.¹²

Under the threat of air raids and invasion, the British evacuated large numbers of young children from London and other large cities. These youngsters were billeted under governmental supervision in small towns and open country districts. The chief effects appeared to be as follows:

(1) If the children were taken away from their parents and put with strangers, emotional disturbances due to loneliness, sense of isolation, and loss of emotional support occurred. The chief difficulties were with children under five years of age. In one study Cyril Burt reported that children under eight years of age and over twelve were more affected by evacuation than those between eight and twelve. R. D. Gillespie summarizes data from one advice bureau—set up as a part of the evacuation program—as follows: 10 per cent came to the bureau from billets said to be unsuitable for them, 19 per cent were sent because their parents made difficulties, and 71 per cent came because the children themselves caused trouble. Straker and Thouless, whose work is summarized by Gillespie, found some sex differences among the difficulties of the evacuated children. "Actively anxious states" and aggressiveness were more common among the boys; "passively anxious" symptoms and delinquency were more frequent among the girls.¹³

The strain was hard on both children and parents, and many families refused to continue with the program. Many children were brought back to their city homes. The family members preferred to risk danger and death together rather than be separated. The deep attachment of younger children for their parents was especially apparent. Older children usually made better adjustments to the foster homes.

(2) Sometimes, if the foster homes were of higher socioeconomic level than their own homes, the children resented the fact and refused to accept clothes and personal

¹¹ See Freud and Burlingham, *op. cit.*, pp. 23-24.

¹² Two convenient sources are Freud and Burlingham, *op. cit.*, and R. D. Gillespie, *Psychological Effects of War on Citizen and Soldier*, 1942.

¹³ Gillespie, *op. cit.*, pp. 142-145.

attention. Some of the children billeted with families below their status considered this a form of punishment.

(3) Common symptoms of disturbed habits and attitudes among evacuated children were refusal to talk, undue fantasies (especially about danger to the parents left behind), misconduct, temper tantrums, aggressive play, and infantile regressions such as bed-wetting and nail-biting.

It was generally agreed that, if evacuation is necessary, families should be kept intact as far as possible, especially when the children are from two to five years old. Every effort should be made not to disturb the feeling of security between parents and children. It is clear that personnel trained in child-care is needed to manage such a program. It is particularly important to secure the best possible relation between children and the billetees, to be able to shift the children from one billet to another if difficulties of adjustment arise, to realize that some children may be better off in hostels than in private homes, and to set up child-guidance clinics for the more unstable children.

While many British children were evacuated, some with and some without their mothers, thousands of others personally experienced the long period of the aerial *Blitz*. Most came through with remarkable equanimity, but there were many mental casualties. Sometimes the fear and nervousness of the parents carried over to the children. Dr. F. Bodman, Director of the Child Guidance Clinic in Bristol, England, reported that 4 per cent of the eight thousand school children of that city showed definite symptoms after raids: such psychological symptoms as general nervousness, trembling, and aggressive behavior, or somatic symptoms such as headaches, indigestion, bed-wetting, pallor, loss of appetite, and nose bleeding. The bodily symptoms were commonest in those from eleven to fourteen years old, and the more psychological symptoms in those from five to seven and those from eleven to fourteen.

Dr. F. Bodman discovered that among the children who had been in a hospital when it was destroyed many symptoms did not appear until some months afterwards. For the most part the children under one year were not obviously affected. Few if any children under three years made any attempt to describe the incident, and most of those from three to seven rejected the experience by not talking of it or by talking of it only to their dolls. Many of those from seven to eleven looked upon the bombing as an exciting adventure. The children above eleven years often took an attitude of responsibility for the younger ones. Most of those under five years and of those over seventeen showed no persistent symptoms.

The consensus of child psychologists and medical experts is that the most serious mental casualties were among those who had already shown evidence of neurotic disorder, either misconduct or some somatic or psychological symptoms.

Mental Breakdown among Adults. There was some mental disturbance among the adults evacuated to the English countryside. Some became depressed, and some, apparently of neurotic disposition, were abnormally ashamed of having left the dangerous areas.

The reactions of adult civilians to aerial bombardment were not unlike those of military men. Among the immediate disorders, according to R. D. Gillespie, were acute panic during the raid, amnesia for the event, immobility or death-feint (which might take the form of stupor, mutism, or temporary loss of use of the limbs), and somatic expressions of fear such as tremors, dilation of the pupils, weakness of the legs, and acceleration of the heartbeat. Other reactions might follow, after a period of rumination or fantasy, especially among the neurotically disposed. Many such victims became hysterical and developed muscular paralyses. In one study of 119 persons Miss Wigan of the Mental Health Emergency Committee found that two or three weeks later 30 per cent complained of symptoms, usually of a bodily sort, though there was no evidence of physical injury.

As might have been expected, the neurotically inclined tended to crowd into the deeper underground shelters, and they showed higher than usual proportion of extreme fear, insomnia, and like symptoms of emotional distress. Occasionally, however, in both civilian and military life, known neurotics performed remarkably well. Individuals with excessive inferiority feelings, under the stress of bombing or battle, sometimes acted with great courage and efficiency. Psychotics, on the other hand, are usually unaffected by aerial attacks. Patients of mental hospitals who got loose either wandered around indifferent to the danger or became violent. Occasionally psychotic breakdowns were precipitated during air raids, but not often.

Actually, little mental disorder arose from bombings. Repeated exposure to such attacks may have resulted in some serious breakdowns, but for the most part the British were amazingly well-balanced. In fact, their fighting spirit was strengthened by these experiences. Such successful adaptation reflects the national character. The stolidity of the British, their great self-confidence, their traditional suppression of overt emotion, their general literacy, their confidence in their leaders and in their cause, all combined to keep them normal under these terrific conditions. It may be that other nationalities faced with defeat would not react so well. On the other hand, in the very process of suffering, courage and determination are often reborn. In any case, such direct military attacks put a great strain on civilian morale. Under such circumstances the role of civilians merges with that of the military.

POSTWAR ADJUSTMENTS

Sooner or later all wars come to an end. Obviously, the return to peace requires readjustments for the armed forces and civilians alike. The present

section will deal with certain problems which the demobilized soldier must face on his return to civil life.¹⁴

The Readjustments of the ex-Soldier. In democratic societies life under military discipline is quite different from life under ordinary civilian conditions. The return to peacetime society demands considerable modification in habits and attitudes: reorientation to new political, economic, and social values; adjustment to familial and vocational changes. We shall comment on the most important of these.

(1) The world to which the ex-soldier will return is not likely to be the one from which he came. Psychologically, if not physically, isolated from his former life, he may be ill-prepared to meet the profound changes in political and economic organization which have taken place in the interim. Young men who daydream of hurrying through the war so as to get back to home, family, and job, and who fail to understand the larger issues which affect local, national, and international affairs, may get a rude shock when the fighting is done. The old world which they left was, on the whole, well-defined; the new one may be in turmoil.

One of the most serious problems is the disillusionment which comes at the end of a long and severe war. A character in Erich Maria Remarque's *The Road Back* puts it thus: "We had pictured it all otherwise. We thought that with one accord, a rich, intense existence must now set in, one full of joy of life regained—and so we had meant to begin. But the days and weeks fly away under our hands, we squander them on inconsiderable and vain things, and we look around and nothing is done."¹⁵

This disillusionment may take a turn toward intense pacifism and a conviction that the war just won was due to the evil machinations of politicians and munitions-makers. Such was a common belief in Britain, France, and the United States in the decade following the Treaty of Versailles. This almost amounted to a psychological defeatism in the countries which had been victorious on the battlefield. With the conviction that little was gained from the war to improve the lot of mankind went a feeling that the victors had been too severe to the conquered. In Germany, on the other hand, a vast wave of disillusionment, particularly among the military class and strong nationalistic groups, led, in time, to a chauvinistic desire for a war of revenge. In Russia, as we know, defeat at arms was associated with the Bolshevik Revolution.

(2) One of the most important needs of the returned soldier, be he officer or enlisted man, is economic and emotional security. Every student

¹⁴ Some of the material in this section is derived from discussions with F. Stuart Chapin and Willard Waller, who, with the author, prepared a memorandum on a course on personality adjustments for ex-service men as a part of a larger report to the American Council on Education. See *Plan for General Education*, 1944.

¹⁵ From E. M. Remarque, *The Road Back*, 1931, p. 165. By permission of Little, Brown & Company.

of postwar problems and planning recognizes the importance of full employment. But the vocational readjustment of the ex-soldier is not always easy, even if work is available. Obviously, the readaptation will vary with the branch of the service. Men with specialized skills in medicine, engineering, and aeronautics may be quickly absorbed into peacetime occupations. Men from the infantry, artillery, and some of the supply services may not be easily brought back into civil life. Skills related to such combat tactics as deployment, defilade, and enfilade are of little use to them in peacetime.

So, too, the discipline of civilian work, in which authority is often more remote and impersonal than among the military, may prove a difficulty. And conflict between the returned soldiers and the civilian workers who have had high wages and have faced no risks of military action may become severe. Obviously, home-front laborers who have suffered aerial bombardment and other "battle" conditions should not be psychologically remote from those who have been in uniform. In this particular, total war, in which the home front merges with the battle line, is different from previous wars.

If employment is not soon available to the returned veterans, economic hardships, restlessness, and disillusionment may give rise to public agitation, ranging from demands for bonuses or other benefits from the state to outright revolutionary movements to overthrow the government in the hope of a better "deal."

(3) Though a good job provides emotional satisfaction as well as economic support, the desire for the affection, companionship, and stability of family life is also strong in most returned soldiers. Regular and frequent letters between the man and his family may have helped to preserve the bonds between them. However, the long separation from the opposite sex may necessitate new adjustments. Military life tends to induce ideas, attitudes, and habits regarding sex and family life which are quite contrary to those of the Christian tradition. Yet the long separation may lead to overidealization of love and family relations, and this may or may not be helpful in the re-establishment of the home. In the love life of the family the ex-soldier may seek the ideals which have been shattered in his general disillusionment.

The family life may have been considerably altered. The wife or mother may have gone to work outside the home, thus taking on economic and other responsibilities that are normally the man's. The attitudes and conduct of children may have changed. The man's acceptance of a life of segregated care in the military may make it difficult for him to resume his responsible position as head of the household. On the other hand, young men, in particular, may have gained something by their emancipation from parental and family ties; many will have escaped their childish dependency on parents and learned adult responsibilities for the first time.

(4) Both occupational and family readjustments may be influenced by incipient or open conflict between age and sex groups. The young adults who made up the bulk of the combat forces may well believe that, since they won the war, they are entitled to occupational and political preferment. In the defeated country the men of the same age may feel that, since they fought and lost, they are the chief sufferers and hence are entitled to whatever good things may be salvaged from defeat.

This conflict is also evident in the values which the postwar society develops. For example, after World War I, ex-soldiers who returned to college often expressed disgust at the ivory-tower philosophy and traditional instruction. The English author Vera Brittain says that, on her return home, "university life, it now seemed to me, conduced neither to adult manners nor mature values."¹⁶

Associated with the common belief that much of the traditional academic curriculum was useless was the sense of conflict with the younger generation of students who had not taken part in battle. One of Erich Maria Remarque's characters expressed a widespread feeling when, planting himself in front of the head of a school to which the ex-soldiers had been sent, he remarked:

"Let's hear something practical,' says he. 'That's what we're here for now. Here we are, seventy soldiers, and we have to go back to school again. What do you propose to do with us? And I may as well tell you at once we know as good as nothing now of all your bookish stuff, and what's more, we've no wish to stay here longer than need be.' . . .

"Don't run away with the idea,' says Willy indignantly, 'that we're going to perch on forms along with kids who never saw the war, and put up our hands nicely whenever we know anything.' . . ."¹⁷

Not only may conflict with the younger generation develop, but the veterans frequently feel resentful toward older people. This not only shows itself, as noted above, in the attitude toward teachers, but after World War I was particularly violent against alleged profiteers and political war-mongers, who, the ex-soldiers often felt, were the only beneficiaries of the war.

(5) The shift from war to peace usually brings changes in prestige. The expected hero-status is either temporary or absent. During the war itself much is made of men who are decorated for gallantry or who become publicized for their deeds. But enthusiasm usually subsides rather quickly at the close of the war. One man described his reactions thus:

"When I came back I had all kinds of stripes on my uniform: service stripes, wound stripes, and the insignia of the Fighting Sixty-ninth, Rainbow Division! I thought

¹⁶ From Vera Brittain, *Testament of Youth*, 1933, p. 488.

¹⁷ From E. M. Remarque, *op. cit.*, p. 126. By permission of Little, Brown & Company.

everyone would look at me, the great hero. I'll never forget that first ride in the subway. I expected people to show recognition. My uniform told the story of my acts. Well, everyone was busy reading his paper and no one even looked up. I was really disappointed. You see I was with the Army of Occupation and the war was over for six months when I came back. We had a parade but it was nothing like we had seen in the movies. The guys who didn't see action got the great applause. By the time we got back the country was fed up with these war heroes. . . . I remember I met a girl I knew and I thought she would treat me like a hero. She acted as though she had seen me the day before." ¹⁸

The problems of an officer may be quite different from those of an enlisted man. We have already noted that in a highly individualistic culture like ours soldiers often resent the authoritative techniques of military life. The enlisted man's ego is usually deflated by authority and command. If, on demobilization, he gets a job and is reunited with his family and community, the ego-deflation experienced in the army may be replaced by acceptable civilian status. For the officer, on the contrary, the change from military to civil life may take a quite different turn. In the army or navy his ego has probably been distinctly inflated by the authority and responsibility of his position, and it may be greatly deflated by his return to a peacetime job. The erstwhile captain, major, or colonel may become but a bank clerk or a minor official in industry or the civil service. One enlisted man reported that he got a real "thrill" at seeing that his former captain had become a shoe salesman in Wanamaker's. "I also saw another captain delivering milk." ¹⁹

(6) The ex-soldier may have developed personal habits and values which border on the neurotic. Military life sometimes sets up restlessness and an unwillingness to settle again into the routine of civilian life. Rather than return to a job and a family, some veterans desire new adventure, travel, and movement. Others may express a devil-may-care attitude by excessive eating, sexual adventure, and extravagance. In most men these reactions are a temporary "letting off of steam." The jazz age of the 1920's was in part such a phenomenon. Some, however, may never be able to adjust themselves to peacetime obligations. Sometimes these persisting traits are accompanied for years by obsessive unpleasant fantasies and nightmares. Apparently most men suppress their memories of battle either by taking up old occupations and interests or by some escape of the sort just noted.

Sometimes the habit of aggression is carried over into civil life. A certain brutalization may have occurred, though the pacifists doubtless overstress this. Just as the knowledge of human conflict may habituate children and adolescents to violence, so, too, indoctrination and practice in killing among

¹⁸ Document by courtesy of Willard Waller.

¹⁹ Document by courtesy of Willard Waller.

soldiers may leave a mark upon their future attitudes and values. Though some may react strongly against such aggressiveness, or may inhibit it during peacetime, it is likely to remain under the surface ready to reappear on adequate provocation. Not only do nationalistic myths and legends tend to keep the war spirit alive during periods of peace, but recurrent conditioning to violence leaves its mark on soldiers and civilians alike. Though the criminal acts of veterans are perhaps not important in the total of postwar crime, there is no doubt that in the difficulties of readjustment some veterans resort to crimes against property or persons.

Some Devices for Aiding Soldiers to Adjust Themselves to Civilian Life.

There are a number of group and institutional aids which may facilitate the transition of the ex-soldier from military to civil life. Obviously, family life is one of the most important. Reunion with loved ones is of immense importance in restoring status and in re-establishing contact with the community. Of equal, if not more, significance, is the getting of a job, and every means of putting the veteran to work is a gain. At the community level, religious, fraternal, labor, civic, and veterans' organizations are useful in aiding the returned soldier to get back to peacetime living. Despite criticism of such bodies as the American Legion, they serve a useful purpose in assisting the ex-soldier to regain his place in the community. Political parties which promise huge bonuses or other benefits to the veterans often get into office because the latter come to believe that this is an effective method of "getting what is coming to them." Participation in such political activities clearly affords a means of re-establishing one's place in local or national affairs. If the war has brought about a national situation tending toward revolution, veterans who do not find work and who are otherwise disillusioned by the war are fair game for the agitators who promise personal prosperity once the ruling class is liquidated. As we noted in Chapter XIII, defeat in arms may produce conditions making for a violent overthrow of the existing government.

Whether the individual's adjustment to peacetime life is hard or easy, whether it involves familial, vocational, political, or other matters, the effects of his military experience are bound to be significant. A war has some of the same psychological effects that a violent religious or other ideological conversion has. New ideas, attitudes, and habits symbolize a considerable shift in the life organization. Although the fundamentals of personality are laid down in the earliest years, there is little doubt that a wartime experience reshapes those earlier forms into a more or less novel configuration. The relations of aggression, dominance, and submission, of fear, anxiety, ambition, and many other basic traits, may be profoundly altered, and the changes may leave their mark on the individual for the rest of his life.

Yet the readjustments following a war are not confined to the military. After total war, civilians also go back to a world unlike the former one.

Their readjustments are not so severe, for they concern chiefly work and residence; but, in terms of larger political and economic matters, in terms of changes in larger values, war has perhaps as great an impact on them as on those who have gone through the ordeal of battle. At any rate, the process from peace to war and to peace again is one of the most striking features of our modern world, and obliges us to consider, in the final section of this chapter, some of the larger problems of war as an institution and its effects upon both group and individual life.

THE INDIVIDUAL AND WAR AS INSTITUTIONALIZED CONFLICT

While some apologists argue that war is a direct expression of a fighting instinct in man, most serious scholars view war as essentially an institution which stimulates and directs the aggressive habits of man. If war is an institution, then, one may ask, can it not be abolished? And, if it can, does this mean that human aggression may, with adequate conditioning, also be eliminated? In this section we shall discuss briefly some of the psychological foundations of war as an institution, war as an outlet for individual aggressiveness, conflict as an integrating element in social intercourse, and the sublimation of aggressiveness in relation to war and other institutions based on conflict.

Some Psychological Features of War as an Institution. It is generally agreed that modern war is closely associated with nationalism and the imperialist ambitions of great states. These, in turn, are related to the economic ambitions of certain classes and to population pressures. In support of the nationalistic expansion of population and economic life, military practices and ideas are kept alive through the schools, the churches, the economic institutions, and the military establishment itself. In nondemocratic countries, a military caste has been a distinctive factor, as was evidenced recently in Germany and Japan and earlier in Spain, Russia, and France.

The national state is for modern man the largest in-group which calls for his reverence, deference, and sense of belonging. It has replaced the church as the basic center of affection, social solidarity, and security, as the core of basic in-group attitudes and values. Identification with the state is provided by myths, legends, and songs of national heroes and previous great events. The stories of battles and conquests, of scholarship, of artistic and mechanical inventions, and of colonial discoveries and expansion are of utmost importance. The flag, the map, and the concept of the frontier, the national anthem, the military insignia, and many other symbols also stimulate patriotism and willingness to fight and to sacrifice for the national state.

These symbols represent the positive attitudes and values organized and

perpetuated in modern national states, and without them nationalism would collapse. Their counterpart are the negative views of enemy countries, the largest and most threatening out-groups with which we must contend. It is perfectly obvious that patriotic enthusiasm and belief in a political system or cause depend not alone on the attitudes of affection and approach but also on their opposite attitudes of hatred, distrust, and avoidance. In fact, a tentative generalization may be made that intensive in-group solidarity is equally dependent on positive and negative attitudes. Group solidarity seems to be born as much of fear and aggression as of love and mutual aid. Hence, no matter how we may view the national state, so long as it exists with its principles of sovereignty and independence and its own closed political system, war as an institution may continue. But, before discussing the alternatives to this as they may effect human personality, let us comment on the roots of aggression and conflict in the individual.

The Interpersonal Bases of Aggression and Conflict. There seems to be little if any evidence to gainsay the widely accepted generalization that aggression is a common and universal experience of mankind. Even in societies known for their co-operative economic and other institutions and for their pacific relations with their neighbors, interpersonal rivalry and conflict are found in some form or another. It is also rather generally recognized that personal aggressiveness arises from the frustrations which individuals experience in their daily contacts with others. As we noted in earlier chapters, frustration does not always lead to aggression, but everybody shows some form of resistance to the frustrating contacts with relatives, friends, neighbors, teachers, and others.

If this be sound, then we may go on to state that the earlier aggressiveness—for example, resistance to parental training in feeding, elimination, sleep habits, and play, and resentment toward siblings as to status in the family—will in time be transferred to other situations and social objects, or repressed, or given expression in fantasy, or otherwise disposed of. There is no evidence that the imprint of the early habits and attitudes of antagonism is ever wiped out. The early aggressiveness is soon extended to persons from other neighborhoods or to the people “on the wrong side of the tracks.” From this extension, at the primary-group level, it is but a short step to other out-groups: to the labor union if one grows up a member of the employing class, or to the employer group if one is indoctrinated with unionism; or to individuals of another religion, another color, or another social class. And in our modern world, just as we extend our affection and sympathy to our national state, with all its trappings of symbol, so we transfer our most intense aggressiveness to nations that threaten our national security. The love of one’s country and the hatred of another country are the psychological underpinning of modern war as an institution. Economic, religious, and other interests are also involved, but the basic inter-

ests are political. War, in short, provides the individual with a culturally accepted and expected outlet for his aggressiveness. Racial, religious, and class antagonisms pale into insignificance when compared with international conflicts.

For the individual, moreover, conflicts usually provide a highly emotional and satisfying integration of otherwise opposing trends in his life organization. In a really intensive struggle, to paraphrase the German "Song of Hate" directed against Britain during World War I, we hate as one, we love as one. In other words, at the very-time when we express our deepest affections and make our greatest sacrifices to save others of our ingroup, we indulge in our most violent hatreds. Under these circumstances men kill not only with impunity but with the praise and moral approval of their fellow countrymen. All the most elemental but suppressed impulses to destroy frustrating persons or objects may find an outlet against the nation's enemy. This is not to say that the soldier or sailor in modern mechanized warfare necessarily feels such impulses consciously. In fact, in large measure the business of killing gets to be impersonal and mechanical, except in hand-to-hand combat, which is relatively rare. Rather this culturized aggressiveness is the psychological foundation of morale, or fighting spirit.

If combat becomes bloody and severe, if men see their comrades shot to pieces by gunfire or ambushed by the trickery of the enemy, personal hatred comes into play. In World War II the jungle tactics of the Japanese, abetted by our national prejudice, led to intense personal fear and rage among the American fighters, for many of whom killing Japanese not only was a military duty but became a thrilling personal pleasure. When combat takes this form, the deep-seated aggressiveness of the individual finds its most direct and satisfying outlet.

When there is a fanatical belief in the sanctity of one's nation and its mission (as in many religious wars, among Nazi Party members, and among Japanese who believe in the myth of the divine emperor), morale reaches a high pitch, and the defeat of an army with such *esprit de corps*, unless it is badly equipped and inadequately led, may be difficult indeed. The enthusiasm of the French armies under Napoleon grew out of their firm conviction that they were carrying the Revolution to the enslaved peoples of Europe. In contrast, the armies of democracies called upon to defend themselves against such zealous aggressor nations may be slow to develop any comparable fanatical aggressiveness. Yet, unless their morale has disintegrated, as had that of France in 1940, such nonaggressive nations may develop a strong fighting spirit that will stimulate intense solidarity. Whether such high morale will lead later to warlike habits and attitudes depends on political, economic, and religious values; a nation forced to defend itself will not necessarily emerge into militarism. That depends on

the use of power, a topic which we shall discuss in the final chapter. But, before closing the present chapter, we must raise two basic problems: (1) the extent and distribution of aggressiveness in a society; (2) the possibilities of sublimation of war-stimulated conflicts into milder and less violent forms.

Equivalents of War: Moral or Otherwise. If we are to divert human aggressiveness from war into less destructive channels, we need, first of all, to ask if there is a given quantity of aggressiveness in every individual which must, sooner or later, come out. Or is aggressiveness, especially at the institutional level, capable of addition or subtraction, depending on cultural training? Sigmund Freud, who has given us so much information on aggressiveness and its expression, apparently held that the individual has a destructive and aggressive "instinct," the "death instinct," which is counterbalanced by a libidinous "instinct," or "life instinct." As the individual grows up, such aggressiveness may be expressed or repressed, but it remains a relatively constant element in all thought and conduct. It is seen in paranoia and other pathological forms, in personal fighting, in war, and in sublimated forms such as gossip and wit. In contrast to this view is one which, though it recognizes the universality of personal antagonism, assumes that the amount, intensity, and distribution of aggressiveness, especially at the cultural level, may be affected by training. Children brought up in a highly militaristic society may have more and intenser violent attitudes and habits than those reared in a pacifistic world. In the former world the rewards, material and other, would go to those who developed increasing aggressiveness; in the latter they would go to those who did not.

Edward A. Ross long ago pointed out that antagonism is less disruptive of society if it is distributed among several minor situations rather than concentrated in one major situation.²⁰ For example, an intensely militaristic and nationalistic country might threaten and even attack other nations, but within the country there might be no conflicting groups. Aggressiveness would be drained off into one central channel and aimed at potential or real external enemies. In such a society the individual might well get the highly emotional integration of love and hate noted above. But the rigidity resulting from this organization of society and personality might well prove disastrous in the end. In other words, the diffusion of aggressiveness into a variety of channels may lessen its intensity as well as spread it into less harmful areas of interaction. Concentrations of aggressiveness are witnessed in religious crusades and in revolutionary movements. In our mass society such concentrations may prove a definite block to the hope of abolishing war as an institution. If the people of a national state believe they will be rewarded for organized attacks on the inhabitants of other states, we may expect an increase, not a diminution, of war.

²⁰ See E. A. Ross, *Principles of Sociology*, 1st ed., 1920.

It is ridiculous to consider modern war as always made or unmade by a small clique of militarists. Certainly, in Germany, Nazi propaganda had laid the foundation for World War II through mass appeals. And the Soviet Union, under the impact of the Nazi attack, has experienced a mass approval of war. Even in Britain and the United States, which have traditionally been most removed from the military tradition and customs, long involvement in a serious struggle for survival has left its effect upon the masses. There is a considerable doubt whether even the sufferings of total war will make nations less aggressive. In other words, it is doubtful if wars tend to cure wars. In this sense the old-line pacifists unwittingly had a point, however inadequate was their analysis of war as an institution or of man's aggressiveness.

In the face of the conditioning to war which has been a common mass experience in the last few generations, one is reluctant to raise the old query about the possibilities of alleviating or abolishing modern warfare. What is the likelihood that we may be able to develop sublimations which will provide acceptable outlets for aggressiveness without disrupting human life and social organization?

In the first place, we must recognize that a social order and a culture built on good will, appeasement, and co-operation are but partial solutions. We must reckon with human aggressiveness. We must give it outlets that will provide personal satisfaction but not destroy society. There is little evidence that we can eliminate aggressiveness in the individual as he grows up. The disparity between human wants and the means of satisfying them is still too great for that. In fact, in order to become a participating member in a social order, the individual must suppress some of his wants. And, once we have such frustration, we have a situation that makes for aggression, which may or may not be sublimated through personal or institutional forms. While the areas of conflict may change, and the institutions associated therewith may be altered, aggression and conflict remain as fundamental and universal as co-operation, mutual aid, division of labor, and other basic interactional forms. Any plan for a peaceful future which ignores this fact seems to be destined to fail. If men draw blueprints for future social organization and culture, they must reckon with the interactions of the human beings for whom such programs are designed. To do otherwise is to court future disillusionment, out of which even worse disasters may arise.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

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On psychological aspects of military training, morale building, and related topics, see, F. J. Brown, ed., "Organizing for Total War," *Annals American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Mar., 1942, vol. 220, especially articles by Bingham, Harlow, Osborn, Smith; Ladislav Farago, ed., *German Psychological Warfare*, 1941, 1942, Part II; Meier, *op. cit.*, chaps. 3, 5; *Psychology for the Fighting Man* (prepared by a Committee of the National Research Council), 1943, chaps. 1-15; "National Morale," *American J. Sociology*, 1941, 47: 277-330, articles by Sullivan, Hocking, Ulio.

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On postwar adjustments of veterans, see Willard Waller, *The Veteran Comes Back*, 1944; Dixon Wecter, *When Johnny Comes Marching Home*, 1944.

Part Three

MASS BEHAVIOR

STUDENTS of social behavior have long recognized that the interactions in large groups of individuals, such as street crowds, mobs, and audiences, differ in form and character from those in the family, in the schoolroom, at the factory workbench, in the business conference, and in other recurrent and regular associations. So, too, there are psychological differences between people massed together, either spontaneously or by design, and those who, though reached by a common and uniform stimulus such as the newspaper or the radio, are scattered in space. The latter are called a public, which may be tentatively defined as a group of people separated in space but held together by common interests, common stimuli, and similar responses. In contrast, a crowd is a contiguous though temporary gathering of people who experience similar stimuli, have more or less the same interests, and tend to react in similar ways.

Part Three deals with certain important aspects of mass behavior, both that of crowds and that of publics. It describes and analyzes the thought and conduct of individuals under mob and panic conditions, in audiences of various sorts, and under the impact of fashions and fads. Considerable attention will be given to public opinion, its nature and function and the means of its formation, including propaganda. In the final chapter some of the broader aspects of social control will be discussed with respect to mass behavior in our modern world.

Chapter XVI

SOME FORMS OF MASS BEHAVIOR: CROWD AND AUDIENCE

A CROWD is a gathering of a considerable number of persons around a center, or point of common attention. In analogy to the movement of iron filings around a magnet, there is a polarization of individuals with reference to something seen, heard, or otherwise sensed together. The basic pattern of a crowd is shown in Figure 5A (p. 389). In a psychological sense mere numbers do not make a crowd. People walking back and forth along a sidewalk do not form a crowd unless they develop some point of common interest and begin to react to it. For example, if a number of pedestrians pause to watch two taxi-drivers in a heated argument, we have the beginning of a true crowd. On the other hand, a deliberate massing of individuals under institutional auspices, such as we find in an audience, has certain characteristics not present in a transitory street crowd or a mob.

The present chapter will deal first with the crowd, especially in its more dynamic, emotional forms, then with the audience, and finally with the broader psychological features of mass behavior in our modern world.

THE NATURE OF THE CROWD

Some of the important features of a crowd may be made clear if we note what a crowd is not. A family at a meal, students working in a laboratory, a board of directors meeting, or a staff in conference, is not a crowd. In these cases only a few persons are involved, their responses to one another are on rather fixed lines, and the repetitive character of their relations influences their solidarity and keeps alive their culturized forms and aims. A vaguely delimited number of people who read the same newspaper every morning, or who listen, as individuals, to the same radio program, we call a public rather than a crowd. Audiences at lectures, motion pictures, or political rallies are in a way institutionalized crowds operating under certain customs and traditions, and under certain circumstances audiences may react in the emotional manner of an action-crowd. An army as a disciplined organization is neither a crowd nor an audience, though it may under some conditions become one or the other.

The Characteristics of a Crowd. Important features of a crowd are its


transitory nature, its spatial distribution, and a common focus of attention and action. The number necessary to form a crowd has never been determined, but it usually involves individuals in such numbers that close face-to-face relations are not possible. There must be the close person-to-person contact, however, of the shoulder-to-shoulder kind. There must be considerable stimulation among the members and a certain sense of mass strength. Moreover, when many people center their attention on something in front of them, the ordinary eye-to-eye and face-to-face relation of conversation gives way to the shoulder-to-shoulder contact, with attention increasingly focused on the situation "out there."

The polarization results in a certain configuration of individuals. Ordinarily those near the center of attention are more stimulated and more overtly active. In contrast, those at the periphery are less interested and less likely to participate directly. Those between the center and the fringe may, in time, be drawn forward to more active roles or may be displaced by more dynamic persons pressing in from the fringe. Thus, along with the close, shoulder-to-shoulder contact, there are milling about, pushing, shoving, and movement forward or backward. These physical contacts, accompanied by kinesthetic sensations, heighten the sense of power in the members of the crowd.

On the basis of common-sense observation we may readily distinguish between passive and active crowds. The former are illustrated by the temporary gathering of idle watchers of workmen putting up a new sign on the marquee of a theater or a group which stops for a few moments to listen while a motorcycle policeman argues with a speeding motorist stopped at an intersection. Looking and listening when others look and listen are old habits. But ordinarily such impermanent groupings do not result in any dynamic participation. Only if people become emotionally concerned do passive seeing and hearing give way to overt action.


The Action-Crowd. Once massed individuals have a common focus of attention, the next step toward a crowd in action is the release of certain deep-lying attitudes and emotions. The action-crowd is one in which love, fear, rage, or aggressiveness emerges. In some mob action there may be free-for-all fighting which tends to disperse the close massing, and in panic flight there is a tendency to spread out and escape the shoulder-to-shoulder contact, provided the space permits. (See Figure 5, C and D.) On the other hand, in some panics, as in a burning theater or night club, the massing itself may prove fatal because it blocks the exits. But these are special phases of crowds in action; here we are concerned with the general features of typical mass action.

Action-crowds may be divided into the attack-rage and flight-fear types. The former is illustrated by a lynching or race riot, the latter by a panic among soldiers.




A

Crowd formation: initial stage—approach to center




B

Crowd formation: later stage. (Dotted lines indicate onlookers on fringe)




C

Panic crowd: flight from center



D

Free-for-all fight. (Dotted lines indicate onlookers)




E

Threesome group: face-to-face relations




F

Twosome group: face-to-face relations




G

Group with fixed face-to-face relations; e.g. meal-time, conference



H

Group with fixed relations; e.g. squad of soldiers, policemen, or paraders marching



I

Group with fixed relations; e.g. audience in lecture hall or (with slight modifications) concert or theater audience

FIG. 5—Some Examples of Human Groupings

The brutal lynching of a Negro, Arthur Stevens, in one of our Southern states, well illustrates the operation of an attack-rage crowd. The story is that Stevens had entered into intimate relations with a white girl, Iona Durfee, whose residence was across the road from Stevens', and that, when she tried to break off relations with him, he murdered her and hid the body. When her body was found, much of the evidence implicated Stevens, and he is said to have confessed his guilt. Feeling ran high in the community, and, fearing mob violence, the sheriff removed Stevens first to one and then to another state jail, and finally to a jail in a neighboring state. These moves enraged large numbers of local people, and a self-appointed posse of 110 men traveled 210 miles to the out-of-state jail, stormed it, and returned to the Durfee neighborhood with Stevens. He was tortured, mutilated, and killed by the mob. Later a larger mob took his body and hung it to a tree, where it was viewed by hundreds of excited spectators. But the rioters were not satisfied; unlike most lynchings, this one was followed by a general outbreak against the Negro members of the community. In the end it took the state militia to suppress the rioting.

The lynching of Stevens and the subsequent attack on the colored people represented an outburst of long-accumulating tensions between the whites and the blacks. This section of the South had suffered a long depression, and the rivalry between the races, especially among those of low income, had become acute. There is little doubt that the killing of Stevens was symbolic not only of white control of Negro sexuality but of intense fear of Negro economic competition. After the whole affair had quieted down, most whites rationalized it as an effective means of "keeping the nigger in his place."

The attack-crowd is activated by man's most elemental motives. The Negro about to be lynched stands for the whole background of conflict between whites and colored, in which economic competition and personal resentment at the Negro's efforts to get ahead become entangled with secret envy of the Negro's alleged sexual potency. So, too, the crowd man pursuing an enemy spy is aroused by fear of enemy invasion, fear for his personal safety, and fear for his basic values. The rudimentary needs for survival, mastery, and preservation of the group's morals override kindlier and more sympathetic motives.

A flight-fear reaction in which prior cultural conditioning and current rumor played important parts was the panic during the battle at Adowa in February, 1896, an action which involved about 15,000 Italian troops and nearly 100,000 Abyssinians. The terrain was rough and cut into deep, parallel watercourses separated by steep ridges. An Italian unit advancing through one of these defiles was suddenly attacked by a small body of native troops, and almost at the first brush the Italians turned tail and fled in disorder.

A number of factors contributed to this panic, but the most important appears to have been the rumors about the cruelty and violence of the natives. All sorts of wild tales were told and retold among the Italians about how the natives castrated and tortured their prisoners. These stories made a deep impression on the men, and at the first contact with the natives there was an upsurge of fear which the officers and the less suggestible soldiers were unable to check.

Individually aroused motives, however, do not make an action-crowd. There must be a basis for concerted action in a common language, a common tradition, common values, and a distinctive facilitation by the crowd itself. Let us examine some of the psychological aspects of crowd behavior.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE ACTION-CROWD

The most important psychological factors of the action-crowd are imitation and suggestion, primary drives and emotions, and other elements of social facilitation, both conscious and unconscious.

Imitation and Suggestion. Imitation as a phase of learning was discussed in Chapter V. We need but recall that it includes similarity in motor responses, likeness in reactions due to likeness in stimuli, and the deliberate or conscious taking of the role of another.

We have all been conditioned to run when others run, to laugh when others laugh, to look when we see others looking. As a rule, these are habitual and unconscious reactions. This type of direct imitation doubtless played a part in the panic of a Prussian regiment during the Prussian-Austrian war of 1866.

"The panic of the Prussian cavalry regiment in retreat after the battle of Trautenau in Bohemia is known. As the regiment was trotting back in marching column on the road, the regimental commander sent an aide to the head of the column to bring it to a walk. As this officer was galloping along the column from the direction of the enemy, his pace was regarded as a sign of the seriousness of the situation. When the officers tried to gain the head of their troops, the troopers followed suit, and soon the entire regiment was galloping away from the enemy, and overran a Prussian battery. Only after miles and some casualties was it possible to bring the regiment to a halt."¹

The second kind of imitation derives from the fact that people living in the same community have been exposed to the same culture or highly similar cultures. In a motion-picture theater we all laugh at the same jokes. At a war rally or a political rally we react favorably to the speaker's words about our country's heroes and negatively to words about our enemy or the rival party. Once a mass of people begin to respond together, they continue to do so simply because the crowd stimulus keeps them going.

Deliberate imitation, though it is common in everyday life, is seldom present in emotional crowds. Sometimes, in the army, officers try to offset the effects of panic by getting the men to start some counteractivity. In a sense this is a deliberate use of imitation.

Closely allied to imitation is suggestion, and the two usually operate together. Suggestion takes place when one person induces an idea, belief, or act in another without the latter's use of logical reasoning. In fact, the aim of suggestion is to get others to think or do something by stopping their

¹ Lt. General Constantin von Altröck, "Panic," *Infantry Journal*, 1930, 37: 116. By permission of the publishers.

critical habits. It requires both a stimulus and an inner readiness to react in a certain way.

Suggestibility is qualified by age, sex, level of intelligence, personality type, and various physiological conditions. As a rule, children and young people are more suggestible than their elders; girls and women—at least in our society—seem more easily persuaded than boys and men. So, too, the feeble-minded and dull appear to be more open to suggestion than the bright and well-educated. Yet, when the stimuli are appropriate, the latter may be more susceptible to rumor, propaganda, and other suggestions than the less intelligent. Extroverts are said to be more suggestible than introverts, but this statement needs qualification in terms of cultural conditioning. There is little doubt that suggestibility is affected by such internal conditions as excessive fatigue, lack of sleep, prolonged hunger, and the effect of certain narcotics, and by such external influences as the constant repetition of appealing stereotypes, the use of color and lights, and the quality of a voice.

In stimulating crowds to action, rumor is particularly effective. Rumor is a special kind of suggestion, a story about some real or fictitious person or event which grows as it spreads. Beginning as simple facts or suppositions, rumors in time may become elaborated into highly emotional stories of great significance. The three most important ways of diffusing rumor are (1) by word of mouth—in short, by gossip (the most effective rumors are spread in this way); (2) by letter, telephone message, or telegram; and (3) on a larger scale, by newspapers, the radio, motion pictures, magazines, pamphlets, and books. One of the classic instances of widespread and disastrous rumor was that which developed out of Orson Welles' broadcast on October 30, 1938, of a drama depicting an imaginary invasion by an armed force from the planet Mars.

Within the larger framework of imitation and suggestion, other psychological processes get in their work. Every crowd, except the most fleeting, tends sooner or later to induce certain feelings and emotions among its members. As we shall see, the very persistence of a crowd depends upon stimulation of the deeper motives and their associated emotions, such as rage, fear, love, and grief. Once the emotions are aroused, they influence everything the individual sees, hears, smells, feels, and does.) As the psychologist G. T. W. Patrick put it years ago, "We see things not as they are, but as we are," a principle which holds good especially under the stress of strong emotion. Not only the perceptions, but the pictures or images carried in the head, become emotionalized. In fear and rage the individual, in common with his fellows, conjures up imaginary features of the victim, of the oppressor, or of the enemy. The rumor-monger not only stimulates the formation of such images, but almost invariably increases their vividness.

Primary Motivation. In the transitory and passive spectator-crowd which quickly forms and as quickly disappears, the motives are usually intellectual curiosity, mere habitual attention to unusual sounds and sights, and the imitation of others. In the action-crowd the more potent and rudimentary drives come into play. These vary, of course, with the particular situation, and they are qualified and given meaning by cultural norms and values. In Chapter IV we tentatively classified the basic adult drives as those concerned (1) with security, safety, and status; (2) with the love life, centered largely in the family; (3) with the community norms and values, such as law and order, property and civic rights, and the continuance of class and community controls.

To see the operation of these motives let us look at the relation between whites and colored under our color-caste system. When this relation is fully accepted on both sides, the day-by-day contacts of members of the two races may be fairly calm. We have what the sociologist calls an accommodation. There are deference and acceptance of inferiority on the part of the Negroes, and implicit, if not explicit, dominance and superiority on the part of the whites. But under the impact of growing competition for work, or upon any event which breaks through the caste barrier (as when the Negro gets "uppish" or insolent toward the white man, or when improper advances are made by Negroes toward white women), individual white men begin to react with threats of violence, fisticuffs, or other personal aggression. These outbreaks may be sufficient to maintain the customary caste system. But, if a more serious crisis arises, such as general employment of Negroes in industries where whites work, or if there is an attack on a white woman, crowd responses may set off mass responses ending in mob action.

However, it must not be forgotten that lynching is a form of publicly, though not legally, recognized social control. It is deep in the mores of certain sections of the country, and it is supported by myths and legends about prior outbreaks of Negroes. In a similar manner, mob action against horse thieves on the frontier rested on a community acceptance of a mob method of dealing with infractions of accepted property rights. In other words, there is some cultural foundation for such aggressions. When violence is directed not against individual malefactors, but against an entire minority group, as in anti-Jewish pogroms or anti-Negro riots, an assumed need of control usually serves as a rationalization for such emotionalized reaction.

Social Facilitation. The action-crowd comes into full play when, in addition to the elemental drives, secondary stimuli are brought into operation. Given the initial discussion of wrongs to be righted, given the emergence of leaders or groups of prestige-bearers (law-and-order leagues, for instance), the further development of mass action depends on factors which

arise after the crowd has begun to assemble. That is, what we call social facilitation comes into play. The basic features of crowd-formation must be present: a common stimulus, the gathering of numbers of persons in close proximity, and the beginnings of talk. From this point on what Neal E. Miller and John Dollard call "crowd stimuli" begin to work.

Social facilitation may be defined as the enhancement of one's response by the presence or activity of other persons. (See pp. 116-118.) The massing of individuals in an action-crowd facilitates excitement and readiness to act. The milling around, the rubbing of shoulders, the craning of neck and straining of eyes and ears—these all serve to energize the participants. It is difficult to experiment on such reactions, and we must depend on ordinary observation and on introspection, chiefly after the event. It is the author's conviction that the very crowding together, with its inevitable hemming of movement, sets up aggressive responses, just as the tight holding of an infant makes it struggle to free itself. This close person-to-person massing, then, stimulates motor activity of an oppositional kind and gives a sense of mass power. All this carries the individual along with others, inhibits his rational habits and ideas, and lets loose, in their place, his emotional drives.

The Role of the Leader. The social facilitation of "everybody's doing it" is not the only form of "crowd stimulus." The role of the leader is most significant. What we call prestige suggestion is amply illustrated in mob activity. Prestige often attaches itself to individuals who are not of the élite. The mob-inciter may come from the lower social strata. Prestige comes into play, however, because he assumes a dominant role, and under his fiery harangue, loaded with emotion-arousing stereotypes, the crowd accepts him as a leader. In acquiring this status he gets the prestige which might otherwise, in calmer circumstances, be denied him. The familiar interactional mechanisms of identification and projection come into play. The members of the crowd identify themselves with his assumption of knowledge and power, and he projects on them his own values and views, which they quickly accept as their own. Obedience to the leader follows more or less automatically because, as we saw in Chapter X, we are all conditioned from our early childhood to deference before those in authority.

Among the stimuli which the leader provides are the following: (1) He gives a focus to a crowd which might otherwise become diffused in space and attention. That is, he aids in polarizing and thus unifying the crowd. (2) He verbalizes people's vague attitudes and feelings and gives them communicative symbols, which, repeated and spread, serve later as stimulators to action. (3) He uses myths, legends, and a rehearsal of recent events to arouse emotion and instigate action. That is, he revives the hatreds, fears, and elemental drives that had been aroused earlier in vaguer and less violent form. (4) He points out the direction in which the mass action shall

take place. For instance, he suggests or commands whipping, beating, burning, hanging, or some other action. (5) He may lead the action, although in some instances the verbal agitator gives the overt leadership to another.

In turn, the vocal approval of crowd members—"Attaboy," or "That's right," or "Let's go"—act to further facilitate the total response. All the tricks of colorful speech, of pauses and excited phrases, of anxiety and exuberance may be used. Sometimes a rhythmic factor appears, not only in the voice of the speaker, but in forward and backward surging of the mass or in their taking up a catch-phrase or slogan, which, in turn, fosters the crowd's reactivity.

In addition to the effects of suggestion, which are especially strong when people have the same aim, there is the underlying conditioning toward social conformity. It is the exceptional individual who can withstand the force of mass suggestion. There is more than a passing truth in the old saying that people may go to a revival to scoff but remain to pray.

Some years ago a group of graduate students attended a revival meeting which was held in the university town. They went out of idle curiosity and out of an interest in observing this kind of mass behavior. Several of them found themselves lustily singing the religious hymns and listening whole-heartedly to the preacher's tirade against sin and his appeals to repent. Before the evening was over, two or three of the group of eight or ten went forward to the front of the hall to confess the error of their ways and to join the church. Later they confided that they were ashamed to have been so swept away by the immediate circumstances. Apparently old habits and values had been rearoused, and they reverted to conduct which had once been accepted in their families and communities.

The way in which a relatively indifferent attitude may be altered by a crowd is shown in the following account of two American students in Germany in the late summer of 1914.

"After dinner Jerry and I dropped into the business district of Frankfort and found a wave of mild excitement running through the throngs of people moving up and down the street. The evening journals had brought us the information that General von Hindenburg had inflicted an horrible and telling defeat on the Russians at Tannenberg in East Prussia. As I read over the dispatches, images of pleasant days spent in and near the Masurian lake country came back to me. I also recalled local stories told there of the manner in which Hindenburg had for years past put the Fifth Army Corps through difficult maneuvers in this very lake region in anticipation of just such attacks from the East as the Russians had now undertaken.

"We strolled down the Allee talking of how long we might remain in Germany and of the possible duration of the war. We came into the square as a crowd was forming to celebrate the victory of General von Hindenburg. In this square were several statues—the omnipresent one of Bismarck, as well as others of national heroes—a fitting place indeed for the celebration. An immense crowd pressed around the Bismarck *Denkmal*, from the high base of which army officers and public men made impassioned speeches, promising the people that, now the Russians were defeated, in

a few weeks the armies of the Empire would sweep into Paris and that the navy would defeat the English on the high seas. Thus would Germany and her allies be vindicated. Lusty voices in the crowd took up the song 'Deutschland, Deutschland über alles, über alles in der Welt.'

"Up to this point Jerry and I had shown only a normal interest in listening to the speeches and in watching and hearing the crowd. But the singing of this warlike song, the grip on one's imagination and feeling of the strength of this nation fighting for its territory brought in my own case a great lurch forward, deeper into the crowd. Then came another song—one which has always stirred me. Is it because of my Nordic ancestry and its love of adventure? I do not know. But the music and the words of 'Die Wacht am Rhein' got under my skin, so that I found myself singing the chorus with great force. I felt myself being surcharged again and again with emotion.

"A feeling of expansiveness, of wanting to get into the fight, into the great emotional swing of this people, surged through me. I remarked to Jerry, 'If I were a German I'd be in this thing in a minute.' And I believe that, had this enthusiasm persisted, I should have done so. I had witnessed just this sort of thing in good German friends of mine, men who had once expressed very liberal or even socialistic views, who now actually wept because they could not join the colors at once, but were remanded to civilian life to await their subsequent call from the war office."

Several months after this experience this American wrote:

"It is a curious thing that to this day I cannot hear 'The Watch on the Rhine' without catching something of a martial spirit, a desire to fight, with images of myself in fine uniform, marching in military step with others. This is all perhaps based on childish dreams of being a hero, but it nevertheless illustrates the tremendous suggestion which a singing, shouting crowd may have upon a relative outsider. There is no doubt in my mind that this song has a rhythm which appeals to my early conditioning and even to my prepotent patterns to struggle, to expand and to fight."²

It must be recalled that America and Germany at that time were not at war, that two years of delightful residence in Germany had doubtless left some effects, and that common ideas and customs helped induce these effects. Nevertheless, the suggestions of the moment were evident. If the defeated enemy had been not Russia but the United States, the emotional reaction might have been strong but of an opposite character.

Finally, the facilitating effects of self-stimulation are not to be overlooked. Since we respond to ourselves as others respond to us, in the very process of identification with the leader and with other members of the crowd there arises an inner circuit of self-stimulation. The more we agree, the more we shout; the more we push forward, the greater becomes the drive to carry on overtly in the direction indicated by the leader.

Emotions and the Unconscious. The action-crowd is moved not only by primitive drives but by unconsciously motivated impulses. Not only are the emotions and feelings closely linked to the elemental drives, but they are further roused by social facilitation. In an attack situation both fear and

² From a document in the author's possession.

anger are aroused. Some people fear the consequences of the Negro's intrusion into the white world; some fear the competition of the Jew or the Japanese. Out of such anxiety is born the angry desire to destroy the threat. As we know, the line dividing fear from rage is very thin, and a mixture of the two is common in the action-crowd.

The crowd acts on impulses that are ordinarily suppressed by the individual. That is to say, the source of such impulses is the unconscious. What Sigmund Freud has called the "id" impulses are released; in the terms of G. H. Mead, there is an opportunity for the expression of a less qualified "I"—that is, for an activity that is less inhibited and qualified by the "me's" which have been built up in the family, the play group, and other associations.

The tendencies and attitudes thus released are characterized by what Wilhelm Stekel has called "parapath"—a confusion of reality and fantasy. In other words, fantasy, which influences our attitudes and behavior even in everyday social relations, really comes into its own in the reactions of a crowd. The sense of freedom and irresponsibility which is fostered by the crowd is merely a phase of this dreamlike stage of thought and action.

Such a reaction is illustrated in the following episode: A college student indulged in a rather brutal hazing episode; with about twenty others he took a lad from his room, tore his clothes, handled him roughly, clipped his hair, and with a burning chemical painted some college insignia on his head. The student later remarked:

"After it was over it seemed to me we were all out of our heads at the time; but it was a glorious experience while it lasted. Herb A. and I were the ringleaders. We went to a side door of the house where Mark L. lived and asked for him. When Mark came to the door, we asked him to step on to the porch. Then we all pounced on him, grabbed his legs and arms, and dragged him down the street away from the house. We were in a frenzy of excitement at catching one of the slackers who had failed to take part in the College Day exercises. We met L.'s resistance by superior force and by threats of violence: 'Shut up, or I'll knock your block off!' 'Ah, give him a poke!' We handled him brutally, and the more he fought the more vicious we became—twenty men to one. 'We'd teach these lousy loafers to stay home when the rest of the college spent a day in hard work cleaning up the campus and whitewashing the huge college letter on the mountainside above the town.' There was lots of profanity and a distinct letting go of violent desires. It was all great fun."²

This student also said that afterwards it all "seemed like a dream to him." Later he became well acquainted with the victim and often regretted the episode. After all, as he rationalized it, "Mark was only a symbol" for all the chaps who failed to take part in the College Day exercises.

We should not think that the individuals in a crowd do not know what they are doing. The dissociation is not of the deep sort found in somnambulism or stupor, but rather of the sort found in milder states of disaggregation of consciousness. The point is that the dominating motive is emo-

tional; the intellectual and social concepts of right and wrong, of kindness and fair dealing, are overwhelmed by the impulse to injure someone.

Closely related to such unconsciously directed violence is the fact that the action-crowd tends for the moment to be fixed upon a single line of conduct. Whereas rational thought may be highly variable in direction, the primary drives and the basic emotions of rage, fear, and love take on an all-or-none character. One is either for or against an individual, a race, or a class; one is hostile or friendly to a cause or a person. There are no half-measures, no compromises, once the individual has committed himself to a line of action. This constitutes both the strength and weakness of the crowd-man: strength in action, weakness in rational morality. Men in action-crowds are characterized by a heightened sense of self-importance, by a sense of the absolute rightness of their action, by their sharp division of conduct into good or bad, right or wrong, and by the most elementary emotions.

It is not true, as E. D. Martin contended, that every crowd is opposed to someone or something.³ The spectators gathered to do homage to a returning hero, or the people at a political or fraternal picnic, are not ordinarily dominated by feelings of hostility. In the festival crowd there is much affectional and sympathetic outpouring: everyone is happy and joyous. However, if the members of such a crowd meet opposition, they quickly form an aggressive mass and attempt to break whatever blocks their free-flowing enthusiasm, be it the police, some other crowd, or an inanimate barrier.

This ambivalence of the direction and emotion of the action-crowd is another characteristic. Sometimes when the emotions are aroused the objects of their attention or response may be changed. In fact, the favorite devices for dissipating the intentions of an angry mob are to distract it with humor, to redirect its aggressiveness toward some other object, and to give it some relatively harmless outlet.

The Morality of the Crowd in Action. Another well-known characteristic of the emotional crowd is a change in the moral quality of its members. Almost all commentators have noted that individuals engaged in mass action, be it attack or panic flight, show an amazing lack of what are, under calmer conditions, considered proper morals. There is a release of moral inhibitions. Social taboos are off, and the crowd enjoys a sense of freedom and unrestraint. The feeling of irresponsibility is perhaps not fully conscious. The crowd man is in a state of mental and emotional dissociation. He finds in joint action not only a sense of conformity but a certain sanction. This is seldom rationally derived, but grows out of the situation. Doubtless the defense that "others were doing it, why shouldn't I" is usually a rationalization made *after* the event.

³ See E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, 1920, p. 113.

In many crowds, of course, the leader not only stimulates the mass action but also provides in advance the moral justification for it. The leader of a pogrom, a lynching, or a mutiny usually furnishes his followers with moral reasons for their actions. Such preliminary stimulation doubtless carries them through the period of open violence.

Everett Dean Martin has stressed the sense of righteousness which most crowds exhibit.⁴ Certainly those engaged in a pogrom, a lynching, or a race riot have a great upsurge of moral feelings, the sense of righting some wrong. Even in panic the intense desire for survival may carry with it a certain sense of correctness. Though the acts performed may be viewed in retrospect as immoral, and may later induce a sense of shame, remorse, and guilt, at the time they seem completely justified.

Not only does the crowd man justify his acts in the very process of performing them, but there is usually a sense of absoluteness about his behavior. The very fact that such highly emotional acts take on an all-or-none character lends support to the sense of absoluteness. Men would be more cautious, more given to weighing pros and cons, in circumstances permitting contemplation and logical examination. In mass attack or flight this is not possible. Should rational considerations begin to arise in enough individuals, the crowd would begin to disintegrate. We must never forget that a participant in a dynamic crowd is motivated by rudimentary drives, such as those related to survival, sex, and basic status, and that the aggressive expression of these is facilitated by the "crowd stimuli." Action in such a situation induces its own form of morality, which is often in striking contrast to that usually accepted as right and proper in the community.

As suggested at the outset of this chapter, the emotional action-crowd is one extreme in a behavior continuum the other terminus of which is the formalized audience. The next section will take up various psychological aspects of the audience.

THE NATURE OF THE AUDIENCE

The audience is a form of institutionalized crowd. The gathering is controlled by certain cultural codes, patterns of polarization, and regularities of ritual and behavior. Audiences gather for a more or less definite purpose at a predetermined time and place. The polarization between the performer and the audience tends, at its height, to be of the all-to-one and one-to-all kind. The one-to-one relations among the members of the audience vary with the intensity of the major polarization.

Types of Audience. It is difficult to classify audiences satisfactorily. We shall confine the concept to gatherings in which there are a performer or performers (speaker, actor, singer, juggler) in the dominant role and persons in considerable numbers who attend to what the performer does.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 155-156.

A congressional committee or a board of directors is not an audience, nor is a jury deliberating a case. Yet the latter may be a part of a courtroom audience when it listens to an argument between the contending attorneys. So, too, a committee, a conference, a debating society, or a research seminar takes on some features of an audience if one member takes the floor for any length of time and the others merely listen. The function as well as the structure and organization determine whether or not there is an audience.

Audiences might be classified as passive⁵ and active, the former being marked by the submissiveness of its members, the latter by the dynamic interaction between the performer and its members. Yet this classification is hardly satisfactory, for the degree of interaction may vary within a single audience. We might resort to sociology and classify audiences, in terms of broad public interests or institutions, as economic, political, religious, and recreational. The present writer earlier used a twofold classification, the *information-seeking* and the *recreation-seeking* audience. To this, however, we shall add a third class: the *conversional* audience, which has come to be persuaded.⁵

Basic Characteristics of the Audience. The chief characteristics of the audience are (1) that it has a specific purpose, (2) that it meets at a pre-determined time and place, and (3) that it has a standard form of polarization and interaction. Our tentative classification of audiences will give broad distinctions of purpose. The physical features of the meeting place aid in determining the polarization. For example, the seating arrangement is designed to produce a polarization of common attitudes. The seats are usually arranged in rows, often in arcs, in front of which is the raised speaker's stand or actor's stage. Usually the lighting and the acoustics are also designed to foster crowdlike polarization. The seating facilitates attention to the performer rather than to other members of the audience. Though the shoulder-to-shoulder configuration of the crowd is found in the audience, the spacing of seats prevents close contact and thus inhibits the rise of crowd drives beyond a certain point. A cunning appeal to prejudice may convert an audience into a dynamic crowd, but the physical arrangement does not itself foster such a development.

Casual observation and experience show that the reactions of the audience are influenced by the size of the hall, by the number who attend, and by many other conditions. For example, if one were to plan a protest meeting—a type of conversional gathering—it would be wise to secure a hall which would by ordinary standards be too small for the expected numbers.

⁵ This concept was suggested by R. T. LaPiere's "conversional-lecture" category. LaPiere appears to have two basic classes, dramatic audience and lecture audience, and to include the conversional as a subcategory of the latter. See his *Collective Behavior*, 1938, chap. 11.

That is, it would be more effective to crowd 200 persons into a room which normally seated only 150 than to scatter the 200 persons in a hall that would easily seat 500. Also of importance are the temperature, the humidity, the ventilation, the lighting, the kind of seats, and the kind of decorations.

The performer's relation to his audience is standardized. Unless the room is very small, there is usually a raised platform or stage for the performer. This permits the audience and the performer to see each other better, but it also sets the performer off from his audience. The audience has, literally, to look up to him; the illusion of his superiority and the passivity of the audience are both enhanced.

A stand may be used for a speaker's notes, but its principal purpose is to set the speaker still farther apart from his auditors. The writer knows a professor who cannot lecture unless he has a reading stand before him; he says that he is "uncomfortable" without it, that he feels "exposed to the students" if he does not have it. The stage has the barrier of the orchestra pit and especially of the footlights, which emphasize the separation of the actors from the audience.

The speaker is generally the active agent in this form of social interaction. He carries ideas and emotions along with him. By painting verbal pictures, by telling stories, by explaining facts or arguing logically, he suggests the trend of imagery and recalls associated feelings. The auditor is the passive member in this one-to-all relation. Though his mind may be full of images and his body full of aroused emotions and feelings, he remains relatively inactive. Whenever the audience begins to act, the purely active-passive relation breaks down. Laughter, tears, applause, shouts of approval, and boos of disapproval are ideomotor evidences of the more active participation of the audience. In some situations the speaker makes a definite bid for this sort of response; in others it is accidental. In a serious, formal lecture by a scientist, it may be quite unconventional and distinctly poor form.

For the most part, the relation of speaker and audience is one of domination and submission, or of active and passive participation. The speaker is superior, at least temporarily. He carries us along with him. We do not dominate him to any extent. Sometimes he dominates us by ideas, and at other times he arouses our fear, sorrow, anger, or laughter. In any case, our participation is less determined by our own initiative than it is suggested by his actions.

On the other hand members of the audience influence the performer. A speaker may arouse aggressive attitudes in his hearers, and their negative reaction may cause him to alter his words; or his appeals may enhance their identification with him. At times, as in vaudeville, the whole relation

of the performer and the audience becomes a game to see which will submit to the other. The audience's passivity toward the performer is always relative.

PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AUDIENCE

The interaction of the audience and its leader, be he actor, speaker or some other performer, follows certain psychological processes from the preliminary stages to the conclusion. These processes involve not only the interactions between the performer and the audience but also the interactions among the members of the audience. We shall discuss the following psychological processes of such interactions: preliminary tuning, establishment of initial relations, maintenance of rapport, suggestion and persuasion, and incitement to action.

The methods of attracting and interesting an audience will vary, of course, with the kind of audience, the cultural background of its members, the purpose of the meeting, and the time and place. In the discussion which follows we shall draw illustrations from different kinds of audiences, but we cannot undertake a detailed analysis of all the rich variety of such gatherings.

Preliminary Tuning. By *preliminary tuning* we mean appeals made in advance which set up anticipatory reactions. The statement of the aim—real or ostensible—is usually important. In our society advertising may be used to stir up interest. The news columns of the press, the radio, and the motion picture may also be used. Press reviews or radio comments on plays or future programs aid in stimulating public attention. Conversation among interested persons about the future gathering may be common, and one of the purposes of advertising, press comments, and the like is to set such talk going among potential listeners and spectators. Drama uses famous names to draw its audience. A large information-seeking audience can be built up for a well-known scientist, philosopher, statesman, or general while a more competent but less famous man attracts few listeners. On the whole, managers use more emotional appeals for recreational and conversational than for information-seeking audiences. These differences are derived largely from convention. We expect the flaming poster and the exaggerated promises of the circus or musical comedy or million-dollar film production and would ordinarily pay little attention to these appeals if they were not put in sensational form.

The preliminary stimulation, however, does not cease when the listeners or spectators appear at the predetermined place and time. The announced purpose of the meeting has set up certain mental associations. The anticipatory reactions of the audience in a church differ sharply from those of an audience attending a vaudeville show or a well-advertised comedy. The quietness of the church, the stained-glass windows, the symbols of

worship, and the lighting effects enhance the traditional reverential attitude. In contrast, the bright lights, garish decorations, and hustle and bustle of the theater foster other attitudes and ideas.

Initial Phases of Audience Reactions. The beginning of the concert, play, lecture, or sermon is marked by some formality or social ritual or other device for focusing the attention of the audience on the leader. The loose one-to-one relations among the audience are dissipated, and the all-to-one pattern, the crowd polarization, begins. One old device for bringing about this change is a sudden appeal to a different sense. Thus the lowering of the house lights, the blare of loud trumpets announcing the appearance of the statesman or public hero, the training of a spotlight on the speaker's stand, will lower the buzz of conversation in the audience and turn attention to the performer. However, mechanical appeals are most effective with younger, less intelligent, and more emotional audiences. Such devices are really part of the institutional ceremonials of party rallies, public celebrations for heroes, and fraternal occasions rather than for serious information-seeking audiences.

Securing and Maintaining Rapport. The first purpose—to secure the attention of the audience—having been attained, the next step is, on the basis of the preliminary tuning, to secure the *rapport* of the audience.

There is some evidence that the influence of the performer on the audience does not flow out from him in concentric circles or in straight lines, but goes in a zigzag manner to the most susceptible persons, who, in turn, serve as centers of radiation to those about them. It is well to locate such potential centers of further radiation. In an audience which has a choice of unreserved free seats, the most suggestible points are usually in the central section, but in some kinds of audience those seeking the front seats are the most ready to react.

The opening remarks of a scientist before his peers may be dull and somewhat desultory, yet no one would consider them a serious breach of etiquette. In contrast, in a comedy, the first lines may set the quality of an entire scene or act. In conversational gatherings there is often a deliberate technique for securing immediately the active participation of the audience. The aim is to arouse individuals emotionally and to produce attitudes like those of an action-crowd. A musical director for a well-known evangelist thus described the procedure at revival meetings:

"At the appointed hour we began the services by getting the entire audience to join in singing. I began with any common songs which I thought the people would know. These did not have to be, in fact they seldom were, religious. Rather they were old favorite folksongs of America: 'Old Black Joe,' 'Dixie,' 'My Old Kentucky Home.' In the years of the war [1914-1918] and shortly thereafter, 'Tipperary' was popular. Almost any song which everyone knew was good. Even romantic or slightly jazzy songs were acceptable at first. The principal idea was to get everybody singing. After a

few of these popular songs I had them sing more religious pieces such as 'Onward Christian Soldiers.' The religious songs, however, needed to have no direct relation to the subject of the revivalist's address. Only toward the end of the opening period of song did we introduce religious songs bearing more directly on the subject of the evening."⁶

This technique is obvious. Group singing breaks down the sense of individual isolation. It removes differences of social status and builds up common emotions and feelings. It is peculiarly effective in wiping out the sense of intellectual divergence. Rich and poor, urban and rural, high-church and low-church, Christian and non-Christian—all may meet on the common ground of old familiar tunes. With this as a bridge the speaker can lead his audience into the promised land of religious experience.

It is always well to take into account the physical conditions that affect the attentiveness of a particular audience, such as temperature, ventilation, and humidity, and the probable degrees of attentiveness of different audiences. A producer of stock plays in a university town once remarked that he found sharp differences in the audience's responses on different nights of the week. Wednesday night, he said, was "a bad night" because so many young couples were there who seemed more concerned with each other than with the play. The Thursday evening attendants, usually older married couples who had dined out, it being "the maid's night off," were more sober and more attentive. Saturday afternoons the theater was often filled with youngsters who easily became rowdy.

Educational psychology has taught us much about the best methods of impressing an audience, especially when the audience is seeking information. What the psychologist calls the "attention span" of an audience is a function of intelligence and education. The more heterogeneous the audience, the more a speaker must allow for a short attention span. Long and involved sentences induce fatigue and loss of interest. In general, sentences of more than twenty-five words are to be avoided, even before specialized audiences of professional people. The rhythm of speaking, the quality of the voice, and the placing of emphasis are important.

In this connection we may note Henry T. Moore's study of the relative effectiveness of reading from a manuscript and free speaking from notes. Material on the scientific work of Helmholtz, the physicist, was given to one group by the formal reading of a paper, to another by speech from notes only. When tested later on the information gained from these presentations, those who got their facts from the freely delivered speech had retained 36 per cent more than had those to whom the information was given from a prepared manuscript.⁷

⁶ From a document in the author's possession.

⁷ H. T. Moore, "The Attention Value of Lecturing Without Notes," *J. Educational Psychology*, 1919, 10: 467-469.

Though we cannot generalize from this study, it is well recognized that audiences—except highly specialized ones—react less sympathetically and with less attention to formally read papers than to freely delivered speeches.

As a rule, a combination of visual and auditory material is superior to either kind alone. Diagrams, graphs, and pictures are more effective when they precede than when they follow oral explanation. Visual aids are particularly effective with audiences that are unfamiliar with the material, and with younger and less intelligent groups. Concrete material is remembered better than abstract. Yet the typical educated audience, given information in a field with which it is already fairly familiar, may be expected to forget two thirds of the facts within a week.

In this connection we may quote H. L. Hollingworth's summary of studies of the relative effectiveness of various modes of presenting material to high-school and college students.⁸

<i>Study by:</i>	<i>Best Method</i>	<i>Second Best</i>	<i>Poorest Method</i>
Kirkpatrick	Objects seen and words heard	Words seen only	Words heard only
Pohlman	Objects seen only or with words heard	Words seen and heard, or heard	Words seen only
Moore	Objects or pictures seen	Words seen only	Words heard only
Erickson and King	Lesson heard only		Lesson seen (read)
Sumstine	Motion pictures seen only	Film seen and lecture heard	Lecture heard only
Lacy	Story heard only	Story seen (read)	Film seen only
Weber (1)	Film seen and story heard	Film seen only	Story heard only
Worcester	Materials heard		Materials seen
Weber (2)	No considerable differences between film alone, story heard, film and story heard, and story read silently, except for ability to draw objects, in which the visual methods were superior.		

Some of the well-known means of impressing auditors are emphatic presentation, repetition, development of material to a climax, and review at the close of the session. Yet research shows that repetition follows a law of diminishing returns. Usually not more than three repetitions need be made, but the number will vary with the intelligence of the audience, the nature of the matter presented, and other factors. Adolf Hitler, like other

⁸ Slightly rearranged, from H. L. Hollingworth, *Psychology of the Audience*, 1935, p. 73..
By permission of American Book Co. The original citations are given in Hollingworth.

demagogues, made effective use of simple appeals frequently presented. What was found true for American high-school and college students in this regard may not apply to mass audiences made up of a cross-section of the nation's population. Advertisers and some speakers have shown that for some kinds of material anticlimax is more effective than climax. (See Chapter XIX on newspaper make-up.) And it has been shown in many instances that the first argument is the most effective.⁹ The device of permitting questions and open discussion at the close of a lecture fixes facts and interpretations more firmly in the minds of the audience. However, democratic discussion may break the emotional hold, and the manipulators of conversional audiences seldom wish this to happen. In recreational audiences, of course, there is little or no provision for this kind of audience-performer interplay.

Suggestion and Persuasion in Audience Situations. The masses have more in common at an emotional and primary-drive level than at an intellectual level. If the purpose of a gathering is to convert those present to a course of action, or to impress them with sentiments and values, or to provide emotional release, the appeals made to them will be different from the appeals made to an information-seeking audience. A variety of techniques of suggestion and persuasion may be used.

One method of persuading an audience is the building up of an apparently logical but basically emotional argument. This method meets our cultural expectation of logical reasons for our acts, an expectation to which we are conditioned in the home, in the school, and in other groups where we get our basic training. If we believed that outright emotional appeals were valid, we might not need such roundabout ways of persuasion. Specialized training in science, art, or business by no means provides against susceptibility to logically fallacious argument. Even leaders in these fields succumb to the blandishments of the shrewd manipulator of public sentiment.

Some common forms of faulty argument are confusing logic with appeals to authority or prejudice, confusing anecdote with proof, using analogy and metaphor as evidence, implying that statistical correlation indicates causation, confusing high-sounding words with profundity, and affirming the well-known *post hoc, ergo propter hoc*. In the discussion of public issues, especially, these devices are used. Since we are trained to defer to authority, the citation of prestige-bearing names or principles quickly convinces most of us. Our prejudices as to class, race, and religion—as we noted in Chapters XI and XII—are easily rationalized in terms of false assumptions about biological or psychological differences. A mere sequence of events is often mistaken for proof of genuine causal relations.

⁹ See F. H. Lund, "The Psychology of Belief," *J. Abnormal Psychology*, 1925, 20: 63-81, 174-196.

A false premise often becomes the basis of assumed results. For instance, the "encirclement" thesis in international relations being accepted, national aggressiveness against a neighboring nation is taken for granted. This familiar paranoid pattern is often found in arguments addressed to audiences in times of crisis.

The changing of ideas, opinions, and attitudes takes place at varying rates. New opinions seem to be more easily formed by persons who are undecided than by those who have already made up their minds. Changes in conviction may take place in connection with topics on which the audience has some information. However, as a rule, listening to an argument favorable to one's views seems to strengthen opinions already held. On the other hand, neutral or indifferent opinions seem less stable than decided ones. If neutral views are changed they seem to move in the direction of those held by the majority. There are some variations in these matters, of course, in terms of age, intensity of conviction, and culture.

Relation of Audience Response to Overt Action. Whether or not an audience is stimulated to direct action will depend on the purpose of those who initiate and manage the occasion. Information-seeking audiences, for the most part, congregate to get facts and interpretations and not to act. The ideas and attitudes presented in school and in public lectures are thought to influence later, but not present, conduct. The participation of recreational audiences may be enthusiastic at the time, as at football or baseball games, but no subsequent action is anticipated. In the conversional audience, however, or in one altered by appeal from the information-seeking or the recreational into this type, persuasion may lead to overt action. When this occurs, the audience becomes a kind of action-crowd, which we have already treated.

A common method of turning a passive audience into an active crowd is to shift the attention from general to particular considerations. For example, a meeting called to hear appeals for a local organization of a Ku Klux Klan might be whipped up emotionally to undertake a raid on a Negro residential section, a Catholic church, or a Jewish store. In the shift from generality and vagueness to specific plans of action, various techniques of suggestion may be used: vivid and repeated appeals to deep prejudices or to prestige and class status, or to slogans, catchwords, well-worn myths and legends. The appeals touch off elemental drives for survival, sexual expression, and the protection of status; when they are reinforced by the audience itself, the latter has become an action-crowd.

In these operations leaders, abetted by well-organized *claqueurs* in the audience, play a dominant role. The stage is deliberately set for the stimulation of action among the members of the party and in the larger audience outside. The use of lights, flags, bands, and enormous halls or open plazas, the marching and countermarching, the fanfare and excitement,

inhibit rational habits and ideas and replace them with emotional enthusiasm for the party or national destiny or whatever end the manipulators have in mind. In the Middle Ages, during the crusades, large gatherings were held to excite the populace against the infidel; today the purpose is usually political. The content of the appeals may have changed, but the social-psychological techniques are about the same. The one special characteristic of modern mass appeals is the deliberate and carefully planned use of all the known devices. Revolutionary dictators and their henchmen have learned to exploit all the old psychological principles for a single end. It is, however, only in this sense that contemporary mass appeals and mass action differ from those of earlier times.

MASS SOCIETY AND CROWD BEHAVIOR

The nature of mass society and its relation to secondary-group organization in our machine age were discussed briefly in Chapter I. The concept *mass society* expresses the fact that individuals living under modern technology develop psychological characteristics that are not found in older primary-group associations. Today, under urban conditions especially, we have a mass of isolated individuals, interdependent in all sorts of specialized and external ways, yet lacking any close sense of personal intimacy and emotional security, and often having no central unifying value or purpose. In a sense modern urban culture has produced a crowd-minded society, with transitory contacts, emotional reactions, irrationality, and values quite different from those of more stable cultures.

Some Basic Features of Mass Society. The most important characteristics of mass society, and their implications for individual and group life, may be summarized as follows: (1) There is a stress on rationality, specialization of role or function, impersonality and impermanence of contact, and self-assertiveness; these indicate the loss of the warm intimacy and emotion of unity and solidarity that we find in the primary group and in the older secondary associations that drew their social support from the primary contacts of their members. (2) Such a condition fosters a sense of personal insecurity, loneliness, and incompleteness, with the result that (3) there are a widespread democratization of wants and a growing demand for their equalitarian satisfaction. (4) As a result of this and of the high division of labor, the older dominant class, or elite, has been challenged, and class organization is in a state of great flux. (5) There arises a strong desire for social-cultural conditions which will restore at least some of the needed emotional warmth, integration, and sense of security. The old cultural order no longer fits the complex demands of life. (6) Despite the rationality implied in the machine process, in scientific ideology, in specialization of function, and in individual rewards (wages, profits, and prestige), there

is a marked increase of irrational and emotional thought and conduct. The manifestations of this are evident in the increased desire for crowd contacts, as at sport events, political rallies, prize fights, and motion-picture houses, and in less frequent but more violent mob actions. (7) In these situations suggestion, persuasion, emotional appeals, vicarious adventure, and vicarious security are provided. A mixture of the rational and irrational carries the individual away and gives him the sense of intimacy, solidarity, and completeness of response that he lacks in his more rational and routine contacts. (8) But such mass security is temporary; it does not afford the permanence and continuity which the human being craves as a foundation for his life.

Individual Adjustment in Mass Society. The many demands for individual choice in the midst of numberless contacts and means of satisfaction leave the individual distraught and dissatisfied. As a result, he indulges in thoughts and actions that resemble in many ways those of the member of an action-crowd. A transitory and emotional or irrational quality makes his attitudes and values different from the more stable and rational ones assumed in traditional social life. Old moral codes appear outworn; personal loyalties of the past mean little or nothing; he desires to get everything he can for himself "while the getting is good"; there is a certain disintegration of life organization. This may reflect the breakdown of society's moral order. Man in mass society is easily aroused to a pitch of enthusiasm for this cause or that, but may be thrown into despair by reverses as easily as the man in an action-crowd. He not only seeks a sense of solidarity and security by joining with his fellows in crowds and audiences but identifies himself with the vague and amorphous publics that are addressed by the printed page or the radio.

In such uncertainty and insecurity, the individual may seek his satisfying integration in any number of ways. It is here that the demagogue and a cause—political, religious, or other—come into being. New leaders and would-be ruling groups arise, with promises to provide for the masses the very solidarity, permanence, and economic and emotional security which they want. The full dinner pail, a thousand years of peace and power, a planned and beautiful society, a new heaven and a new earth with no wants and no problems—these and similar entrancing prospects are heralded abroad. Moreover, the most effective of the modern demagogues not only use propaganda and indoctrination but organize to assume dominance and leadership over the masses. This organization takes two forms: the close-knit group of would-be revolutionists and manipulators, and the more extended organization of the masses themselves. The latter not only provides great satisfactions for the otherwise unorganized and more or less amorphous mass of mankind, but serves as a channel of expression for the deep-felt need of solidarity, of the sense of belonging, of close identification,

which has become dissipated in the atomistic massing of people with values that stress individual power, initiative, and rationality.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

On crowd behavior, see H. Cantril, *The Psychology of Social Movements*, 1941, chap. 4; H. Cantril, *The Invasion of Mars. A Study in the Psychology of Panic*, 1940; R. T. LaPiere, *Collective Behavior*, 1938, chaps. 17, 18, 19, 20; G. Le Bon, *The Crowd*, 14th impression, 1922; E. D. Martin, *The Behavior of Crowds*, 1920; N. E. Miller and J. Dollard, *Social Learning and Imitation*, 1941, chaps. 14, 15; K. Young, *Source Book for Social Psychology*, 1927, chap. 22.

On audiences, see H. L. Hollingworth, *The Psychology of the Audience*, 1935; K. Young, *op. cit.*, chap. 23.

On the nature of mass society, see E. Lederer, *The State of the Masses—The Threat of a Classless Society*, 1940; Karl Mannheim, *Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction*, 1940; Sigmund Neumann, *Permanent Revolution*, 1942, chaps. 4, 7; and Jose Ortega y Gasset, *The Revolt of the Masses*, 1932.

Chapter XVII

FASHION

AS AN EXAMPLE of collective action, the following of fashion has much in common with crowd behavior. Fashions formerly spread and changed slowly, by personal contact, but today they spread and change quickly, by our modern means of rapid communication and transportation. They are, therefore, related to the behavior of the public as well as to that of the crowd. This chapter will deal with the nature of fashion, fad, and craze, with certain psychological features of these, and with the social functions of fashion change.

THE NATURE OF FASHION

Fashion may be defined as the current or prevailing usage, mode, manner, or characteristic of expression, presentation, or conception of those particular cultural traits which custom itself allows to change. If we consider custom as a stable and persistent phase of social behavior, fashion may be thought of as a variation permissible within this general acceptance. In other words, fashion applies to the prevalent mode in those things in a culture which are subject to periodic change in form. Fashions in clothes, architecture, vehicles, conversation, and in the arts and in popular philosophy appear and disappear. There is always a time sequence to be considered in dealing with fashion.

The term style is often associated with fashion and fashion change, but it is at best a vague concept. It may variously refer to manner of expression or action, as when we speak of a golfer's "style of play," or to a characteristic mode of presentation or manufacture, as in talking of "Renaissance style." But in addition, in other cases, style is used in the sense of individual quality or production, as in speaking of an author's own style, or in reference to what some psychologists call a person's "style of life" as distinct from the life organization of another. Where the term style is used in this discussion, the context will indicate its meaning.

Fashion, Custom, and Social Organization. Fashions are not in the mores; they are among the nonmoral folkways. The social currents of thought and action upon which fashion depends are impermanent and superficial; and, in contrast with mores, which alter slowly, fashions are highly temporary and are always in flux. Yet in their time fashions seem important and

significant. They are a part of the social ritual. They have, as Herbert Spencer said, a ceremonial aspect. In a society like ours, fashion touches many aspects of human behavior. In a static society where class or caste lines are firmly drawn, fashion in the modern sense of rapid change can hardly be said to exist. Fashion affects only articles of competitive consumption, which, in our society, cheap manufacture has brought within reach of ever larger numbers. In the so-called backward culture areas, things which we commonly consider to be determined by fashion—forms of clothing, ornamentation, housing, vehicles, amusements—may be highly standardized.

In some societies an infraction of the conventions of dress not only leads to ridicule and minor social pressure, but may, like violation of the mores, be dealt with in more drastic ways. The castes of India have not only distinctive forms of language but rigid forms of dress and manners. To them the old ways are the right ways. The degree to which rigidity may go in some societies is described by Lafcadio Hearn:

"Every class of Japanese society was under sumptuary regulation. . . . The nature of [the controls] . . . is best indicated by the regulations applying to the peasantry. Every detail of the farmer's existence was prescribed for by law,—from the size, form, and cost of his dwelling, down even to such trifling matters as the number and the quality of the dishes to be served to him at meal-times. . . . A farmer with a property assessed at twenty *koku* (of rice) was not allowed to build a house more than thirty-six feet long, or to use in building it such superior qualities of wood as *keyaki* or *hinoki*. The roof of his house was to be made of bamboo-thatch or straw; and he was strictly forbidden the comfort of floor-mats. On the occasion of the wedding of his daughter he was forbidden to have fish or any roasted food served at the wedding-feast. The women of his family were not allowed to wear leather sandals: they might wear only straw-sandals or wooden clogs; and the thongs of the sandals or the clogs were to be made of cotton. Women were further forbidden to wear hair-bindings of silk, or hair ornaments of tortoise-shells; but they might wear wooden combs and combs of bone—not ivory. The men were forbidden to wear stockings, and their sandals were to be made of bamboo [grass]. They were also forbidden to use sunshades . . . or paper umbrellas. . . .

"In Izumo I found that, prior to Meiji, there were sumptuary laws prescribing not only the materials of the dresses to be worn by the various classes, but even the colors of them, and the designs of the patterns. The size of the rooms, as well as the size of houses, was fixed there by law,—also the height of buildings and of fences, the number of windows, the material of construction." ¹

Similar distinctions in dress have been used in other societies to mark one class off from another. In Greek society veils, and parasols carried by slaves, distinguished the woman of rank from other women. In Europe during the Middle Ages "the veils of princesses and queens came down to their feet

¹ From L. Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation*, 1904, pp. 182, 183, 184, 186. By permission of The Macmillan Company, publishers.

and were surmounted by a crown; those of plebeian women came only to the waist, and no crown was worn." During the seventeenth century "the length of the train denoted the rank of the wearer. Seventeen yards was the prescribed length for the queen, ten yards for the king's daughters, seven yards for other princesses, and four yards for duchesses."²

In Europe there still exist distinctive dress, dialects, and manners in the various social classes. In the isolated areas even the older peasant costumes persist. Wherever class lines are sharply drawn, there is a tendency to conservatism in matters which in democratic countries are subject to changes in fashion.

Class lines are more sharply drawn in England than in this country. Before World War II an English merchant would scarcely have felt comfortable if he had not dressed for dinner, whereas in America dressing for dinner is far less common among persons of corresponding wealth and education. We see the influence of ancient convention in the clothes of British royalty. The court follows long-established forms. On certain formal occasions the clothes and ornamentation of previous centuries are required. During his visits in Scotland the king must on occasion wear kilts.

In the mass society of the West, with its swift changes and heightened animation, its mobility and rapid communication, fashions change rapidly, and the changes are among the life expectancies. Today the control of fashion over our lives is everywhere evident. It has a distinctive place in our life organization.

The cyclic changes in modern fashion have often been noted. What is in vogue today may tomorrow be quite *passé*. A. L. Kroeber studied the cycles in women's styles by examining fashion plates of the years 1844-1919. He used various measurements: the total length of the figure from the center of the mouth to the tip of the toe; the distance from the mouth to the bottom of the skirt as a measure of the height of the gown above the ground; the distance from the mouth to the narrowest part of the waist as a measure of the length of the waist; the depth of the décolletage; the diameter of the skirt at the hem. We briefly summarize some of his findings:

The figures on the ratio of the width of the skirt to the total height of the figure show that there was a rapid widening of the skirts from 1844 to 1859, when the width of the skirts was greater than the entire height of the figure. These were the days of crinoline. There followed, with variations up and down, a decline in the width of skirts until 1910-1911, when the hobble skirt was in vogue. A sharp rise up to 1917 was followed by a drop in 1918.

In 1844 the skirt barely escaped touching the ground. From 1860 to 1870 there were slight fluctuations, the skirts sometimes sweeping the ground and at other times rising an inch or two above. From 1875 to 1887 skirts became shorter, not so short as

² Elizabeth Hurlock, *The Psychology of Dress: An Analysis of Fashion and Its Motive*, 1929, p. 32. By permission of Ronald Press, publishers.

later, but definitely off the ground even to the extent of exposing the shoes. From the late 1890's to 1910 skirts swept the ground. After Kroeber's report a very rapid shortening of skirts lasted until about 1927. In the 1930's skirts were longer, and they were shortened again about 1940.

Décolletage and length of waist fluctuated, the former showing no significant trend, but the latter showing a definite cycle of fifty years: the longest waists in 1853, the shortest in 1903. The relation of width of waist to height of figure also shows variations. From 1844 to 1867 lacing was very tight. Then there was a period when lacing was not so tight. In the 1880's and 1890's tight corsets were in vogue. From about 1905 on a distinct widening of the waist marked the beginning of the trend toward the elimination of corsets which was practically accomplished about the end of World War I.³

Agnes Brooks Young found that "fashion change in women's dress is a continuous slow process of modification" and that the modifications take place within well-defined phases, which are characterized by the forms of the skirt. In modern times, at least, there have been only three such forms: the bell-shaped skirt, the tubular skirt, and the skirt with back-fullness. From 1760 to 1790 the skirt with back-fullness was in fashion; from 1805 to 1825 it was superseded by the tubular skirt; from 1830 to 1860 the bell-shaped skirt was fashionable. From 1870 to 1895 the skirt with back-fullness was popular again, and from 1910 to the present the tubular skirt has once more been in vogue.⁴

These and other investigations show that fashions follow certain rhythms, and that we can measure trends in fashion statistically, but that we can predict only the general direction of such trends, not their exact direction or quantity. Paul Poiret, the famous "King of Fashion," once remarked:

"It is not possible to predict Style. Everything, indeed, is permitted. Style makes progress by contrasts, and one must expect anything from it in the way of excess. Think of the cries that would have been uttered in 1900 if the public had seen women walking along the streets with the short skirts now worn. And if, tomorrow on Fifth Avenue, a fashionable woman is seen wearing trousers, what will your grandparents say?"⁵

As we shall note below, it is a popular misconception to attribute change in fashion to business interests. Cycles of fashion depend on something psychologically and culturally deeper than a passing advertising campaign.

Fads and Crazes as Extreme Fashion. The more superficial aspects of fashion change are often referred to as "crazes," "rages," or "fads." A fad

³ Adapted with some slight additions from A. L. Kroeber, "On the Principle of Order in Civilization as Exemplified by Changes of Fashion," *American Anthropologist*, 1919, 21: 235-263.

⁴ Agnes Brooks Young, *Recurring Cycles of Fashion, 1760-1937*, 1937, pp. 205 ff.

⁵ Paul Poiret, "Who Sets Our Styles?" *Forum*, 1928, 80: 192. Courtesy of publishers and of American agent of M. Poiret, Mr. Charles I. Reid. Since this was written, many women wearing trousers—politely called slacks—have appeared on Fifth Avenue.

is usually confined to minor details of dress or ornamentation. Moreover, its effect is usually bizarre, and it is often disapproved by conservatives as being in "bad taste." A craze, or rage, is a more extensive and persistent fad and is more deviant in form. Crazes are stimulating, vivid, and exciting. They are really mental epidemics.

For more than a quarter of a century (1914-1941) E. S. Bogardus has collected—with the help of about 150 persons over the country—a list of over 2,700 fads. These he grouped into eight categories representing phases of human life and interest. Any fad listed by the informants was not recorded as such unless it was cited by at least five persons. Fads in "women's dress and decoration" led the list with 57 per cent, those in men's clothes came next with 16 per cent, and the third in order of frequency was "amusements and recreation" with 8.6 per cent. Other fads, with small percentages of notation, were automobiles, "slanguage," architecture, and education. Other findings of Bogardus show that fads represent highly superficial aspects of behavior, that most fads survive less than one year, that there is a rapid acceleration in the rate of adoption till a given fad reaches a plateau of popularity, and then begins a decline, sometimes of sharp and sudden nature.⁶

Verbal fads have an amazing popularity. They become so much a part of daily speech that they seem to be indispensable parts of the language. In the 1910's "Twenty-three skiddoo!" and "Oh you kid!" were fads in phrases; in the 1930's and 1940's "Oh, yeah?", "How come?", "Says who?", "So what?", "But definitely!" are on every tongue. A short but widespread fad was that of the "Confucius say" phrases.

"It's sweeping the country! National magazines picture it and liven up their ads with it. Newspapers conduct contests for it. Radio comedians pepper their gags with it. High-school chatter columns are full of it. Popular songs blazon it on their covers. Spring sport dresses say it in colors. . . . What is it? Listen:

" 'Confucius say:

'Chemist who fall in acid absorbed in work!'

'People call him a card because he look like the deuce!'

'Eye resemble schoolmaster . . . always has pupil under lash.'

'Man who drive with one hand on wheel have one foot in grave!'

'When a man bring home the bacon, wife want the whole hog!'"⁷

People in America apparently must have their little fads and crazes. A list of the crazes that have taken the American people by storm during the past few decades would doubtless include knock, knock; handies; miniature (midget) golf; garterless socks; boop-boop-a-doop; mah-jong; the big

⁶ See E. S. Bogardus, *Fundamentals of Social Psychology*, 3rd ed., 1942, pp. 306-309.

⁷ Reprinted from *Scholastic, the American High School Weekly*, March 18, 1940, 36: 35. By permission of the editors.

apple; flagpole-sitting; marathon dancing; walkathon; tree-sitting; *Bei mir bist du schön*; jam and jive sessions; zoot suits; swallowing goldfish; Sadie Hawkins day; crossword puzzles; bank night; Baby Wampas stars; Eskimo pies; Mickey Mouse; cellophane raincoats; jig-saw puzzles; chain letters; pinball; and many others.

Occasionally fads become much more than temporary individual tastes or group crazes. They become ritualized and stable and pass over into the realm of fashion and convention. Such a change from fad to fashion is apparently exemplified by the use of the fan. The fan first appeared as only a superficial part of the costume. Then,

"... No lady would appear at the theater, walk on the boulevards, go to church, take her marriage vows, mourn at a funeral, stand trial for a felony or commit a murder without her trusty fan in hand. Charlotte Corday appeared before Marat in his bath, a knife in one hand, her fan in the other, and consummated the crime that has handed her down to posterity.

"During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries a lady would as soon have appeared in public without her little pink shirt as without her fan. It was, for centuries, not only the indispensable accessory of every costume but of every act of her life. It was her chief weapon in flirtation, the accent of every gesture, the screen for her blushes, the interpreter of her moods. It was her tongue, her wit, her modesty itself. A woman might have every other charm in the world, but if she couldn't handle a fan she just quietly sank below the social horizon."⁸

That was in Europe. In the Orient men, not women, carried fans.

THE PSYCHOLOGY OF FASHION

A psychology of fashion should try to explain our curious modern habit of looking for the novel, the exciting, the different, in dress, decoration, speech, and manner. The modern specialized, mobile world is dynamic and changing, in contrast with the static life of previous ages. Men have always been attracted by color, pleasant sounds, dancing, and chances for recreation, but today this seeking and following of changes in fashion is in the folkways. It is a part of our daily existence, and we are accustomed to it as thoroughly as the stable Chinese population is attuned to local custom and ancestor-worship.

Individualism and Conformity in Fashion. Like so much of our social behavior, the search for fashion is an outgrowth of our emotional and irrational tendencies. In a world increasingly dominated by mass-society organization, with its impersonality, anonymity, and mobility, fashion gives us new experience and also a chance to deviate, at least for a time, from the mass—especially in the individualization permitted in the acceptance of new styles. Sound practice in fashion does not demand slavish conform-

⁸ Marie Beynon Ray, "Flutter of Fans," *The Mentor*, 1930, 17: 28. Springfield, Ohio, The Crowell Publishing Co. By permission of the author.

ity but rather adaptation within a permissible range of choice. Alexander Goldenweiser brings this out in the following comment:

"When a garment of a new type establishes itself as an accepted style, the resulting fashion never consists in a slavish reproduction of this one original pattern. What takes place is the appearance of a kaleidoscopic variety of individualized garments, all differing in detail but similar in certain points prescribed by the style. Out of these differences or through an extraneous suggestion, there soon arises the outline of a new style which in its turn asserts itself, leading to a similar differentiation. Now, the large variety of individualized garments which fall between one style and the next could readily be conceived as actually intervening stages, constituting a chronological series of steps. But this interpretation would evidently be erroneous, for the variations in question are practically synchronous and must be regarded as expressions of individual taste and creative ingenuity, displaying themselves within the limits of an accepted style."⁹

The alterations in dress and ornamentation, in vehicle design, in song and dance, are often not utilitarian. Yet, as a rule, when we are pressed for a reason for our behavior, we follow custom once more and fall back on contemporary rationalizations. Thus in 1925 the women in a class in social psychology assured the author that bobbed hair and short skirts had come to stay once and for all. They were "so convenient, so sensible, that women would never give them up." Five years later more than 30 per cent of the women in another social psychology class were wearing their hair long. Yet of the sixty women—juniors and seniors—all but one had at one time or another bobbed their hair. In the early 1940's longer hair was accepted. In the fifteen years between 1925 and 1940 skirts were lengthened and again shortened. Utility is not the basis of fashion. Certain fashionable things may become utilitarian and stable, but fashion itself does not rest on usefulness. It is essentially irrational.

The influence of fashion on behavior and attitude is such as to make almost anything, once accepted, seem appropriate or beautiful, no matter how hideous it may appear when not in vogue. Hoopskirts, bustles, and leg-of-mutton sleeves were once considered charming and appropriate; and, though we have not returned to the first of these, the other two reappeared in modified form in the early 1940's. Doubtless the present fashions will in time seem just as ridiculous and unbecoming as past fashions seem to us now.

In a study of fashion motivation Estelle Barr discovered that the desire to conform is the most important motive determining the time of buying women's clothes. Other important fashion motives are desire for comfort, awareness of the physical self, desire to be beautiful, desire to express "personality," and desire to appear distinctive. The wish to conceal physical

⁹ From A. Goldenweiser, *Early Civilization*, 1922, p. 172. By permission of F. S. Crofts & Co.

anomalies is also evident. Barr found that modesty is not a very important motive for resisting a new fashion. This is perhaps best shown by the popularity of the brassière bathing suit. Though the desire for economy is very widespread, as a motive in determining the time of buying a particular thing it is less important than the desire for conformity.¹⁰

Fashion holds us because it appeals emotionally to our fancy and to our sense of importance, and because it gives us social approval. Here is one of the paradoxes. While fashion aims at difference, it also aims at approval. It is approved because it is followed by others. Fashion, as E. A. Ross remarks, means a certain uniformity of practice. (It does not imply any uniformity in intellectual processes.) When too many follow a fashion, it decays, and a new one arises.

Georg Simmel, the German sociologist, analyzed this apparent paradox of individualization and social conformity, or, as he said, "socialization." Fashion satisfies man's desire for novelty, for differentiation, for individuality, and still, at the same time, it makes for social adaptation and uniformity of action:

"Two social tendencies are essential to the establishment of fashion, namely, the need of union on the one hand and the need of isolation on the other. Should one of these be absent, fashion will not be formed—its sway will abruptly end. . . .

"From the fact that fashion as such can never be generally in vogue, the individual derives the satisfaction of knowing that as adopted by him it still represents something special and striking, while at the same time he feels inwardly supported by a set of persons who are striving for the same thing, not as in the case of other social satisfactions, by a set actually doing the same thing." ¹¹

Thus fashion furnishes for the personality a nice balance between the desire for conformity, security, and social solidarity, and the desire for distinction, individuality, and differentiation. The whole sway of fashion is related to the disturbance of this ever-shifting balance of individualism and conformity.

Fashion, Desire for Change, and Ego-Expansion. Psychologically, fashion rests on our desire for change, for divergence, for being set apart from others. We grow bored with fashions long in use. Certain seasonal changes in clothes and decoration illustrate this. In the spring of the year we secure new clothes, redecorate our houses, and purchase a new car. We are on the lookout for new fads. How much of this desire for change is a purely psychological reaction to ennui, and how much of it is an outgrowth of the culture pattern of fashion, it is difficult to say. At any rate, an alteration in fashion may offer us an opportunity to compensate for "disappointment

¹⁰ Estelle de Young Barr, "A Psychological Analysis of Fashion Motivations," *Archives of Psychology*, 1934, No. 171.

¹¹ G. Simmel, "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, 1904-1905, 10: 137, 140.

with achievements," as P. H. Nystrom remarks.¹² As Hurlock puts it, "one of the chief values of clothing is that it enables people to advertise themselves in a way that will win the attention and admiration of others. Many who lack any ability and could not hope to rise above the 'average' on their merits alone, find a satisfactory outlet for this desire for recognition through the medium of dress."¹³ A young woman once remarked that, whenever she felt "blue" or disappointed, purchasing a new pair of shoes quite restored her to good humor. A change in clothes may stimulate a revival of self-feeling.

This desire for change is related to our egoistic wishes for social approval. It is probably rooted in our childhood habits of exhibitionism, of showing off, of dressing up and being distinct in costume and manner in order to gain the attention of others. However, as a phase of culture, fashion is a social ritual related to mobility, to specialization, and to the rise of modern secondary groups. As we noted above, where status is fixed in the mores, where groups are isolated and codes or manners are inflexible, fashion in our sense hardly exists; the things which change—phrases, songs, decorations, clothes, modes of travel—do so imperceptibly. Change of fashion is rapid and conspicuous. We have constructed a folkway out of change rather than out of stability. It is in the folkways to be up with the fashions of our group, no matter how quickly they may be altered. Whatever exhibitionism may result from our early personal-social conditioning becomes more firmly fixed as we grow up and discover that there is a convention of fashion and that to be in fashion is to be noticed by others. In other words, early personal-social conditioning becomes integrated with cultural conditioning.

The extreme result of this desire for new experience and for recognition is seen in fads and crazes. In a world marked by anonymity and often by lack of a large, group-centered goal, where publicity is one way of gaining attention and of rising above the masses, bizarre fads seem to be important. Though some may consider them evidence of emotional instability, they bespeak a deep human need for novelty, recognition, and attention.

Our desire to be divergent, to gain attention, leads to emulation by others, who look upon us as prestige-bearers, as persons to be followed. They unconsciously or consciously identify themselves with us as leaders. Emulation, therefore, aids the spread of fashion. Leadership in fashion has been institutionalized by the manufacturers of dress goods, automobiles, and other articles of fashion. People follow the lead of Poiret, of the merchants on Bond Street, or of the fashionable designers of automobiles or houses.

Fashion may also be a means of compensating for our sense of inferiority.

¹² See P. H. Nystrom, *Economics of Fashion*, 1928.

¹³ Hurlock, *op. cit.*, pp. 27-28. By permission of the Ronald Press, publishers.

When we dress in the latest fashions, we are marked as one of the elite. The *nouveau riche* always attempts to keep up with styles in consumption goods. Georg Simmel remarked:

"From all this we see that fashion furnishes an ideal field for individuals of dependent natures, whose self-consciousness, however, requires a certain amount of prominence, attention, and singularity. Fashion raises even the unimportant individual by making him the representative of a class, the embodiment of a joint spirit."¹⁴

The young immigrant often adopts current fads in dress and manner in order to overcome his sense of insufficiency. In the same way the ordinary working man or woman may attempt to dress in fashionable clothes in order to obtain the feeling of superiority which goes with being in style.

"The housewife who does her own housework dresses in an apron or a house dress for the purpose, and as long as she is dressed in this manner and is doing the routine work of the home, it is likely that she feels as if she were something of a drudge. If after completing her work she makes a change to an afternoon dress or street garment, the change makes a lady out of her. . . . Something of the same thing takes place when factory workers don their street clothes after emerging from the factory at the close of the working day. In their factory clothing they are workers. In their street clothes they are ladies and gentlemen, and in their minds comparable in every way with ladies and gentlemen of any grade or classification."¹⁵

Many students of social behavior have maintained that women's intense interest in fashion is clearly a case of compensation for their sense of inferiority in this world of men. In an earlier day they found compensation in dress and ornamentation to attract men, on the one hand, and to set themselves off from men, on the other. Today the tendency for women's styles to ape those of men is possibly the result of the changing position of women in business, politics, and the professions. Our contemporary ideology of the equality of the sexes is doubtless influencing the direction of fashion. Women attempt to prove their equality with men by adopting the manners, dress, and habits of men.

Where there is a definite leisure class, women reveal the family's economic status through their dress and other conventions. As masculine clothing has become more and more conventionalized, it has lost the ability to display the pecuniary status of the wearer. Feminine clothing has consequently come to assume this function. For that reason many men encourage the women of their families to outdress other women. Indirectly, the financial status of the man is displayed in this way. Satisfaction which has been denied him by his own simple dress is thus attained when his women have unnecessarily large wardrobes. We can hardly doubt that our desire to expand our ego, to identify ourselves with activities which give

¹⁴ G. Simmel, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

¹⁵ Nystrom, *op. cit.*, p. 79. By permission of the Ronald Press, publishers.

social distinction, is a powerful factor in promoting fashion and changes in fashion.

Fashion and Sex Attraction. From time to time writers have discussed the possible relations between personal adornment and sexual selection. It is easy to draw analogies between the secondary sexual decoration of animals and the self-adornment of human beings, but the analogies are really far-fetched. We need not go into the origin of dress and personal ornamentation except to say that, though dress doubtless had utilitarian values in the colder climates, both dress and personal adornment were advanced by man's wish for self-expression and by his desire to gain the attention of others. In many earlier societies the dress of men was much more decorative than it is now. We can hardly decide whether this was due to a desire to please women or to convey an impression of leisure-class power. The more practical and businesslike dress of contemporary men seems sufficiently attractive to women, nor do short skirts, bobbed hair, rouged faces, and cigarette-smoking seem to make women less attractive to men than they were in the days of Richardson's *Pamela*.

Although dress and personal decoration may be based on a desire to exert sexual attraction, the content of fashion seems dependent on other than purely sexual desires. Whatever is accepted as in current fashion will be thought attractive by the other sex. At the outset men may oppose stockingless legs for their women, but, once these are accepted, the women who do not wear stockings may be more attractive simply because they have the distinction of being in fashion. Likewise, if Western women should adopt the trouser skirt, it would not be long before women *not* dressed in such a costume would be considered out of fashion.

FASHION AND GROUP BEHAVIOR

In matters of fashion we readily modify our rationalizations. For the purposes of sexual attraction one style is as good as another. Whatever is moving toward universal acceptance at the moment is correct. As soon as it becomes nearly universal, however, it is no longer in the height of fashion.

"The very character of fashion demands that it should be exercised at one time only by a portion of the given group, the great majority being merely on the road to adopting it. As soon as an example has been universally adopted, that is, as soon as anything that was originally done only by a few has really come to be practiced by all—as is the case in certain portions of our apparel and in various forms of social conduct—we no longer speak of fashion. As fashion spreads, it gradually goes to its doom."¹⁶

As Robert E. Park once remarked, "Some of us fall behind the fashion, but no one ever gets ahead of it." Once fashions reach a saturation point,

¹⁶ G. Simmel, *op. cit.*, pp. 137-138.

they decay. As fashion spreads downward, from one social class to a lower class, the leaders begin to change their fashions. This shift in modern fashion is perhaps its outstanding characteristic. It seems an intimate part of our touch-and-go civilization, where nothing appears to be permanent. For most of us, rather than detracting from its interest, this transitory nature of fashion adds to its piquancy and zest.

Influence of the Elite on Fashion. In his inimitable book *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, Thorstein Veblen pointed out the influence of the upper classes on standards of fashion. "Conspicuous consumption" and "conspicuous leisure" are two of the marks of class distinction, especially in a capitalistic society like ours. We can hardly doubt that the upper bourgeois classes have played the largest role in establishing the folkway of frequent changes in fashion. The leadership of these classes and social control through fashion go hand in hand. Reputability is essential to the adoption of a fad or fashion. The prestige-bearers have a distinct place in determining the direction of changes in fashion.

The basic historical factors which account for the frequency of changes in fashion are the Industrial Revolution and the rise of political democracy. The open-class system fosters change, for the desire to rise in social status is a powerful motive for trying to be in style. Today fashions and fads spread very rapidly through all classes of our population. In fact, such diffusion bridges the gap between the classes. With cheap duplication easy, expensive luxuries filter down quickly. At the bottom of the gradation of luxury objects we have the ten-cent chain stores. These institutions afford for the poorer classes the illusion of luxury without the expense. It is an amazingly interesting study in social psychology to see what a prominent place these stores have in the diffusion of objects of fashion.

An interesting example of the downward seepage of fashion was the ready acceptance of the wedding gown of the Duchess of Windsor in 1937.

"On May 26 [a] sketch with the heading 'Wedding Ensemble of Mrs. Wallis Warfield' and detailed description of cut and material appeared in *Women's Wear*, trade paper of the women's apparel industry. On June 3, radiophotos of the Duchess of Windsor in her \$250.00 Mainbocher wedding gown appeared in many U.S. newspapers. On June 13, Bonwit Teller, swank shop on Fifth Avenue, New York, advertised 'this moment's European sensation . . . seen . . . in cabled photographs from the Chateau Cande. . . .' It was a short-sleeved, short-skirted, printed-silk version of the Duchess' wedding dress. Price: \$25. In early July, Lord and Taylor, farther south on Fifth Avenue, had a version of the 'Wally' dress in its window. Price: \$16.95. A week later thrifty shoppers found racks full of the 'Wally' dress at Klein's cash-and-carry store at 14th Street, New York. Price: \$8.90." ¹⁷

¹⁷ "The Descent of the Wally Dress," *Life Magazine*, August 9, 1937, pp. 57-58. By permission of the publishers.

The very speed of the downward movement of fashion has its effect on the plutocratic pace-setters. When every housemaid, shop girl, and stenographer acquires cheap imitations of expensive objects, the wealthy leaders feel an intensified desire once more to be divergent. However satisfactory our awareness of the financial and class difference between a piece of glass and a genuine diamond may be, for the practical purpose of impressing other people glass may be as good as diamonds. From across a street we may find it hard to discriminate between the trimming on a hat which appears at the servants' door and that worn by the lady who steps out the front door into her waiting limousine. As soon as the lower classes begin to adopt fashions, the upper classes move on to others.

Occasionally the elite borrow certain fashions from the lower strata of society. They may romanticize milkmaids, as at the prerevolutionary French court. They may adopt the turban of African troops, as in nineteenth-century France. They may, partly as fad and partly for utility, adapt the overalls and coveralls of the laboring classes for beach wear, gardening, or hiking.

Fads and fashions are not confined to material things. Smart phrases, jokes, popular songs, and dances are spread through the general population by newspapers and magazines, by the radio, vaudeville, the motion picture, and the spoken drama. Even advertising encourages the dissemination of such fads and fashions by associating them with sales suggestions.

Yet in all fashion change the elite plays an important role. In dress and personal adornment we have had an interesting series of such influences. For example, Lafayette's visit to America in 1823 had a great effect on the trends of fashion. His attire in the older French tradition helped maintain the conservative French influence in America for several years. Louis Kosuth, the Hungarian patriot, who visited this country in 1851, was everywhere enthusiastically received. He was largely responsible for the introduction into America of the soft felt or velours hat, which at the time was a part of the costume of the Hungarian nationalists. In 1860 Albert Edward, Prince of Wales, later King Edward VII, visited the United States. After his visit the Prince Albert coat was worn by American men, and it remained a part of our formal attire for a long time. Perhaps American men are less inclined today than they were formerly to be dominated by such foreign influences. The visit of the Prince of Wales in 1924 did not lead to any sharp changes in style, although there was an emphasis on certain plaids, snap-brim hats, and other apparel which he used. These were hardly innovations, however, for all these or similar things had been worn before he came. In 1923, after the excavations at the tomb of Tutankhamen, we had a craze for Egyptian patterns in dress goods and decorative designs. Various World's Fairs have had some effects on fashion changes, in dress and personal adornment and in architecture.

During 1939 and 1940, when the United States was "all out" for national defense, aid to Britain, and aid to China, and was trying to foster amicable relations with Latin America, military, Chinese, and South American influences were seen in fashions: Royer, a famous designer, contends that "the fashions of the last five years . . . have reflected a world obsessed with the jitters. The cocktail hats, the ludicrous veils, and the fantastic costume jewelry have expressed the turmoil in the world today."¹⁸

During World War II all sorts of links between military attire, fashion, and national patriotism were made. Mildred Adams, in 1939, soon after the outbreak of World War II, remarked:

"Over the last 150 years the trend has been unmistakable—the major wars have produced clothes that women could move about in, and the intervening peacetimes have swaddled them up again. The Civil War here and the Crimean War in Europe stripped women of ruffled crinolines and pantalettes and dressed them in practical linsey-woolsey. The French Revolution took them out of diadems and stomachers, out of padded paniers and tight stays, and put them into straight and simple gowns that required no lacing.

"Not all of this was accomplished during the war itself—some of the war's most important effects in this field as in others come to a climax after the fighting has ceased. It was not until the Directorate that those straight and simple gowns became so thin and so split that, to quote one historian, 'they exposed more of the female form to the public than has ever happened since the modern period.' And the war of 1914-1918 did not achieve its most spectacular effects until the nineteen-twenties."¹⁹

Today manufacturers and merchants are vitally interested in fashion changes. It has sometimes been said that dress-designers and manufacturers deliberately modify fashion. In the opinion of many, advertising is used to set the fashions. The matter is not so simple. The changes are largely imperceptible at first and not so consciously controlled as some believe. However, the close connection of business and fashion warrants our attention.

Business and Fashion. There is no doubt that we spend an enormous amount of money on fads and fashions. In 1926 Stuart Chase estimated, on the basis of tax returns, that in 1919 the people of the United States spent nearly twenty-three billion dollars for what he called luxuries. This sum was a third of the entire purchasing power of the population. We spent three quarters of a billion for perfumes and cosmetics, five billion for luxuries in foods, six hundred million for soft drinks and ice cream, a billion for candy, three billion for resorts, races, and joy rides. At best these are very rough

¹⁸ Quoted by Mildred Adams, "Mars also Couturier," *New York Times Magazine*, October 22, 1939, p. 12.

¹⁹ *Ibid.* By permission of the author and publisher.

estimates.²⁰ In 1938, Elizabeth Hawes estimated, Americans spent more than two and a half billion dollars on fashion items proper.²¹

The makers of fashion goods have developed an elaborate technique of creating public interest in their wares. They strive desperately to go with the currents of public fads. Manufacturers and distributors have attempted to inaugurate fashion crazes, but they are rarely successful. The consensus seems to be that fads and crazes arise spontaneously and spread rapidly, and that predicting their rise and diffusion is extremely difficult and financially risky. Extremes in fashion appear to be a phase of our rapidly changing life, of our superficial social contacts. To foist them on people seems social folly; yet manufacturers naturally attempt to trade on the trends in fashion and to stimulate our desire to "be in the swim." Modern advertisers have exploited every principle of the psychology of suggestion and persuasion in order to foster fashion change. Appeals to snobbery, to the desire to "keep up with the Joneses," to the spirit of adventure, to the observance of social conventions—these and others are used when time and place seem suitable. These frank appeals are based on sound psychology. They are deliberate methods of putting into practice the principles of social control. The clever advertising manager simply applies his knowledge of the basic facts of human behavior.

Parisian designers of women's clothing were long the leaders not only in France and on the Continent but in this country as well. We developed a definite mental set toward Paris styles. "Made in Paris" was a stereotype of great sales value. Leaders of fashion the world over patronized various French designers. Worth, Poiret, Paquin, Lucille, Lelong, Redfern, Patou, and Chanel were for years names to conjure with in the world of fashionable dress. The distribution of styles through periodicals and newspapers reaches millions of persons who are far removed from the dominant fashion group.

As instability is one of the dominant characteristics of fashion, the designer, the manufacturer, and the merchant are all confronted with serious economic risks. Fashions in dress and decoration often change overnight. The manufacture of dress goods and decorative materials involves tremendous risks because fashions are so capricious and unpredictable. Manufacturers must try to estimate the trends and then, by speeding up production, to exploit them while they still prevail.

Some manufacturers often wish to keep fashions stable—in their own economic interests, of course. Years ago the corsetmakers tried to stop the changes in fashion which produced the corsetless woman. Manufacturers of hairpins were greatly distressed by the bobbed-hair fad (which gave the

²⁰ See Chase, *Tragedy of Waste*, 1926.

²¹ E. Hawes, *Fashion Is Spinach*, 1938, p. 6.

barbers a great increase in work). In the spring of 1925 one trade paper reported a drive by the members of the trade against the felt hat for women: felt hats wear too long. But it is doubtful if the economic interests can create fashion or prevent changes. Almost every concerted effort to do so has been quite futile.

The deeper motives of fashion change are the desires to combine conformity with individuality (fixity and flexibility) in new ways, to relieve boredom by new experience, and to find symbols of difference and prestige. It would be foolish to deny that advertisers and modern salesmanship affect the cycle of fashion, but their appeals must reach the underlying psychological motives. Our standardization of life, our stress on impersonality, anonymity, speed, and change, have made our personalities susceptible to prestige, to the sense of superiority, to opportunities of escaping from the mass, and to demands for still further change.

Fashion and Morality. In our Christian society the dominant churches have made numerous efforts to control the direction of fashion, especially of fashion in things considered sacred or taboo. From the fourteenth century on, laws against indecent clothes have appeared periodically. In the religious enthusiasm of the Reformation and Counterreformation efforts were made to control personal apparel and ornamentation. The clergy and moralists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, when women began to uncover the neck and bosom, denounced what they considered indecent dress. The Puritans, the Quakers, and some other sects tried to stipulate dress and prevent the exposure of a woman's body or the use of any personal adornment. Outside certain narrow circles the mores rejected these demands as excessively severe. Ultimately the mores always control fashion.

Whether exposure of the neck and bosom, at one time, and of the legs and arms, at another, contributes to immorality seems always to provoke debate. In our own day certain preachers have repeatedly inveighed against fashion changes. During the 1920's various municipal ordinances and local mores attempted to prevent the wearing of scanty bathing suits by women. Some American communities forbade young women to appear on the streets without stockings—a fad which was permitted elsewhere. But in Japan and Russia people are not morally offended by seeing naked men and women bathe together. Women's smoking may not seem immoral to us, but it certainly would have seemed so two generations ago. As in many other fields, the breakdown of the old folkways and mores is evident in dress. Except in isolated areas where present-day animation and modern living have not become common, conventions in clothes and ornamentation seem to be escaping more and more from the older moral standards. What is considered proper and right in the folkways of fashion is generally accepted. W. G. Sumner's statement that "whatever is, is right" applies to fashion as to everything else in the folkways and mores.

Fashion and Utility. Occasionally the rationalists among us attempt to institute reforms of dress. They may affect certain minorities, but the agitation of dress-reform leagues has never been successful. The reason is not difficult to find. Fashion makes irrational appeals. Its strength lies in the feelings and emotions, not in intellectual considerations. Hoop skirts in the 1870's, waist-pinching and bustles in the 1890's, leg-of-mutton sleeves in one day and tight sleeves or none at all in another, long skirts yesterday and short ones today—all indicate the illogic of appeal. In fashion—as in prejudice, crowd behavior, public opinion, and most social attitudes and activities—men and women are illogical and impulsive rather than rational. In the days of narrow sedan chairs women wore wide-spreading paniers. Fantasy thinking, not logic, dominates much of fashion. In the days of crowded stagecoaches women wore crinolines. The hobble skirt did not make for ease in getting in and out of streetcars or automobiles. The irrationality of change is illustrated in this little story by Paul Poiret, written in 1928:

"Even stranger still is the history of the short skirt. I have been to America three times. My first visit was in 1912. As you know, they began to wear short skirts in 1913. I brought with me a film which showed the parade of my models in my gardens in Paris. Naturally, all of them wore short skirts—skirts shorter than those ordinarily worn, but much less short than those worn today. I had planned to interest my American public in this new fashion, but the film was refused by the censors and was not passed by the customs officers. It was refused as obscene, because one could not see ladies parading with uncovered legs. It is hardly believable today. What must that customs officer think, if he were alive now, when he sees all women walking along the streets with their skirts to their knees? But he must already be dead from mortification!"²²

There are, of course, some utilitarian tendencies in certain features of dress and personal decoration. As upper- and middle-class men more and more pursue lives of activity rather than of leisure, there are not the frequent fundamental changes in costume that we see in earlier historical periods. Thus the pantaloons, made common in the French revolutionary period, has been taken over by most classes except on occasions of ceremony in Europe and of amusement in our country. Perhaps women in industry and business may insist upon retaining some of the practical advantages of the short skirt, bobbed hair, and the more masculine manner. At least such fashions may change more slowly than those which involve our leisure time and the frills of polite social intercourse. With the whole modern tendency to rapid change, fashion is overstepping more and more the bounds of its original domain of personal externals, and is acquiring, as Simmel remarks, "an increasing influence over taste, over theoretical convictions and even over the moral foundations of life." As the rationale of the capitalistic social-economic order comes to affect the life organization of men and women,

²² Poiret, *op. cit.*, pp. 191-192. By permission as above stated.

certain things that were formerly in fashion may become more stable parts of the permanent folkways, and other things may increasingly become aspects of fashion. But it seems unlikely that fashions and fads will disappear, unless the Universal Robots of Čapek come into being and standardize life. Such a profound change would imply equally profound modifications in the biological character of human beings as well as in the present direction of civilization.

SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

For sound social-cultural orientation, see Edward Sapir, "Fashion," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, 1931, 6: 139-144; Georg Simmel, "Fashion," *International Quarterly*, 1904-1905, 10: 130-155; and Thorstein Veblen, *The Theory of the Leisure Class*, 1899, chaps. 3, 4, 7.

On the psychology of fashion, especially in clothes, see Estelle de Young Barr, "A Psychological Analysis of Fashion Motivation," *Archives of Psychology*, 1934, No. 171; J. C. Flügel, *The Psychology of Clothes*, 1930; and Elizabeth B. Hurlock, *The Psychology of Dress*, 1929.

The economics of fashion change is discussed by Paul H. Nystrom, *The Economics of Fashion*, 1928.